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2ABSTRACT
After an informal relationship between the Indians of the
Mosquito Shore and the governor and merchants of Jamaica that had
lasted for nearly a hundred years, Robert Hodgson was sent to the
Shore in 1740 to organise the scattered English settlers and Indians
for military campaigns on the Spanish Main during the War of Jenkins'
Ear. When the war ended, the Board of Trade established a superintendency
on the Shore naming Hodgson as superintendent. His government (1749-1759)
was punctuated by disputes between the Mosquitos, Shoremen and Spanish
which nearly erupted into a new war.
The second superintendent, Richard Jones, was replaced at the
outbreak of Anglo-Spanish hostilities in 1762 by Captain Joseph Otway,
when it was felt that a field officer was needed on the Shore. However,
the war soon ended and the Mosquito Shore during Otway's superintendency
(1762-1767) experienced peace, growth and prosperity.
At Otway's death in 1767, Robert Hodgson, son of the first
superintendent, was named to the office. His superintendency soon
deteriorated into a series of bitter feuds with the settlers and the
governors of Jamaica. In 1775 Hodgson's enemies persuaded Lord George
Germain to replace him with his worst adversary, James Lawrie. Lawrie
was superintendent until the evacuation of the Shore in 1787, avoiding
3all attempts by Hodgson to force his removal from office.
During Lawrie's superintendency (1776-1787) the Shore was used
as a base for military operations in the Anglo-Spanish conflict of
1779-1783, and then as a refuge for American loyalists. Succumbing
to constant pressure by the Spanish, England abandoned the Mosquito
Shore in 1786 at the signing of the Mosquito Convention. The evacuation
of British settlers was terminated in June 1787, and Spanish settlements
were formed on the Shore immediately thereafter.
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9Chapter I
INCURSIONS, MERCHANTS and MAROONERS:
Guerrilla Warfare and Clandestine Trade on the Spanish
Main during the War of Jenkins' Ear, 1738 - 1744.1
Seizures of English merchant vessels and contraband trade on the
Spanish Main, the two major issues that split the English and Spanish
crowns early in the eighteenth century, in 1739 led to the conflict
known as the War of Jenkins' Ear. 2
 War suited the purpose and temperament
of each nation. England was determined to protect and encourage her
commercial interests, while Spain was anxious to preserve her official
trade monopoly.3
Mere suspicion of clandestine trading activities was sufficient
1 Captain Robert Jenkins lost his ear to the commander of a Spanish guardacosta
in 1731. The case was forgotten until 1738 when it was revived and became
one of the culminating causes of the war, just as Jenkins' patriotic cry
"I committed my soul to God, and my cause to my country" became England's
wartime rallying call. DNB, xxix, 306.
2There were other important issues that helped to provoke the conflict; the
asiento trade and the dispute over Georgia, for example, but they remain
outside the range of this paper. For studies on the causes of the war see:
H.W.V. Temperley, "The Causes of the War of Jenkins' Ear, 1739", Royal
Historical Society Transactions (third series, London, 1089), iii, 197-237;
Ernest G. Hildner, "The Role of the South Sea Company in the Diplomacy
Leading to the War of Jenkins' Ear, 1729 - 1739", HAHR, xviii (1938), pp.
320-341; Richard Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies (Oxford, 1936),
pp. 29-64.
5Benjamin Keene, British minister plenipotentiary in Madrid, was aware of
Spain's willingness to fight. In June 1739 he wrote: "...in my private
Opinion I thought these people had taken a kind of Pleasure to throw
Affairs out of all Hopes of Remedy...." Keene to Newcastle, 29 June 1739,
SP 94/133.
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ground for the seizure of English merchantmen--no matter the composition
of the cargo or location and destination of the vessel. 4 "Acts of
aggression" against peaceful British traders, whose commerce in the Bay
of Honduras was felt by many to be authorised by the "American" treaty
(1670), and by the Treaty of Utrecht (1713), hindered the growth of
British trade and settlement on the logwood coast of Yucatan
5
 and on
the "Island of Mosquito", 6 where British marooners settled among the
irreduced and independent Zambos Mosquitos Indians° had begun to open
a profitable trade throughout the provinces of the kingdom of Guatemala.
Spain's major concern in the West Indies was focalised in the Bay
of Honduras. The English court must surely be aware, wrote oneSpanish
minister, of the excesses committed by the British in their usurpations
4See Basil Williams, Carteret and Newcastle (Cambridge, 1943), p. 111.
'Vera Lee Brown, "Contraband Trade: a Factor in the Decline of Spain's
EMpire in America", HAHR, viii (1928), p. 184. Logwood cutting had
long been notorious on the rivers Belize and Nuevo on the Yucatan
peninsula, a region today known as British Honduras. Throughout the
eighteenth century Spain grudgingly accepted in her own councils the
English right to cut logwood. See Observations on Spanish interests,
c. 1762, AGS, Est 8162. The hostile and unproductive country made
trade almost impossible with the interior, consequently little Spanish
gold, silver or other products of her colonies could filter out. But
Spain never relinquished her claim to the region, and occasionally tried
to eject the logwood cutters.
6The most common Spanish name for the Mosquito Shore from the latter half
of the seventeenth century until C. 1739 was "Isla de Mosquitos".
7"Marooner" was a term used to describe the undisciplined and often lawless
white settlers on the Mosquito Shore. After about 1749 they were popularly
known as Shoremen: the logwood-cutters of Belize as Baymen.
8The Zambos Mosquitos were comprised of two major racial strains: pure
blooded Indians and Zambos, the latter a mixture of Negro and Indian blood.
However the two groups were culturally and linguistically one.
9Merchants of Kingston to Vernon, 21 January 1739, SP 42/85, f. 119.
9
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of Spanish territory on the coasts of Guatemala and YucStan. 10 The
Spanish could have pointed to more serious outrages by the British and
their Mosquito allies. Incursions, robberies, burnings and kidnappings
had continued unabated since at least as early as 1699. 11 Governor
Francisco Carrandi y MenSn of Costa Rica wrote in 1738: "It is a
disgrace how the cold blooded Zambos, servants and assassins for the
English and Dutch, bother the 400 leagues of coastline of the kingdom
from Portovelo to Campeche." 12 Losses to the contrabandista were a
nuisance but they were harder to measure than the precious metals and
cattle stolen, lives lost, and people carried into slavery. 13
In May 1738, the Mosquitos attacked the town of Catacamas near
Comayagua, burning altar pieces in the church and taking fifty-nine
prisoners. 14 As a result of that raid, of the many that had preceded it,
and of the fear of more to follow, extensive defensive preparations were
10Quadra to Keene, 15/26 May 1738, SP 94/247 f. 201.
11
The first well documented Mosquito raid on a Spanish community occurred
on 17 August 1699. Betancourt to Berrera, 17 August 1699, Guat 299.
12
Report by Francisco Antonio de Carrandi y MenSn, 20 August 1738, LCRC,
p. 65.
13Governor Haya of Costa Rica reported that 2,000 people were kidnapped
from Matina and Talamanca between 1710 and 1722 by the Zambos Mosquitos
and sold to traders from Jamaica. Virginia Rosslyn, ed., "Arguments of
Costa Rica Before the Arbitrator Hon. Edward Douglas White", Costa Rica-
Panama Arbitration (Washington, 1913), p. 2. The Spanish ambassador
in London in 1734, the Conde de Montijo, accused the English in Jamaica
of instigating Mosquito incursions and protecting the raiders in exchange
for the slaves furnished by the Indians. They had even carried off an
entire Indian nation from the province of Campeche. Memorial from the
Conde de Montijo, 28 October/8 November 1734, CO 324/36, f. 490.
14Zelaya to Parga, 28 May 1738, Guat 303; Rivera to Philip V, 1 September
1738, DRN, no page reference.
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carried out in the kingdom. A junta de guerra in Comayagua suggested
that the militia could offer better resistance to the enemy if rifles
and ammunition were distributed to the militiamen, 15
 while in Yucatan,
detachments of men were kept at forts in Bacalar and Campeche because
of the fear of the Baymen and their Mosquito allies. 16
 Because of the
threat to Cartago, the capital of Costa Rica, and the danger of losing
the rich valley of Matina (where production of cacao had already been
considerably reduced by Mosquito incursions), Carrandi y Men4n wanted
to attack the enemy, but the royal treasury had been depleted by
maintaining lookouts against the Mosquitos at the mouths of the rivers
Matina, Mon, Suerre and Raventazon. 17
 Although the loss of Indian
tribute because of epidemics and "Indian sterility" had caused a distressing
shortage of funds in the kingdom, the president of the audiencia of
Guatemala, Pedro de Ribera, was forced to raise two companies of soldiers
for defence against the Zambos Mosquitos. The "miserable inhabitants"
of Guatemala, who were "weary of the oppression and fear engendered by
the tyranny" of the Mosquito Indians, longed for relief. Ribera predicted
that unless the Mosquitos were exterminated, their increasing numbers
and territorial expansion would soon make them "inextingui6hable". 18
Most infuriating to the Spanish court was word that King Edward
15Parga to the teniente of Olancho, 9 June 1758, Guat 303.
16From Manuel de Saliendo, 2 July 1738, Mex 892.
17Testimony by Francisco Antonio de Carrandi y Monk', 5 April 1738,
CDHCR, ix, 305; Carrandi y Menstn to Villalon, 10 April 1738, ibid.,
T-2E1; Report by Carrandi y Men4n, 20 August 1738, LCRC, p. 637—
18Ribera to Philip V, 10 September 1738, Guat 303.
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of the Mosquitos had had the arrogance to propose a treaty of peace
and commerce with the Spanish. The fiscal called the attempt "ridiculous
and despicable", adding that Spain must put a stop to "the outrages and
insults that (the Mosquitos] commit, protected by the English who live
in Virginia and in Jamaica,." On 8 July 1739, the Consejo de las Indias
expressed its outrage at the "audacity of the Mosquitos in naming a King
and pretending that Your Majesty would recognize him as such in a treaty
of peace and commerce." Furthermore, "Such unspeakable and insolent
effrontery was not born in them alone"; the Indians were "allied and
addicted" to the English, creating a grave problem that demanded "an
immediate and radical remedy". The Consejo admitted that the British
settlers on the Mosquito Coast might be outlaws rather than representatives
of the English government, but "How many islands of America does the
crown now lack because in the beginning their occupation was only by
outlaws and pirates?" To encourage the settlement of the Honduras coast,
which was "deserted for fear of the frequent enemy invasions", and to
stimulate trade between Campeche and Havana, which had been "entirely
suspended" because of the English and Mosquitos, the Consejo recommended
that forts be constructed in Truxillo and Matina. An offensive should
be conducted against the enemy, with President Ribera in command of the
operations and the viceroy of M4xico responsible for constructing the
necessary vessels. Finally, the Conse'o suggested that Spain's envoy
in London should avoid representing Spanish complaints to the English
court. Their pleas would be ignored, or if the two nations became
14
"declared enemies, which can happen", England would probably take
advantage of the Englishmen living on the Spanish Main by promoting
acts of aggression against Spanish communities. 19 Consequently, demands
made at that time, that she relinquish all settlements made in Spanish
territory since the Treaty of 1670 ignored the Mosquito Shore and Belize.
Yet minor settlements--the islands of Providence, St. Catherine, Port
Royal, St. Andrew, the "Fat Virgins alias Panistron", and the Turtle
Islands--were listed by name. 20 Nevertheless, the renewed "claims to
universal sovereignty in America", 21 although weakened by the omission
of the Bay settlements, helped to speed on the approaching war. Efforts
were still made by both sides to solve the existing problems--but
stubbornly, on harsh terms unacceptable to the other side. Anglo-Spanish
discussions in London were primarily on the reparations demanded by
England for unjust seizures of English merchantmen. 22 In Madrid the
two main issues discussed were Georgia and logwood, 23 although Keene
was unaware that logwood had become subordinate in Spanish thinking to
the problem of the Mosquito Indians, their friendship with the English,
and the consequent invasions and clandestine trade in middle America.
19
Report on the Mosquito Coast, anon., 8 December 1775, AGS, Est 8133,
folder 8a; Edward to Ribera, 20 September 1736, Guat 665; Fiscal's
opinion, 22 May 1739; Consejo report, 8 July 1739, CRM, p.77—
20Spanish memorial to Benjamin Keene, 25 June 1739NS, SP 94433.
21 P*res,	 P. 36.
22Jean 0. McLachlan, Trade and Peace with Old Spain, 1667 - 1750
(Cambridge, 1940), p. 119.
23Keene and Castres to Newcastle, 243 January 1739, SP 94433.
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Spain was reluctantly willing to supply England with logwood, but she
could not condone the Anglo-Mosquito relationship or allow British
merchandise to enter her colonies--no more than England could allow
Buardacostas to molest British merchantmen.
On 19 July 1739, a directive was issued to all English naval
commanders in the West Indies ordering them to "commit all Sorts of
Hostilities against the Spaniards". 24
 The order was the result of
Spain's refusal to pay £95,000 in reparations to which she had agreed,
for the continued activity of the guardacostas, and because of the boundary
problem over Carolina and Florida. 25 A fortnight later, Benjamin Keene
was informed of King George II's decision to open hostilities and
ordered to return home; 26
 on 20 August, the English issued a declaration
of reprisals against Spain. 27 Ten days later, King Philip V took the
Consejo's advice and ordered that immediate operations be undertaken "to
dislodge and exterminate these Indians (the Mosquitos .] and the English
and other foreigners who sustain them." 28
Each nation was aware that an undeclared state of war existed. 29
At Whitehall, Andrew Stone, an "intimate confidant" of Newcastle, 30
24Ministerial minutes, 8 and 15 June 1739, SP 94/248, f. 88.
25Newcastle to Keene, 14 June 1739, SP 94/134.
26Newcastle to Keene, 3 August 1739, SP 94/134.
27
TCD, p. 345.
28 Ilip V to Ribera, 30 August 1739, Guat 391; Quintana to Ribera,
1 October 1739, Guat 303.
29Real orden, 15 October 1739, CC 5104; Quintana to Ribera, 1 October 1739,duat ,u5.
3°Stone, a "joint collector of papers" in Newcastle's office, was in fact
Newcastle's close friend and personal secretary, and as such he had
considerable influence in government. DNB, li, 405.
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suggested that war be declared openly, to prove England's resoluteness,
and to retaliate against the seizures and the "violent Proceedings of
the Court of Spain, in ordering all The King's Subjects to leave the
Spanish Dominions...."31
 England declared war on 19 October 1739;
Spain followed a month later.32
The Mosquito Shore was an important periphery consideration in
British military planning throughout the war; use of the Mosquito Indians
was considered on each of the abortive English invasions of the Spanish
Main during the conflict. The Shore afforded an impregnable base of
operations and a supply of aggressive Indian allies. In spite of these
advantages, schemes involving the Mosquitos were seldom rationally planned
or executed. The Indians were scheduled to participate in the invasion
of Panamirt in 1742, but the campaign was so poorly coordinated that it
began, and failed, before the Mosquitos reached the rendezvous.
Nevertheless, the English inflicted more damage on the Spanish during
the war in guerrilla fighting conducted from the Shore than in all other
campaigns combined. 33
Even before the war, Governor Edward Trelawny of Jamaica had decided
to establish a semi-military government on the Mosquito Shore, a country
that would be a valuable commercial entrepOt and a "place of refreshment"
for the Baymen driven from Belize by the Spanish or by the rains.
31Stone to Waldegrave, 4 October 1739, BM, Add 32,801, f. 290.
32Mary Wilhelmine Williams, Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, 1815 - 1915
(Washington, 1916), p. 17; TCD, p. 345.
33George Metcalf, Royal Government and Political Conflict in Jamaica, 1729
- 1783 (London, 1965), p. 74.
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Furthermore, English civilisation and religion would replace the bad
habits borrowed from English pirates and marooners by the savages.
Trelawny, who wanted King Edward to sit as president of an Indian council
of chiefs, took a personal interest in these reforms, requesting the Society
for the Propagation of the Gospel to send a schoolmaster to teach the young
Mosquitos, and inducing four Kingston merchants each to take a Mosquito
youth as an apprentice. He even took one Mosquito boy into his own home.
Admiral Vernon was also attracted to the idea. Educating the Mosquitos,
he wrote, would be a practical way to "render them most usefull to the
enlargement of our Trade in these parts...." 	 seemed certain that
the Indians would respond enthusiastically to the scheme, for their loyalty
to England was unquestioned. Mosquito chiefs still applied to Jamaica
for their commissions as had their predecessors since 1687. 35
34Trelawny to Newcastle, 25 November 1738 and 20 January 1740, CO 137/56,
ff. 156, 279; Vernon to Trelawny, 18 September 1742, CO 137/57, f. 293;
Trelawny to Vernon, 21 Seitember 1742, CO 137/57, f. 293; C.F.Pascoe,
Two Hundred Years of the S.P.G., 1701-1900 (London, 1901), P . 234;
Williams, Isthmian Diplom cy, p. 16.
The Duke of Albemarle, governor of Jamaica, reported in 1688 that the
Mosquito Indians had visited him in Jamaica to request the protection of th
English government. He wrotei "Some Indians by the name of Musketa-Indians
(whose Country is calld Cape Gratias de Dios, situated 15°20' or there-
abouts) have been here with mee, have told mee they became subjects to King
Charls the First of ever blessed memory, that they were never in subjection
to the Spaniard or any other but the English. And that they did now
earnestly desire, that the King would please to give them his speedy
protection, otherwise they must fall under the French or Dutch." See
Albemarle to the Board of Trade, 11 February 1688, co 138/6, f. 85. In
1718 a Dutch visitor to the Shore said that the leaders of the settlers
there were Englishmen, and that the Indian chiefs received their
commissions from Jamaica. Declaration by Pedro de Fuen Cueba, 21 June 1718
Guat 302. There are numerous other reports of the close ties between the
Mosquitos and the English throughout this period. See for example:
Jamaica council to Lawes, 29 June 1720, CO 137/13, f. 272; King Peter of
the Mosquitos to Hunter, 3 October 1729, CO 137/18, f. 68.
35
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To establish and to command this frontier outpost, Trelawny
selected Robert Hodgson, a young lieutenant who had come to his attention
while serving with Trelawny's son as a subaltern in the 49th regiment of
foot in Jamaica. "A discreet Man", according to the governor, "sympathetic
to the needs of the Indians, and yet Courageous", Hodgson was to bring
government to the Shore, although the establishment of a true colony
would have to wait until the willingness and ability of the white settlers
to live under civil authority were determined.36
Hodgson received his final orders to proceed to the Shore on 17
February 1740, shortly after news of the declaration of war reached
Jamaica. He was to assemble the Englishmen for defensive purposes, to
pledge England's protection to the Mosquitos, and to assure King Edward
that he would not usurp his prerogatives. The Mosquitos were to be
organised for military campaigns, but Hodgson was advised to "bend and
sway to the humours of the Indians", to turn them as best he could to
his desires, but to have "no humour, no whim, no conceit, no favourable
fancy, to which every thing must be bent...." 37
36Trelawny to Newcastle, 20 January 1740, CO 137/56, f. 279; Trelawny
to Hodgson, 11 December 1741, CO 137/65, f. 218; Commissions for the
49th regiment of foot, 25 December 1743, SP 44/184, f. 480.
37Trelawny to Edward, 25 February 1740, Sta Fe 1261; Trelawny to Hodgson,
17 February 1740, Sta Fe 1261; Trelawny to Hodgson, 11 December 1741,
CO 137/65, f. 218; Pascoe, a.cit., p. 234. Three chiefs ruled over
separate Mosquito provinces, or "guards". Governor Britain, "a sensible
old man", ruled the pure Indians south of Sandy Bay; King Edward, very
young and still "not much observed" by his people, ruled the guard of
Zambos between Sandy Bay and Cape Gracias a Dios; and General Hobby
governed the second guard of Zambos west to Black River. Each office
was hereditary. Report by Robert Hodgson, n.d., Sta Fe 1261.
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Governor Trelawny had ambitious dreams; the Spanish had reason to
fear the English threat.
I should imagine we might induce, by the offer of liberty,
the neighbouring Indians to revolt, & indeed I do not think
it Romantick in the least to expect that we might, by
supporting the Indians a little, spread the revolt from one
part to another, till it should be general over the ndies,
& drive the Spaniards entirely out or cut them off.
The Mosquitos were to be Trelawny's instruments to throw off "the Spanish
Yoke". 39
 He did not know how much success Hodgson might have, but he
believed that it was "better to play at small game than absolutely to
stand out...."4°
Soon after his arrival at Edward's home in Sandy Bay, Hodgson met
with the Xing, Governor Britain, and most of the other principal Mosquito
chiefs.
I proceeded to explain to them that, as they had long
acknowledged themselves of Great Britain, the Governor of
Jamaica had sent me to take possession of their country in
his Majesty's name; then asked if they had anything to object.
They answered after the chiefs had consulted among themselves
for two weeks they had nothing to say against it, but were
very glad I had come for that purpose; so I immediately set up
the standard, and reducing what I had said into articles, I
asked them, both jointly and separately, if they approved and
would abide by them. They unanimously declared they would.'"
The articles composed by Hodgson and accepted by the chiefs formed a
comprehensive treaty of friendship and military alliance.
Article I. That he (King Edward] resigneth all his Country
on each Side of Cape Gratia di Dios, and as far back as any
Mosquito Indians or others that are depending upon him do
inhabit to the Crown of Great Britain to be settled by English-
men in such manner as shall be thought proper.
38Trelawny to Newcastle, 20 January 1740, CO 137/56, f. 279.
39Trelawny to Hodgson, 17 February 1740, Sta Fe 1261.
40Trelawny to Wager, 26 July 1740, CO 137/56, f. 383.
41Ephraim G. Squier, The States of Central America (New York, 1858), p.635.
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Article II. That he and his People do hereby become Subjects
of Great Britain and desire the same Protection and to be
instructed in the same Knowledge and to be governed by the
same Laws as the English who shall settle amongst them.
Article III. That they desire the Assistance of Great Britain
to recover the Countries of their Fathers from their Enemies
the Spaniards, and they are now ready to undertake any Expedition
that may be thought good for that End themselves.
Article IV. That they receive and choose Captain Robert Hodgson
their Commander in Chief as appointed by the Governour of
Jamaica and will obey all Orders and follow all instructions
which he shall from Time to Time communicate to them from the
Governour of Jamaica or the King of Great Britain.
Article V. That they will help all Indian Nations who are now
in Subjection to the Spaniards to throw off the Spanish Yoke,
and to recover their Ancient Liberty, and will join any Force
which Great Britain shall think fit to send to the West Indies
for that Purpose.
A gun was fired as each article was read to the Indians, and then the
ceremony ended with a ritual "cutting up a turf" and an exchange of vows
to defend the country. 42
Hodgson first proposed an expedition to Yucatin, however the Indians
43favoured attacking on the Cocles River of Panama.	 On 16 April, Hodgson,
Edward, Britain, 230 Zambos-Mosquitos, and nine white marooners (most of
whom were "so wicked and mischievous" that they did more harm than good),
sailed for the Cocl4s River by way of Bocas del Toro, home of the Toxares
Declaration by King Edward, 16 March 1740, CO 123/1, f. 52; Ephraim G.
Squier, Waikna; or Adventures on the Mosquito Coast (London, 1855), p. 340;
L.M. Keasbey, The Nicaragua Canal and the Monroe Doctrine (London, 1896),
p. 90; Pares, ol.cit., p. 100.
43After hundreds of their people died of small pox contacted in an otherwise
successful raid on the Yucat4n peninsula in 1722, the Mosquitos refused
to undertake expeditions past the British logwood settlements. Descriptior
of the Mosquito Shore by Robert Hodgson, 1757, CO 123/14.
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Indians, a tribe "so perfidious and savage that they took the life of
any stranger who came among them". When Hodgson learned that these
Indians had massacred some English traders, he implored the Mosquitos
to destroy them, however because of their number and ferocity, the
Mosquitos refused to attack. 44
When the expedition arrived at the Coclis River, the Mosquitos
silently eliminated eight Spanish lookouts at the river's mouth. During
the night, while the main force rowed quietIvupstream, Mosquito scouts
"Intercepted the Reverend Prebend of Panama coming down with his mony
to (trade with_7 the Dutchman." They learned that the churches of
Penonome had "miraculous images and other rich Trumpery" worth 400,000
pieces of eight, while merchants in town (who were also planning to trade
with the Dutch) had another 600,000. Penonome suddenly became a more
worthy goal than Santiago.
With the difficult choice of accompanying the Mosquitos or "remaining
in the river"--whatever was meant by that--the priest joined the expedition,
but on the condition that he be handcuffed in case he fell into the
hands of his compatriots. That night Hodgson wrote, "I concerted every
thing with the Father...about Surprizing the other fathers: saving ye
Host & Ransoming ye Consecrated Plate." But that same night ten Mosquitos
and a white marooner slipped away from camp with two "little Breeches"--
Spanish prisoners. Hodgson suspected that the Mosquitos planned to beat
their comrades to Penonome, but at day-break the men inexplicably returned,
The Toxares were eventually exterminated by the Mosquitos.
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minus one of their captives. Hodgson was furious. He demanded that
governor Britain hang the Indian captain who had led the night escapade,
and he wanted to do the same with the white man, but he doubted his
authority to exact such summary justice. The Zambos feared that the
missing prisoner would arouse the country, and they refused to continue
the expedition, although they were only hours away from " a fine Prospect
of the South Sea" and rich Spanish territory. Hodgson would have taken
Penonom4 he said--and Panamit too-- "If I had been Master of 150 resolute
English Men instead of so many Mosquito Men being Masters of me."
To "Retrieve his honour" on the return trip, Governor Britain insisted
that they attack Matina, the only Spanish settlement on the Caribbean
coast between Yucat4n and PanamS. In July they advanced up the Matina
River, "stopping at every house where we saw any Spaniards, chaseing them
in their cocoa walks, which afforded good Diversion." The victory was
accomplished with only one death: a Spanish caballero who tried to defend
his hacienda with a handful of frightened slaves. Afterwards, while their
masters were obliged to fill the seroons with plundered cacao, 45 Indian
mulatto and Negro prisoners "played upon their Guitars". The Mosquitos
stood over them, telling the Indians "that little Breeches had made them,
(to whom the Country belonged) work many a hard days work; but now they
45The plunder taken on the expedition was moderate: approximately 60,000
pounds of cacao worth 40,000 pesos, several coins from the Spanish
priest, three ingots and 103 "lumps" of gold, and about 2,500 pieces
of eight. The Mosquitos also "ransomed" to Jamaican merchants at sixty
ppesos a head, most of the Cocles Indian captives. Hodgson to Trelawny,
28 November 1740, CO 137/57, f. 35.
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were come to give them a play day." To avert a slaughter of the
prisoners, Hodgson encouraged the Mosquitos "to Dance, Sing and Play,
and made the Spaniards do the same to keep the Mosquito Men in good
humour."
The expedition was marred from the beginning by the actions of
the "Mosquito high Priest (the Zambo Sukia)" who caused the occasional
displays of cowardice exhibited by the Indians, and who "Distinguish'd
himself by stealing several thousand weight" of cacao at Matina and
selling it to "Mirandez the Jew". In spite of the problems encountered
on the expedition, Hodgson was satisfied that the Mosquitos, and other
Indian nations tributary to them, "seem'd reserv'd for the English;
having all rejected the Spaniards."46
Spanish officials in Guatemala were frustrated by Hodgson's expedition,
for in spite of their ardent desire to retaliate against the enemy they
had not the barest means to do so. 47 Furthermore, they were humiliated
by the British kerchants who even traded with the Spanish in the midst
of battle. While one Spanish official reported an English military threat
to the fort on the San Juan, 48 another accused a British trader of
forcing a commerce at Matina, only a short distance away.
49
46Account of Hodgson's first expedition, n.d., Sta Fe 1261; Antonio to
Quintana, 20 August 1740, Guat 640; Hodgson to Trelawny, 28 November 1740,
CO 137/57, f. 35; Declaration by Sim6n de Espinoza, 10 October 1740,
Gust 303.
47Gemmir y Lleonart to Ribera, 18 July 1740, AC 432, f. 29; Ribera to Gemmir
y Lleonart, 16 August 1740, cited by Manuel Esquivel Molina, "Las
Incursiones sobre la Provincia de Costa Rica por los Zambos-Mosquitos".
Unpublished Master's thesis, The University of Costa Rica, San Jos, 1956,
p.31. Report by Gemmir y Lleonart, 27 March 1740, AC 3864, f. 27.
48From Pedro de Ribera, 27 November 1740, Guat 448.
49Anon. testimony, 24 November 1740, Gust 872.
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During the war the council of Jamaica tried to protect Spanish
merchants desirous of trading with the English, and to shield the Mosquito
Indians from unscrupulous traders. 50 Many Spaniards also hoped to improve
ihe leading settler on -the Shore,
the trade; one of them contracted with William Pitt,/to cut a road from
Black River into the province of Comayagua. 51 The involvement of Spanish
officials and clergy in the clandestine trade was also notorious. Those
who tried to stop the practice were never successful because of the lack
of funds, the difficult terrain, and the unhealthy climate, a disinterested
public, and especially the obstruction posed by other officials.52
The possibility of a British invasion during the war remained the
most dangerous threat to middle America. Exaggerated rumours of English
plans to harass Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala, and to invade Panama
with 5,000 veteran soldiers and Mosquito Indians, prompted frantic defensive
preparations. 53 As a result of the real cedula of 20 August 1739, President
Ribera ordered his provincial governors to strengthen their defences,
but without more specific orders he was afraid to draw on the royal
treasury to finance an offensive against the enemy. 54 The governor of
Jamaica council meetings, 14, 24 and 28 April 1741, CO 140/23, ff. 559,
563 and 565; Thoves to Arana Salazar, 29 October 1742, Guat 349; Trelawny
to Newcastle, 10 December 1743, CO 137/57, f. 361.
51Description of Roatain, 20 July 1743, CO 323/11, f. 42; Herrera to
Hermengildo de Arana, 12 October 1743, Guat 303.
52Herrera to Hermenegildo de Arana, 26 October 1743, Guat 303; Thoves and
Arana Salazar to the Sr. del Despacho Universal de Indias, 14 March 1744,
Guat 303; Thoves and Arena Salazar to the alcalde mayor of San Salvador,
18 November 1743, Gust 303.
53Llanos y Ramlrez to Gemmir y Lleonart, 29 September 1740, Gust 303; Parga
to Ribera, 12 February 1740, Gust 303; Ribera to Philip V, 25 August 1740,
Gust 665; Ribera to Philip V, 27 November 1740, Gust 448; Arada to Ribera,
7 February 1740, BAGG, ii (1940), p. 194.
54Ribera to Philip V, 15 December 1739, Guat 303.
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Havana promised to help in an attack if he could but his first obligation
was to Havana--and there was a war going on. 55
 The viceroy of Maxico
openly refused to help, explaining that he lacked funds to build warships,
that the English were masters of the sea, and that the Mosquitos had been
building up their strength on land for seventy years.%
Spanish plans to build badly needed forts on the Mosquito frontier
also remained unexecuted. 57
 The provinces of Guatemala had "for many years
suffered (from thej continuous hostilities of the Zambos Mosquitos",
according to Ribera, because there were only three forts to defend 650
leagues of coastline. 58
 In March 1741, Philip V again ordered that forts
be constructed at Matina and Truxillo "to impede the hostilities planned
by the English allied with the Mosquito Indians", while vessels were to
be constructed to carry the attack to the foe. 59
 Antonio Benavides, the
new governor of Yucatan, was to command the operations. 60
55GUemes y Horcasitas to Campo de Arve, 10 June 1739, CRM, p. 115.
56
Ribera to Philip V, 15 May 1740, Guat 50.
57Consejo report, 17 December 1740, Guat 665.
5 8Ribera to Philip V, 15 September 1740, Guat 872. The forts were the
Castillo de la Inmaculada ConcepciOn on the San Juan River, San Felipe
de Bacalar and Peten Itzi in Yucatan.
59Real cedula to the Duque de la Conquista, 24 March 1741, Guat 665; Reales
3;71;nes to the president of Guatemala and to the governors of Havana and
Yi-lat	 24 March 1741, Guat 665; Arivinos to Quintana, 23 May 1741, Guat
665.
60King's resolution, 20 December 1741, Guat 303; Arivinos to Campillo, 29
March 1742, Mex 3017. The governors of Yucatan were occasionally given
the responsibility for reducing or exterminating the Mosquito Indians
(in spite of the great distances involved), because Spanish ministers
confused the Mosquito Coast with the English logwood settlements on the
eastern coast of Yucatan.
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British plans to attack the Spanish were evolving more quickly.
The English high command in the West Indies, encouraged by the arrival
of strong reinforcements in Jamaica (Governor Trelawny said that there
were thirty ships of the line and 10,000 troops), met in January 1741
to plan offensive operations. The council, Admirals Vernon and Ogle,
Generals Wentworth61 and Guise, and Governor Trelawny, studied proposals
by Robert Hodgson, Lieutenant Lowther, a pirate who had been commissioned
in the navy for his services to the crown, and by William Lea, a former facto
of the South Sea Company in Guatemala. The Mosquito Indians appeared in
the plans of all three men. 62 Lowther's scheme to strike at Panami with
3,000 regular troops, 500 Negroes and 400 Mosquito Men excited General
Wentworth, who carried the others with his enthusiasm. On the advice of
Governor Trelawny, who believed that success depended on the Zamboa
Mosquitos, the council commissioned Pitt and Hodgson to attract them to
the enterprise. 63 Although Trelawny insisted that the expedition begin
immediately, before the troops became too sick to fight in the debilitating
climate, Admiral Vernon and Wentworth, who now complained that removing
the troops from Jamaica would leave the island unprotected, 64 stalled
until bad weather forced its postponement. 65
61Lord Cathcart, commander of the expedition, died before reaching Jamaica,
and was replaced by General Wentworth, a an "without imagination or
initiative". Basil Williams, The Whig Supremacy, 1714 - 1760 (Oxford,
1939), p. 223.
62Lea to Wentworth, 3 March 1740, BM, Add 32,698, f. 145; Council of war,
8 January 1741, SP 42/92, f. 26; Squier, The States, p. 747.
63Trelawny to Pitt and Hodgson, 31 July 1741, RCS, Honduras Archives, iii.
William Pitt was the grandson of a former governor of Bermuda, and probably
the richest Englishman on the Spanish Main.
64Council of war to Vernon, 21 and 22 January 1741, SP 42/92, f. 31 32.
65Pares,	 p. 96.
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Meanwhile, Hodgson had arrived in Sandy Bay with orders to take
the Mosquito Men to a rendezvous with the British expeditionary force
near the Chagr4s River in Panam4. 66 At first the Indians refused to go
after hearing rumours that Hodgson planned to enslave them, since "they
were good for nothing else". 67 Eventually convinced of his sincerity,
however, a large force of Mosquitos headed south with Hodgson. They
travelled without sufficient provisions and they were forced to return
, 68home before reaching Chagres. 	 In August Hodgson reassembled the
Mosquitos, divided them into three war parties, and at five day intervals
sent them into the interior by different routes. Hodgson's sergeant led
200 Indians of Britain's "guard" up the Ido Grande River near Bluefields;
General Handyside69 directed 200 of his father's Zambos, with 100 Patook
and Paya Indian auxiliaries, up the Patook River; while Hodgson went up
the Cape River with 220 Zambos from Sandy Bay. Britain's people soon
retired when rough water overturned their piraguas and drowned several
Indians; Handyside's force met the same fate. Only Hodgson and King
Edward's Zambos were able to penetrate into Spanish territory. After
crossing the peninsula and sacking San Juan de Jinotepe near Realejo on
the Pacific, they returned home, experiencing great difficulties on the
66Trelawny to Hodgson, 30 January 1741, Sta Fe 1261.
67Hodgson to Trelawny, 15 July 1741, Sta Fe 1261.
68Trelawny to Newcastle, 20 July 1743, CO 137/57. f . 351. A Ducth merchant
estimated that Hodgson began this expedition with 4,000 men, but counting
all three guards of Mosquitos--and 100 Payas and Patooks for good measure-•
they could not have numbered more than 1,500 men. Declaration by Captain
Hoare, 22 March 1741, Adm 1/232.
69Handyside was probably General Hobby's son.
28
trip. The Spanish commander at New Segovia tried to cut off their
retreat by preparing an ambush on the Cape River near Pantasma Mountain.
In the early hours of the morning the Spaniards opened fire on the
Zambos, passing on a balsa raft, who gave a "cry of horror" because
their powder was wet and useless. Hodgson raised a white flag and
asked to parley, which the Spanish commander agreed to do. At dawn
the Spaniards offered Hodgson's party their freedom in exchange for
their prisoners and spoils. Hodgson procrastinated through the morning
by agreeing to give up a small part of the loot, while bargaining for the
remainder. At noon, after the besieged Indians and Englishmen had
constructed a log barricade on their raft and allowed their powder to
dry, they unleashed a torrent of fire on their startled adversaries and
escaped downstream before the Spaniards could react. The episode prompted
one Spanish official to comment: "This will give you an idea of how the
people of that region may be counted on."7°
When they returned to the coast every man on Hodgson's expedition
was sick; many died from the hardships of the campaign. Hodgson suffered
a violent hemorrhage and was ill four months. And the strategic purpose
of the mission failed because the Indians scattered during the expedition
to plunder indiscriminately, giving the Spaniards time to conceal their
valuables and to prepare their defences and counterattacks. As on the
previous expedition to Cocl4s, Hodgson claimed that with soldiers to keep
70
"Tratados Varios, Mexico", 1743, BM, Add 17,566, f. 219; Account by
Robert Hodgson, n.d., Sta Fe 1261; Jose Dolores dimez, Historia de is
Costa de Mosquitos (hasta 1894)...(Managua, 1939), p. 93.
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the Indians in line "he might have been...Master of the Country as
long as he pleas'd." 71
When plans for the Panam‘ invasion were renewed in Jamaica late
in 1741, Trelawny asked Hodgson to prepare the Shoremen and Mosquitos
for the expedition. 72 But few settlers responded to Hodgson's call,
and those who did made extravagant financial demands for the use of
their slaves and piraguas. 73 Rumours circulated that other Shoremen,
who carried on a "clandestine correspondence" with the Spaniards, might
try to ruin the expedition. 74 Discussion of the projected attack
continued sporadically through 1741, and although an expedition sailed
for the Main early in 1742, sickness and disputes between the officers
forced a retreat before they could do much damage to themselves or to
others.
The Zambos Mosquitos remained quiet while the English council of
war discussed the attack on Panam‘, but by the summer of 1742, finding
their inactivity too restricting, and agitated by Shoremen who depended
on Indian depredations for their living, 75 they began indiscriminate
attacks on widely separated communities. After a flurry of defensive
71Trelawny to Newcastle, 20 July 1743, CO 137/57, f. 351.
72Wentworth, 27 March 1742, CO 5/42, vol. ii, f. 134; Articles of
enlistment on the Mosquito Shore, 26 February 1742, CO 137/57, f. 177.
73Articles signed by the settlers of the Mosquito Shore, 26 February 1742,
CO 137/57, f. 177. zstimates of the total number of white settlers on
the Shore at the time were as low as fifty so the turnout may have been
relatively good. Of the forty-four men who came forward, only one,
Abraham Tonoston, was still on the Shore twenty years later, indicating
the transient nature of the Shoremen as well as the dangers of life on
the frontier in those early years.
74Anon. letter to Edward Trelawny, 17 December 1741, SP 42/92, f. 46.
75The Shoremen purchased Indians captured by the Mosquitos and re-sold
them to Jamaican merchants.
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activity in Spanish provincial capitals, with militiamen76
 and Indian
flecheros (bowmen) assembled, sentinels stationed in the mountain passes,
guards doubled on the Chamelean River and in Puerto Cavallo and temporary
forts constructed, the Spaniards tensely awaited further attacks by the
rumoured 10,000 Mosquitos and Englishmen throughout the frontier region,
from Portovelo, Matina and the San Juan River in the south, through the
mountains to the coasts of Honduras and YucatAn in the north. 77 But the
Mosquitos did not follow up their attacks of 1742, undoubtedly because
of a new British offensive then under consideration.
Meanwhile the long neglected Spanish project to attack the Bay of
Honduras was revived. Cosairs from Campeche were scheduled to join an
expedition, and intricate plans were made to cut off the retreat of the
Mosquitos when the attack began. To solve the Mosquito problem after
the expedition, the Indians were to be transferred to the Windward Islands. 78
Governor Benavides acknowledged his orders to guide the operations, but
due to the scarcity of available vessels, 1742 ended with no action having
been taken.79
Meanwhile, the British high command in the West Indies, who insisted
not only on a safe project, but on one on which they all might agree,
76An inventory of weapons and men available in Honduras showed 221 men
armed with 124 swords, forty-nine machetes, twenty-six rifles, fifteen
broadswords, three cutlasses, two muskets, and two pikes. List of
infantry and cavalry companies in Comayagua, 15 July 1742, Guat 665.
77Report by Gemmir y Lleonart, 21 October 1742, AC 272, f. 11; From Tomtits
Hermenegildo de Arena, 6 and 13 July 1742, Guat 665; Flores to Hermenegildc
7 and 10 July 1742, Guat 665; Juntas de guerra in Comayagua, 15 July 1742
and 6 March 1743, Guat 665.
78Ribera to Philip V, 23 November 1742, CRM, p. 117.
79Benavidea to Philip V, 22 January 1743, Guat 303; Benavides to Gampillo,
21 January and 17 April 1743, Mex 3017.
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found a plan by Robert Hodgson that seemed to fulfil their requirements.
Roaan Island in the Bay of Honduras, he said, could be easily fortified
at little cost. 8o It could serve as a base from which to enforce England's
Acts of Navigation, to drive Dutch traders from the Bay, to stamp out
the last vestiges of piracy, and to conduct military operations on the
Main. 81 Merchants at Belize and on the Shore would be protected by
warships stationed at the island and they would find it easier to insure
their ships and cargoes, previously difficult to do because of the threat
of the guardacostas. 82 They could also supply the Mosquitos with
British manufactured goods and encourage them to open new branches of
trade with the interior. Although the idea was far from the noble
ambitions of 1739 and 1740, it was a project that Whitehall would
approve--and a safer venture could hardly have been found. 83 The idea
of assembling in one community "all our Vagabonds" scattered in the Bay
Governor
excited/Trelawny, and the means were available to carry out the scheme,
for the English fleet at Jamaica was idle.
Trelawny's initial enthusiasm for the Roataln plan was dampened by
8
°Trelawny to Stone, 16 October 1742, CO 137/57,f. 273. Roataln was known
by the English as "Rattan" throughout the eighteenth century.
81Allan Christelow, "Contraband Trade Between Jamaica and the Spanish Main,
and the Free Port Act of 1766", BAHR, xxii (1942). p. 316; Pares, 2R.cit.,
pp. 103, 123, 126; Trelawny to Vernon, 27 July 1741, SP 42/90, f. 317;
Report by Robert Hodgson, n.d., CO 137/57, f. 175.
82Philip L. White, The Beekmans of New York in Politics and Commerce, 1647 - 
1877 (New York 1956), p. 273.
A ministerial memo early in 1739 suggested that Gibraltar be surrendered
to the Spanish in exchange for Ceuta and Roaan. "And as to the Island of
Roatan", the writer said, "it will be in our hands 	 a considerable
Security to our West Indian Commerce, and a far greater curb upon the
Treasures, and consequently upon the Power, of Spain, than the Rock of
Gibraltar." c. May 1739, 30/50/43, f. 91.
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Vernon's impatience and by Wentworth's scepticism. 84 However, after
Vernon reviewed the glowing advantages of the plan and Trelawny noted
the lethargic state of the troops in Jamaica, the council agreed to
go ahead with the scheme. 85 In July they decided to form a civil
government on Roatein and commissioned William Pitt as the "Lord Chief
Justice & Supreme Magistrate". 86 Pitt's "Dignity Ling approved Merit",
Trelawny wrote,
has rais'd him go the post] he having universally the best
Character without dispute or rivalship, of any in these
parts; & stands almost alone, civiliz'd among Savages, like
the late Czar. He is much the Richest too, & Dominion being
foundeg they say in Property, I therefore appointed him my
Chief. °7
Admiral Vernon agreed that moving the Shoremen to RoatSn would be beneficial
noting that they were not in possession of any large branch of trade, in
spite of the country being capable of holding a considerable number of
people. But moving the Baymen there might be attended by "very pernicious
Consequences", he said, "because it would ruin the logwood trade. However
no effort was ever made to discourage the Baymen emigrating to the island.
84Vernon to Wentworth, 21 August 1741, SP 42/90, f. 318; Wentworth to
Vernon, 22 August 1741, SP 42/90, f. 319; Vernon to Wentworth, 23 August
1741, SP 42/90, f. 320; Council of war, 26 and 29 September and 25 Novembe:
1741, SP 42/90, ff. 362, 364, 455; Vernon to Newcastle, 5 October 1741,
SP 42/90, f. 329.
85Council of war, 28 June 1742, sp 42/93, f. 169; Wentworth to Newcastle,
29 June 1742, sp 42/92, f. 173; Vernon to Wentworth, 27 July 1742,
SP 42/93, f. 202.
86
Vernon to Cusack, 5 August 1742, CO 137/57, f. 174. The Spanish applied
various titles to Pitt: "General of that coast", Parrilla to Arana, 11
February 1743, Gust 303; "Governor of Honduras and YucatItn", Declaration b
Juan Thomas, 26 February 1743, Gust 665; "Governor of the Zamboa" and
"Governor of the Gulf of Belize and the Mainland of Honduras", Declaration
by Felipe Grageda, 11 March 1743, Guat 665.
87Trelawny to Stone, 16 October 1742, CO 137/57, f. 273.
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Captain Cusack was named commander of the expeditionary fleet, with
orders to "Countenance and support" Pitt's government in every possible
way."88
In August, Governor Trelawny had another change of heart. War with
France was imminent and the British troops in Jamaica were needed to
balance the powerful enemy forces in Havana. 89 But the majority of the
council insisted that the plan be carried out, although the timid
Wentworth, whose support was secured only on Vernon's assurances that
the detachment would not be exposed to any danger, 90
 refused to accept
the responsibility for any failure that might ensue. Trelawny
reluctantly approved the scheme when the Shoremen expressed their
enthusiasm, and hoped that Whitehall "would foster it with a Parental
care, without fondling it, as they have done the costly & unpromising
Brat Georgy." He despaired of Roaan having a proper upbringing. After
Pitt requested supplies, and a report by the engineer general said that
the new settlers would need a year's provisions, 41
 he wrote: "the Brats
will be craving & I have nothing to give them. A new Colony is a many
headed Monster that has whor son's appetites.... Why do they apply to me?
I did not beget them!" 92 The governor seems to have forgotten the part
he played in the conception of the little scheme.
88Vernon to Cusack, 5 August 1742, CO 137/57, f. 174.
89
Trelawny to Stone, 4 September 1742, CO 137/57, f. 218; Council of war,
12 August 1742, CO 137/57, f. 216.
90Council of war, 12 August 1742, CO 137/57, f. 216.
91
Extract of an engineer general's report to Wentworth, 16 October 1742,
CO 137/57, f. 172; Extract of a letter from Pitt to Trelawny, 26 September
1742, CO 137/57, f. 172.
92Trelawny to Stone, 16 October 1742, CO 137/57, f. 273.
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The RoatSn idea was safe, but unimaginative and unrealistic. To
consider removing the Mosquito Indians and Shoremen from their nearly
impregnable coastal bastion was at beat ill-advised. Yet encouraging
settlement on the Main was a responsibility that few men--including
the governors of Jamaica and the principal secretaries of state--wished
to take. Contact between Jamaica and the Shore had always been influenced
more by British merchants than by the governor and council. Yet Jamaica's
governors encouraged, and Whitehall countenanced, this tenuous relationship.
Whitehall was at first uncommital about Roat gn, although Trelawny
was ordered to maintain and support a settlement there until further
notice. 93 Then in February 1743, the "King most Excellent Majesty in
Council" approved the recruitment of Shoremen to settle the island and
the formation of a governing council under Chief Magistrate William Pitt.
British and foreign protestants were encouraged by the offer of land
grants to "Contract Marriages with Indian, Mulattoes or Negro women". 94
In Madrid the Conse'o de las Indias studied the critical situation
in the Bay of Honduras and expressed their opinion that if the English
were not forcei to abandon their settlements in Roatin, at Belize, and on
the Mosquito Shore, it would be impossible to oblige them to do so after
the war. 95 They concluded that in spite of the lack of troops, funds,
93Stone to Trelawny, 19 January 1743, CO 137/57, f. 313.
94
"The King most Excellent Majesty in Council", 2 February 1743, CO 323/11,
f. 36.
The Spanish prepared for the necessity of having to go to the conference
table to eject the English from the Bay. Article ten of the Second Family
Compact, a secret treaty of alliance between Spain and France, signed on
25 October 1743, called for both nations to cooperate during the peace
negotiations to force the English to abandon the Bay of Honduras (the "new,
colony"), and to restore all places seized from Spain during the war. Jose
Antonio Calder& Quijano, Belice, 1663(?) - 1821 (Sevilla, 1944), p. 158.
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supplies, weapons and transport ships, the king must send an armada
to throw the English out of the Bay and to exterminate the Zambos
Mosquitos. 96 Philip followed his council's advice, and ordered President
Rivera y Santa Cruz of Guatemala to aid the governor of Havana in
expelling the English "from Cape Camarcin and other settlements on the
Main". 97
But 1743 proved to be yet another year of inaction for Spanish arms.
Crown officials in Honduras, Guatemala, M4xico and Yucatafn attested to
the impossibility of dislodging the English from Roatin and from their
settlements on the Main simultaneously. 98 The establishment of numerous
British settlements in the Bay had made it impossible to construct a
fort in Truxillo, although a small wooden stockade had been thrown up
at Matina. 99 Luis D/ez Navarro, inspector general for the kingdom of
Guatemala, felt that Omoa should replace Truxillo as the site for the
new fort. Commerce at Belize and Pitt's trade in Truxillo could more
easily be stopped from there, he said, thus forcing the English to
abandon their settlements on the Main and frustrating "Pitt's hopes to
make himself master of the whole coast". 10°
Settlers trickled slowly into Roataln, but by the middle of 1743,
96Consulta from the Consejo de las Indias, 12 August 1743, Guat 303.
9 7Ibid.; Esquivel, 2E.cit., p. 248.
,14----
Junta de guerra in Comayagua, 6 March 1743, Guat 665; Benavides to
Fuenclara, 13 April 1743, Guat 303; Rivera y Santa Cruz to Philip V,
8 June 1743, Guat 303; Fuenclara to Trivino, 31 July 1743, Guat 303.
99Declaration by Juan de Buenaventa, 10 March 1743, Guat 665.
1MIJunta de guerra in Omoa, 11 March 1743, Gust 665; Testimony by Luis
Diez Navarro, 17 July 1744, Gust 351.
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only six or eight families had arrived, mostly "a poor and idle lot",
unfit subjects for a new colony. Prospective settlers in the Windward
and Virgin Islands and merchants in Jamaica expressed more interest in
nthe Mosquito Shore than in Roatan, 101
 thus Governor Trelawny again turned
his attention to the Shore. He proposed that an independent company be
established there with Robert Hodgson as its commander. The governor
said that the fledgling colony in RoatSn would be made secure, the rich
trade of Guatemala and Nicaragua would fall to the English, and order
would be brought to the friendly but tempestuous and disorganised Mosquito
Indians. 102
While the Board of Trade were considering Trelawny's new proposals,
the governor of Havana postponed the attack on English settlements because,
according to him, the English were aware of the plans. 103 In fact, the
English had no intelligence of Spanish designs; the lack of leadership
in Spain's Caribbean colonies matched the destitution of means to carry
out the king's orders.
The lords commissioners for Trade and Flantations met in London
early in 1744 to discuss Trelawny's scheme and to listen to testimony by
Robert Hodgson. 104
 On 3 May the lords of committee of council reported
that they saw no reason why an independent company should not be approved
for the Shore, but they were unwilling to propose a specific form of
101
Trelawny to the lords of the Board of Trade and Plantations, 19 December
1743, CO 137/24, f. 20; Trelawny to Hodgson, 19 December 1743, Sta Fe 1261
Description of Black River, c.December 1743, CO 323/11, f. 65.
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Trelawny to Newcastle, 20 July 1743, CO 137/57, f. 351.
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-.From Francisco de Gitemes Horcasita, 28 April 1744, Sto Dom 1207; Rivera y
Santa Cruz to Betancourt, 25 April 1744, Guat 303.
1 04Re port of the lords of committee, 6 February 1744, CO 323/11, f. 32.
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government since they were unacquainted with the country. The Board
accepted the general view of the committee, but decided against forming
"a regular Establishment" at that time. Rather than raise an "Independent
Company", which in essence would have guaranteed colonial status, they
recommended that Trelawny send a detachment of troops to the Shore from
his own regiment in Jamaica. 105 The decision tied the future of the
Mosquito Shore to the council and governor of Jamaica; since the regiment
was supported by the island, any decision to disband or to transfer it
meant its withdrawal from the Shore. The Board made another critical
decision when it decided to leave the funds appropriated to support the
Shore in the hands of the governor, for certainly not all Jamaica governors
would be as sympathetic to the Shore as Governor Trelawny.
The Board might easily have granted colonial status; the whole region
could have been claimed by conquest and occupation. Even some Spanish
ministers admitted privately that the Treaty of 1670 did indeed apply
06
to British settlements in the Bay of Honduras. 1 	But according to
Sir Gerald Berkeley Hertz,
...in the West as in the East Indies, British commercialism
aimed at no territorial aggrandisement. The end in view was
trade not empire, the enjoyment of a monopoly without the
responsibilities of government. 'Great Britain,' according
to Houstoun, 'wants no castles but floating ones.'107
Trelawny was ordered by the Board to allot as much money as he thought
105Report by the lords of Committee of Council to the lords of the Privy
Council, 3 May 1744, CO 324/12, f. 284; Order in council, 19 July 1744,
CO 123/1, f. 35, and PC 2/98, f. 442; Act in council, 14 June 1744,
CO 137/69, f. 78; Brown, p.cit., p. 185.
10 7Gerald B. Hertz, British Imperialism in the Eighteenth Century (London
1908), p. 37.
1C6Observations on Spanish interests, c. 1762, AGS, Est 8162.
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necessary for the services on the Shore, so long as it did not exceed
the sum he had originally requested, i.e., £300 a year for presents to
the Mosquito Indians; £500 for contingency expenses; and £1,330 for the
initial expenses of establishing and quartering the detachment on the
Shore. 108
Government had taken a second step--Hodgson's initial commission
on the Shore in 1740 being the first--towards acquiring a lasting foothold
on the mainland of Spanish middle America.
1
°80rder in council, 19 July 1744, CO 123/1, f. 35.
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Chapter II
THE FORMATION of BRITISH GOVERNMENT on the
MOSQUITO SHORE, 1744 - 1749
Whitehall's decision during the War of Jenkins' Ear to support
an embryonic government on the Mosquito Shore encouraged the expansion
of British intrigues on the Spanish Main, although France's entry into
the war posed the threat of an invasion of Jamaica, and placed some
restraint on these activities. According to one Spanish official, the
English and their Zambo Mosquito allies acted "as if they were lords of
the coast" in the Bay of Honduras and from Cape Gracias a Dios to Escudo
de Veragua. 1 Truxillo was the last of the Spanish settlements in the
Bay--which had included Truinfo de la Cruz, Puerto Cavello, Omoa and
Santo Tomas de Castilla--that had been "liquidated" by the enemy, 2 while
trade between Granada on Lake Nicaragua and the cities of Portovelo and
Cartagena had been interrupted by the Zambos Mosquitos for the last seven
years. 3 Rich gold mines in Veragua were inoperative because of Mosquito
raids, 4 and the mountainous country of Honduras had been thrown into
1 Vicuii to Ensenada, 28 August 1745, Guat 873.
2Declaration by Pedro de Garaycoechea, 19 January 1746, BPR, Ayala 11-2817;
Pares, War and Trade, p. 101.
3Description of the San Juan River by Jose Lacayo, September 1745, MN, 570,
f. 408; Avila to the governor of Nicaragua, 25 October 1745, BN, MSS 17,606;
Notes on the San Juan River by Jose de Meza, 14 January 1746, MN, 339, f. 77
4
Testimony by Juan Bautista Salgado, 29 October 1746, Guat 422.
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turmoil by the activities of the contraband traders and by the sacking
of the important town of Sonaguera. 5 One provincial governor said that
because of the enemy incursions, the country had become "more wretched
than Galicia". 6
Meanwhile, to extend British influence on the Main, Governor Edward
Trelawny generously distributed gifts to the San Bias and to other
Indian nations of Darin in Panami. 7 There were also rumours that
England planned to support the scattered marooners near Almirante Bay
south of the San Juan River, a region where local Indian tribes had been
exterminated by the Zambos Mosquitos, or had deteriorated into tributary
appendages of the Mosquito kingdom.8
Early in 1745 the Spanish expected a major Anglo-Mosquito invasion
of the kingdom of Guatemala by way of the San Juan River. The English
plan, according to intelligence received from Jamaica, was to seize the
Castillo de la Inmaculada Concepcidn on the San Juan, then cross the
peninsula to open a trade to the South Sea. 9 The invasion was not
executed, but the threat made the Spanish aware of the dangers of foreign
Declaration of the merits of Eugenio 104rez, 6 May 1754, Guat 873; Herrera
to Machado, 6 November 1746, Guat 422. While Spanish sources reveal strong
enemy activity during this period, English documents make almost no mention
of Mosquito incursions or of contraband trade, probably because of the
extralegal nature of these activities and because of the preoccupation
of the government of Jamaica with the threat of invasion.
6Vera to Ensenada, 23 February 1747, Guat 455.
7An accounOf disbursements on presents for the San Bias Indians, 1745,
CO 137/57, f. 486.
82aquivel, "Las Incursiones", p. 33.
9Fuenclara to GUemes y Horcasitas, 31 October 1844, BN, MSS 17,617; Navarro
to Ensenada, 22 December 1844, SP 94/247, f. 126; Lacayo to Gemmir y
Lleonart, 4 January 1745, AC 456; Navarro to Lacayo, 1 February 1745,
Guat 827.
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domination over this valuable trade route.
Although an enemy invasion of middle America was a distinct danger,
Madrid was more concerned with English contraband trade, a greater
threat to the most important fundamental of Spain's colonial rule:
economic monopoly in the trade with her colonies. The centres of this
illicit commerce were in Black River and Truxillo to the west of Cape Graciaa
a Dios and in Bluefields and Matina to the south. Over the "roads"
recently opened from Black River into the interior passed Zambos Mosquitos
--acting as middlemen and guides rather than as invaders--"Commerce"
Indians, 10
 Spanish mulattos and mestizos, and occasional Spanish entre-
preneurs. Tegucigalpa, Lecln, Comayagua and other colonial towns
benefited by receiving merchandise impossible to obtain by legitimate
means. For these goods the Spaniards exchanged gold, silver, cacao,
tobacco and medicinal drugs including sarsaparilla, plus cattle for the
maintenance of the English troops and colonists on the coast. 11
Master of the commerce was William Pitt, who had established a
small feudal empire on the Shore. The trade became so popular and
profitable in the beginning that ferias were held in Black River similar
10Tributary tribes of the Zambos Mosquitos who acted as middlemen for
English merchants and Mosquitos.11Rodriguez to Thoves and Arena, 24 September 1746, Guat 422; Thoves and
Arena to Zayas, 27 November 1746, Guat 422; Isidro to Vera, 25 September
1746, Guat 873; Extracts from letters on contraband trade, 1745 - 1747
AHN, Est 3028. Mules served a double purpose for the Spanish and
English traders. A larger number were needed to transport the bulkier
goods from the interior than were needed for the return trip, and since
the animal was valuable to the English, the trader was able to find a
ready market for them.
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to those held twice a year in Matina at cacao harvest time, when the
inhabitants of Cartago came down to the coast to trade with the Jamaican
and Dutch merchants. 12 Yet this illicit commerce, that so bothered the
Spanish court, stopped increasing before the end of the War of Jenkins'
Ear, and never really came up to expectations. 13 Most merchants incorrectly
blamed "some revolutions in the interior" for the poor business, 14 but
unknown to Pitt and the others, who believed that the kingdom of Guatemala
was rich and popullus, the heavy traffic over Pitt's new road had quickly
glutted the small Spanish market.
Francisco de Thoves and Domingo de Arana Salazar, treasury officials
in Comayagua, argued that it was now impossible to receive Spanish goods
in Honduras, because of "deceitful and self-interested people in
Guatemala (intent on promoting a trade monopoly in the kingdom for
Guatemalan merchants], who leave the coasts of Honduras without a single
fortified port" through which these goods might enter. With few register
ships trading on the coast of Honduras, and Vera Cruz 500 leagues away,
the colonists turned to the readily available goods supplied by foreign
merchants. Thoves and Arana claimed that they had tried to stifle the
illicit trade between Comayagua and Black River, but their efforts had
made them the "targets of the fury" of the Comayag1Jans.
15
 Other zealous
12_Thoves and Arana to Philip V, 30 December 1746, Gust 422.
13W. Pitt to J. Pitt, 20 May 1746, Sto Dom 1207; Baxter to Prayer, 22 May
1746, Sto Dom 1207.
14Costa de Silva to Silva y M4ndez, 28 May 1746, Sto Dom 1207. Dutch
traders from Curelao also traded with the Spanish in the Bay of Honduras,
but it is unknown how it affected the English trade at this time.
15Thoves and Arana to Ensenada, 30 December 1746, Guat 422.
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officials in Honduras, Costa Rica and Nicaragua who tried to apprehend
the contrabandistas had no better luck, occasionally even finding
themselves hindered in their duty by principal crown officers, civil
and ecclesiastical. 16 In fact, most minor officials on the frontiers
--and their superiors as well--participated in the trade or accepted
bribes to allow it to continue. The prelate of Comayagua and Governor
Hermenegildo de Arana of Honduras, supported by the governor's father,
the senior oidor of Guatemala, and by the president of the audiencia,
Pedro de Ribera, had traded with Pitt since 1739. One provincial
governor complained that a smuggler who he had planned to execute had
taken refuge in the cathedral after being freed from prison by the
bishop. 17
In the spring of 1745 the Conse'o de las Indian recommended that
Governor Hermenegildo de Arana of Honduras be replaced by an experienced
military man with the authority to alleviate the problems that afflicted
the province: illicit trade and Zambo Mosquito incursions. 18
 Philip V
decided to attack the problem by introducing radical changes in the
provincial organization of the kingdom of Guatemala. On 23 August 1745,
Juan de Vera was named governor of Honduras and Comandante General de
las Armes in the region extending from Yucatin to Cape Gracias a Dios.
A similar commission was granted to Alonso Fern4ndez de Heredia for the
16Herrera to Machado, 6 November 1746, Guat 422.
17
Ftom Luis Machado, 31 December 1746, Guat 455; Opinion of the fiscal of
Spain, 13 May 1745, Guat 303; From Thoves and Arana, 30 December 171+7,
Guat 422.
18Opinion of the fiscal, 13 May 1745, and resolution of the Consejo, 17 May
1745, Guat 303; Consejo to Ensenada, 14 July 1745, Guat 303; Ensenada to
Montijo, 2 July 1745, Gust 422.
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province of Nicaragua, with jurisdiction from the Cape to the Chagr4a
River in Panamit. The two governors had orders to force the English
to abandon their clandestine settlements and "to attack violently the
Mosquito Indians in their communities and ranches, and to devastate
and punish them until they are reduced to a secure obedience to the
crown." Rinds and military assistance for these operations were to
/
come from Guatemala, Mexico, Havana and Yucatan.19
Nearly a year and a half passed before Vera and Heredia travelled
to their new posts, thus further allowing the clandestine traders to
strengthen their operations. 20 Vera blamed the delay on President
Rivera y Santa Cruz of Guatemala, accusing him of obstructing him in
his duties, and insinuating that he traded illicitly with the British.21
Governor Vera finally arrived in Comayagua on 11 February 1747.
Within a fortnight he claimed to have suppressed all illegal communication
between Comayagua and the English merchants on the coast, but he said that
it would be impossible to remove the Shoremen from their settlements,
for the coast from Campeche to Portovelo was nearly devoid of Spaniards
and the fort at Bacalar served only as a "great consumer of royal funds".22
19Instructions to Vera, 23 August 1745, Gust 641; Real cedula to Heredia,
23 August 1745, Guat 352; Reales Ordenes, 23 August 1745, Gust422;
Ricardo BeltrEln y R6zpide, La Mosquitia: Notas documentadas para la
historia territorial de este parte de Centro Am‘rica (Madrid, 1910),
p. 22; GH, p. 251.
20From Luis Machado, 31 December 1746, Gust 455.
21
"Vera to Ensenada, 8 January 1747, Guat 455.
22Vera to Ensenada, 23 February 1747, Guat 455.
45
If Vera were successful in his early attempts to stop the clandestine
trade (there were accusations that he cooperated with rather than fought
the enemy), he had little time to follow up his successes. Combating
illicit trade and fretting over the Mosquito Indians "gave him an apoplexy"
and he died five months after his arrival in Comayagua. 23
On hearing of Vera's death, Governor Heredia assumed jurisdiction
over the province of Honduras, citing the exceptional nature of his
commission as the authority for doing so. When he learned from Thoves
and Arana that before his death Vera had "abandoned himself to the advice
of the enemy git17", Heredia ordered--but apparently without success--
that all correspondence between Comayagua and Black River be stopped. 24
The problems of illicit trade in Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Honduras
were very similar. But while Pitt, acting to secure his trade with the
Spanish, had restricted the offensive activities of the Mosquitos in
Honduras, pressure from the Indians continued to be felt in Costa Rica
and in Nicaragua. The pueblo of Muimui in the mountains of Tologalpa
was attacked by the Mosquitos in 1747 for the third time since 1735;
the alcalde was killed and a number of people taken prisoner. The
Mosquitos also assaulted Lovaga and threatened Loviguiscas and Acoyapa
in the same region. Governor Heredia, fearful of an Anglo-Mosquito
invasion, had sixty loyal Indians patrolling the banks of Lake Nicaragua, 25
23From Thoves and Arana, 20 September 1747, Guat 455.
24Heredia to Tablada, 16 August 1747, Guat 455; Thoves and Arana to
Ensenada, 15 September 1747, Guat 873.
25From Alonso FerntIndez de Heredia, 26 October 1747, Guat 826; Heredia
to Ensenada, 17 April 1747, Guat 640.
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and he commissioned Baltazar Hurtado de Mendoza to construct two
galliota for reconnaissance on the San Juan River, for use against
the Zambos Mosquitos, and to harass contraband traders between Cape
/ 26Gracias a Dios and Chagres. 	 Hurtado sailed for the San Juan ready
for action, 27 but his only success on the expedition, and perhaps
the only one by Spanish arms in Guatemala during the war, was the
destruction of a small English settlement at the mouth of the San
Juan River. 28
Meanwhile, traders arriving in Black River from the interior
brouglit reports that the Spaniards were constructing twelve galliots
/
and many smaller craft on the San Juan to transport an army to Roatan29
and the Mosquito Shore. William Fitt and Major Caulfield, commander
of the small detachment of British troops in Black River, sent a patrol
of Shoremen and Mosquitos to determine the truth of these reports. When
they returned with confirmation of the rumours--actually exaggerated
reports obtained from frightened prisoners--a plea for aid was dispatched
to Jamaica. Governor Trelawny immediately asked the Jamaica council for
approval to send reinforcements to the Shore, but the council denied his
26Heredia to Hurtado, 15 August 1747, Guat 826; From Alonzo Fern‘ndez de
Heredia, 17 August 1747, Gust 826.
27He carried a laree supply of aguardiente "to cure the injured and to
refresh the people when they need it in battle". List of supplies needed
for the exploration of the San Juan River and the Mosquito Coast, 25
August 1747, Gust 826.
28From Heredia, 16 December 1747, Guat 826.
29Roatin was known by the British as Rattan throughout the eighteenth
century.
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request, afraid to weaken the island's defences. However, at their
suggestion, Trelawny sent an engineer, Richard Jones, to construct a
small battery in Black River and to encourage the Indians to aid in
the defence of the community.
To counter the enemy plans, the Shoremen and Mosquitos set out
to capture the fort on the San Juan, but the insufficient flow of water
made it impossible to ascend the river and the attack was cancelled.3°
Hurtado had also found it expedient not to venture past the mouth of
the San Juan, thus averting a confrontation between the two sides.
In the Bay of Honduras, Governor Benavides of Yucatain tried to
attack the English and Mosquitos. He armed a guardacostas (at great
sacrifice to the province because of the exhausted state of the treasury)
which sailed for the Mosquito Coast, then fought the weather for two
months and returned to Merida without having seen the enemy. 31
And so the initiative remained with the English and their Mosquito
allies. In May 1747, they by-passed the Spanish fort of San Fernando
de Matina and sacked the adjacent valley. Two prisoners were released
to warn their unfortunate compatriots that the English and Mosquitos
had promised to return within four months to destroy the fort. 32 Shortly
after noon on 12 August, while most of the garrison in Fort San Fernando
30Monson and others to Newcastle, 14 October 1747, CO 138/19, f. 77;
Trelawny to the Board of Trade, 9 August 1747, CO 137/48, f. 150;
Trelawny to Newcastle, 9 August 1747, T 1/333, f. 27; Jamaica Council
minutes, 20 July 1747, CO 140/32; Trelawny to Newcastle, 19 January
1748, CO 137/58, f. 44.
31Benavides to Philip V, 2 July 1746, Mex 3017.
32Declaration by Francisco Rodriguez, 13 October 1747, CDHCR, ix, 439.
Declaration by Antonio de Albas, 18 September 1747, ibid., p. 405.
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were in the kitchen awaiting the usual meagre lunch of plantains and
chocolate, a party of English soldiers and Mosquitos were gliding
towards them through the swamp and high grass on the blind side of
the fort. A cry suddenly arose from the gates " A las armas! A las
armas! The enemy is coming!" The Spanish troops rushed from the
kitchen, taking what arms they could find, as seventy-five or eighty
of the enemy broke through the barricades. In the great confusion the
Spanish could not turn their cannon against the enemy in the fort, and
with his men falling dead and injured around him the commander cried
" Buen cuartel!" - "We surrender!" The fort was in English and Mosquito
hands, just as they had promised. The victors sacked and burned the
wooden fort and again plundered the nearby cacao plantations. 33
The commander of Fort San Fernando, Francisco Rodriguez, was later
charged with dereliction of duty in allowing the fort to fall to the
enemy. Rodriguez said that he had had insufficient strength to man the
fort, and the lookouts at Mofn and Suerre--and still keep men out
searching for food. At the time of the attack there were only twenty
men fit for action. The commander was also unable to "surrender with
honour" by asking for conditions; because of his inability to speak
English and the chaotic conditions during the fighting, he was forced
to capitulate without first discussing the matter.
33Declaration by Manuel de Campos, 31 August 1747, ibid., p. 397;
Declaration by Antonio de Albas, 18 September 1747, ibid., p. 405;
Declaration by Juan Montalb4n, 19 September 1747, ibid., p. 414;
Declaration by Pedro Rodrfguez, 20 September, 1747, ibid., p. 414;
amez, Costa de Mosquitos,p. 95.
'Declaration by Francisco Rodrfguez, 13 October 1747, CDHCR, ix, 439.
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The Shoremen tried to capitalise on their victory by demanding
that Governor Gemmir y Lleonart of Costa Rica approve free trade between
his province and Jamaica, but the governor's death stopped this effort.
Just as in Honduras at the death of Juan de Vera, Gemmir y Lleonart's
vacant post was claimed by Governor Heredia, who sent Luis Diez Navarro
to Cartago as interim governor, with instructions to stop the clandestine
trade. 35
Heredia's military and administrative endeavours were not appreciated
by the Consejo de la5Indias; he was criticised for extravagant spending,
including 170,451 pesos to prepare the castle on the San Juan for an
attack, and 5,000 pesos for Hurtado's excursion on the San Juan. 36 They
called Heredia's assumption of "absolute jurisdiction" over Nicaragua,
Honduras and Costa Rica a dangerous precedent. "To the prejudice and
dishonour of the Superior Government and Royal Audiencia" of Guatemala,
Heredia had been left "with no one to obey. "37 However he defended his
actions "in the three provinces under my command", arguing that he had
been ordered to spend as much as necessary to stop clandestine trade and
to reduce the Mosquito Indians. As to the accusation that he had failed
to send reinforcements to Matins before the enemy attack, Heredia said
that the fort there "did not merit the name", and that there had been a
greater need to strengthen the citadel on the San Juan.
35Heredia to Ensenada, 6 March 1748, Guat 873; amez, 21);. cit., p. 96;
Rosslyn, "Arguments of Costa Rica", p. 63.
36Dec1aration by Francisco de Olaechea, 26 February 1749, Guat 873:
Account of expenditures, n.d., Guat 827.
37Consejo report, 8 November 1748, Guat 351.
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Heredia also claimed responsibility for the "triumph" over the
clandestine traders and for the cessation of Mosquito incursions.38
He cited a declaration by one Thomas Timothy Pendet, who swore that
1747 and 1748 had been bad years for William Pitt's trade because the
merchants of Honduras had stopped going to Black River, afraid of the
vigilance established by Heredia. 39 Pendet's comments were surely
written at Heredia's request, for Pitt, who would have known if Spanish
officials were arresting his agents and confiscating his goods, said
nothing. In any case, Heredia was too late to save his post, for he
was dismissed on 10 November 1748, although many months passed before
he was actually relieved of his duties.4°
President Rivera y Santa Cruz was in office an even shorter time
than Heredia. He was succeeded by Alonao Arcos y Moreno, a vigorous
man with definite ideas on how the Mosquito Indians should be subjected
to the Spanish crown; he suggested that they go to the source of the
problem, the island of Jamaica, and restore it to Spanish rule. But
the war was approaching its end; Arcos y Moreno was informed that his
plan, though laudable, was impractical.41
After the destruction of Fort San Fernando in the summer of 1747
neither side showed a further desire to fight on the Spanish Main.
The Shoremen preferred attending to their neglected trade aid plantations,
while the Spanish--having neither funds, arms, nor trained men for an
38Declaration by Heredia, 16 August 1749, Guat 449.
39Declaration by Thomas Timothy Pendet, n.d., enclosed in Heredia to
Ensenada, 10 March 1748, Mex 3099.
Real cedula to the president and oidores of the audiencia of Guatemala,
10 November 1748, CDHCR, ix, 454.
41Arcos y Moreno to Ensenada, 25 October 1747, BM, Add.17,583, f. 175.
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offensive--made only a few uninspired efforts to dislodge their
adversaties from posts among the irreduced Indians on the frontier. 42
Rather by inertia than by victory for either side, the War of
Jenkins' Ear ended on 28 June 1748, when Spain followed the other
belligerent powers, Great Britain, France and Holland, in signing the
Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. The convention settled none of the problems
centered in the Bay of Honduras; seizures and clandestine trade
continued, and England retained her settlements on the Shore and at
Belize. 43
 Although the two nations had agreed to restore all territories
conquered during the war, these were not new conquests--nor were they
44
old conquests formally recognised by Spain.
	 The result was an unchanged
and unsettled situation in the Bay, as each nation was left to interpret
the treaty for herself. 45
At the end of the war, Englishmen were lodged in a number of meagre
settlements on the Shore. The principal community of Black River had
fourteen white male inhabitants, a few white women and children, and 100
negroes, mestizos and mulattos. There were twelve white men at Caps
Camercin, five at Brewer's Lagoon, and a like number between Cape Gracias
From Heredia, 30 December 1747, and 21 February 1748, Guat 826;
Declaration by Francisco de Olaechea, 26 February 1749, Gnat 873.
43
The English did evacuate the island of Roatin, which had proved to be
a white elephant from the beginning.
44
Pares, ca.cit., p. 104; Caldercin, Belice, p. 139.
Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, 1748, TCD, p. 49; Ensenada to the governor
of Honduras, 21 May 1749, SP 94/250, f. 109; Alan Cuthbert Burns,
History of the British West Indies (New York, 1965), p. 484; Trelawny
to Bedford, 8 April 1749, CO 137/57, f. 524; Bedford to Trelawny,
25 November 1748, 30/8/98, vol. ii, f. 380; Bedford to Trelawny, 30 June
1749, 30/8/98, vol. ii, f. 382.
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a Dios and Sandy Bay, the home of Mosquito King Edward.
	 A few more
white men and slaves were settled at Bluefields and at other points between
Sandy Bay and the San Juan River. The small garrison at Black River,
which had been transferred from Roaan at the end of the war, brought
little security to these settlements, for even as word of peace reached
Black River rumours were circulating that the Spanish were lavishly
supplying the Mosquitos with gifts ("its well known that they are People
to be easily Gained when such Methods are taken", Pitt had written), and
preparing to attack the Shore. Pitt, who was not a cowardly man, announced
that he would leave the Shore in the spring unless additional troops were
sent from Jamaica to defend the settlers. 47 Although no Spanish force
was actually being prepared, Pitt's fears were well-founded. When
PantaleOn Ybkez Cuebas was named governor of Comayagua late in 1748,
he was ordered "to suppress, pacify and reduce" the Zambos Mosquitos
Indians. 48 Soon afterwards the new governor of Nicaragua was also
commanded to attend to their "conquest and conversion". 49 But these
orders--given to so many others without success--were for the present
ignored.
On 7 October 1748, Governor Trelawny requested that the Lords of
Trade consider a lasting form of government for the scattered marooners
Jones to Trelawny, 22 September 1748, CO 123/3.
47
Pitt to Trelawny, 17 July 1749, CO 137/59, f. 2.
48Valenciano to Yb4nez Cuebas, 21 December 1748, Guat 456.
49
Real cedula to PantaleOn Ybkez Cuebas, 26 April 1749, CRM, p. 145.
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on the Mosquito Shore. Government protection would encourage merchants
and planters to settle there, he said, and make the Shore one of the
greatest British markets in the West Indies by increasing commerce with
the kingdom of Guatemala and Yucatein, and by frustrating Dutch commercial
schemes in the Bay of Honduras. 50
Unknown to Governor Trelawny when he sent his proposals to Whitehall,
Robert Hodgson51 was in London--as he had been five years earlier--to bid
for a post on the Mosquito Shore. Hodgson's reasons for supporting a
government on the Shore complemented the governor's. He agreed that
England's honour demanded that the marooners and Indians be protected,
and ridiculed the suggestion that establishing an English government
there would offend the Spaniards. It could happen, he admitted, but not
"till we were successful and were found out to be so, and then would
be Time enough for the Ministry to disown them...." Furthermore, he
argued, the next war would find them with much greater knowledge of the
Spanish colonies on the peninsula. Hodgson proudly admitted that
another motive for his petition was to promote and participate in "new
Avenues of Commerce" on the Spanish Main. 52
50Rumours had reached Jamaica that a Dutch company from Curacao intended
to establish a trading post at Cape Gracias a Dios under the pretence
of erecting saw mills to cut cedar and mahogany. Trelawny to the
Lords of Trade, 7 October 1748, CO 123/3.
51Hodgson, who had been sent to the Shore in 1740 (see above, p. 18) by
Trelawny, spent the last years of the war in South Carolina as commander
of an independent company. But the company was "lately broke", and
Hodgson returned to England early in 1748. Hodgson to Aldworth, 25
July 1749, 30/50/39, f. 25.
5 2Ibid.
Hodgson, 5 October 1749,
Trelawny, 5 October 1749
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On 5 October 1749, after weeks of long deliberations by the Lords
of Trade, the Duke of Bedford, secretary of state for the southern
department, named Captain Robert Hodgson of the 49th Regiment of Foot
the first superintendent of the Mosquito Shore.
I have received His Majesty's Commands to inform you,
that He has been pleased to appoint you to regulate and
Superintend the Settlement upon the Mosquito Shore, which
has been subsisting several Years, under the Protection of
Our Friends & Allies the Mosquito Indians.
You will therefore repair forthwith to Jamaica, and
put yourself under the Direction of the Governor of that
Island, who is empowered to give you farther Instructions,
and dirdcted to pay you a Salary of Five hundred Pounds a
Year for that Service, commencing from the Date hereof, as
you will see by the inclosed Copy of my Letter to Mr.
Trelawny, which I send you for your Information, and as soon
as you shall have received the Orders, he may think proper to
give you, you will proceed without Loss of time, to the
Mosquito Shore.
You will regularly inform the Governor of Jamaica now,
& for the time being of your Proceedings, and follow the
Instructions he shall think proper to give you, for the
Good of this particular Service.53
Hodgson was instructed to:
cultivate such an Union & Friendship with the Indians in
those parts, as may induce them to prefer His Maty's Alliance
& Protection to that of any other Power whatever, which must
at all Events be of Advantage to this Nation, but especl,ally
in Case of any future Rupture with the Crown of Spain.54.
The English superintendency on the Mosquito Shore—the first official
English government on the mainland of Spanish America--had been established;
Spanish reaction was to follow.
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CHAPTER III
THE SUPERINTENDENCY of OBERT HODGSO the ELDER,
1749 - 1755
The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle ending the War of Jenkins' Ear
left the English solidly established in the Bay of Honduras and
refusing to abandon their settlements or their contraband trade (the
Mosquito Indians and English marooners were even unwillinb to recognise
the peace), and the Spanish determined to assume sovereignty throughout
the area. With each nation interpreting the treaty in her own way,
England and Spain remained dangerously close to a renewal of hostilities
until a fragile detente was established in 1754.
England had no official on the Mosquito Shore immediately after
the war to govern the settlers or to control the warlike activities of
the Mosquitos, who made continuous attacks on Mui Mui, Comalapa, Lobaga,
Boaco and other villages. Bosco, a village of forcibly reduced and
discontented Indians, was attacked after a number of its unhappy
inhabitants pleaded with the Zambos Mosquitos to aid them in punishing
their Spanish tormentors. The Mosquitos responded by murderinb a
Spanish missionary in the village and enslaving seventy Indians.
William Pitt, the Shore's leading settler, was accused of inciting
these raids, but in at least one instance marooners from Bluefields
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were responsible. 1
 Robert Hodgson, who had been named the first
superintendent of the Shore on 8 October 1749, was still in London,
while neither Pitt nor the officer commandin b
 the small troop in Black
River seemed able or willing to govern effectively.
In June 1749, Pitt threatened the province of Honduras with a
Mosquito invasion unless the murderers of a certain Dr. Dempster were
punished. While the local inhabitants rushed into the hills in panic,
Diego Tablada, teniente of Governor Francisco FernAndez de Heredia of
Nicaragua, and interim governor of Honduras, searched for a way to defend
the province against the savage Mosquitos. A French merchant-adventurer,
Raymond Grenier, who said that he wanted to harass English contraband
traders and Mosquito Indians, had recently arrived on the Honduras coast
from New Orleans in an armed vessel well supplied with French goods.
Grenier and a Spanish merchant, Francisco Mateo de la Guerra y Vega, were
given a corsair's commission by Tablada. Guerra purchased a small vessel
with money borrowed from Pitt, hired an English captain and crew from
Black River, loaded the vessel with French goods obtained from Grenier
(but manifested as English merchandise), and furnished the captain with
fraudulent documents signed by Governor Trelawny of Jamaica. Guerra
and Grenier then "seized" Guerra's own ship in what they described as
Castillo to Truco, 22 May 1749, Guat 873; Cabildo of Leen to Ensenada,
7 October 1749, Guat 352; Heredia to Trela;17377-26 January 1750, Guat
351; Pitt to Trelawny, 8 April 1751, CO 137/57, f. 544; Francisco de
Paula Garcia Pe16ez, Memorias para la historia del antiguo reyno de 
Guatemala (3 vols., Guatemala, 1851), iii, 50; Pablo L6vy, Notes
geogrilficas y econ6micas sobre la Replblica de Nicaragua.... (Paris,
1873), p. 43; Pares, War and Trace, p. 542.
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a "bloody battle", and took the merchandise to Comayagua where it was
declared to be a le6a1 prize by Tablada, a decision later confirmed by
Heredia. Pitt and Trelawny, Guerra, Grenier, the hired English captain
and Governor Heredia, even the Honduras treasury officials Thoves and
Arana--who so often ranted at the illegal commercial activities of other
Spanish officials--were all involved in the scheme. 2
The contraband trader did not usually go to so much trouble to peddle
his wares. He was often convoyed to the Main by English men-of-war, to
trade openly with Spanish merchants, even during periods of conflict.
In 1751, while "some Merchants of the best Reputation" were trading in
Black River, their own governor was preparing to attack the community. 3
Genuine efforts to suppress the clandestine trade are more difficult
to trace than efforts to promote it. Governor Pantale4n Yb gBez Cuebas of
Honduras said that his predecessors, Juan de Vera, stopped the trade with
thirty horse dragoons, but after Vera's death the number of dragoons
diminished until the illicit trade was as strong as ever. Ybgfiez claimed
in 1751 that he again cut off the trade with Black River by bringing the
troop complement back to normal, but he complained that President Josg
Vgzquez of Guatemala ruined his efforts by transferring the dragoons to
Omoa. However a few dragoons could never have stopped a commerce on
2Pitt to Urrua, 21 June 1749, AHN, Con 20,964; Arrias to Walton, 26
September 1749, AHN, Con 20,964; Guerra to Tablada, 9 December 1749,
cited by Adgn Szaszdi de Nagy, "El Comercio ilicito de la provincia
de Honduras", RI, lxviii (1957), p. 279; Consejo report, 9 October
1761, Guat 407.
3Keene to Bedford, 6 October 1749, SP 94436, f. 151; Hodgson to Aldworth,
12 July 1751, CO 137/57, f. 562.
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which so many people depended. Even minor efforts to hinder it were
likely to generate unruly reactions. After some contrabandistas from
Sonaguera were punished with "arrogance and cruelty", a militia officer
was murdered in retaliation. Similar resistance was shown in Olancho
and elsewhere. 4
When Superintendent Robert Hodgson arrived in Jamaica on the way to
his post in January 1750, he heard rumours that the Spanish, "flush'd
with their Success against the Dutch trading Sloops on the Coast of Caraccas
were preparing to attack the Mosquito Shore. Governor Trelawny, who was
determined to maintain England's precarious position in the Bay of
Honduras, ordered him to the Shore as quickly as possible to "take fflig
Chance with the Detachment, the Settlers and the Moskito Indians." 5
Assured of the Mosquito tA loyalty, even that they would be rather
more irritated than alarmed by the Spanish invasion menace, Hodgson was
confident when he departed for Black River. He arrived on the Shore to
find the rumours of a Spanish attack apparently confirmed, but he hoped
to effect its postponement or cancellation with a demonstration of his
sincerity. Not only would he control the Indians, he had provocative
commercial proposals for Spanish merchants and officials. To forward
his plans, Hodgson had brought a London educated Spaniard, Pablo Ruiz,
from England as his factor. Immediately after their arrival in Black
4 ..-
Ybanez to Vaizquez, 29 January 1752, Guat 455; yallez to Ferdinand VI,
27 February 1755, Guat 873; Yl,a5ez to Ensenada, 6 July 1752 and 10
October 1753, Guat 455.
5Hodgson to Aldworth, 3 February 1750, CO ,137/59, f. 10; Trelawny to
Hodgson, 14 April 1750, CO 137/59, f. 28.
59
River, Hodgson sent Ruiz to the president of Guatemala under the pretext
of demanding that the assassins of two English merchants be punished,
but with private instructions to open a correspondence with Guatemalan
merchants. 6 From Comayagua, however, Ruiz was rerouted to Granada where
Governor Heredia claimed that the affairs of the Mosquito Coast "belong
to none but myself", 7 and appropriated the letters addressed to President
1Vazquez, accusing the "pusillanimous" Vazquez of failing to expel the
English or to reduce the Mosquito Indians. Heredia then demanded that
all arms be taken from the Mosquitos, that Spanish Indians held in slavery
by the Mosquitos be freed, and that the English evacuate Black River and
Belize. In exchange he promised that
If the Zambos Mosquitos Indians will render obedience to
their legitimate monarch, the King my master, I will treat
them with kindness,without doing them any harm, on the
condition that they accept a governor to be named by me, as 8
well as Missionaries to reduce them to the Catholic Religion.
Hodgson replied that he was always "glad to see any Gentleman at
Black River who made the Propagation of the Gospel his Profession...."
However, because the Zambos Mosquitos would undoubtedly rebel at finding
Spanish missionaries in their territory, it was "almost certain the
Consequence would be Death to any such pious Gentleman in spite of all
I could do to prevent it." Hodgson promised to try to impede the Mosquito
incursions, although the Indians were an independent people who declared
6Ruiz believed that Hodgson's intentions did not extend beyond the mercantil,
they extended far beyond. Hodgson hoped that England would assume control
of the peninsula for trading purposes, but he was unable to advance this
idea. Although similar schemes were proposed throughout the eighteenth
century, no attempt was made to execute the dream until the American
revolution. See below, p.255.
7
Hodgson to (probably) Aldworth, 14 November 1754, Sta Fe 1261; Declaration
by Juan S4nchez Buitrago, 22 November 1751, Guat 873.
8 Heredia to Trelawny, 23 June 1750, CO 137/59, f. 43; Heredia to
Hodgson, 22 June 1750, SP 94/250, f. 204.
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themselves to be at perpetual war with the Spanish; but as to acknowledging
a Spaniard as their governor, he scowled "Sir, I am already here posted
among them by the Governour of Jamaica." 9
Heredia condemned the "unjust continuance of the hostilities gy
the Mosquitog against the sad Indian pueblos, and the sale of their
prisoners to the English, although they know that they were born free,
vassals of his Catholic Majesty." Governor Trelawny assured Heredia
that Hodgson would have suppressed this "vile Practice", except that he had
been called to duty in South Carolina late in the war, and the Mosquitos,
who were "Strangely bent on this inhuman Traffick", had returned to their
old habits. 10
Trelawny also said that England would not abandon the Mosquito Shore;
her dominion over the territory was unquestioned, and based on the
seventh article of the Treaty of 1670.
Moreover it is agreed that the most Serene King of Great
Britain and his Heirs and Successors shall have, hold and
keep and always possess in full right of Sovereigdity, Seiniory,
Possession and Propriety, all the Lands, Countries, Islands,
Colonies and other Places, be they what they will, lying and
Situate in the West Indies, or in any part of America which
the said King of Great Britain and his Subjects now hold and
Possess....
Furthermore, the Mosquito Indians made a voluntary cession of their country
to the English crown in 1687 which was reconfirmed by Hodgson's treaty
9Hodgson to Heredia, 3 December 1750, co 137/59, f.
10Heredia to Hodgson, 22 June 1750, SP 94/250, f. 204; Heredia to TrelawnY,
23 June 1750, CO 137/59, f. 47; Trelawny to Bedford, 15 November 1750,
CO 137/59, f. 41. Hodgson to Aldworth, 10 April 1751, co 137/57, f. 550;
Trelawny to Heredia, 16 October 1750, co 137/59, f. 48.
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with King Edward in 1740. 11 The governor ignored Heredia's demand to
confiscate the arms distributed among the Mosquitos. The move would
only anger them, and in any case the weapons had probably all been ruined
by rust and misuse.
Observing that Heredia's major complaint was about Indian slavery
rather than political dominion, and desiring to appease the brigadier,
Hodgson and Trelawny sent Ruiz to collect as many Christian slaves as he
could from the Mosquitos, and then to make a second visit to Heredia.
At the same time Hodgson dispatched a boat to the San Juan River to meet
two of Heredia's galliots. But the vessel, which carried a few Indian
slaves and "gifts" for Heredia (which were probably goods intended for
trade with the governor and merchants of Granada), was seized by the
infamous corsair Captain "Pancho the Cataltin". Rather than meeting
Hodgson's party, Heredia's men encountered two Mosquito piraguas and lost
one of the galliots in the ensuing skirmish. Hodgson was grieved. He
believed that if the contact had succeeded, a safe commerce would have
been opened with the interior, "because that chief Leredia7 desired nothing
more than motives to cover up his own activities from the court. ,12
Heredia accused Hodgson of luring the galliots into a trap, but
Ruiz placated him with assurances that the Mosquitos had consented to
11Trelawny to Heredia, 16 October 1750, SP 94/250, f. 278; Heredia contended
that the Treaty of 1670 applied only to dominions that had "from that
Time maintain'd themselves in, under the Rules of Government & laws &
customs." He noted that "Nothing of this has been observ'd in Rio Tinto."
Rio Tinto was the Spanish name for the English settlement at Black River.
Heredia to Trelawny, 30 April 1751, CO 137/59, f. 141.
12_
Hodgson to (probably) Aldworth, 14 November 1754, Sta Fe 1261.
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a general peace with the Spaniards. In fact, they were already calling
the Spanish their "brothers" --and asking only to be allowed to trade
in Spanish territory and to fish anywhere they wished.13
The commercial nature of Ruiz' commission is apparent throughout
the correspondence between Ruiz, Hodgson, Trelawny and Heredia. "We may
henceforward obtain greater advantages", Ruiz had told Heredia, "by the
continual Communication the Spaniards will have by entering amongst them
gleaning the Mosquito Indians and by extension the Jamaican traders] by
Sea & Land, & They amongst Us." He also hinted that the Shoremen might
allow Heredia to introduce missionaries among the Mosquito Indians.
(Unknown to Ruiz, a Spanish missionary representing one of Heredia's
fellow governors had already arrived in Black River and had been allowed
to stay--if only temporarily.) 14 To silence the suspicions about his
illicit trading interests, Heredia encouraged rumours that the liberation
of Indian slaves by the English was his pretext for allowing the
foreigners to remain on the Mosquito Coast. 15
13The Mosquito king (El Ell Quin—pronounced keen--alias "Chache" to the
Spanish) had an additional request: that Heredia release his brother-in-
law who had been captured during a raid on Boaco. Heredia promised to
free the captive, but it is unknown if he actually did so.
14
See below, p. 65.
Ruiz to Heredia, 7 March 1751, CO 137/59, f. 127; Declaration by Juan
S4nchez, 22 November 1751, Guat 873; Trelawny to Bedford, 17 July 1751,
CO 137/59, f. 112. Ruiz quoted Heredia as saying: "It is marvelous how
the English will run such great risks for the illicit trade of a little
wood, sarsaparilla and turtle, when they could easily obtain a licence
to cut wood and to sell goods anywhere on the coast between Truxillo and
the San Juan, as well as for the introduction of Negroes, who are much
needed for the work in the mines of Guatemala."
The governor had 50,000 pesos to invest,"but it was too dangerous to do
so until he became president of Guatemala." Hodgson to (probably) Aldworti
14 November 1754, Sta Fe 1261.
15
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Meanwhile, Ferdinand VI responded to the solicitations of numerous
officials by issuing a real cedula on 22 September 1750 designed to
eliminate the problem of Mosquito incursions and clandestine trade.
If the English refused to evacuate the Coast they were to be thrown out;
if the Zambos Mosquitos denied their vassalagea7gbedience to Ferdinand
they were also to be ejected. 16 When Heredia received the cedula, he
claimed that he would have long since dislodged the English and reduced
the Indians except for President Vizquez' opposition and obstruction. 17
for want of Foresight, & Understanding in the Presidt. of
Guatimala, Every Military Operation here will miscarry;
Since, over & above his known Dislike Jealousy & Opposition
to People of Our Profession, as he is so regular in his
Fiscal Schemes, his Council Votes, and Assemblies concerning
the King's Estate, he benumms L6ic7 every Disposition that
has either Zeal or Activity. 18
Heredia also accused Vezquez of maliciously conspiring to frame him at
court on the Guerra-Grenier contraband plot, but his apparent belligerent
ways were tempered by his contacts with Trelawny and Hodgson. He asked
the Marques de la Ensenada, secretary of the four departments of finance,
war, marine and Indies, for an interpretation of the Treaty of 1670 as it
applied to the English settlement in Roaten, which he was considering
attacking, making no mention of the far more important communities of
Black River and Belize. Yet knowing that he must demonstrate his intention
16The actual intention of the Spanish ministry at this time, as indicated
by subsequent dispatches, was to reduce or to exterminate the Mosquitos
rather than to expel them from the Mosquito Shore.
17
Real cedula, 22 September 1750, Guat 406; Heredia to Iscar, 12 January 175]
CO 137/59, f. 137; Hodgson to Aldworth, 10 April 1751, CO 137/57, f. 550;
Pitt to Trelawny, 8 April 1751, CO 137/57, f. 544; Heredia to Ensenada,
12 April 1751, CO 137/59, f. 133.
18Heredia to the viceroy of Mexico, 30 April 1751, English trans., CO 137/59,
f. 137.
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to carry out the royal commands, Heredia requested funds and military
equipment from the presidents of Guatemala and Panama, and the viceroy
of Mgxico. Perhaps he would have attacked the Coast if he had received
the support he requested; but he did not receive it; he probably did not
expect to. 19
The cedula of 22 September gave equal responsibility for operations
against the Mosquito Shore to the governor of Yucatifm, the Marques de Iscar.
Iscar, amazed as the governors of Yucat4n usually were at receiving this
remote responsibility, said that it was impossible for him to attend
personally to the conquest, but he promised to help as best he could. 20
Left confused and leaderless by the absence of their superintendent,
who was in Jamaica, and fearful that the small number of disease-ridden
British soldiers on the Shore would goad the Spanish into action, the
Shoremen requested the removal of the troops. They preferred to rely
on the Mosquito Indiana for protection. Governor Trelawny publicly agreed
to remove the detachment of twenty men, but privately he promised Hodgson
to replace them with forty "King's Negroes" and fifty veterans (dressed
as marooners so as not to anger the Spanish). 21
Although Ferdinand's intention to reduce the Mosquitos and to expel
the Shoremen was explicit, the use of force was dependent upon the failure
19Heredia to Iscar, 26 April 1751, CO 137/57, f. 572; Heredia to Ensenada,
26 April 1751, SP 94/251, f. 5; Heredia to Navarro, 5 April 1751, Guat 874.
20Iscar to Ferdinand VI, 8 March 1751,Mex 3017.
21
Trelawny to Bedford, 7 December 1750, CO 137/59, f. 58; Trelawny to
Bedford, 8 Dece ber 1750, CO 137/59, f. 60; Trelawny to Bedford,
17 July 1751, CO 137/59, f. 112; Hodgson to Aldworth, 11 July 1751,
CO 137/57, f. 559.
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of more peaceful means. At the end of the war, Jose Gonzalez Ranca5o,
who had been named to replace Heredia as governor of Nicaragua, but who
was still in Spain, requested permission to send a missionary to the Coast
to reduce the Mosquitos "by the cross rather than by the sword". Ferdinand
approved the plan. Even if it were unsuccessful, the knowledge acquired
would be valuable in the future. The priest Gonzalez proposed to use,
Juan de Solis y Miranda, was already known in Black River. Early in the
war he had been shipwrecked on the Coast, where he was well treated by
Pitt and the Indians, and then opened a commerce between Black River and
Guatemala; Gonzalez undoubtedly hoped to profit by a renewed contact with
the Coast--with the king's unknowing permission--thus explaining his
objection to the use of force to convert the Mosquitos. 22 When the two
men finally arrived in Nicaragua after a further long delay in Spain,
Gonzalez' relationship with Heredia immediately erupted into a contentious
rivalry. Gonzalez corroborated Hodgson's remarks that Heredia trafficked
with the English and that his apparent support of force against the
English and Mosquitos was merely a pretence to pass some large bills on
the public accounts and procure future access to the royal treasury. 23
In May 1751, while Hodgson was in Jamaica to discuss Ruiz' first
journey to Granada--and to recover his health ("Fevers, Dysenteries, and
22_
veclaration by Juan de Solis y Miranda, 26 February 1743, Guat 665;
Real cedula to Jose Gonzalez Rancao, 26 April 1759, CR14 , P . 145;
Ensenada to Gonzalez, 26 April 1759, Guat 873.
23
Paradoxically, Solis accused Heredia of using influential friends at
court to promote the extermination of the Mosquitos by sangre z fuego.
See Gonzalez to Heredia, 21 November 1751, AGI, Guat 873.
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pleuritick Pains, having been my chief Amusements since my landing at
Black River") 24-- Solfs arrived in Black River. His first responsibility
was to gain William Pitt's confidence, hopefully by conversion to the
Church, and then to work through him to reduce the Indians, and finally
to move them inland away from the "pernicious influence" of the English. 25
Solis was greeted with great civility in Black River; his presence
was a form of protection against invasion and an instrument to promote
25a trade with the interior. "Thro' the assistance & connivance of Mr Pitt",
who hoped to obtain permission to move his family and slaves into Spanish
territory, Solis was allowed to remain in Black River until Governor
Trelawny was consulted. 27
Solis had considerable early success with the Mosquitos. King Edward
accepted baptism for himself and his people and asked the missionary to
come to Sandy Bay to teach the young Mosquitos, although he again demanded
the freedom to fish, hunt and trade in Spanish territory. To demonstrate
his "vassalage and obedience" to Ferdinand, Edward promised to pay a
symbolic yearly tribute of one tortoise shell, a masorca of cacao and
a bunch of bananas, representing everything that the Indians needed for
24
Hodgson to Aldworth, 10 April 1751, CO 137/57, f. 550.
25Gonzalez to Solis, 5 and 7 March 1751, Gnat 873; Declaration by Jos‘
Gonzeflez Ranca5o, 20 and 22 November 1751, Guat 873; GonzAlez to Heredia,
21 November 1751, Guat 873; GonzAlez to Ferdinand VI, 2 December 1751,
Guat 873; Jones and Lawrie to Trelawny, 9 April 1751, CO 137/59, f. 149.
26Solis to GonzAlez, 26 May 1731, Guat 873; Pitt to Trelawny, 8 April 1751,
CO 137/59, f. 117.
27Trelawny to Holdernesse, 25 November 1751, CO 137/59, f. 163.
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subsistence. GonzSlez was jubilant with Solis' success and requested
additional money and missionaries to enlarge the work on the Coast. 28
But in the midst of the rainy season Solis' edifice began to crumble.
Hodgson returned to Black River and Solis lost an opportunity to gain
his support by telling him that "there was not the least doubt that
these territories were the seigniories and dominions of my Catholic King",
reasoning illogically that the country "belongs to the king of Spain
because they are his own dominions." 29 Still, Hodgson was wary of
acting too hastily against the missionary for fear of offering the
Spanish an easy annexation of the Shore by widening the dissension
between those settlers favouring Solis and those opposed.
The reaction of the obstreperous and independent General Handyside
to Edward's conversion gave Hodgson an opportunity to act. Handyside
forced the king to denounce his relationship with Solis by threatening
a civil war. A delegation of Zambos even asked Hodgson for permission
to kill the missionary. "The Fellow's Impudence, Dishonesty and desperate
Zeal have richly deserv'd it", he wrote, but he denied their request in
spite of the temptation. Hodgson informed Trelawny of Solis' subversive
activities, which included a conspiracy to massacre all the English and
Indians on the Shore who did not adhere to his teachings. Trelawny
ordered Solis to be brought to Jamaica to answer charges that he had
been sent to the Shord "to pervert & bring over the Indians to the
28Solis to Gonziles, 3 July and 23 August 1751, Guat 873; Hodgson to
Aldworth, 12 July 1751, CO 137/57, f. 562; Gonz4lez to Ferdinand VI,
29 July 1751, Guat 873.
29So1is to Hodgson, 26 July 1751, Gust 873.
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Catholick Religion & the King of Spain's obedience."
	 Solis
arrived in Jamaica, Governor Trelawny took him into his own home,
promising that he could return to Nicaragua when he proved that he had
a commission from his king. But Solis, who was in debt to an English
merchant from an earlier trading venture, was recognised in the streets
of Kingston and imprisoned; then, to Hodgson's horror, he died in gaol
("in cruel chains", according to Gonzalez). "The Clergy of Guatimala",
Hodgson wrote, "are all in a ferment about Father Solis, and load one
liberally with their Anathemas, and when they hear of his death, I make
no doubt will propogate a Belief that I have got him Murdered...." 31
When Gonzallez arrived in Nicaragua, Heredia was transferred to
Comayagua as governor of Honduras. Solis claimed that he took 2,000 small
arms with him, and was now recruiting 3,000 men to invade the Shore.
Richard Jones and Lt. James Lawrie 32
 reported that a Spanish fleet in
the Gulf of Dulce would join with galliots from Lake Nicaragua in the
invasion. Hodgson heard that five privateers commanded by Pancho the
Catalan had orders to attack Black River, and a North American merchant
30
Trelawny to Holdernesse, 25 November 1751, CO 137/59, f. 163. Hodgson's
desire to remove Solis may have been for the expressed reason that he was
trying to corrupt the Mosquitos, but it is more likely that, as the middle
man in the commerce between GonAlez and Pitt, Solis represented a threat
to the trade that Hodgson was trying to develop with Heredia.
31
Hodgson to Aldworth, 12 July 1751, CO 137/57, f. 562; Trelawny to Heredia,
15 May 1752, CO 137/59, f. 218; Hodgson to Knowles, 19 January 1753,
CO 137/60, f. 25; Log of H.M.S. Queenborough, Captain Robert Duff, 25
August 1751, Adm 51/755; Hodgson to Halifax, 22 February 1752, CO 137/48,
f. 225; Declaration by GonzAlez, 26 November 1751, Guat 873; Gonzkez to
Arriaga, 26 April 1755, Guat 456.
32Both men, together with Hodgson's son, served under Captain Hodgson.
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said that sixteen vessels had sailed from Havana, St. Augustine and
Campeche to blockade the British settlements in the Bay. Hodgson was
overwhelmed with these worries and others; his health was failing and
his son was missing; the Spanish corsairs were using RoatSn, off the
leeward Shore, as a rendezvous, while the French were reportedly planning
to settle Old Providence, off the windward Shore. He was also dissatisfied
with his dependency on William Pitt, his friend and business rival, who
was the only person on the Shore with a sufficient number of slaves "to
carry on the King's service". 33
 Furthermore, the seizure of his vessel
had delayed a rapprochement with Heredia, and Hodgson was angry with
Commodore Townshend, commander of the Jamaica station, for refusing to
send warships to the Shore. Hodgson blamed Townshend for his apparent
failure with Heredia. If his vessel had been convoyed to the mouth of
the San Juan, he argued, it would not have been seized, and the Shore
would not be awaiting an invasion. He found Townshend's reasons for not
assisting him incomprehensible; the commodore had • "particular dislike"
for the idea, and would do nothing without specific orders from home.
Spanish "insolence" had forced him to retain every vessel under his
immediate command, "which methinks is an odd Reason for exposing us to
more gnsolencg", Hodgson retorted.
Rather than fall prey to a monstrous invasion force, the Shoremen
33Fitt to Trelawny, 8 April 1751, CO 137/57, f. 544; Jones and Lawrie
to Trelawny, 9 April 1751, CO 137/57, f. 546; Hodgson to Aldworth,
10 April 1751, CO 137/57, f. 550; Solis to Gonzillez, 26 May 1751,
Gust 873.
3' Hodgson to Aldworth, 10 April 1751, CO 137/57, f. 550.
70
sent a piragua to reconnoitre the harbours and islands in the Bay of
Honduras. They found no sign of Spanish military preparations, but on
a stormy night near Omoa a flash of lightning revealed a nearby vessel
which they immediately boarded and found to be a Spanish mail packet
carrying official dispatches from Heredia. The capture became an act
of piracy when the Shoremen seized a considerable quantity of doubloons,
silver and pieces of eight, then abandoned the crew on a deserted beach
and sank the vessel. The dispatches were taken to Black River, where
they were studied by Pitt and by Hodgson, who had returned from Jamaica.
Although the documents proved Spain's aggressive intentions towards the
Shore, Heredia's request for an interpretation of the Treaty of 1670
promised a long respite. The seizure of the mailboat might have caused
an Anglo-Spanish rupture, but Whitehall disavowed the act and the Spanish
court accepted the indirect apology. 35
In their official correspondence, Trelawny and Heredia arrived at
a kind of truce which concealed whatever private arrangement Ruiz had
reached with the Spanish governor. Heredia continued to call for the
complete evacuation of Roatin, but while refuting English claims to the
Mosquito Shore he no longer demanded that the Shoremen evacuate their
settlements. Nevertheless, in spite of the harmony between the two
governors, the gentle methods of Gonz‘lez, and the inaction of Vsizquez,
the Shoremen were not relieved from harassment or future danger. Corsair
35Hodgson to Aldworth, 11 July 1751, CO 137/57, f. 559; Hodgson to Aldworth,
12 July 1751, CO 137/57, f. 562; Trelawny to Bedford, 17 July 1751,
CO 137/59, f. 112; Ensenada to Wall, 24 January 1752, AHN, Est 4267,
vol. ii.
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commissions were easy to obtain and many unscrupulous men took advantage
of this licenced piracy to prey on shipping in the Bay of Honduras.
Furthermore, complaints were still reaching the Spanish court of English
contraband trade andMosquito slave raids. To remedy these evils, President
Vazquez was again ordered to reduce the Mosquitos and to dislodge the
English. 36
 But Vezquez was not anxious to initiate such a dangerous
enterprise, which he said demanded more time and care, and suggested that
an attack on Belize would be easier. The Marques de la Ensenada called
Vazquez' suggestion impetuous and unwarranted; Belize was not even within
his jurisdiction. He repeated the order for Vezquez to "personally direct
the enterprize of dislodging the English, and the Zambos Mosquito Indians
from the coast of Honduras." Corsairs and zuardacostas from Omoa would
join with others from Panama to assault the enemy, while the armada de
barlovento (windward fleet) would sail from Havana to block communication
between Jamaica and the Coast. But the admiral of the armada did not
obey his orders, and when English reinforcements were sent to the Shore
to repulse an invasion, Vezquez decided to correspond with Trelawny.
English troops were "violently occupying the Territories belonging to
His Majesty", he wrote. "Such behaviour.. .might be the beginning of
complete breaks between the two crowns." If he had to use force, Vezquez
added, the Shoremen would be "treated with that Severity...which Pirates
& disturbers of the publick quiet are deserving of, being Usurpers of
36Heredia to Trelawny, 30 April 1751, CO 137/59, f. 141; Ensenada to
Vezquez, 25 April 1751, Guat 448; Unsigned minute, 31 October 1752, Gust
448; Vizquez' original assignment to the presidency of the audiencia of
Guatemala had been primarily for the purpose of expelling the English
from the Mosquito Shore. Ensenada to Vezquez, 26 June 1752, Mex 3099.
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the Rights of the Princes of the Earth, to whom the greatest veneration
& respect is due." Veizquez further denied British claims to the Bay of
Honduras and refused to recognise the Trelawny-Heredia truce.37
notwithstanding the Agreement you imagined that Brigadier
Heredia had made with Your Excy (the w:ch my Small knowledge
can't comprehend upon), gg...a positive order from the King
my Master,...he Should use his endeavours with the Officers
that Commanded at the Island of Rattan, the Places adjacent
& Black River on the Coast of Honduras, to the end that they n
Should evacuate & leave them free as they were before the War. 30
President Valzquez had neither the desire nor the means to carry out
his orders or his threats. And according to Heredia, "For wept of foresight
and understanding in the president...every military operation will miscarry.'
The question was left to the two courts to decide, although for many years
it was not resolved, and each succeeding ministry approached the issue
anew. Every few years English and Spanish under-secretaries had to
search through poorly-kept archives to compile brief histories of the
dispute. Spain's determination to expel the English from the coasts of
Honduras and Yucatan never weakened, but her efforts to do so were
blundering and intermittent. England had no regular policy towards those
settlements, unless it was to protect English commerce by preserving
the status quo. English ministers were poorly acquainted with the Bay
of Honduras. Ambassador Keene, when ordered to persuade Ensenada to
37Heredia to the viceroy of Mexico, 30 April 1751, CO 137/59, f. 141;
From Veizquez, 1 April 1752, AGS, Est 8133, folder 8a; Consejo report
approved by Ferdinand VI, 21 May 1752, AGS, Est 8133, folder 8a; Reales
6rdenes to Veizquez, 9 September 1752, AGS, Est 8133, folder 8a; Ensenada
T-4771327pez, 26 June 1752 and 24 September 1752, Mex 3099; Trelawny to
Heredia, 15 May 1752, CO 137/59, f. 218; Trelawny to Holdernesse, 25 May
1752, CO 137/59, f. 197. To guard against a more insidious invasion,
Hodgson was told not "to allow any Papist Missionary to reside on the said
Shore on any account whatever." Trelawny to Hodgson, 20 May 1752, CO
137/59, f. 216.
38Vazquez to Trelawny, 25 November 1752, English trans., CO 137/25, vol.iii,
f. 336.
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cancel his offensive schemes against the Mosquito Shore, admitted his
ignorance of British rights there. He understood that "one Capt. Hogson
L73127 Zas assigned to the Shorg in order to make further Discoveries up
into the Inland Countries, and to be better Situated as to the Ports for
carrying on the Logwood Trade from the Bay of Campeachy." 39
 The Bay of
Campeche is hundreds of miles from Belize and even farther from the
Mosquito Shore. Unfortunately Keene turned to Newcastle for illumination,
and no English minister in the eighteenth century was more obscure on
the subject than he. Keen's comments on the Mosquite settlements gave
the king some concern, Newcastle remarked. "If it relates to the Right
of cutting Logwood", he added uncertainly (it did not), then "the claim
of His Maty's Subjects to it seems well founded." Then later: "Your
paragraph about the Mosquito Shore gives me real concern. The right our
people pretend to of cutting logwood (not a stick grew on the Shore],
and the absolute disallowance of it on the part of Spain, is I apprehend
the source of all our difficulties...." 40
Spanish ministers were no more knowledgeable about the region.
Englishmen had been living in the Bay for more than 100 years, yet Joe4
de Carvajal y Landster, minister of state, told Wall: "They say that
there are Englishmen established on the Mosquito Coast, a country belonging
to the king, and nobody can establish himself there without the king's
licence." The Spanish seldom faltered in their claim to absolute dominion
39Keene to Newcastle, 30 August 1752, SP 94/142, f. 237.
4o
Carvajal to Wall, 10 January 1752, AHN, Est 4277; Keene to Holdernesse,
17 January 1752, SP 94/141,f.20; Newcastle to Keene, 26 July/6 August 1752,
printed in Richard Lodge, ed., The Private Correspondence of Sir Benjamin
Keene, K.B. (Cambridge, 1933), p. 28.
over the Bay of Honduras, nor in their right to seize all foreign ships
in the Bay. Of the many encounters between British ships and Spanish
guardacostas at this time, two especially were viewed critically by
Whitehall. After a visit to the Mosquito Shore, H.M.S. Ferret was
threatened with destruction by Spanish corsairs, but she was released
when the Ferret's captain swore that she carried no contraband.
Nevertheless, the Spanish commander later remarked that the vessel "had
else
nothing/to do there than to introduce or run goods." Neither the Admiralty
nor Whitehall wanted to discuss a case that might expose clandestine
trading activities by the English navy. Yet there were eleven seizures
in 1750, most of which were made on or near the Mosquito Shore, about
which complaints could be made. The most important was that of the
Mosquito, the flagship of William Pitt's little fleet. Governor Trelawny
told the Duke of Bedford that the Mosquito was seized when "going from
one part of His Majesty's Dominions Z7amaicg to another he Mosquito
Shorg", but he was afraid to meddle "in so delicate a matter untill I
have His Majesty's directions how to proceed." 41
When the complaints reached Ambassador Keene, with the order to
condemn these outrages, he advised Carvajal that serious consequences
would ensue unless the Spanish abstained from seizing English vessels.
Keene's mild representation was not answered, and the following year
Log of the Ferret, Captain Carr Scrope, 2-15 January 1751, Adm 51/3831;
Navarro to Torres, 22 March 1752, CO 137/59, f. 253; Trelawny to Bedford,
5 July 1750, SP 94/138, f. 195; Affidavit by Andrew Connel, 30 April 1750,
SP 94/138, f. 201; From Francisco Cagigal de la Vega, 29 May 1750, AGS,
Est 8133; Jean 0. MacLachlan, "The Seven Years' Peace and the West Indian
Policy of Carvajal and all", EHR, liii (1938), p. 463.
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the Earl of Holdernesse, the new secretary of state for the southern
department, ordered Keene to renew the complaint about the seizures.
Keene was concerned that Spain would reply by reviving her complaints
against British subjects on the Mosquito Shore; but Holdernesse was
persistent, explaining that the maintenance of peace depended on the
speedy alleviation of the problem. In February and again in March 1752,
he ordered Keene to lodge strong complaints with the Spanish court.
Holdernesse also considered the greatest fear of the British settlers
in the Bay of Honduras: Spanish military action. "What is of still
greater Consequence", he wrote, was a "Design of interrupting His Majesty's
Subjects in their Settlement, upon the Mosquito Shore."42 The "State
of Affairs in America between the two Crowns", Keene replied unhappily,
"has been the uneasiness of my Life." 43 Carvajal had not the authority
to treat of these problems and Ensenada was too busy. Keene discovered
yet another problem that might endanger the peace: a Spanish plan to
establish a trading and logwood company in San Andr4s, an island near
the Mosquito Shore occupied by British settlers. 44
Keene admitted that he had not discussed England's rights to the
Mosquito Shore with the Spanish (again acknowledging that he did not
know what those rights were), and claimed that doing so would "neither
42Holdernesse to Keene, 5 March 1752,
43
Keene to Holdernesse, 21 March 1752
44Keene to Carvajal, 23 December 1750
to Keene, 9 December 1751, referred
17 January 1752, SP 94/141, f. 20.
SP 94/141, f. 83.
, SP 94/141,f.135.
, SP 94/139, f. 3; Holdernesse
to in Keene to Holdernesse,
Holdernesse to
Keene, 22
26 May 1753,
; Knowles to
procure Satisfaction for the past, nor hope to correct Abuses for the
future", while it would end all chances to regulate other disputes.
The "Utility and Value" of the Shore, he said, should be "weighed
against th!/ Consequences, which would infallibly follow" English
representations to the Spanish court. 45
The situation also remained serious in the West Indies during the
summer of 1752. Corsairs operated promiscuously against British
merchantmen and a massive invasion force was reportedly poised to strike
against the British settlements in the Bay of Honduras. Unless these
"thorns in the British side" were removed, Holdernesse commented, war
might erupt. But Ensenada pushed the thorns deeper when he declared
the Mosquito to be a legal prize, although he agreed to reconsider the
sentence if new evidence were presented. 46
Then late in 1752 another rash of seizures, including three more
vessels belonging to Pitt, occurred near the Mosquito Shore. Angered
by the intelligence that the crews of the corsairs were mostly English
and Irish, Hodgson sugosted that "a little hanging for these Renegades
•..would be extremely wholesome." However his request for men-of-war
with which to attack the corsair base at Omoa was denied for fear of
provoking a conflict. 47
45Keene to Newcastle, 4 July 1752, Sp 94/142, f. 107.
46Keene to Newcastle, 30 August 1752, SP 94/142, f. 237;
Keene, 15 January 1753, SP 94/143, f. 234; Ensenada to
February 1753, SP 94/143, f. 61; Holdernesse to Keene,
SP 95/143, f. 280.
47
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VSzquez, 20 March 1753, CO 137/60, f. 39.
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During the winter of 1752-3 the insecurity of the Shoremen heightened
after Solis' death, and as Whitehall's interest in the problems in the
Bay of Honduras declined. Furthermore, Admiral Charles Knowles, who
had replaced Trelawny as governor of Jamaica, inherited neither his
interest in the Shore nor his fondness for Robert Hodgson. In fact, he
quickly acquired a strong aversion to both. At first Knowles continued
the policy initiated by Trelawny, but he soon became suspicious of the
superintendent's heavy bills, and noted that Hodgson (Knowles sometimes
called him Hudson) had received £2,759 more than he had receipts for.
He also suspected that Hodgson turned the Indian presents to his own
use, and concluded that the superintendent's salary could "be spared
very safely". He wrote derisively of the "delusive Schemes" of the
interested persons there and of the "Chimerical Advantages this Pigmy
settlement ghe Shoremen preferred 'infant colonygwill be to the State." 48
Knowles blamed Hodgson for every problem in the Bay of Honduras, including
the activities of the guardacostas. Even an Anglo-Spanish rupture would
be his responsibility; "if Captain Hodgson is not checqued in his exploits
he will soon involve the Nation in difficultys...." A suggestion by
Hodgson that England's hold on the Shore be strengthened only managed to
"shew the Absurdity of the undertaking...much as the madness of the
undertaker." Knowles also reasoned that the Solis episode was Hodgson's
fault. If Hodgson had not gone to the Shore, Solis would not have been
sent tnere, and the Mosquito Indians would not have been tormented and
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confused by the conflicting offers of the two men. 48
Hodgson did little to relieve Knowles' suspicions. He made a
further claim for £300, saying that he would exceed his yearly allowance
more than expected, and justifying his heavy expenditure by insisting
that the French would spend four times as much on a similar venture.
Knowles refused to pay these "extraordinary" claims and pressed
Holdernesse to dismiss Hodgson. The superintendent replied heatedly to
Knowles' accusations and insinuations. He was distressed to find his
motives questioned, especially since Governor Trelawny had thought him
"worthy of a discretionary power, without which I could not execute
his 0rders."49 If Knowles had any case against Hodgson it collapses
under the weight of his prejudices and intemperate accusations. Hodgson
was in Jamaica when Solis was permitted to remain in Black River, and
the bills Hodgson presented were for SUM spent by others before he had
arrived on the Shore. Knowles' request to remove Hodgson was considered
by the Board of Trade, who let the matter drop. 50
Governor Knowles retained his enmity towards Hodgson. When Matina
was sacked in May 1753 by Mosquitos and Shoremen, the governor, convinced
that Hodgson had approved the raid, and calling his conduct "such a
breach of...Instructions as deserves the severest Censure, andEihiclg
may be attended with fatal Consequences", 51 sent Captain William Galbraith
48Knowles to Holdernesse, 29 October 1752, Co 137/59, f. 221; Hodgson to
Knowles, 19 December 1752, CO 137/60, f. 19; Knowles to Holdernesse,
10 January and 26 March 1753, CO 137/60, ff. 1,	 17; Metcalf, Royal 
Government, p. 115.
49
Hodgson to Knowles, 19 January and 9 February 1753, CO 137/60, ff. 25, 27;
Knowles to Holdernesse, 10 January and 26 March 1753, CO 137/60, ff. 1, 171
Knowles to Hodgson, 24 January 1753, CO 137/60, f. 23.
50Hdldernesse to Board of Trade, 28 June 1753, CO 137/48, f. 252; Board of
Trade to Holdernesse, 9 July 1753, CO 137/48, f. 255.
51 Knowles to Hodgson, 8 October 1753, CO 137/60, f. 55.
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to the Shore to investigate. Galbraith reported that the raid was
inconsequential; Hodgson had even tried to return the stolen cacao,
although several Shoremen had proved to be "greater Rogues than the
Mosquito Indians", by appropriating most of the booty for their
own use.
52
Hodgson accused Galbraith of assuming his duties in an angry note
to Knowles that the governor called "the most insolent as well as
scurrilous Letter...that I believe ever was penn'd and for which I
shall order him to be tryed by a Court Martial." 53 However Knowles
did not follow up his threat, preferring to make another plea to
Sir
Whitehall for his removal. /Thomas Robinson, who had replaced Holdernesse,
replied that Hodgson should remain at his post until current fears of
a Spanish invasion of Belize diminished. ' ButBut the attack had already
been made, and in October 1754, Knowles named Galbraith superintendent
of the Mosquito Shore, with orders to return the Baymen to their
settlements and "to Protect and defend them he British settlers
throughout the Bay of Hondurag in their Rights and Possessions and to
repell Force by Force in case any attempts should be made against them,
either upon the Mosquito Shore or at the River Belise." 55 Hodgson
sailed to Jamaica after Galbraith's arrival in Black River, but soon
52Anon. declaration, 27 May 1753, AC 504; To Juan Antonio Velarde Cienfuegos
2 March 1754, Guat 448; Knowles to Holdernesse, 13 October 1753 and 12
January 1754, CO 137/60, ff. 53, 66.
53Knowles to Holdernesse, 12 January 1754, CO 137/60, f. 66.
54
Robinson to Knowles, 8 July 1754, CO 123/3; Knowles to Robinson,
11 December 1754, CO 137/60, f. 126.
55Knowles to Galbraith, 13 November 1754, CO 137/60, f. 128.
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afterwards he returned to his duties because Galbraith had "succeeded
so unexpectedly" in his assignment, according to Knowles. With the
crisis over, the governor seemed to infer, Hodgson could probably do
little damage at his post. Galbraith, who apparently had not received
further orders, soon found himself idle and bored in Black River, and
returned to Jamaica; Knowles made no further attempts to remove Hodgson.%
Early in 1754, while the Hodgson - Knowles feud was moving towards
its climax, Alonso de Arcos y Moreno, who had assumed the presidency
of the audiencia of Guatemala at the death of Jose VSzquez Prego,
received instructions from the Marques de la Ensenada to command an
invasion of the Mosquito Coast. But at the su bgestion of the oidor
decano of Guatemala, and approved by Arcos y Moreno and the viceroy of
Mexico, the Conde de Revillagigedo, it was decided to unite the armada
de barlovento with vessels from Bacalar for the massed attack on Belize,
to be followed by one on Black River. 57 Intelligence of the Spanish
plans disturbed poor Newcastle. "I am frightened out of my Wits at
these Ensenada Orders", he wrote to limn. "If I know Knowles, he will
already have tried to repulse force with force." "For the love of God",
he pleaded, "where will that place us? You and me, we will certainly
be the victims."58
56Galbraith to Knowles, 15 April 1755, co 137/60, f. 158; Knowles to
Robinson, 13 January and 12 July 1755, co 137/60, ff. 132, 214.
57Ensenada to Arcos y Moreno, 2 February 1754, Guat 448, Revillagigedo to
Ensenada, 18 May 1754, Mex 3099; Keene to Robinson, 17 June 1754, SP 94/14
f. 12; Newcastle to Albemarle, 1 August 1754, BM, Add 32,850.
58Newcast1e to all, 4 July 1754, cited by Lawrence H. Gipson, "British
Diplomacy in the Light of Anglo-Sianish New world Issues", AHR,
(1946), p. 632.
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Ens nada's aggressive plan was coupled with a fanciful scheme
to conquer the Mosquito Coast from within. During the summer of 1753,
Ambassador Keene received a visitor with the "feigned name" of Richard
Dranover. In exchange for a promise of secrecy and a reward, Dranover
divulged the details of a Spanish project for driving the English from
the Mosquito Shore. In February 1750, a Spanish merchant by the name
of Pedro Flores de Silva arrived in Black River, where he was treated
"civilly and familiarly" by the "English Governor", William Pitt. Flores
de Silva had made the trip in spite of
Having so frequently heard and lamented the barbarous
Outrages, and execrable Abominations, which the Zambos,
supported, in Peace and in War, by the English, commit in
plundering the Provinces of Honduras, by profaning the
Churches, defiling the Images and holy Vessels, and the
insuperable Difficulties which seem to oppose every Remedy
that can be thought of for such crying Evils.
During his stay in Black River, Flores studied the settlement, its
government and its defence. The forts at Black River were two "ill
contrived castles", and there were only eleven armed Englishmen in the
community, although a like number used the settlement as a base for
commercial operations;
	 about 150 Negro families and a few Indian
slaves were dependent upon the white settlers. Yet in spite of its
weaknesses, the country was "morally impossible to attack. ..by land"
and "rather Madness than Bravery" to do so by sea. Nevertheless, Flores
said, the expulsion of the English was "necessary for the succouring
those Provinces, for defending the Churches from Insults, for putting
a Stop to the Counterband za27 Trade, and to the Extraction of our
Treasures by Strangers"--and to open the rich mines in the country
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without danger of interruption by the English and Mosquitos.
Flores had three alternate plans for driving the English from
the Coast "without Expence to His Majesty, without the Noise of War,
and without Danger to the Lives of his Subjects." He proposed to
introduce 200 or 300 men onto the Coast singly and in small groups
as carriers on mule teams loaded with bulky products such as tobacco,
cacao and dye-wood. The ruse should fool the Zambos Mosquitos, he
thought, because the Indians were often impressed by Pitt into this
unappealing labour and they would be happy to see others doing the work.
The easy success Flores envisaged depended on the Shoremen's habit
of manning the fortifications in Black River on the weekend to allow
the regular garrison--comprised principally of Negro slaves--time to
work their provision grounds.
The English, in this Country, are used to spend the Day
'over the weekeng in Merriment and Drinking from twelve
o'clock at Noon, to twelve at Night, till Drunkenness renders
them stupid and defenceless. It would be an easy Matter,
therefore, to fall upon them in this Situation; and to become
Masters of the Castles, and bind them, without drawing a
Sword, or firing a Gun.
Flores' second plan involved the Negroes and mestizos of Sonaguera,
Olancho and the other frontier towns in Honduras and Nicaragua, who went
to Black River every few months in companies of forty or fifty men to
make cordage, to cut sarsaparilla, and to perform other tasks. Flores
hoped to cultivate the friendship of these people and then to induce
them to attack their English employers.
The third idea was to introduce men individually as private
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adventurers, ostensibly to cut wood, to gather sarsaparilla, and to
do other odd jobs. At a prearranged time they would assault the English.
After the expected victory, Flores planned to tell the Paya and
other irreduced Indian nations in the mountains--the "Xicaques" of
Honduras and the "Caribs" of Nicaragua--"that the Christians have
again got Possession of that Country", and to assure them of Spain's
"Friendship and Protection". If the Zambos Mosquitos did not acknowledge
their obedience to the Spanish King, "They shall, without Distinction
of Age or Sex, be put to the Sword, as a just Punishment for the Mischiefs
they had done in His Majesty's Dominions." Abandoned by their English
friends and surrounded on land and by sea, they "would immediately
surrender, and offer to be baptised; This being the Way, by which they
soonest hope to appease the Anger of the Christians." Although Flores'
scheme was approved by the Spanish court, he died before it could be
implemented; however Ensenada's more practical invasion plans were
pushed forward. 59
Secretary of State Robinson reacted more calmly to the intelligence
of Ensenada's plans than did Newcastle. "You will see", he said, "how
precarious the peace is in America." Ensenada, he said, should "plainly
see the absolute Necessity, (if they intend to preserve Harmony between
the Two Crowns,) of finishing this Affair amicably, and expeditiously."
The English ministry searched for ways to settle the perpetual quarrels
59F1ores to Ensenada, n.d., trans. inclosed in Keene's dispatch of
30 June 17> , SP 94/143, f. 169; Flores to Ferdinand VI, 1752, BPR,
Ayala VI-2821, f. 293. Keene to Holdernesse, 30 June 1753, sp 94/143,
f. 164.
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in the Bay of Honduras. The king, Robinson said, wants to arrange
an agreement "between the Two Courts for Settling all Disputes relating
to the Mosquito Shore, and the Cutting of Logwood...." 60 But in that
summer of 1754, serious conversations on the problems relating to the
Bay of Honduras were still far in the future.
When notice of the Spanish attack plans were received on the Shore
by William Pitt, he advised the Baymen of the danger, prompting 500 of
them to flee to the secure confines of the Mosquito Shore. 61 To bolster
the defences of Black River, superintendent Hodgson brought in the small
troop of soldiers stationed at Cape Gracias a Dios and also asked the
Mosquito chiefs to gather forces there. But his plan to assemble the
Indians was "render'd fruitless by the Cowardice or Treachery of that
Villain Handyside", 62 who had again demonstrated his independence of
both British and Spanish influence.
Soon after the Baymen arrived in Black River a report circulated
that the "Spanish attack" was a scheme by Pitt to acquire an advantage
in that season's London logwood market. Approximately 100 Baymen
returned to Belize--wh re they blundered into the large Spanish inv sion
fleet. 63 Belize was captur d without a fight, but it was a hollow
6oRobinson to Knowles, 8 July 1754, CO 123/3; Robinson to Keene, 8 July
1754, SP 94/147, f. 17; Lodge, 21.cit., p. 336.
61 Fitt to Knowles, 1 August 1754, CO 137/60, f. 111; Petition of the
Shoremen to Knowles, 5 September 1754, CO 137/60, f. 117; Memorial from
Andrew Reid on behalf of Robert Hodgson and the Shoremen, n.d., CO 137/60,
f. 136.
62Hodb5on to Reed, 3 August 1754, CO 137/60, f. 115.
6 3Affidavit by William Allison, 5 September 1754, CO 137/60, f. 113; Ano .
letter from a merchant tr ding on the Pos uito Shore, 16 D cember 1754,
BM, Add 33,029, f. 152; Pitt to Hall, 9 January 1755, co 137/60, f. 142.
64Spanish intelligence report, 4 April 1755, in Keene's dispatch of
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CO 137/60, f. 144.
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victory; the Spanish found only a few miserable huts to destroy, and
mo t of the wood was already cut, under w ter, and impo Bible to burn.
The invaders deserted Belize as being "only fit for the Eng1ish". 64
Meanwhile, the distraught Shoremen and the Baymen who remained in Black
River frantically prepared their defenc s against an expected attack.
Probably because of the large number of ar ed men on the Shore, however,
the armada retired to Omoa, divided the scanty spoils taken at Belize,
and returned to their own provinces. 65
Meanwhile, the English court was applying strong pressure on Spain
to stop all offensive activity in the Bay of Honduras. But the menace
of a renewed offensive would surely continue so long as Ensenada
remained the virtual dictator of Spanish policy. In July 1754, however,
with the threat to the Shore at its greatest and war imminent, Ensenada's
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enemies--with valuable assistance from Ambassador Keene--caused his
downfall. He was replaced by friar Julitim de Arriaga, a few months
after the French-born Irish general, Ricardo Im11, had become minister
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of state. An immediate relaxation of Spain's belligerent policy
accompanied the change of personnel. On 4 September 1754, Ferdinand
ordered a suspension of plans to dislodge the English from the Bay of
Honduras, and later he withdrew all corsair commissions in the Bay.
The king expressed his "firm Persuasion...that all such Points, as
deserve to be discussed, will be amicably adjusted with the King of
Great Britain." Although he still maintained that it was the duty of
Spanish governors "not to suffer Foreigners to make any Settlements,
in those Parts of the King's Dominions which are entrusted to their Care",
yet Ensenada's militant policy was repudiated and war was averted.67
After the changes in the Spanish ministry and policy, Governor
Knowles was informed that there was "no reason at present to apprehend
that the Spaniards will revive in America such Hostilities as were
intended some Months ago...." Nevertheless, his instructions to repel
force by force if neces ary remained, 68
 and although "His ajesty has
not yet thought proper to establish any fixed Plan of Government" on
the Mosquito Shore, the status quo, meaning effective English sovereignty,
was not to be altered. 69
Tensions now subsided in the Indies, but remained strained in
67
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Europe. Believing that the Shoremen had been driven from Bl ck River,
Keene informed the Spanish court that "this act of agression must be
stopped in order to maintain the harmony betw e4khe two crowns", and
demanded that the Shoremen be allowed to return to their homes. 70
In response to Keene's heated representation, Arriaga reconfirmed
his conciliatory orders of the previous September forbidding the use
of force to support "the King's Rights a gainst the English". Provincial
governors were ordered to restore all vessels taken in the Bay and to
make reparations for damages--even for acts which occurred before
September. 71 But Arriaga refused to issue orders allowing the Shoremen
and logwood cutters to return to their homes (only the logwood cutters
had actually been expelled from their settlements). Keene suggested
that such an order would have been a virtual acknowledgement of British
sovereignty in the Bay of Honduras, and added that a suspicion of
Anglomania in Wall had actually worked to England's detriment; the
Irishman was forced to present a stern front to England to soothe the
shrill hostility of his opposition.72
In spite of the change in Spain's attitude, the Shoremen were nervous
70Robinson to Keene, 12 December 1754, SP 94/147, f. 312; Keene to Wall,
3 January 1755, SP 94/148, f. 7; Robinson to Keene, 27 J nuary 1755,
P 94/148, f. 32; Lodge, op.cit., p. xix.
71
Arriaga to Arcos y Moreno, 5 January 1755, SP 94/252, f. 3; Arriaga to
Navarrete, 5 January 1755, SP 94/148, f. 13.
72-
xeene to Robinson, 12 and 24 January 1755, SP 94/148, ff. 5, 53.
French ministers even complained that Wall was being bribed by the
English, which was certainly not so. Allan Chr'stelow, "Economic
Background of the Anglo-Spanish War of 1762", Journal of I4odern
History, xviii (1946), p. 22.
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about a renewal of hostilities. They were r assured by a demonstration
of their inherent defe sive strength, however, when a ship sent to
their relief was driven onto the Mosquito reefs by the violent winter
northers. And by February 1755, it became apparent to them that the
Spanish had postponed their aggressive plans. To prove his good
intentions towards the Spaniards, Hodgson sent the Mosquitos off on
a peaceful turtling expedition, and returned the cacao seized by them
in a recent raid on Matina. Spanish colonial officials also promoted
this new feeling of harmony by freeing all English prisoners in Omoa.
The crisis of 1754 was over, but new problems and disputes were to arise
almost immediately. 73
73Knowles to Keene, 13 January 1755, sp 94/149, f. 33; Knowles to Robinson,
13 January 1755, CO 137/60, f. 132; Cayetano to Hodgson, 19 February
1755, CO 137/60, f. 190; Hodgson to Knowles, 16 March 1755, CO 137/60,
f. 162; Knowles to Robinson, 25 February 1755, CO 137/60, f. 140;
Hodgson to Knowles, 16 April 1755, 30/47/17.
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Chapter IV
HODGSON, GOVERNOR KNOWLES and the
GALBRAITH "SUPERINTENDENCY", 1754 - 1759
George I, brother of Edward, son of Jeremy II, grandson of
Jeremy I and great-grandson of Oldman, was crowned king of the Mosquito
nation in Sandy Bay in February 1755. 1 The situation on the Mosquito
Shore and at Belize was much the same as it had been at the beginning
of the British superintendency five and a half years earlier. William
Pitt, with his plantation on Black River notorious for its size, number of
slaves (approximately 400), and "harem" of sixty women, was still the
leading settler and the patriarch of all British colonists in the Bay
of Honduras. The logwood settlements at Belize remained dependent upon
the Mosquito Shorq which offered the protective security of the Mosquito
Indians, the only fresh provisions closer than Jamaica, and a secure
asylum against the threat of invasion and the rainy season. Furthermore,
it was the headquarters of the sole British official in the Bay of Honduras.
AS Belize was dependent upon the Mosquito Shore, both settlements
were the wards of the governor and council of Jamaica. Without an
independent company, immigration to the Shore was hindered and the
' Memorial from Joseph Smith Speer, January 1755, CO 325/2; Lawrie to
Robertson, 10 November 1774, NLS, Robertson-Macdonald Papers, MS 3942,
f. 173; Keasbey, Nicaragua Canal, p. 82. King Edward's eldest son was
still a child at his father's death. Consequently the Mosquito chiefs
elected Edward's brother to succeed him.
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threat of a Spanish invasion always pre ent. Nevertheless, the
establishment of the superintendency did encourage some development
there. Black River now had two small forts which guarded the ocean
bar and community of 213 houses, most of which were temporary thatched-
roof dwellings. Practically, the Shore was as secure as Jamaica, because
of its natural defences, the wretched state of Spanish arms in the Indies,
and the friendship of the stalwart Indians. "They are so skillful", wrote
one Spanish official, "that only the Veteran troops of Europe can equal
them."2
The beginning of Mosquito King George I's long reign coincided with
with
the dismissal of the disgraced Marques de la Ensenada, and/an agreement
between England and Spain to resolve their disputes over the Bay of
Honduras by peaceful means. 3
 The most important issues were Mosquito
incursions instigated by Shoremen and Jamaicanslave dealers, the seizure
of English merchant ships, 4
 the presence of English settlements on the
Main, and the contraband activities on the coasts of Yucattm (Belize)
and Honduras (the Mosquito Shore).
An eventual Anglo-Spanish conflict seemed certain, in spite of a
mutual desire to resolve their differences. Successive English ministers
were willing to accede to Spanish demands, but only in exchange for
20ropesa to Arcos y Moreno, 20 November 1755, Guat 449.
3The right to fish on the Newfoundland banks was the only major issue
at this time between England and Spain not directly related to the
Mosquito Shore and Belize.
4
Most of these seizures occurred near the Mosquito Shore; at least four
of the vessels belonged to William Pitt.
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equivalent concessions; Spain would only debate the form that England's
concessions would take, holding stubbornly to her claim to dominion
over the Bay of Honduras, and to the king's sovereignty over the Mosquito
Indians.: "legitimate vassals of the Crown of Spain--although obstinate
rebels." Consequently, Spain demanded the evacuation of all English
settlements in the Bay prior to discussin b
 the questions of logwood
and seizures; England rejected the demand; she had already begun to
fortify Belize and Black River after the Spanish raid on the former in
September 1754, eliciting a Spanish complaint that England failed to
maintain the status quo in the Bay. Distrust of the British was
heightened by certain undiplomatic gestures, such as the personal attack
on the Spanish king by the governor of Jamaica, Admiral Knowles. 5
Nevertheless, the immediate threat of a Spanish invasion of the
Mosquito Shore ended with Ensenada's removal and the accompanying Anglo-
Spanish truce. Superintendent Robert Hodgson, whose bitter feud with
Governor Knowles had also ended at this time with Knowles' recall, now
turned his attention to the other problems on the Shore, such as the escape
(the Shoremen called it "seduction") of Negro slaves into Spanish
territory. The profession of faith and the dangers of flight were a
Keene to Robinson, 22 September 1755, SP 94/149, f. 157; Keene to
Holdernesse, 24 July 1755, SP 94/149, f. 27; Robinson to Knowles, 28
August 1755, CO 137/60 , f. 184; Wall to Abrgu, 15 October 1755, AHN, Est
4273,vol. i; Vicente Palacio Atard, Las Embajadas de Abrgu y Fuentes en
Londres, 1754 - 1761 (Valladolid, 1950), P. 5. British "encroachments" in
the Bay of Honduras were of such consequence that they became one of the
primary motives in Charles III's decision to initiate the Bourbon reforms,
Other factors leading to this administrative revolution were the influence
of the modern economic theorists, and pressure from France to reform all
branches of administration. See John Lynch, Spanish Colonial Adminis-
tration, 17 2 - 1810 ... (London, 1958), p.11.
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small price to pay for the freedom promised by numerous royal adulas.
The result was a shortage of badly needed labourers on the Shore and
the fear of a slave rebellion. The situation angered and frightened
the Shoremen who told the Spaniards through Superintendent Hodgson that
if they did not stop encouraging this practice the Zambos Mosquitos would
be unleashed on them. The threat was relatively hollow, however, for
Hodgson had orders to maintain the existing peace--and to do so the
5a
Indians had to be restrained. The problem was to remain unsolved
throughout the period of the superintendency.
Hodgson faced other pressing problems, such as the commercial
activities of the Dutch in the Bay of Honduras and the seizure of English
ships. The enterprising Dutch had acquired a near monopoly in the logwood
trade; one English merchant estimated that of the 17,000 tons of logwood
cut yearly, 15,000 went to Holland. Few Dutch ships were directly
involved in the commerce, which was probably carried on by North Americans
and Jamaicans, who exchanged the wood for Dutch and East Indian goods,
which were then traded at Belize, the Shore, England and North America.6
a
'Hodgson to Knowles, 16 March 1755, co 137/60, f. 162; ardenas to Hodgson,
10 May 1755, co 137/60, f. 200; Hodgson to C‘rdenas, 26 May 1755, co 137/60,
f. 204; Hodgson to ardenas, 24 March 1755, co 137/48, f. 270; Hodgson to
Knowles, 16 April 1755, 30/47/17; From Fulgencio Garc/a de Sol‘s, 2 November
1757, Guat 456; Testimony by escaped English slaves, 11 March 1758, Gust 456
Hodgson to Knowles, 16 March 1755, co 137/60, f. 162; Declaration by Martin
Murphy,c. 1755, 30/47/17. This would explain why Spanish documents make
almost no mention of Dutch participation in the logwood trade. A table of
logwood exported from Belize in 1755 lends support to this theory. Although
it does not indicate where the exchange of cargoes took place, it was prob-
ably in Curacao. From a map of the Bay of Honduras and the Mosquito Shore,
MN, Ba. XI - ca.B - u9 1. Logwood, in tons, shipped from Belize in 1755,
as listed by ship registration:
Jamaica 2,746 South Carolina 60 New York 3,750
London 1,785 Rhode Island 1,875 Bristol 400
Boston 810 Philadelphia 360 Holland 1,771
Loghorn 120 TOTAL: 13,672
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Hodgson was unable to hinder this trade, but the problem was not as
serious as he believed because American and Jamaican traders profited
by it as did the logwood cutters.
The seizure of English ships, however, was serious. As part of
the Anglo-Spanish truce agreement of 1754, Spanish governors in America
were ordered to stop issuing corsair commissions. But the seizures
continued, and when complaints were made to the Spanish court, Ferdinand VI
declared that all foreign vessels taken in the Bay of Honduras were legal
prizes. He even encouraged stronger measures by harshly rebuking royal
officers who had released one English vessel on the complaints of the
owners, after it had been captured when carrying wood and turtle from the
Mosquito Shore to Jamaica. ?
While the English complained about seizures, the Spanish fumed over
the enslavement of Hispanicised Indians, who were "bought and sold...as
if they were Negroes" by the Mosquitos and Jamaican traders. Aware of
Spain's aversion to this practice, Hodgson knew that he must try to control
the Mosquitos, yet he also knew that this was an almost impossible task,
for he alone patrolled the great expanse of Mosquito territory, and most
of the raids were incited by British settlers on the windward Shore such
Navarrete to Arriaga, 22 June 1755, Mex 3099; Real orden to Melchor de
Navarrete, 4 September 1754, Mex 3099; Ferdinand VI to Arcos y Moreno,
12 August 1756, AGS, Est 8133, folder 8a; Arcos y Moreno to Arriaga, 22
April 1757, Guat 884; To Alonso de Arcos y Moreno, 21 May 1757, Guat 884;
Anon. memorial, c. 1758, AGS, Est 6962. On 1 April 1756, guardacostas from
Omoa seized a vessel belonging to William Pitt, James Lawrie and Henry and
John Crugger. Pitt was the leading merchant in the Bay of Honduras, Lawrie
commanded the small English garrison at Belize, and the Crug$ers were
merchants from New York. The partnership demonstrates the close ties
between merchants from the Mosquito Shore, Belize and North America.
Affidavit by David Young and three others, 9 June 1756, CO 137/60, f. 233.
as Henry Corrin in Bluefields and Abraham Tonoston in Pearl Key Lagoon.
Hodgson also lacked sufficient responsibility to stop the trade, and
tacitly allowed the sale of certain classes of Indians. One man, he
declared, "had the Impudence" to sell "a Bluefield Indian for a wild
one before my face...."8
The Mosquitos often entered Panam‘ and Costa Rica in their search
for slaves. In October 1755, eighty Indians, including their chief, were
enslaved at Bocas del Toro. The next year an attack was made on San
Francisco del Terraba in Veragua, sixty leagues from the coast, with
the whole population being marched into slavery. The Mosquitos returned
to Bocas del Toro in 1757, drove away the few Spaniards living there and
carried away another tribe. 9
 One Mosquito incursion particulary outraged
the Spaniards, and gave momentum to the race towards war that six years
of blundering diplomacy failed to halt. Early in 1756 the Shoremen and
Mosquitos planned to destroy the Spanish fortifications then under
construction in Omoa, but the timely arrival of an armed Spanish xebec 10
forced them to alter their plan. They sailed to Matina, where Governor
Francisco Fernalndez de la Pastors of Costa Rica was awaiting a supply of
arms intended for the defence of the province against the Mosquitos.
Pastora was at the new fort in Matina (the previous one had been destroyed
8
Hodgson to Knowles, 16 March 1755, CO 137/60, f. 162; Oropesa to Arcos
y Moreno, 20 November 1757, Guat 449.
9From Francisco FernifIndez de la Pastora, 10 November 1755, Guat 874;
GonzEllez to Arcos y Moreno, 10 September 1757, Guat 874; Report by
Joseph Smith Speer, n.d., c. 1758, 30/8/98, vol. ii, p. 405.
10
A sled; three-masted Mediterranean sailing vessel.
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by the Mosquitos in 1747) when the Indians arrived. They lured the
governor and his teniente from the fort, abducted them and then murdered
them on a nearby beach. The whole garrison witnessed the capture of
the governor, but afraid to leave the fort, they did nothing to save
him. When word of the kidnapping rea hed Cartago, fifty militiamen
were mustered to go to his aid--at their own expense, for there was no
money in the treasury. 11
President Arcos y Moreno of Guatemala reacted to Pastora's murder
by calling for the extermination of the Zambos Mosquitos and the Shoremen,
the destruction of their haciendas, and the suppression of illicit trade
with Jamaica. 12 Pastora's replacement, Jose Gonzalez Rancaffo, was even
more outspoken, accusing the English king of approving the atrocious acts
instigated by Englishmen in order to humiliate the "honor and greatness"
of the Spanish crown. If the enemy were not all "put to the Sword", he
added, the whole kingdom of Guatemala would be in danger of conquest. 13
A French minister agreed with Gonzalez: "Spain knows not, What she does,
when She allows the English to set their Feet into America." 14
Shortly after Pastora's murder, the Mosquitos clashed with a Spanish
party reconnoitering Bluefields. The encounter was described in a New
11
Jose Luis Coto Conde, "Un Personae de la Colonia", Revista de los 
Archivos Nacionales, nos. 7-12 (1953), p. 237; From Alonso de Arcos y
Moreno, 30 March, 20 September and 26 November 1756, Guat 874; Arcos
y Moreno to Arriaga, 26 May 1756, Gust 831.
12Arcos y Moreno to Arriaga, 26 November 1756 and 10 February 1757, Guat 874.
13Gonzalez to Arcos y Moreno, 10 September 1757, Gust 874.
14
Keene to Robinson, 3 March 1755, SP 94/148, f. 132.
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York newspaper.
the Spaniards, apprehensive of being overpowered, beat a
Parly, which the Indians consented to, but while they were
parlying, the Spaniards treacherously endeavoured to surround
them,and cut them off. The Indians, armed with their Lancets,
and seeing Death before them, resolutely fell upon the Spaniards,
cut two thirds of them to Pieces, and took three of their
Principals Prisoners, putting the others to Flight. The Indians
afterwards towed across Bluefield River, the three Prisoners at
the stern of their Canoes, and then tied them to Trees, and
shot at them with their blunt Arrows, gradually to put them
to Death.15
The Spaniards faced another threat at Bluefields, a region "governed"
by Henry Corrin under a land-grant from Mosquito King George I. Styling
himself CapitSn Comandante de la Costa , according to the Spanish,
"Corriente" was reportedly fortifying Bluefields, thereby threatening
the security of Fort Inmaculada ConcepciOn on the San Juan and the
communities in the interior. Although "Corrin's fort" was nothing more
than a suggestion made to the governor of Jamaica, its rumoured existence
elicited heavy defence expenditures that neither the Spanish colonists
nor the crown could afford. 16 Unable to draw on the royal treasury--
"there is not a real in it" 17-- the Costaricans did their best to put
their province into a defensive posture, but fortunately for them their
defence was not put to a test.
The panicky fear of Spanish officials in Guatemala over Corrin's fort
and the English settlements on the Coast elicited Ferdinand Vi's sarcastic
15Clipping fron an unnamed New York newspaper, 13 December 1756, Adm 1/2009.
16Abalos to Oropesa, 19 January 1757, Guat 874; Arcos y Moreno to Arriaga,
10 February 1757, Guat 874; Lorca y Villena to Arriaga, 12 April 1757,
Guat 874; Vargas to Ferdinand VI, 12 May 1757, Guat 874; George I to
Corrin, 4 April 1757, FO 53/44, f. 301; Oropesa to Arcos y Moreno, 20
May 1757, Guat 665.
17Crown officials to Ferdinand VI, 10 September 1758, Guat 456.
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comment that with only 200 to 400 foreigners scattered over that immense
territory, things could not be too bad, With the promi e to send arms
(admitting that this was all that he could do) and the advice that
Spanish colonists be taught how to use them, Ferdinand sugge ted that
the governors of the affected provinces unite to punish the enemy. 18
The Zambos Mosquitos thwarted the Spaniards in yet another way by
maintaining a commerce with the "Xicaques" Indians of the "Province of
Tologalpa", 19 which "perverted" them and caused the failure of their
reduction. The Franciscans had attempted to reduce the Indians of
Tologalpa in 1696, but they abandoned the province because of the lack
of funds, the work already being done among the Talamancas of Paname and
the Lacandones of Mexico, and the murder of a missionary stationed in
Tologalpa. Another attempt was begun in 1744, but the Zambos Mosquitos
constantly harassed the region, finally destroying one of the new
reductions in 1749, killing a missionary and thirteen Indian inhabitants,
and enslaving seventy more. Until the threat of the Zambos and English was
eliminated, according to friar Francisco Xavier Ortiz, the guardian (Father
Superior) of the Franciscan or er in Guatemala, missionary work in Tologalpa
would never succeed. Each missionary in the province needed a military
escort of twenty-five or thirty men. How could they gain the confidence
of the Indians, he asked, when they were "seized with horror at seeing
the Padres accompanied by soldiers?" 20 In 1755 the Franciscans reluctantly
18
Ferdinand VI to Vidal de Lorca, 30 September 1758, Gust 874.
19
The "Province of Tol galpa" was the mountainous country betw en Yata. lpa 1]
the province of Yicar gua and the beaches of the North Sea: the windward
Shore.
20Report by friar Antonio, 16 May 1754, Guat 385; Declaration by Jose Lanzas,
26 May 1754, Guat 385; Report by friar Francisco Xavier Ortiz
'
 c. 29
Dec nib r, 1754, BAG, iii (1940), p. 236; From friar rancisco
Xavier Ortiz, 12 July 1753, Gust 365.
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discontinued their work in Tologalpa, praying that the Xicaques would
not unite with the Zambos Mosquitos to "make war on the Christian lands". 21
The issue that most concerned the Spanish crown was illicit trade,
which centred in Black River, "the most modern, the most unjust, and
the most detrimental of any foreign settlement in America." 22
Guardacostas had some success against the contrabandistas in the Bay of
Honduras, but patrolling the land was more difficult. There were only
two companies of dragoons in the kingdom of Guatemala, one of which was
fully, though ineffectually, occupied in combatting the trade and
defending the kingdom against the Zambos Mosquitos. 23 The English often
sent "Commerce" Indians to Spanish villages with offers of friendship
and trade and a few gifts as tokens of their sincerity. 24 The corregidor
of Matagalpa used the same pretext as former governor Heredia of
Nicaragua to trade with the English: the receipt of Indian slaves freed
by the English or Zambos Mosquitos. 25
21Declaration by military officers of Yoro, 12 February 1754, Gust 385;
Declaration by Felix de Garay, 8 March 1754, Guat 385; Xavier to Arcos y
Moreno, c. 10 March 1755, BAGG,iii (1940), p. 245; Arcos y Moreno to
Ferdinand VI, 17 September 1755, Guat 385; Real cedula to Arcos y Moreno,
30 November 1756, JTCR, p. 359; Ferdinand VI to president of Guatemala,
30 November 1756, BAGG,iii (1940), p. 267.
22To Ferdinand VI, 30 August 1756, Mex 3099. Black River was the
administrative centre of the superintendency. Consequently, most of the
available documentation concerns trade there, although Bluefields and
Pearl Key Lagoon on the windward Shore were also centres of illicit
trade.
23Arcos y Moreno to Arriaga, 30 November 1758, Guat 874.
24Declaration by Bartolome de Zepeda, 14 October 1756, DRN, no page reference
25Abalos to Oropesa, 19 January 1757, Guat 874.
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There were rare victories over the contrabandista. Late in August
1759 two merchant ships from Curapo and a third from Jamaica were at
anchor at Matina, when a large Spanish force commanded by the lugarteniente 
of Matina ambushed and killed two of the traders and a number of Mosquito
Indians who w re accompanying them. The Spaniards confiscated the
illicit merchandise and released fifteen Bocas del Toro Indians who
had been captured by the Mosquitos. 27 The surprising victory was
profitable for the governor of Costa Rica and for the president of
Guatemala, each of whom was entitled to a sizeable percentage of the
spoils. Ferdinand VI, understandably pleased with the triumph, ordered
that an extra share of the booty be given to the family of each Spaniard
killed in the battle. 27
The only way to stop illicit trade and Indian incursions was generally
thought to be an attack on its source, the English and Mosquito settlements
on the Mosquito Shore. 28 The Consejo de las Indias said in March 1758
that unless the English were immediately ejected from Black River the
cost to expel them would climb from sev ral thousand pesos to several
million. 29 In 1759 Governor Melchor Vidal de Lorca y Villena of Nicaragua
offered to command such an attack if he were given the necessary means.
26Declaration by Peter Stewart, 8 November 1759, CO 137/31, f. 7; Galiano to
Soler, 3 and 5 September 1759, CRM, pp. 164, 166; Moore to the Board of
Trade, 10 November 1759, 30/8/97—vol. ji, f. 255; Moore to Arcos y
Moreno, 26 April 1760, Guat 641.
27Soler to Arcos y Moreno, 10 September 1759, CRM, p. 162; Arcos y Moreno
to Soler, 10 October 1759, CRM, p. 160; Arcos y Moreno to Arriaga, 12
October 1759, CRM, p. 159; Real orden to Arcos y Moreno, 21 October 1760,
CRM, p. 170.
28It was sugbested by some that the origin of the problem was the British
control of Jamaica. Thoves and Arana to Ensenada, 30 December 1746,Guat
29
From Pastora, 10 November 1755, Guat 874; Lorca y Villena to Arriaga, 1
Octobqr 1757, Guat 874; Gon;61ez to Argos y oreno, 10 September 1757,
Guat 074; Consejo report, 16 March 1756, Guat 406.
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The king praised Lorca's good intentions, but denied his requ st for
assistance, explaining that they could not be expected to garrison all
of America with theavailable troops.") The only other way to solve
these problems was by negotiation, a method that had proved impossible
after Ensenada's dismissal in 1755 because of the intransigent stand
taken by each nation. In August 1756, Ferdinand VI approved a plan to
conclude a convention with Enbland for the evacuation of Black River.
He was optimistic that the English "might be disposed to giving the
Spanish satisfaction regarding the settlements and territory at Belize
and Black River." The Spanish ambassador in London, Felix Abreu, agreed,
and predicted that England would accommodate Spain when she was assured
that her dye-wood needs would be filled. But Ricardo Wall was afraid that
the scattered marooners on the Coast "would receive the orders of
England go abandon their settlements7 as indifferently as they would
orders from Constantinople. He emphasised, however, that whether by
treaty or by force, they must be ejected. 31
 By the autumn of 1756, Wall
had become optimistic that the English court would order the evacuation
of the Mosquito Coast; to assure obedience to the expected orders he
suggested that Spain send a frigate to the Coast and establish a garrison
of 100 men in Black River until every "English vagabond" was gone. 32
30Real orden to Melchor Vidal de Lorca y Villena, 23 March 1759, CRM, p.158;
Lorca y Villena to Arriaga, 30 April 1758, CRM, p. 152.
3 1Ferdinand VI to Arcos y Moreno, 10 and 12 August 1756, AGS, Est 8133,folder
8a; Navarrete to Arriaga, 25 August 1756, cited by Calder6i, Belice, p.165.
Spanish governors in America had already been ordered to be prepared for
an invasion of the Mos uito Shore if its peaceful evacuation could not
be arranged. Arriaga to Navarrete, 10 January 1756, Mex 3099.
32Arriaga to Wall, 6 and 25 August 1756, cited by Calderqn, Belice, pp.169,
167; Wall to Arriaga, n.d., c.1756, ibid., p. 167; Abreu to WaIl, 5
October 1756, AHN, Est 3515; Observations by Ricardo Wall, 25 October 1756,
Mex 3099; vial]. to Arriaga, 29 October 1756, Mex 3099.
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However the English would not evacuate the Shore without previously
discussing the terms, and they renewed the argument that the Treaty of
1670 sanctioned English settlements on the Mosquito Shore. The capable
and reasonable friar Juliin de Arriaga admitted that a few English
"outlaws" had been living among the Mosquito Indians in 1670, but he
denied that the clandestine settlements of the vassals of one monarch
on the territories of another were a sufficient basis on which to claim
dominion. Furthermore, they had not formed towns and had neither political
unity nor the protection of their king; in fact, he said, they were all
fugitives from English justice. Regarding the English claim that the
Mosquito Shore was a grant from its native inhabitants, Arriaga said
that the land was not theirs to cede and that the Mosquitos Indians were
not vassals of the English king. Existing treaties, he added without
elaborating, conferred the dominion of all of America to Spain--including
the Mosquito Coast. 33
Spain pressed for a settlement of Anglo-Spanish disputes in America
early in the Seven Years' War; England joined the discussions, but
abstractly, her thoughts on the burgeoning conflict with France. But as
the fighting that had broken out in the backwoods of North America spread
to Europe, and fared badly for England, English ministers looked more
closely at Spanish demands. The elder Pitt thought that Spain might
be drawn into the conflict as an ally, if England would acknowledge
Spanish claims in the Bay of Honduras and make an even greater concession:
33Arriaga to Wall, 31 August 1756, Mex 3099. Arriaga's arguments were
very similar to those expressed to Superintendent Hod son by Governor
Heredia five years earlier.
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the exchange of Gibraltar for Minorca. '
Wall discussed Anglo-Spanish differences with Benjamin Keene,
British minister plenipotentiary in drid, early in Septe ber 1756,
demanding satisfaction for Spain's many co plants against the English
on the Mosquito Shore and at Belize. Keene did not think that the
Spanish would take advantage of England's current difficulties to settle
their differences by force, yet "so weighty a Matter as This...could
not be left any longer neglected, and in Silence." He recommended
that England yield to Spanish demands "as well for the Sake of Justice,
as of our Regard for the Friendly Conduct of Spain in such Circumstances
as the Present." While many obstacles remained, Spanish officials felt
that they could
Satisfy Mr. Fitt, or others, who under any Directions or
Protections from the Crown, may have expended any Sums of
their own private Property in this illicite Establishment;
Some Considerations, may easily be made to content Them,
by admitting Them to certain Advantages, in the future
carrying on the Trade of Log-wood.35
Meanwhile, in London, Abreu complained to the English court about the
construction of the two forts at Black River, and as a prerequisite to
further discussion, demanded its evacuation as well as th t of Belize
and Bluefields. In spite of a desire to accommodate the Spanish, England
insisted that the questions of logwood and evacuation be discussed
simultaneously.36
3 Pitt to Bristol, 1 August 1758, SP 9
Inglaterra y sus pactos score Belice (Guatemala, 1942), p. 29; Pitt
to Keene, 23 August 1757, zP 94 155, f. 227; Basil illiams, The Life 
of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham (2 vols., London, 1913), i, 339.
35Keene to Fox, 8 September 1756, SP 94/153, f. 153.
36Abreu to Fox, 25 September 1756, 30/8/92, f. 236; Abr gu to Wall, 5October 1756, AHN,
	
t 3515.
4/158, f. 10; Jose Luis Mendoza,
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According to Henry Fox,secretary of state for the southern
department, Abr4u
had not sufficiently separated what relates to our
Settlements, made under the Direction of the Governor
of Jamaica, since the tear 1744, on the Mosquito Shore,
Rio Tinto (Black  River7, and River Valis, from the Disputes,
that have subsisted, for near a Century past, between the
Two Nations, concerning the Logwood trade, in the Bay of
Honduras, and Campeachy.
Fox was willing to give "ample and immediate satisfaction; Especially,
as it is supposed, their Desire of Evacuation really extends to Them
he Shore, Black River and Belizi7 only", 37
 unaware that these were
the only establishments that England had in middle America, or that they
were considerably older than twelve years, or even that Belize was the
heart of the wood-cutting operations; to abandon Belize was to abandon
the logwood trade. When Arriaga read Fox's comments he noted derisively
that the English government "does not seem to know anything about the
place or even the names of the establishments on the Spanish coast."38
Yet Arriaga was no clearer when he told Abr‘u "not to use the term Bay
of Honduras, but rather Black River on the Coast of Honduras, because
it is outside that which is called the Gulf of Honduras." 39 Spanish
37Fox to Keene, 5 October 1756, SP 94/153, f. 173.
38
Arriaga to Wall, 25 October 1756, Mex 3099. As a preliminary to further
discussions, Newcastle suggested that England agree to evacuate the
settlements in the Bay of Honduras, but he opposed abandoning Laguna
de Terminos and Cabo de Catoche--settlements made before the Treaty of
1670--not realising that both settlements had been evacuated by the
English many years before. Wall politely informed Keene of the incredible
inaccuracies in British knowledge about the region. Keene commented in an
embarrassed and ruffled tone: Wall "imagines we do not understand one
another, as to what we think we are in Possession of...." Keene to Fox,
10 November 1756, SP 94/153 f. 254.
39Arriaga to Wall, 18 October 1757, cited by Calderon, Belice, p. 155.
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officials in the Indies exhibited the same confusion. The president
of Guatemala sent an envoy to Black River to complain of English logwood
cutting activities. Hodgson listened to the complaint, then told the
messenger that he had no idea why he had come to him, commenting that
"they didn't cut dyewood here". 4o
Abr‘U, incognisant of how close the British ministry was to acceding
to his demands, was frustrated by a lack of specific directions from
Madrid to guide him in the discussions that had already lasted three
years--and might last "a lifetime". He advised nis court to allow
English settlers to remain in the Bay of Honduras in exchange for the
evacuation of the "modern establishments" of Black River and Belize,
to occupy English forts in both settlements with the agreement to
reimburse England for their construction costs, and to form a Spanish
company to supply English dyewood needs. 41
At the same time, Wall and Arriaga were becoming increasingly
pessimistic about Spain's future in the Bay. Even if the British
marooners were evacuated, they would soon return because of Spain's
inability to defend that immense territory with so few available troops.
Arriaga was sceptical that the Shoremen would move in the first place,
with or without orders from their government, and both men wondered
how they might practically supply England with logwood. 42
 But further
°Extract of a letter from the Bay of Honduras, 6 September 1756, AHN,
Est 3515.
41
Abreu to all, 5 October 1756, AHN, Est 3515; wall to Arriaga, 21 October
1756, Mex 3099. all sugge ted that the English be allowed to cut the
wood themselves in exchange for relinquishing their forts in the Bay.
Wall to Arriaga, 29 October 1756, Mex 3099.
42
Arriaga to Wall, 25 October 1756, Mex 3099; Wall to Arriaga, 29 October1756, Mex 3099.
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talks were delayed as England plunged deeper into the crisis of war
and convulsions wracked the English cabinet. When talks were resumed
in London in February 1757, Pitt, who had replaced Fox, wanted to
terminate the vexing issues, but he refused to fulfil the promise that
Fox had apparently made to evacuate the English settlements in the
Bay, explaining that the previous ministry had not understood the
issue. 43 But now Pitt became the victim of the continuing ministerial
spasms, and the negotiations were again postponed.
Pitt returned to the cabinet in July, in time to receive renewed
demands from Abreu that the English withdraw from the Mosquito Shore.
The Spanish envoy's irregular contacts with a series of English ministers,
and the inconsistency of their policies explain the contemporary aura of
pessimism in his dispatches. 44
I am engaged anew more warmly than ever in my Ne (pciation for
the Evacuation of the Bay of Honduras. I have presented a very
strong Memorial, & They are determined to support my Threats
at Our Court; I hope to succeed well, but cannot assure it,
because they say sometimes one thing, & sometimes the contrary. 45
Abrgu's English counterpart in Madrid, Benjamin Keene, was even more
apprehensive over the secret machinations of Wall, who was in "great
Acrimony, Yystery & Disgust of Business".
I fear something has been hatching with regard to the Points
of the Musquito Shore, and the Bay of Campeachy, tho' I have
no particular Information. The other Ministers have met at
43Abrgu to Wall, 23 February 1757, AHN, Est 3515.
44
Fitt to Abreu, 9 September 1757, SP 94/156, f. 44.
45Abr4u to Grimaldi, 5 July 1757, PRO 30/8/92, vol. ii, f. 243•
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Genl. Wall's Appartment since his Return to Madrid, more
in the Air of Business, than barely to enquire after his
Health, which, indeed, is very bad.46
Pitt agreed that these mysterious meetings were probably detrimental
to British interests, and interpreted them to represent Spain's fall
into the hands of the French,whose successes in the war were alarming.
"In this violent & dangerous Crisis", he wrote, extreme measures were
needed to gain "a more intimate Union with the Crown of Spain." Keene
was authorised to offer Gibraltar in exchange for Minorca and was told
that:
Their Lordships are further of Opinion, that Satisfaction
should be given to Spain on their Complaints, touching
Establishments made, by the Subjects of England, on the
Mosquito Shore, and in the Bay of Honduras, since the Treaty,
concluded at Aix-la-Chapelle, in October 174E7-13 order that
all Establishments so made be evacuated.47---
Pitt was as ignorant of the history and geography of the Bay of Honduras
as Newcastle or Fox. Satisfaction given by evacuating all settlements
made since 1748 meant no satisfaction at all; all important British
settlements in the Bay outdated the treaty by at least fifteen years.
Either Pitt had no intention of drawing Spain into the war as an ally
(by offering nothing)--certainly a doubtful conclusion--or his rare
awkward diplomacy helped to obtain that unintentional effect. When
Ruvigny de Cosne, who became England's interim emissary in Madrid after
Keene's death, explained to Wall that Abr gu himself had said that Ferdinand
would be content with the evacuation of the settlements made since the
46Keene to Holdernesse, 21 July 1757, SP 94/155, f. 207.
47
Pitt to Keene, 23 August 1757, NLS, MS 5528, f. 39. Italics my own.
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Treaty, the Irishman exploded; "What do I care for what Mor. d'Abreu
may have said by Word of Mouth; It is what is written; and that Alone; That
must be answered."48 Wall ordered Abreu to return Pitt's letter, which
was "filled with Restrictions & Reservations, but no Satisfaction given."
"In England", he told De Cosne, "many fair Words were often given on
Complaints, but None of Them had yet been followed by good Effects."
But Pitt, who failed to understand the "extraordinary and haughty manner
of Treating" the situation by the Spanish, was still hoping to reopen
the negotiations. 49
qf
Aware of England's wartime difficulties and/her fear of a Franco-
Spanish alliance, as well as of the advantages that Spain might gain by
continued negotiations, Arriaga and Wall were also anxious for the talks
to continue. The Consejo de las Indias recommended that Spain demand
the evacuation of all English settlements made on the Spanish Main
since the Treaty of Utrecht. Wall, Arriaga and the Consejo considered
the settlement at Black River to be more important than Belize, which
was why they were willing to compromise on the logwood issue, but not
on evacuation. Black River, Arriaga wrote, "opens a road mpossible
from Ben& by which the English there can make themselves masters of
the commerce of Guatemala."50
48Pitt to Abreu, 9 September 1757, SP 94/156, f. 44; De Cosne to Pitt,
26 December 1757, SP 94/156, f. 337.
49K
eene to Pitt, 26 September 1757, SP 94/156, f. 107; De Cosne to Pitt,
3 October 1757, SP 94/156, f. 163; Pitt to Keene, 29 November 1757,
SP 94/156, f. 220.
50Arriaga to Wall, 18 October 1757, cited by CalderOn, Belice, p. 155.
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After Pitt's imprint proposals to Abrgu, his hope of renewing
negotiations leading to an Anglo-Spanish alliance was delayed by Keene's
death in December 1757, and then virtually ended by Ferdinand's hopeless
and pitiful insanity. No Spanish minister was willing to pursue an
active foreign policy without the approbation of the king. 51
 Consequently,
England turned her full attention to the war. Then in the spring of
1758, Pitt again became interested in promoting an alliance with Spain
by offering to evacuate the Bay of Honduras. He directed De Cosne to
broach the subject unofficially to Wall. Wall took the bait--and broke
the line; he was more uncompromising than ever. "If England really
meant to give Spain the just satisfaction she had Reason to expect", he
said (though "It could never be believed"), "it was too plain of itself
to need any gliscussiog. ..." "If England did not think fit to do them
Right, it must be left to Time & Circumstances for them to procure it."
Wall added
with Warmth,& a seeming Regret, that he totally despaired
and had given up, all Thoughts of connecting the two
Courts in that close & solid Union that would be for the
Interest of both, & which he had passionately desired to
see effected; but that the conduct of Great Britain, since
the present War, had entirely destroyed the Seeds of it.52
In March 1758, the Conse'o again discussed the Mosquito question
and reviewed the numerous Spanish complaints relating to the Bay of
Honduras: the piracy trial of a commissioned Spanish corsair; the
imprisonment and death of friar Juan de ScAls; the menacing letters
51 De Cosne to Pitt, 16 December 1757, SP 94/156, f. 326.
52
De Cosne to Pitt, 24 April 1758, SP 94/157, f. 162.
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from English commanders on the Mosquito Shore and in Jamaica to the
governors of Havana and Guatemala; and the exaggerated complaints against
Spanish guardacostas by Benjamin Keene. Far from giving satisfaction
to the English, they said, Spain must support her own demands.
On the advice of the Conse o, orders were issued to President Arcos
y Moreno of Guatemala in April 1758 to conquer the Zambos Mosquitos.
But Arcos y Moreno, who traded with the British merchants of Black River,
delayed taking action against the Mosquito Coast for an indeterminate
period of time by asking the governors of Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa
Rica for suggestions on how to reduce the Mosquitos. He promised to
forward the replies to Madrid when they were received and await further
orders. 53
Nevertheless, Arcos y Moreno did take steps to stop the incursions of
the Zambos Mosquitos and to combat illicit trade. While construction work
was continued on the fort in Omoa, 40,000 militiamen were reportedly
being trained in the kingdom of Guatemala. Vides (watch towers) were
built in Matagalpa and armed piraguas were constructed in Costa Rica.
Great sums were expended on these projects, far more than the kingdom
could afford, while disease and hunger killed hundreds, possibly thousands,
of labourers. As workers became scarce at Omoa, the king even approved
the acquisition of 100 Negroes from "foreign colonies...for one time
only." The purchase was arranged through Pitt and Hodgson in Black
River, the very enemies against whom the Spanish were constructing the
53Conse . o report, 18 March 1758, Gust 406; From Alonso de Arcos y Moreno
30 November 1758, Guat 449.
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fort. 54
 This terrible physical and financial drain on Nicaragua,
Costa Rica and Honduras kept these provinces in a virtual state of
bankruptcy to the end of the eighteenth century. 55
In the summer of 1758, with England beginning to gain an advantage
in the war, Pitt decided that it was no longer necessary to court
Spanish favour. He told the Earl of Bristol, Keene's permanent
replacement:
It is His Majesty's Pleasure, that your Excy do consider
that Idea (the evacuation of British settlements in the Bay
of Honduras] as totally at an End; And that you should not,
on any Occasion whatever, touch upon this Subject, or appear
to be, in the least, informed, that such a Thought had ever
existed. 56
The Zambos Mosquitos and Shoremen were not so reticent; in April
1759, after the Indians had destroyed a Spanish village, Governor Haldane
of Jamaica wrote:
Ensenada told Jose Vezquez Prego in 1752 that "it was the king's opinion
that in order to remove the English from Black River and the other estab-
lishments, and to destroy the English and the Zambos Mosquitos, there was
no more excellent way than by the construction of a fort or castle in the
port of Omoa." Ensenada to Vezquez, 26 June 1752, Mex 3099. The Spanish
also sought Pitt's assistance for "secret" reconnaissance missions on the
Mosquito Coast. Juan de Lara y Ortega reconnoitred the Coast in 1759 in
a piragua rented from him. From Lara y Ortega, 30 August 1759, Guat 459.
55To Arcos y Moreno, 16 June 1758, Guat 874; Arriaga to Arcos y Moreno,
1 October 1757, Guat 873; Juntas de guerra in Guatemala, 13 and 30 March
1756, Guat 874; From Luis Diez Navarro, 3 April 1756, Guat 874; Arcos y
Moreno to Arriaga, 30 April 1756 and 19 April 1757, Guat 874; Jose de CasaE
14 June 1758, Guat 874; To Melchor Vidal de Lorca, 5 September 1758, Guat
874; Arriaga to Arcos y Moreno, 5 September 1755, Guat 875; Hall to Arcos
y Moreno, 15 May 1756, Guat 875; Arcos y Moreno to Arriaga, 15 May 1758;
Guat 875; krcos y Moreno to Arriaga, 22 April 1757, Guat 875; Real orden
to Arcos y Moreno, 29 March 1757, CRM, p. 149; Troy S. Floyd, 'Bourbon
Palliatives and the Central American Mining Industry, 1765-1800", The
Americas, xviii (1961), p. 106.
56
Pitt to Bristol, 1 August 1758, SP 94/158, f. 10.
54
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the Reason they Assign for such Violence is in revenge
to the Spaniards for having kill'd one of their chiefs;
but there is greater room to believe that they are
instigated by those of His Majesty's Subjects, who carry
on a Pyratic 1 and Smugling Trade from these parts.57
Afraid of further disruptions in the tense Anglo-Spanish relations,
Haldane ordered Hodgson to try to restrain the Mosquitos, yet he had
no hope that the superintendent would succeed, for he believed that
Hodgson was responsible for the disorderly behaviour of the Indians
and settlers.
The Mosketto Indians disobedience is entirely owing as
I suspected to the bad Conduct of Captain Hodgson, I have
therefore sent an Officer with presents to the Indians in
order to reconcile matters with them, and to enquire
particularly into the Affair, if upon his Report I shall
find Captain Hodgson guilty of neglecting his Zautieg and
applying the Money allowed for supporting his Majesty's
gfew words are illegible oherg ...recall him, and
appoint some other Person....5°
Like Governor Knowles before him, Haldane was unacquainted with the
actual situation on the Shore. He "accused" Hodgson of residing in Black
River rather than among the Mosquito Indians, although Black River had
long been the principal English community on the Shore and it was located
in the centre of the territory ruled by the Zambo Mosquito general. He
was also unaware that Hodgson, as superintendent of the Mosquito Shore,
was governor of the white settlers as well as superintendent of Indian
affairs. In addition, Hodgson was accused of building a home for himself
with money allotted for the construction of fortifications. In fact, he
lived in a fortified building that served as Black River's civil and
58
Ha1dane to Pitt, 20 July 1759, 30/8/98, vol. ii, f. 239.
57Haldane to Pitt, 23 April 1759, 30/8/98, vol. ii, f. 229; Haldane to
Board of Trade, 11 May 1759, CO 137/30, f. 191.
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military headquarters. 59 Captain Douglas, who was sent to the Shore
with orders for the superintendent, returned to Jamaica with further
petty complaints against him. No doubt some of the many complaints
were true, but none were ever substantiated.
Lt. Governor Henry Moore, who replaced Haldane at the latter's
death, was so impressed with Captain Douglas that he sent him to London
to report to the Board of Trade. Moore noted that
the Inhabitants of the Musketto-shore seem vastly prejudiced
in favour of Mr. Douglas, therefore if Your Lordships have no
objection, they would be extremely happy to have him appointed
in the room of Captain Hodgson who is willing to resign.60
In the early autumn of 1759, before Douglas could present his report
to the Board, Superintendent Hodgson died. Moore, unwilling to leave the
Mosquito Shore without a governor for long, appointed Richard Jones, an
engineer stationed in Jamaica, as its second superintendent. Thus
Captain Douglas, the heir aEparent to Hodgson's post, lost the
superintendency because of his absence from Jamaica. 61
The government of the first British superintendent of the Mosquito
Shore, that of Captain Robert Hodgson, which began in 1749 at the
conclusion of the War of Jenkins' Ear, ended ten years later during the
Seven Years' War. The short government of the taciturn Richard Jones was
to witness the uncontrollable slide to renewed Anglo-Spanish hostilities.
59Haldane to the Board of Trade, 20 July 1759, CO 123/3; Declaration by
Juan de Lara y Ortega, 18 September 1759, BAGG, ii (1940), p. 147.
6oMoore to the Board of Trade, 28 August 1759, CO 137/30, f. 237; Hodgson was
ill at this time and undoubtedly suspected that he was dying, for he made
out his last will and testament on 12 'arch 1759. FCC, Rushworth, f. 333.
61Moore to the Board of Trade, 10 November 1759, 30/8/98, vol. ii, f. 255;
Board bf Trade to Fit , 28 November 1759, 30/3/98, vol. ii, f. 225; Moore
to (probably) Pitt, 4 December 1759, CO 137/60, f. 292, Board of Trade to
Pitt, 16 Nov mber 1759, CO 137/48, f. 286; Governor Moore's accounts,
31 December 1759, CO 137/32, f. 159.
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Chapter V
THE SECOND SUPERINTENDENCY:
Richard Jones, 1759 - 1762.
The death of the senior Robert Hodgson late in 1759 left a vacuum
on the Mosquito Shore that was only partially filled by the hurried
appointment of Richard Jones to the superintendency by Lt.Governor
Moore of Jamaica, who feared that the Mosquitos would think themselves
abandoned and seek vengeance on the Shoremen. Jones was a poor selection.
He had little enthusiasm for the work, and wrote just one dispatch--to
announce his arrival in Black River--during twenty-eight months as
superintendent. 1
Jones arrived on the Shore as rumours were circulating that Spanish
invasion forces were poised on the Mosquito frontier, the same rumours
that Hodgson had heard ten years earlier at the beginning of the
superintendency. The Shoremen claimed that the construction of
fortifications in Omoa and at Matina were "effectively muzling and
confining us, and threaten even from Merida utterly to dislodge us, in
these parts...." Their anxieties were strengthened by the evacuation
to Jamaica of some of the troops stationed in Black River, and by a
recent Mosquito "declaration of war" against the Spaniards. When the
Indians attacked Spanish settlements, it was the Shoremen who had "just
1
From Henry Moore, 4 December 1759, CO 137/60, f. 292; Jamaica accounts,
31 December 1759, CO 137/32, f. 159.
2Shoremen to Moore, 12 January 1760, BM, Add 32,901, f. 219.
3See above, p. 94.
Description of the east coast of America Meridional by Dionisio de
Alcedo y Herrera, 30 September 1761, BPR, Ayala 11-2817, f. 177.
This is the only reference yet found to indicate that the Mosquito
Indians practised head-shrinking. Although it is certain that they
did not actually do so, the rumour is indicative of the terror they
engendered.
4
ilk
reason to fear the dismal effects of their Savage heat and rancour...." 2
The deterioration of Anglo-Spanish relations in the West Indies
had become pronounced by the winter of 1759 - 1760. The ambush and
slaughter of many British and Dutch traders and Mosquitos at Matins in
August 1759, evoked a heated correspondence between Moore and President
Alonso Arcos y Morena of Guatemala. Moore accused the attackers of
acting with "greater inhumanity than any of the savage nations of Africa";
many innocent people might suffer by the Mosquitos' indiscriminate acts
of revenge. Arcos y MorenoCbnied that the Spanish attacked from ambush
at Matina, and then denounced the murder of Governor Ferdndez de la
Pastora3
 and the Mosquito raids, which were incessant at this time.
One party drove a Spanish guardacostaa from the mouth of the San Juan
River early in 1760, while another was raiding Lovaga in the mountains.
Far to the south, the Mosquitos, "dextrous in their activities by land
and sea", and "monstrous in the art of shrinking human heads", 4
 had
stopped production in the rich mines of Veragua. 5
5Moore to Arcos y Moreno, 26 April 1760, CDHCR, ix, 531. Arcos y Moreno
to Moore, 29 May 1760, ibid., p. 533. Arcos y Moreno to Arriaga, 50 June
1760, ibid., p•	 9530 . the three preceding documents are in Guat 641.
Diary of a trip to the San Juan River by Jose Cabantas, 5 March - 15 May
1760, Gnat 875; Garcia Peleez, Memorias, ii, 162.
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In reaction to these offences, King Charles
	 reaffirmed his
determination not to allow foreigners to trade or reside in the Spanish
colonies, 6 and ordered fuardacostas commanders to broaden their
activities so as to "contain the piracies of the Mosquitos", to protect
the expanding trade of Cartagena and Portovelo, and to study the coast
of the Mosquito territory, which he said was "as unknown...aa that of
Japan." Secret orders were issued to dislodge the English from Black
River because of the fortifications being erected there and because of the
interminable delays by the English court in discussing its evacuation. 8
Brigadier Alonzo FernSndez de Heredia, the former governor of Nicaragua
and clandestine trading correspondent with Pitt and Hodgson, and most
recently the governor of Campeche, was appointed president of the
audiencia of Guatemala9
 to guide these operations, which were to include
the conquest or extermination of the Mosquito Indians. Heredia, who
accused his predecessors, Jose Vezquez Prego and Alonzo Arcos y Moreno,
of permitting the English to trade openly in Guatemala, initiated his
government with a campaign against illicit commerce, claiming to have
confiscated considerable contraband merchandise from Black River during
the first few months of his presidency. Yet Pitt and the merchants of
Jamaica and Black River did not complain of increased harassment by the
7--Superior despacho 1 February 1760, AC 546.
?Charles III to Bermudea, 14 November 1760, Guat 875.
8Instructions to Juan Antonio de la Colina, 16 December 1760, AGS,
Eat 8133, folder 9c.
9There is no indication that Heredia ever invested the 50,000 pesos in
illicit trade as he had intimated he would do as soon as he became
president of Guatemala. See above, p. 62n.
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Spaniards at this time. In fact, the meagre figures available actually
indicate a growth of trade. 10
 When Heredia planned to attack the English
and Mosquito Indians, as he had been ordered to do, rather than using
the forces available to him, he requested ships and men from Havana and
Cartagena. The usual long delay due to the exchange of correspondence
followed. 11 One can conclude that Heredia's own interests precluded
acting against British merchants in the Bay of Honduras.
According to unofficial trade figures for 1761, imports in Black River
"had risen" to a value of £25,800. The exports, worth E23,317, did
not include those from Bluefields or Pearl Key Lagoon on the windward
Shore, or trade with the Dutch and other foreigners, or clandestine
trade with English colonies. The leading exports:
sarsaparilla	 150,000 pounds	 £7,500
mahogany	 446,000 feet	 5,575
turtle shell
	
12,600 pounds	 3,150
gold and silver	 2,100
mules	 150	 1,200
indigo	 3,000 pounds	 937
cacao	 4,4o0 pounds	 220
horses	 23	 148
raw-hides	 750	 141
deer skins	 1,40o	 131
Extract of exports from the Mosquito Shore in 1761, Sta Fe 1261
How much more trade was carried on unnoticed would be nearly impossible
to estimate. The English traders on the Mosquito Shore were deeply
involved in illicit commerce with the Spanish colonies, yet according
to this table the commerce with the Spaniards amounted only to about
45,000 pesos a year. A Spanish report in 1761 noted that the illicit
trade between the English and Spanish in America was worth annually more
than 6,000,000 pesos. Obviously very little of the total trade from the
Shore was reported. See Clarence H. Haring, The Spanish Empire in America
(New York, 1947), p. 311.
11 Instructions to Alonso Fernandez de Heredia, 11 November 1760, AGS,
Eat 8133 folder 9c; Heredia to Arriaga, 30 September 1761, nos. 11 and
12, Guat 641; Heredia to Arriaga, 25 November 1761, Guat 641; Heredia
to Arriaga, 30 September 1761, no. 16, Guat 449.
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In spite of the apparent confirmation of rumours of Spanish plans
to invade the Mosquito Shore, Whitehall saw little danger in the situation.
The Treaty of Utrecht was England's legal claim to the Bay of Honduras,
according to Ereereterry-e-f—g4a4e-Holles-Newcastle, who intimated that
the treaty protected the Shore against attack. Furthermore, he added,
Charles III was much too interested in Italy and too dependent on English
support there to quarrel over America. 12 Newcastle underestimated the
importance that Spain attached to her American empire, and seemed
unaware of the Spanish fear of Mosquito depredations, clandestine trade,
and the future consequences of the Anglo-Mosquito alliance. 13
Spanish representations concerning the "Logwood Coasts" 14 reached
the English court from the Conde de Fuentes, Abr4u's replacement as
Spain's ambassador in London. The harsh tone of the complaints, which
were "pressed with such uncommon Vehemence, and Warmth", angered the
elder Pitt, and elicited his caustic observation that the Mosquito
Indians were unenthusiastic about pledging their allegiance to Spain. 15
Even Newcastle, who wanted no quarrel with Spain and who had earlier
12_Newcastle to York, 29 May 1760, BM, Add 32,906, f. 350; Memo. from
Holles-Newcastle, 25 July 1760, BM, Add 32,909, f. 47; Pares, War
and Trade, p. 560.
13Fuentes to Wall, 12 September and 26 October 1760, AHN, Eat 4266,
vol. ii; Fuentes to Wall, 23 September 1760, AHN, Est 4266, vol. i;
Fuentes to Wall, 23 September 1760, no. 3,AGS, Est 6947; Gimez, Costa
de Mosquitos, p. 101.
140ften used to describe the Mosquito Shore as well as the coast of Yucatim.
Fuentes to Pitt, 9 September 1760, AHN, Est 4266, vol. i; Fuentes to
Wall, 12 September 1760, AHN, Eat 4266, vol. ii; Fuentes to Wall, 23
September 1760, AGS, Est 6947; Pitt to Bristol, 26 September 1760,
SP 94/162; Kate Hotblack, Chatham's Colonial Policy: a study in the 
fiscal and eoonomic implications of the colonial policy of the elder
Pitt (London, 1917), p. 129.
15
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favoured granting Spanish demands without reciprocal concessions,
called Fuentes' remarks "very strong, & peremptory in Stile; And, I
wish I could think, They were not too much so, in Fact & Reason;
Especially, as to The Logwood, & our Establishments in the Bay of
Honduras." Newcastle prophesied that "The Answer to these Memorials
...may determine our Fate with Spain...."16
Pitt's angry rebuttal incensed Fuentes, who accused the English
of stalling while they strengthened their fortifications in the "Country
of the Mosquitos", actions which he said were "against the dignity of
the King and manifestly wicked." 17
 But England wanted to ensure Spanish
neutrality and was still willing to accommodate Spanish demands. The
Earl of Bristol, the British envoy in Madrid, was instructed to inform
the Spanish court of England's readiness "to give all just Satisfaction
to the Catholick King, with regard to Fortifications and Establishments
erected there." Since England still insisted on an equivalent exchange
Ricardo
however, and Pitt said that/Wall i s stubbornness left no room for
negotiations, 18
 the offer was of little practical value.
Yet each side had an important advantage to be gained, and felt
that an attempt must be made to settle the issue. England dreamed of
a Spanish alliance; Spain wanted to secure her American colonies from
the foreign threat. In January 1761, Bristol and Wall renewed talks
16Newcastle to Hardwicke, 13 September 1760, BM, Add 32,911, f. 269.
17FUentes to Wall, 26 October 1760, AHN, Eat 4266, vol. ii; Fuentes to
Wall, 23 September 1760, printed in Palacio, Las Emba adas, p. 57.
18
Pitt to Bristol, 26 September 1760, SP 94/162.
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that for all practical purposes had been abandoned at Sir Benjamin
Keene's death late in 1757. Wall asserted that Spain had taken no
steps to support her just claims to fishing rights at Newfoundland,
while England had busily and perniciously thrown up fortifications
on the Mosquito Coast. He conceded that Charles III did not mean to
19deprive British industry of the dyewood they badly needed, however he
insisted that England must first abandon her settlements in the Bay
and
of Honduras,/then rely on Charles' benevolence to settle the logwood
question equitably. 20
 Bristol believed that the Spanish minister was
as sincere in his proposals as he was stubborn in his demands.
'till the Time some Agreement could be compleatly made
for regulating to mutual Satisfaction our Enjoyment of
the Logwood Trade, the Settlers, already fix'd in Huts
upon that Vast Extent of Coast, wherever they were
employed in cutting the Wood, should, upon no Pretence
whatever, be interrupted either on the Shore, or Molested
at Sea, when they were carrying off a Commodity, which
His Excellency acknowledg'd i
 We should never be deprived
of in some Shape or other.21
Except for the Spanish concession on the logwood question, neither side
would compromise further. In London, Fuentes saw no hope for a settlement,
and in Madrid, Wall told Bristol that only a demonstration of good faith
by the evacuation of the Bay of Honduras and the dismantling of all
19Wa11 had made a similar observation in 1756 which Whitehall ignored.
See above, p. 102.
20Bristol to Pitt, 19 January 1761, SP 94/163; Wall to Bristol, 24 January
1761, BM, Add 32,918, f. 97.
Bristol to Pitt, 20 May 1761, SP 94/163. Italics my own. Wall was as
uncertain about the geography and history of the Bay as the other English
and Spanish ministers in Europe, which promised new difficulties in future
negotiations. The offer not to molest British logwood cutters, "wherever
they were employed in cutting the Wood", defined only the Belize settle-
ments, because there was no logwood on the Mosquito Coast, but he implied
the whole coast when he said that "the English Settlers upon the Logwood
Coasts, had chiefly been fortifying themselves in Black River."
21
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fortifications could avert a war. "'He wished not to leave Spain in
a War with England", Bristol quoted Wall, "but...the court of London
seemed to be driving everything that way. n22
Meanwhile, Pitt received with pleaaure the news of Spain's
willingness to compromise on the logwood question, stating that England
would consider "any just overtures on the part of his Catholic Majesty
for amicably adjusting" their difficulties. 23
 But a serious new problem
arose. Feeling that "He could gain no Ground upon the British Court by
having this Business transacted directly", Charles III virtually declared
war on England by accepting a ludicrous French offer to mediate their
differences. If she could not gain her objectives peacefully, Spain was
willing to do so through a French alliance and war; her intentions were
confirmed almost immediately by the signing of the Third Family Compact
on 15 August 1761. 24
However Spain still hoped that war would be unnecessary. Until
the two courts resolved their disputes, the Spanish promised not to
disturb the settlers on the "logwood coast", including the Mosquito
Shore, or the English traders involved in the logwood trade. The
concession was incomprehensible, for it would have licensed the hated
contrabandistas. Because of the distrust engendered by the French
22FUentes to Wall, 23 January 1761, BM, Add 32,918, f. 27; Bristol to
Pitt, 28 January 1761, BM, Add 32,918, f. 94; Marginal note by the
Conde de Fuentes, dated 6 May 1761, on a despatch from Abr gu to Wall,
5 October 1756, AHN, Eat 3515.
23Pitt to Bristol, 28 July 1761, ABH, i, p. 86.
24
Bristol to Pitt, 6 August 1761, SP 94/164; Fuentes to Wall, 17 November
1761, AGS, Eat 6950; the Third Family Compact between France and Spain,
15 August 1761, Alfred Bourguet, Le Due de Choiseul et l'Alliance 
Frangaise (Paris,1906), p. 239k
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mediation offer and by the Family Compact, the English did not respond,
and continued to exercise effective territorial sovereignty throughout
the Bay of Honduras, treating the Mosquito Shore "as if it were one of
their own colonies". 25
In October 1761, Bristol reported that the Spanish were preparing
an expedition against the Bay settlements. Considering this threat and
many other complaints against Spain, especially the renewal of the
Family Compact, Pitt called for a Spanish war (which George III called
"Mr. Pitt's black scheme"). Despite the provocative Spanish actions,
he received little support from the cabinet and none from the king, who
had recently commented that they must get rid of "that mad Pitt", and
was forced to resign. 26
The Spanish were as angry with the English as Pitt was with them.
Fuentes again accused England of strengthening the fortifications in
the Mosquito establishments. However, while England made no practical
concessions in the negotiations, she was guided by a stern but honest
policy rather than by ulterior motives.27
Wall made his last pre-war proposal early in December 1761, promising
25Fuentes to Wall, 18 September and 17 November 1761, AGS, Est 6950;
Bristol to Pitt, 28 September 1761, SP 94/164.
26Bristol to Egremont, 9 November 1761, SP 94/164; Bristol to Egremont,
6 December 1761, SP 94/164; Extract of a letter from Bristol, 6 December
1761, BM, Add 36,807, f. 183; Hotblack,	 p. 134; George III to
Bute, 19 September 1761, printed in Romney Sedgwick, ed., Letters from
George III to Lord Bute, 1756-1766 (London, 1939), p. 63.
27Fuentes to Wall, 17 November 1761, AGS, Eat 6950. Fuentes had a radical
plan to solve Spain's problems in the Bay of Honduras. First eject the
English settlers, then "burn and lay waste to the whole region" so that
the English would have no further reason for settling there. His idea was
not acted upon, nor were similar suggestions made later by others,
including King Charles III. See below, p.148.
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not to disturb the logwood cutters if the English would dismantle their
forts on the Mosquito Coast. This offer seemed insincere, since the
Family Compact was already signed and orders to attack the enemy had
already been issued. In his last conversation with Bristol, the unhappy
Spanish minister seemed resigned to a conflict.
Was it an amicable Proceeding, His Excy said, to profess a
Friendship for a Power, And to be gradually invading their
Dominions, to usurp their Coasts, And then to persevere in
maintaining an unjust Possession of what We had no Right to
hold, but seemed determined to keep. 28
England might have averted war--but only by acceding to all Spanish
demands.
The failure in the negotiations led to the final staccato steps
ending in a rupture. On 6 December 1761,Fuentes officially informed
the Earl of Egrement, who had replaced Pitt as the secretary of state
for the southern department, of the signing of the Family Compact; a
few days later Bristol was asked to leave Spain. England declared war
on 4 January 1762; Spain issued her own declaration a fortnight later.29
On 4 February, France and Spain signed an alliance to guide them in
the conduct of the war, a conflict which they considered to be necessary
because England "obstinately refused to restore the usurpations made...
in the Spanish dominions in America!' Spain pledged to fight for a
reasonable peace while France promised to work for the restoration of
prizes taken by England during the war, to gain fishing rights for Spain
2 8Bristol to Egremont, 6 December 1761, SP 94/146; Pares, 22.cit., p. 555;
Captured French documents, 9 - 16 January 1762, CO 137/61, ff. 60-61.
29
TCD, p. 495.
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on the Newfoundland banks, and to effect the evacuation of all English
settlers from Spanish America.30
Meanwhile, to furnish protection for English settlers in the Bay
of Honduras, Lt. Gov. Moore sent a company of the 49th regiment of
foot commanded by Captain Joseph Otway to the Mosquito Shore. Believing
that a field officer should govern on the Shore during this critical
period, Moore also named him to replace Richard Jones as superintendent.
England had thus stated her determination to retain her settlements on
the Spanish Main, 31 even as Spain was preparing to expel them by force.
30Franco-Spanish alliance, 4 February 1762, TCD, p. 482.
31 0rders to Captain Joseph Otway, O. 1 February 1762, WO 17/162, vol. i;
Lyttelton to Egremont, 12 May 1762, CO 137/61, f. 117; James McLeish,
"British Activities in Yucatan and on the Mosquito Shore in the Eighteenth
Century", Unpublished M.A. dissertation, London University, 1926, p. 240.
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Chapter VI
PEACE and PROGRESS in the BAY of HONDURAS:
Joseph Otway, 1762 - 1767
Joseph Otway, a captain in His Majesty's 49th regiment of foot,
and a quiet, unobtrusive man, replaced Richard Jones as superintendent
of the Mosquito Shore on 20 April 1762. Otway had not requested the
post, nor does it appear that he was as well qualified as three
lieutenants in the regiment who did: Joseph Smith Speer, the younger
Robert Hodgson and James Lawrie.
Lawrie, who was an occasional trading partner of William Pitt, was
popular with the Shoremen for his "happy temper and disposition of mind".
However, his petition for the superintendency only indicated a desire
to avoid the frequent and expensive transfers between the Shore and
Jamaica that he had experienced in military service, and thus it failed
to gain government approval. 1 Lieutenant Hodgson was "groomed for the
responsibility" ("Tho' his Prospect was very fair, he was suffered to
2
think of the Mosquito Shore only"--a preoccupation that was responsible
for this being his eleventh year as a lieutenant.) and had the support
of Under-Secretary of State Robert Wood, who said that it was "manifest
propriety' that he replace his father as superintendent. 3 Speer became
1 Lawrie to Newcastle, 9 June 1760, BM, Add 32,901, f. 218; Shoremen to
Moore, 12 January 1760, BM, Add 32,901, f. 219.
The younger Hodgson usually refe red to himself in the third person.
3Hodgson to Newcastle, n.d., BM, Add 33,055, f. 294; Wood to Hodgson, 24
July 1762, DRH, appendix p. 2.
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interested in the superintendency while commanding a small fort at
Black River, but he had few ties on the Shore and spent very little
time there. 4
 Although two of these men eventually became superintendent,
their bids were now denied, principally because Otway outranked them. 5
The Shoremen feared a "new and possibly disinterested" superintendent
when they learned that Jones was to be replaced. Henry Corrin, the
leading settler in Bluefields, was concerned that Otway would not bother
to visit the more remote settlements south of Cape Gracias a Dios,
"Especially when there are some persons at Black River whose intent it
is to Endeavour to dissuade him from Coming this way." 6
 Corrin left
unsaid his worry that Otway would interrupt the profitable Indian slave
trade.
In spite of the internal rivalries and the usual war-time anxieties,
the situation on the Shore at the beginning of Otway's superintendency
was encouraging. The chance of a Spanish offensive was slight: the
possibility of a victory if they did attack almost nil. The Mosquitos,
the Shoremen and their slaves, and the company of the 49th regiment
stationed on the Shore, constituted a formidable defensive unit. During
the short period of Anglo-Spanish hostilities in the Seven Years War,
they carried the combat to the enemy almost without respite. In June
1762, they sacked Matina; the next month they assaulted Lobiguisca,
burning the church and carrying a number of Indian inhabitants into
4
Military commission to Joseph Smith Speer, 7 August 1761, 30/8/98,
vol. ii, f. 423.
5Lyttelton to Egremont, 12 May 1762, CO 137/61, f. 117; War Office
memorandum, 1 February 1762, WO 17/162, vol. i, f. 1; McLeish, "British
Activities", p. 240; Burns, British est Indies, p. 505.
6Corrin to Jones, 20 July 1762, CO 140/42.
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slavery; a week later they attacked the castle on the San Juan, 7
 but
decided against besieging the fort because they had no cannon; and three
months later they returned to wreak havoc throughout the frontier region.
The Mosquitos also captured a resister ship, which they armed, and with
which they audaciously, but unsuccessfully, assaulted Omoa. 8
 Mosquito
plans to invade the Costa Rican highlands were only cancelled because
of the conclusion of the war.9
Less than nine months after Spain entered the Seven Years War,
7A heroine of Nicaraguan folk-history, Rafaela Herrera, is reputed to
have taken command of the fort during the assault. According to
Rafaela, the enemy decided to attack when they heard of the dedh of
her father, the commander of the fort. Refusing to surrender, she
turned a cannon on the headquarters of the English commander and
killed him with a single shot, forcing the enemy to retire in disgrace.
Petition from Rafaela Herrera y Sotomayor for a government pension,
16 March 1780, Guat 465. But there is almost no supporting evidence
for her tale. She claimed that she was thirteen at the time; other
sources say that she was nineteen. She also said that the attack
occurred in August 1764, yet the only attack on the fort during
this period was in July 1762, and there is not a single account of
Rafaela's deed by anyone either defending or attacking the fort.
Lyle McAlister sugsests that hicaraguan historians greatly magnified
the story "from patriotic motives". See Lyle N. McAlister ! "British
Interest in the Nicaraguan Transisthmian Route, 1648 - 1798",
Unpublished MA dissertation, 1947. University of California, Bancroft
Library, p. 75; Sofonlas Salvatierra,  Contribucidn a la historia 
Centroamericana (2 vols., Managua, 1940), i, 478.
8Vidal to Charles III, 30 June 1766, Guat 456; Vidal to Arriaga, 1 March
1763, Guat 456; From Melchor Vidal, 30 December 1762, Guat 449; Merits
of Jose Antonio de Vargas, 20 July 1771, Guat 600; Heredia to Arriaga,
30 April 1763, nos. 9, 11, Gust 641; Cayetano A1c4zar Molina, LOES
virreinatos en el siglo xviii. Vol. XIII of Historia de Am4rica y e
de los pueblos americanos. (Barcelona-Buenos Aires, 1945), 219; Garcia
9 l'eldez, memorlas, iii, 50.Report by Jos‘ Antonio de Oriamuno, 3 November 1762, AC 557; Esquivel
Molina, "Las Incursiones", p. 248; Juez de prevenciOn of Matina to
Oriamuno, 27 January 1763, AC 558.
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officials representing Spain, France and En„,land met to discuss peace.
The English commissioner, the Duke of Bedford, was instructed to agree
to the evacuation of the Mosquito Shore in exchange for logwood-cutting
/
rights on the east coast of Yucatan. 10 In an early proposal Bedford assured
the Comte de Choiseul, the French envoy who also represented Spain at
the talks, that England would evacuate Black River. 11
 Choiseul said
that Spain must "insist with warmth" on her rights to the Mosquito Coast,
since from their settlements there the English controlled illicit commerce
with Veragua, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Honduras, as well as the mouth
of the San Juan River, which was the old invasion route of the filibusters.
Any concession to England, Choiseul said, would lead "to new discussions
and a new rupture". 12 But with the fall of Havana, Spain lost her
strong bargaining position, and consequently, neither the preliminary
nor definitive treaties made any mention of Black River or the Mosquito
Shore. Article seventeen of the definitive treaty read:
His Britannick Majesty shall cause to be demolished all
the Fortifications which His Subjects shall have erected
in the Bay of Honduras, and other Places of the Territory
of Spain in that Part of the World, four Months after the
Ratification of the present Treaty: And His Catholick Maj sty
shall not permit His Britannick Majesty's Subjects, or their
Workmen, to be disturbed, or moleQted, under any Pretence
whatsoever, in the said Places, in their Occupation of Cutting,
Loading, and Carrying away Logwood: And for this Purpose, they
may build without Hindrance, and occupy without Interruption,
the Houses and Magazines which are necessary for Them, for
their Families, and for their Effects: And His Catholick
Majesty assures to them, by this Article, the full Enjoyment
10
Instructions to the Duke of Bedford, 4 September 1762, 30/50/54, f. 20.
11
Project of articles for the preliminary treaty of peace, article
thirteen, Bedford to Choiseul, 24 September 1762, 30/50/54, f. 29.
Unsigned memorial, c. 1763, AGS, Eat 8162.
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of those Advantages, and Powers, on the Spanish Coasts
and Territories, as above stipulated, immediately after
the Ratification of the present Treaty. 13
This article was intended to resolve the Anglo-Spanish dispute in the
Bay of Honduras, however while it conceded a tenuous legality to the
logwood settlement, it only confused the question of the Mosquito Shore.
The English, giving a literal anOnsophisticated interpretation to the
article, issued orders to "demolish all fortifications constructed by
His Majesty's subjects in the Bay of Honduras and on other places of
Spanish territory in that part of the world...." Not until British
officials in the West Indies questioned the interpretation of the
article did Whitehall look at it more closely. The Spanish, on the
other hand, gave the article an extremely loose interpretation.
Demolishing the fortifications in the Bay, they claimed, automatically
referred that the settlements there would be evacuated. This divergent
interpretation, with the attendant danger of another Anglo-Spanish
confrontation, was the main concern of Joseph Otway and the Shoremen
during Otway's superintendency.
The Treaty of 1763 did not change the occupations of the Shoremen,
except to discourage heavy investments in slaves or clearing new land,
because the fear remained that government might eventually withdraw
its protection. But the passage of the Sugar Act of 1764 offered the
possibilities of an improved economic situation there by promoting
13
The Definitive Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Between his Britannick
Majesty, the Most Christian King, and the King of Spain. 10 February
1763 (London,1763), p. 204 TCD, p. 491.
*Mahogany cutting, turtling, sugar production, the Indian slave trade
and commerce with the Spanish and Mosquitos remained the leading
occupations.
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settlement and industry. Benjamin Franklin, who had close family
ties with Otway, 15
 showed an active interest in the Shore. Because
of insufficient land in the sugar colonies, he prophesied that prices
would rise as foreign sugar was eliminated from the English market,
"unless Plantations are admitted on the Mosquito Shore, where I am
told there is plenty of suitable Land; and Numbers ready to go and plant
there, if the Crown will allow it and protect them." Franklin asked
Richard Jackson, agent for Pennsylvania in London, to probe government
willingness to support a colonising enterprise on the Shore. But
Jackson replied that he did not think that government would "choose
to meddle" in the matter. 16
Rumours of a Spanish invasion continued to sweep the Shore after
the signing of the definitive treaty. In May word reached Black River
that the Spanish were massing troops on the frontier and bringing
warships to the Bay from ,Havana, Vera Cruz and Campeche. To avert an
attack, Otway sent Joseph Smith Speer to Omoa with a copy of the
preliminary treaty, and orders "to demand...satisfaction, and reparation,
for captures made by the Spaniards after the time limilted fer cessation
of Hostilities." But the Spanish commander at Omoa, Francisco Aybar,
"Treated His Majestys Authority and Name with Great Insolence". He
15Otway's wife's brother was Franklin's son-in-law.
16Franklin to Jackson, 25 June 1764, printed in Carl Van Doren, Letters 
and Papers of Benlamin Franklin and Richard Jackson 1753 - 1785 
(Philadelphia, 1947), p. 168; Jackson to Franklin, 11 Au6ust 1764,
ibid.
17Quiros to Cristobol, 19 April 1763, CO 137/61, f. 215; Declaration by
Joseph Smith Speer, 21 August 1765, CO 137/33, f. 236; Declaration by
Christian Boom, 13 May 1763, 30/8/98, vol. ii, f. 424; Lyt elton to
Ellis, 15 July 1764, WO 1/49; Jamaica council minut 8, 21 November
1765, Journal of the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations (14 vols.,
London, 1920
.,1938), xii 225.
18
Egremont to Hodgson, 16 March 1763, CO 137/61, f. 53. The warrant was
inscribed "Robert Hodgson the Commanders of Our Troops or Garrisons in
the Bay of Honduras, and other Places of the Territory of Spain, in
that part of the World; and to all others, whom it may concern."
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charged Speer with combining illicit trade with his official duties
and detained him for five months. Nevertheless, if plans were underway
to invade the Shore at this time, they were abandoned. 17
To fulfil th terms of the treaty, the Earl of Egremont, seer tary
of state for the southern department, issued a special commission to
Lieutenant Robert Hodgson "to repair to the Bay of the Logwood Cutters
gay of Hondurag", to dismantle all British-built fortifications, and
to bring away all troops and military stores. 18 Few men knew the region
as intimately as Hodgson, who had been given responsible assignments
there during his father's superintendency, but there was an intimation
that he was not a judicious choice. In 1753, Governor Knowles of Jamaica
said that his activities on the Shore had angered many settlers. 19 Hodgson
received specific instructions from Governor Lyttelton to car y out his
commission, with additional orders to bring away the troops from the
Mosquito Shore--or so Lyttelton seemed to imply.
19The elder Hodgson to the younger Hodgson, 14 May 1755, CO 137/48, f. 265;
Knowles to Hodgson, 8 October 1753,00 132/60, f. 55; Lyttelton to Hodgson,
19 August 1763, CO 123/I, f. 46; Egremont to Lyttelton, 26 A ril 1763,
CO 123/1, f. 46; Egremont to Lyttelton, 26 April 1763, CO 137/61, f. 167.
Knowles did not explain the nature of the complaints against the younger
Hodgson.
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altho' you are directed by the Orders in the first part
of this Letter to repair to the Bay of Honduras and other
Parts of the Spanish Coasts frequented by the Logwood Cutters,
you will nevertheless understand that those Orders do not
restrain you from demolishing the Fortifications erected by
His Majesty's Subjects and bringing away any Troops
Artillery &c. from any Place where you shall be when you
receive this Letter.2u
A master of double-talk, Hod son demonstrated his flair for resisting
distasteful and irresolute orders by assuming a posture of confused
innocence. "Your Excellency has not ordered me to divest this Country
of Military Protection, it rather seems to me as if Your Excellency did
not choose to order it; but yet, Sir, You go so very near to the doing
so...." He then asked a question that higher officials than the governor
had been unable to answer. Was the Mosquito Shore part of Spanish
territory? Hodgson contended that it was not, and delayed carrying out
his instructions, explaining that "any Mistake of mine may occasion more
Discussion between the two Courts than my Life can attone for...." 21
The military evacuation was retarded still further when Hodgson
sent the transport vessel back to Jamaica with a presumptuous note to
Lyttelton. 22 If the governor really did intend to remove the company
and stores, he said, then the transport should be returned. Hodgson
then sailed to Belize, where he informed the wood-cutters of the orders
to destroy their fortifications and to bring away their troops. In
20Lyttelton to Hodgson, 19 August 1763, CO 137/61, f. 180; Hodgson to
Lyttelton, 6 August 1764, CO 137/61, f. 323. Hodgson was at Black
Rivef when he received his orders.
21Hodgson to Lyttelton, 13 September 1763, CO 137/61, f. 195.
22_Hodgson to Lyttelton, 20 February 1764,C0 137/61, f. 329.
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fact, the tropic climate had obliterated all traces of the fort
constructed in 1755, and there was not a red coat within 250 miles. 23
When Lyttelton received Hodgson's impudent note, he sent the sloop
back to the Shore with explicit orders to convey the troops and stores
to Jamaica. Joseph Otway, who was conmander of the contingent of the
49th regiment on the Shore as well as superintendent, was ordered to
remain in Black River. Lyttelton felt less assurance than he demonstrated
however, and asked Lord Halifax, who had replaced Egremont, if he had
been correct in bringing away the troops, and if he should also recall
Otway.
24 Halifax turned the problem over to the Board of Trade who
decided on 2 December 1763 to retain the superintendency, thus
effectively upholding Hodgson's interpretation of the treaty, and
relieving him of the responsibility for not having immediately carried
out his orders. The ruling also confirmed the continuation of the status
quo in the Bay of Honduras, although it made no mention of what was to
be done with the fortifications or the troops. 25 Before these instructions
23Proclamation by Robert Hodgson, 7 October 1763, CO 137/61, f. 325.
24Hodgson to Germain, 1 May 1776, CO 137/71, f. 207, Lyttelton to Hodgson,
2 November 1763, CO 137/61, f. 199; Lyttelton to Otway, 2 November 1763,
CO 137/61, f. 203; Lyttelton to Halifax, 18 November 1763, CO 137/61,f.193
Halifax to Board of Trade, 12 November 1763, 30/8/96, f. 321; Minutes
of the Board of Trade, 28 November and 1 December 1763, Journal of the 
Commissioners, xii, 413, 416; To the Earl of Egremont, 6 June 1763,
30/50/49, f. 211; Hillsborough to Halifax, 2 December 1763, CO 137/61,
f. 184; Board of Trade to Halifax, 2 December 1763, 30/8/96, f. 323.
The Board's decision was transmitted to Otway and Lyttelton by Lord
Halifax, who also reviewed the duties of the superintendent: he was to
improve commerce, retain a strict friendship with the Indians, keep the
public peace, compile statistics on populati n and the volume of trade,
and transmit information of future commercial interest to the governor of
Jamaica. Halifax to Lyttelton, 9 December 1763, CO 137/61, f. 186;
Halifax to Otway, 9 December 1763, CO 137/61, f. 188.
25
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reached Lyttelton, he accused Hodgson of purposely delaying the
ex cution of his orders.
It is supposed also that he had a further motive to induce
him to remain so long at the Mosquito Shore - that being
engaged in Traffick at that place, and the Bay of Honduras,
he required a longer time to adjust his Affairs and settle
the accompts of monies due to him in those parts, than woud
have been ponsistent with a prompt obedience to His Majesty's
Commands.2°
When the troop transport arrived on the Shore, Hodgson told
Lyttelton that: "The Artillery and Stores are scarcely worth in Value
the Expence to the Crown of hiring a Transport for them". Furthermore:
"I forgot to mention the important point that the Commander of the vessel
said that there was enough room only for the troops and not for the
stores, etc., and that is why there is all this fuss." 27 The stores
remained, but the troops finally sailed for Jamaica in February. They
fought the heavy seas and northers for three weeks, when to the great
surprise of the passengers and crew, and to the chagrin and embarrassment
of the captain, they again found themselves off the bar at Black River.
With the need to repair a leaky bottom, they then sailed to Bonaca--
where a chance wave capsized the ship. Few of the troops were on board
at the time, and eventually a private vessel successfully transported
the unit to Kingston. 28
News of the decision to retain the superintendency arrived too
late to countermand the orders to evacuate the troops from the Shore
26Lyttelton to Halifax, 13 September 1764, CO 137/61, f. 319.
27
Hodgson to Lyttelton, 20 February 1764, CO 137/61, f. 329.
28Vanriell to Otway, 27 March 1764, CO 137/61, f. 256.
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In any case there were reasons to withdraw them besides the stipulations
of article seventeen. The council of Jamaica refused to continue to
support the company. "They were reduced to a Necessity of returning,"
Hodgson reported, "their subsisting being impracticable without...Pay."
Furthermore the regiment was transferred to Ireland. Yet the Shoremen
accused Lyttelton of abandoning the Shore, and thereby criminally
interpreting the treaty in favour of the Spaniards.29
In the autumn of 1763, intelligence was rec ived from a priest in
Sonaguera that 350 dragoons were in Truxillo awaiting Spanish ships of
war from Havana l to attack the Shore. Otway pleaded with Lyttelton for
instructions, but knowing that he could not afford to wait for advice,
he sent Bartholomew Gilibert, "a Sardinian who spoke barely understandable
English", according to Hodgson, on a mission similar to that undertaken
by Speer earlier in the year. On his journey through Honduras, Gilibert
encountered two companies of regular Spanish troops and a large body of
poorly-trained militia, proof to him of Spanish intentions. In Olanchito,
he informed the Spanish governor that the Mosquito Indians were flooding
into Black River (an exa8terated Spanish report estimated their number
to be 10,000); it would be almost impossible to restrain them from
retaliating against "acts of cruelty". Furthermore, Gilibert said, he
had information that the Mos uitos would allow the Spaniards to pass
into their territory, then cut off their retreat and massacre every
29Lyttelton to Halifax, 4 April 1764, CO 137/61, f. 245; Declaration by
Robert Hodgson, 23 December 1766, CO 123/1, f. 111: Shoremen to George III,
31 May 1766, CO 123/1, f. 88; Memorials from the Shoremen, 8 and 12
April 1781, CO 123/3, vol. ii.
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man caught in the trap. On hearing this intelligence the greater
part of the undisciplined militia dispersed in terror.3°
When Spanish officials in Honduras learned of the defensive
preparations on the Shore, they ordered the commander of the small
garrison in Truxillo, Eugenio Ferez, to reassure the Shoremen of
Spain's peaceful intentions. Perez' arrival in Black River pleased
the Shoremen, "but the Mosquitos were so exasperated at seeing Spaniards
in their Country", according to Gilibert, who had recently returned
to Black River, "that they were resolved to murder them & even forced
me to secreet myself for some time." 31
Luis Diez Navarro, who was commissioned to verify the execution
of article seventeen, also left for the Shore in October 1763, 32 but
a series of incidents delayed his arrival in Black River until April
30Jimenes to Pitt, 27 October 1763, CO 137/61, f. 213; Otway to
Lyttelton, 11 November 1763, CO 137/61, f. 217; Otway to Perez,
11 November 1763, CO 137/61, f. 209; Declaration by Bartholomew
Gilibert, 12 March 1770, CO 137/65, f. 212; From Joseph Otway,
7 January 1764, CO 137/65, f. 213; Declaration by William Pitt,
James Lawrie and Daniel Hewlett, 12 March 1770, CO 137/65, f. 214;
Calbo to SSenz, 23 January 1764, AGS, Est 8133, folder 1.
31,Saenz to Perz, 2 February 1764, Guat 875; Perez to Navarro,
March 1764, AGS, Est 8133, folder 1; To Pedro Mesia de la Cerda,
28 May 1763, Guat 665; To Alonso Fernandez de Heredia, 30 May 1763,
AGS, Est 8133, folder 1; Instructions to Antonio Oyaritide,
23 September 1763, Guat 665; Declaration by Bartholomew Gilibert,
12 March 1770, CO 137/65, f. 212.
32Navarro was scheduled to take 200 militiamen to Black River to
force the fulfilment of the article if necessary, but Ferez
convinced him that this would be unwise. Navarro to SSenz,
6 February 1764, AGS, Est 8133, folder 1.
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1764, just five days after word of the English decision to retain the
superintendency had reached there. 33
 Luis Dfez Navarro's little fleet
of three piraguas was gree ed by cannon fire from batteries manned by the
Mosquitos, but he was eventually allowed to come ashore with some of
his men, but blindfolded so that they could not see the English
fortifications. An "indescribable" scene, a "comedy sketch" staged by
General Tempest's Zambos confronted Diez Navarro when he reached Otway's
house. M rching towards him was "a great tr op of armed Zambos Z;ne
report said 400, another 2,0027 in lines four abreast, with drummers
leading, the head of each file carrying lances flying the English
banner." The Indians, gaudily painted in hideous designs, filed by
with drums beating. "with his loin cloth trailling behind him rnd
wearinz7 a military coat and a bright red three peeked hat", Tempest
approached Dfez Navarro and exclaimed loudly "God damn you Spaniard",
and indicated his desire to seize him, as the man who "was going to
cut off their heads and take their lands." Only a guard of mestizos
and Pitt's Negroes saved the Spanish commissio er from the same fate
experienced by Governor Pastora eight years before. 34
33Navarro to Sitenz, 6 February 1764, AGS, Est 8133, folder 1; Navarro to
Otway, 11 February 1764, AGS, Est 8133, folder 1; Heredia to Navarro,
3 October 1763, AGS, Est 8133, folder 1. After a month on the trail to
the coast, Navarro was hin ered by rains, the lack of transportation,
the seasonal northers, a fire that destroyed the sails of a vessel he
had planned to use, and finally by a typhoid epidemic that swept his party
and killed his own family. Report by Luis Dfez Navarro, 14 June 1764,
AGS, Est 8133, folder 1; Aguirre to N varro, 18 March 1764, Guat 665.
34N varro to Cerda, 26 April 1764, Guat 665; Report by Luis 1:)ez Navarro,
14 June 1764, AGS, Est 8133, folder 1; Otway to Navarro, 27 March 1764,
AGS, Est 8133, folder 1; Testimony by Manuel de Ibarra, 15 January 1766,
Guat 875; Heredia to Arriaga, 30 Septe ber 1764, Guat 875. See above,
P-94.
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After Tempest had been soothed by the assurance that the Spanish
had no arms with them, Dfez Navarro turned to the purpose of his mission.
He asked Otway and Hodgson if the English order to destroy the forts in
the Bay of Honduras had been obeyed. Hodgson refused to reply, so Dfez
Navarro turned to Pitt and the other principal inhabitants present to
inquire if they intended to remain. Otway interrupted to assert that
the Shoremen were under England's protection. But Diaz Navarro persisted;
his king wanted the settlers and merchants in Black River to move to Belize
or Jamaica. Is this an order, or was he merely asking? Otway queried.
Merely asking, Dfez Navarro seemed to reply, for having no way to support
his demands, he dropped the subject and left Black River with nothing
more than an affidavit from Otway to prove that he had been there. 35
Shortly after Dfez Navarro's departure, and nine months after
having received orders to demolish the British fortifications in the
Bay of Honduras, Hodgson was still in Black River--and the fortifications
were still standing. On 10 May, Lyttelton confirmed the orders to
demolish the forts and to return the military stores. The governor,
Hodgson said, sounded "as if he thought that Country was part of the
Spanish Territories", and was attempting "to have the Mosquito Shore
compleatly dismantled."36
The sundry equipment that Hodgson reluctantly shipped to Jamaica
35Otway to Halifax, 25 April 1764, CO 137/61, f. 275; Declaration by
Robert Hodgson, 23 December 1766, CO 123/1, f.111; amez, Costa de 
Mosquitos, p. 105.
36Lytte1ton to Hodgson, 10 May 1764, CO 137/61, f. 255; Lyttelton to
Halifax, 31 May 1764, CO 137/61, f. 251; Hodgson to Germain, 1 May 1776,
CO 137/71, f. 207.
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in the summer of 1764 included ”13 old muskets (useless), four Useless
Pistols, 50 Old Bayonets, one Half barrel Gun Powder, two old Powder
horns...“ and other odds and ends. Hodgeon suggested that the stores
were not worth the expense of transporting them back to Jamaica. 37
Nor were they worth the perilous and unpleasant duty for the crew of
H.M.S. Nautilus, which received the stores. Captain Locker noted in
his log:
8 June 1764 — sent a lieutenant and 25 men ashore...fresh Gales and
Hazey Weather....
	
16 June	 — Modr Gales with much Rain A man was drown e d by the
Boats Oversetting in the Surff.
17 June — Fresh Gales and Cloudy Weather with Thunder Lighting
and Rain. ...diserted from their Duty on Shore James
Sheridan, William Williams and John Crawford.
	
24 June
	
— a man drowned on duty at Black River...Mod Breezes....
	
26 June
	
— diserted from their Duty on shore James Henderson
Peter peterson Wm Bobb & Joseph Disdell...Mod and Clout
	
1 July	 — diserted from their Duty on Shore James Even and
William Noyse Marines Mod and Cloudy.
2 July — came on Board a lieutenant with the Remainder of the
Men. Fresh Gales and Cloudy Weather with Small Rain
Thunder and Lightning.38
In Hodgson's report on his commission, he said that he had obeyed
Lyttelton's orders only because he was his superior officer. “He never
—
understood those Orders in anywise to relate or concern hi/Duty it
executing the 17th Article of the Peace'', which applied to Spanish
territory in the Bay of Honduras. 39 Lyttelton e s report on the operation
37Inventory of military stores, 28 June 1764, CO 137/61, f. 290.
38Log of H.M.S. Nautilus, Captain Locker, 1764, Adm 51/630.
39Hodgson to Lyttelton, 6 August 1764, CO 137/61, f. 323; Hodgson to
Germain, 1 lay 177 6, CO 137/71 , f. 207.
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was mainly an indictment of Hodgson, who he said had probably "framed
pretexts for delaying the accomplishment of the Service he has been
entrusted with" to increase the amount of his stipend. The governor
wanted Hodgson's allowance for his stay in the Bay to correspond to
the time that he was "employed in the execution of his Orders, and
not for the Term during which he lay under various pretexts in a state
of total inaction at the Mosquito Shore." 4o
Lytelton's denunciations were unsupported, and Hodgson was absolved
from any responsibility for his extended stay on the Shore. "Such Delay",
according to Henry Conway, secretary of state for the southern department,
"seems rather to have been owing to a Want of Explicitness in the
Instructions He received, than to a View of gaining Time & prolonging
his Commission." 41 Another British official said that Hodgson did
"essential Service, in not hastily executing Orders which...gveg the
Governor...thought proper to require an Explanation...." 42 Lord Halifax
and the Board of Trade seemed to accept Hodgson's claim that he had
"saved the Mosquito Shore to the Crown." 43
After Diéz Navarro's visit to Black River, Spanish officials
4oLytte1ton to Halifax, 31 May and 13 September 1764, CO 137/61, ff. 251,
319.
41 Conway to Treasury, 10 February 1766, SP 37/22, f. 36.
42Burke to Cooper, 12 March 1766, SP 37/22, f. 46.
43From Robert Hodgson, 21 December 1765, SP 37/4, f. 42; Conway to
Treasury, 12 March 1766, DRH, appendix p. 3.
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abandoned all immediate hopes of satisfying their demands in the Bay
of Honduras and concentrated on courting the Mosquito chiefs and luring
the Negro slaves away from the Shore." Spanish traders visited
Mosquito Kine, George I early in 1765, and when Superintendent Otway saw
George shortly afterwards, he
could not forbear observing some Trifles among them which
I am certain they must either have received or taken from
the Spaniards, the King, in particular, had a Cane with a
Gold Head, one of his Chiefs had a long silver Cross which
he wore about his Neck, and there were divers other Things
distributed among the rest of his People.45
Yet the loyalty of the Mosquitos was not seriously doubted; the slave
issue, however, had become a vexation. Authorised and encouraged by
various reales c4dulas, the Spanish succeeded in attracting many slaves
away from their English and Mosquito owners. 46 On the night of 16 August
1765, seven slaves slipped across the dangerous bar at Black River in
a stolen piragua and made their way to Omoa. Two of them, Pompey and
Blow, were government property and particularly valuable to Otway, who
sent John Christopherz, a merchant of Black River, to demand their return.
En route, Christopherz was courteously treated by Spanish officials, but
he was unfortunate to encounter a man of Aybar's temperament at Omoa.
The Spaniard heaped abuse on the Shoremen, those "Harbourers of Robbers
and Villains", and refused to recognise Christopherz as the representative
of a British official, using "the extraordinary Subterfuge of denying
44Arriaga to Grimaldi, 18 April 1765, AGS, Est 8133, folder 1.
45Otway to the Board of Trade, 12 July 1765, CO 137/33, f. 232; Testimony
by Manuel de Ibarra, 15 January 1766, Gust 875.
46Mosquito chiefs and even lesser warriors owned considerable numbers of
Negro, Indian, mestizo and Spanish slaves.
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His Maj sty had any Settlement or Officer" on the Mosquito Shore. 47
The astonished British emis ary was then placed under armed guard,
given "two small Pieces of jirked Pork, very rusty, and ten small mouldy
nay rotten Biscuits", placed on a horse and driven from Omoa after being
told that he should "Thank God you aren't being sent in irons to
Guatemala." During his short stay the only satisfaction he received
was an admission that the escaped slaves had been sent away "to be
instructed in the Christian principals", and that neither the slaves
nor the piragua would be returned. 48
When Otway informed Whitehall about Christopherz' treatment at Omoa,
Louis Devisme, the British representative in Madrid, was ordered
to convince the Spanish Ministers, how necessary it is that
effectual Instructions be given to the Governors & Officers
of the Catholick King, for conducting Themselves towards His
Majesty's Officers and Subjects upon all Occasions, in a
manner suitable to the Friendship and Harmony subsisting
between the Two Nations.49
Devisme reported that the Marques de Grimaldi "seemed much offended at
the Mosquito Complaint, saying it was an Imposition, & that we had no
right to be there". Spain had not the force to take a strong stand,
however, and so orders were issued to return the s ven slaves and the
piragua and to reprimand Aybar. 5° But the English must be expelled
47Otway to Board of Trade, 20 January 1766, CO 137/34, f. 11.
48Otway to Aybar, 2 September 1765, CO 137/62, f. 192; Truxillo to Aybar,
25 August 1765, AGS, Est 6963; Aybar to Otway, 19 January 1763, CO 137/61,
f. 190; Report by John Christolaherz, 10 January 1766, CO 137/62, f. 194;
Otway to Halifax, 20 January 1766, CO 137/62, f. 188.
49Richmond to Devis e, 4 July 1766, SP 94/174.
Devisme to Richmond, 28 July 1766, SP 94/174; From friar Julien de Arriaga,
19 November 1766, AGS, Est 6963; Devisme to Grimaldi, 1 August 1766,
SP 94/175.
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from the osquito Coast, as well as from all other settlements in
Spanish territory, Grimaldi exclaimed, "It would be intolerable to
sacrifice idpanish rightg for the conservation of peace." 51
Consequently the Spanish reopened discussions on the question of
the Mosquito Coast which had been ne lected since Diez Navarro's visit
to Black River. Grimaldi directed the Spanish ambassador in London,
the Conde de Masserano, to complain of the excesses caused by the
continued British presence in the Bay of Honduras that had afflicted
the kingdom of Guatemala and to a lesser extent Fanamit, Santa Fe and
Mexico since the seventeenth century. 52 The Mosquito Indians and
English "outlaws" had been an agonising plague to Guatemala, an
inherited catastrophe to each succeeding captain general by their
pillaging of towns and plantations, burning and sacking of churches,
murdering priests and secular officials, hindering missionary work and
enslaving or driving reduced Indians into the mountains, and seizing
Spanish vessels--and then multiplying the humiliation by trading with
the Spaniards when they were not plundering them. To a certain extent,
Anglo-Mosquito incursions masked illicit trade, yet more often suffering
accompanied their visits. "The surprises of the Zambos Mosquitos Indians
51Arriaga called Black River the most important English establishment
on the ,ext naive coast between the Orinoco River and Florida. Antonio
Calderon Quijano, "Un incidente militar on los establecimientos
Ingleses en el Rio Tinto (Honduras) en 1782", Anuario de studios 
Americanos, ii (1945), p. 761.
52Grimaldi to Masserano, 20 January 1767, AHN, Est 4269, vol. i.
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have been the principal reason for the abandonment of the cities that
used to be on the vast coast la the kingdom of Guatemalg", wrote
Pedro de Salazar, president of Guatemala, when demanding that the
Indians be "exterminated by blood and fire". 53 The tragic call on
the lives and miserable fortunes of the ladino and Indian population
and even on the Creole and Spanish classes resulted in a degrading and
relentless poverty throughout the kingdom from which Central America
has never fully recovered. Mines remained inoperative and fields unworked
as endless numbers of men were conscripted to serve--and to perish--in
frontier garrisons. To avoid the labour on the massive fort of San
Fernando de Omoa, entire male populations of frontier pueblos went into
the bush. The cost of constructing the fort was staggering: 1,117,591
pesos and thousands of lives by 1765, with the end not yet in sight and
the fort a failure. Even the town of Candelaria, which because of its
proximity furnished most of the workers for the fort, remained exposed
to the raids of the Zambos Mosquitos. 54
Because the Mosquitos never grasped the significance of the
difference between war and peace, there was seldom great variation in
the frequency of their raids. Only four months after the signing of
the Treaty of 1763, they fell on the tormented valley of Matina. After
53Salazar to Arriaga, 31 August 1766, Guat 875; From Pedro de Salazar,
11 December 1765, Gust 876.
54
To Jose Saenz, 29 January 1769, BAGG, iv (1940), p. 317; Ortiz to Salazar,
28 September 1769, Guat 423; Report by Pedro de Salazar, 1 November 1768,
Guat 408. Fort Omoa was built primarily to withstand the raids of the
Zambos Mosquitos, to counter illicit trade, and eventually to act as a
base for operations against the Mosquito Coast and Belize settlements.
See above, p. 109.
the attack King George I offered the Spanish peace in the future in
exchange for two silver-handled swor s, some shirts and socks, 150 pesos
and an annual tribute of cacao and plantains. If the e gifts were not
immediately forthcoming he threatened to destroy the valley. The
governor of Costa Rica accepted the offer; the price was small enough
in view of the province's weak defences. The truce lasted just three
years, then in the summer of 1766, 300 Mosquitos arrived in Matina to
demand the fantastic sum of 1,000 quintales (slightly over 100,000 pounds)
of cacao in tribute. Although it was over half the annual produce of
the valley, the harassed growers paid, or so they claimed to explain
the loss of such a large sum of taxable cacao. Undoubtedly most of it was
carried away peacefully by Jamaican traders.55
The occasional periods of truce at Matina never affected Mosquito
activities elsewhere. They sacked Comoapa and burned its church in
1767, enslaving fourteen women after chasing their men into the hills.
The governor of Nicaragua reacted angrily against the "poor Wretches" of
these frontier towns who panicked on "hearing the name of the enemy".
The Mosquitos then returned to Comoapa early the next year to seize many
prisoners, each of whom was off red for ransom at 100 pesos, a cow, a
horse and a mule. As on other occasions numerous ladinos and Indians
55The Costa Rican historian, Manuel Esquivel Molina, considers this raid
to have been the origin of the tribute-paying tradition that continued
into the nineteenth century. However the Mosquitos had extracted
tribut in various forms from the Spaniards and Indians of middle America
and Yucatan since the seventeenth century. See Esquivel, "Las
Incursionesu ; Gamez, 22.cit., p. 104.
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travelled to the coast to search for their wives, but they either
lacked enough money or goods to pay the ransom, or the women had
already been shipped away on Jamaican slavers. Even when the Spanish
showed some initiative, it was usually of no avail. Eighty men pursued
the assailants after the raid on Comoapa in 1767, but they had no arms,
and they could do no more than watch the enemy escape with their
captives. 56
Against Mosquito incursions the Spanish could afford no adequate
defence. Forts in Guatemala were under-manned and in poor repair and
provincial militias were untrained and unarmed. 57 It was suggested
that presidios internos, such as those used successfully against the
savage Chichimecs in the desert wastes of northern Mexico, be tried,
but most officials realised that this would not work against the
Mosquitos, who were agile mountain men as well as skilful sailors,
dextrous in the use of modern weapons, and whose settlements were widely
dispersed over rugged inhospitable terrain. The governors of Costa Rica,
5 6Serna to Cabello, 16 January 1767, BAGG, iii (1940), p. 214; Cavello
to Serna, 18 January 1767, ibid., p. 215; Serna to Salazar, 22 January
1767, ibid., p. 218; Ramiro to Salazar, 14 December 1768, ibid., p. 141;
Declaration by Captain Yarrinsen (Garrison), 9 September 1768, Guat 460;
Questions of law relating to trade with the Mosquito Indians (and indirect%
to the ransoming of captives) were not answered by the Recopilacic5n de 
los Leyes. Hispano-Mosquito trade was apparently made legal by the first
and ninth laws, title four, book four. Yet the fiscal of Guatemala,
Romana, considered the case of the Mosquitos to be unique. "The laws speak
of another class of Indians, one who has not had intercourse with the
natiuns of Europe, who cannot handle firearms or the other European means
of defending thew lves, and who have not prevented Spanish domination."
The Mosquitos do all of these things, he pointed out, insinuating that they
were rather closer to being an independent nation that a tribe of irreduced
savages. Ro ana to Salazar, 11 November 1769, B GO, iv (1936), p. 381.
57Cavello to Arriaga, 25 April 1765, Guat 456; Cavell° to Salazar, 31 March
1767, Guat 876; Opinion of the Conse'o, 27 June 1771, Guat 408; Salazar
to the commanding officer St Bavana, 1 8
 May 1767, Guat 642.
146
Nicaragua and Honduras were asked for their opinions on how to contain
or exterminate the Zambos Mosquitos, but their replies were not
particularly adaptable. Governor Nava of Costa Rica sugg sted that
a fort be constructed at Bluefields to stop incursions at Matina and
Talamanca. Governor Cavello of Nicaragua, who said that his two most
important jobs were to establish the real renta del tobaco and to defend
his province against the Mosquitos, believed that it was "indispensable
that a bloody war be carried to the Zambos Mosquitos without giving them
any quarter", but the cost would be prohibitive and he would need 3,000
trained and well-armed men, he added, a number impossible to draw from
the insufficient and dwindling labour force of the kingdom. Governor
Hermenegildo de Arana of Honduras only commented that it would be
impossible to contain the Mosquitos or to eject the English from the
coast as long as they were protected by the Indians. Spanish inhabitants
on the frontier, he said, were "fat and stalwart at sleeping in the shade",
while "the Zambo wolves have famous dispositions and bodies, Li-nd arg
capable and robust for every type of difficult labour." They were
invincible on their incursions encumbered only by a loin-cloth, short
sword, rifle, cartridges and powder-flask. President Salazar had a
pet plan for extinguishing the race. He would remove all Mosquito women
from the coast, "taking great care in so doing to avoid the opposition
that the Mosquito Men might offer to the seearation." Salazar saw only
one disadvantage to his plan; it would take time.58
Romana to Salazar, 10 December 1768, BAY', iii (1940), p. 231; Nava to
Salazar, 14 July 1769, BAGG, iv (1940)7 -T. 319; Cavello to Salazar, 20
January 1770, ibid., p. 330; Merits of Domingo Cavello, 30 January 1773,
Gnat 456; D claration by Toms Hermenegildo de Arana, 30 May 1764, BFR,
Ayala VIII-2823, f. 117; Echeandia to Leguinazabal, 16 October 1764, BPR,
Ayala IV-2819, f. 19; Salazar to Charles III, 13 August 1768, Guat 874.
58
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Spanish officials occasionally moved frontier Indian reductions
to interior regions for greater security, 59 and also attempted to
counter the enemy by attracting Mosquito chiefs and their Indian allies
away from the English. Captain Garrison, chief of the Woolwa Indians
near Pearl Key Lagoon, had one commission from the British and another
from the Spanish. It was Garrison who captured the notorious Zambo
Pangil, "a horrible man of gigantic bulk", 60 and later killed the
minor Mosquito chief Captain Avocado. But Garrison (known as Yarrinsen
or Yarrisen to the Spaniards) also participated in Mosquito raids and
fought for the English during the Seven Years War and in the Anglo-Spanish
war of 1779. These displays of bad faith cost him his life. He was
arrested on a visit to Granada after the American revolution, accused
of having participated in the English invasion of Nicaragua, 61 and then
59These migrations helped to destroy the work of the Franciscan missionaries
in the mountains of Matagalpa and Tologalpa by eliminating the strong
base of reduced In ians from which further advances into the frontier
could have been made. Furthermore, as President Salazar noted, for the
missions to succeed "it is indispensable first that the Zambos Mosquitos
be conquered." Opinion of the Consejo, 10 Vay 1770, Guat 408; Mello to
the president of Guatemala, 24 December 1764, BAGG, iii (1940), p. 210;
Garcia Pe14ez, 22.cit., p. 75. The padre guarTITTI of the order in
Guatemala, citing Romana's comment that it would be inconvenient to form
reductions on towns in Chontales because of the Mosquitos, commented that
"it would be no more convenient to form cities". Ramiro to Salazar,
14 December 1768, BAGG, iii (1940), p. 229; Archivo General del Gobierno
of Guatemala, A1.12-17, 6056/53630. I am indebted to Dr. Murdo J. Macleod
for supplying me with this information.
60Declaration by Antonio Hernandez, 9 September 1768, Guat 460. he name1Pangil (occasionally PabOn) is obviously a corruption of an unknown
English name.
61See below, p.255.
148
strangled in the public square. 62
A more vexing problem to Madrid than Indian incursions was the
expanding illicit trade. Roads had been opened between Black River
and the Spanish towns of Olancho el Viejo and Agalta, and from Cape
Gracias a Dios to Matagalpa, while Matins and Truxillo still received
numerous English and Dutch merchantmen. 63 And the wood products of
the Mosquito Shore were becoming popular in Europe and North America.
An advertisement in a New York newspaper announced that "A Parcel of
Musquito-Shore MAHOGANY" was for sale at Joris Brinkerhoff's, "opposite
Coenties Market". 64 To frustrate English trade in Guatemala, Charles III
even
proposed to burn all the Logwood Trees in that Part of the
World, to prevent all possible Connection with us there,
which Scheme, tho' a very wild one, proves how prepossessed
They are of our People's carrying on an illicit Trade, under
the Pretence of Cutting Logwood.5
Spanish merchants in Guatemala were more interested in the clandestine
trade than in the legal. According to Luis IZez Navarro, Spaniards were
unwilling to invest in legal corn erce because of crushing taxes. The
English profited not only from this extensive trade, but also from the
rich mines of Tegucigalpa, which in the latter half of the eighteenth
62irez to Arriaga, 30 August 1767, Gust 642; Petition from the fiscal of
Guatemala, 12 January 1768, Guat 460; Vargas to Cavello, 15 April 1768,
Guat 460; Declaration by Captain Yarrinsen, 9 September 1768, Guat 460;
Ramiro to Salazar, 14 December 1768, BAGG, iii (1940), p. 229; Diary of
Robert Ho gson, 28 December 1769, CO 137765, f. 239.
63Report by William Lyttelton, 9 July 1763, CO 123/4, f. 56; Thover to
Arriaga, 15 April 1764, Guat 641; Truxillo to Aybar, 25 August 1765,
AGS, Est 6963.
64
New Yor Gazette, 10 February 1766.
65Rochford to Halifax, 6 Auc,ust 1764, SP 94/168.
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century produced annually about 230,000 pesos worth of gold and silver.
Mine owners and operators avoided paying much of their quinto duties
by a "collusion between treasury officials and miners, and by smugling
with the British". 66 Governor Hermenegildo de Arana, who claimed
that his province was impoverished by the contraband trade with the
English of Black River (in fact, Spanish merchants prospered by the
illicit commerce), said that: "It is will known that for every four
parts of gold, silver and other goods of these provinces they carry
away two." English traders': he continued, "own not only the territory
in which the Zambos Mosquitos live, but also the whole province of
Honduras...gngthey possess the hearts of the inhabitants, the great
and the small...."67
Nearly everyone participated in the trade. The little man from
Sona6uera, Yoro and other frontier communities made his living by carrying
sarsaparilla and other wood products to Black River, where they were
exchanged for English merchandise, or by transporting English goods into
the interior for Spanish merchants wYo sent down cattle, indigo, cacao,
tobacco and other products. He occasionally joined large gangs to work
for the English on the coast, clearing land, cutting wood, harvesting
sugar and doing various other 3obs. 68 Most Spanish officials also
66
Floyd, "Bourbon Palliatives", p. 103.
67
Declaration by Tom's Hermenegildo de Arana, 30 May 1764, BPR, Ayala
VIII-2823, f. 177; From Luis Diez Navarro, 10 September 1764, AGS,
Est 8133, folder 1.
68
To the president of Guatemala, n.d.,1764, Gust 449.
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traded with the English, some openly and others by subterfuge. Jose
Gamboa, commander of Fort Omoa, absconded to the Mosquito Shore with
the garrison's pay, then established a trading post on the frontier
and acted as a middleman in tne Anglo-Spanish trade, while provincial
officials were unable or unwilline, to impede his activities. 69
 Alonso
Ferntindez de Heredia, who had become president of the audiencia of
Guatemala, was active i4khe commerce on an even greater scale, but
although his opponents were noisier, they were no more effective in
stopping him. When Heredia's replacement died before taking office,
Grimaldi was prompted to remark: "This Devil of a Governor is in Power
again untill we can send to reimplace him"; Navarro noted that efforts
to stifle the trade with Pitt at Black River were abandoned by Heredia
"for personal ends"; and the escribano (notary) of the audiencia of
Guatemala suggested that the only way to stop the illicit trade was
to replace Heredia with a man who had no other ambition than to serve
the king. 70
The Spanish made sporadic efforts to obstruct the illicit trade.
Guardacostas and corsairs occasionally seized English merchant ve sels,
but they were inclined to resort to piracy if legal prey were not
available, or to participate in clande tine trade if greater profit
were to be found there. Efforts to crush the trade in the interior
6 9Testimony by escaped slaves, 7 November 1765, AGS, Est 6963; Declaration
by Tom s Hermenegildo de Arana, 30 May 1764, Ayala VIII-2823, f. 177.
70Rochford to Halifax, 29 August 1764, SP 94/168; From Luis Diez Navarro,
10 September 1764, AGS, Est 8133, folder 1; Guiraola to Marles III,
30 September 1763, Guat 641.
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were also unsuccessful. Liberal rewards for informers could not
overcome the fear of retaliation by the Mosquitos and by the English
and Spanish contrabandist s, while the occasional orders to execute
everyone involved in it could not inhibit the profitable and relatively
safe trade. 71
In January 1766, complaining that they were the only British subjects
to lose the protection of the crown as a result of the Seven Years War, 72
The Shoremen requested "the happi ess of being immediately made a civil
government, entirely independent of Jamaica." 73
 To support their request
they sent George Hewm to London, accompanied by General Tempest. In that
same summer of 1766, Robert Hodgson and Joseph Smith Speer were also in
. London, each promoting his personal interests. In a memorial to the
Earl of Dartmouth, Speer outlined the advantages of securing the Mosquito
Shore to the British crown, and asked to be named surveyor general for
.71 Dec1aration by William Reid, n.d., SP 94/183, Quitos to Cristobol, 19 April
1763, CO 137/61, f. 215; Petition to AuGustus Keppel, 1 July 1763, Adm
1/237.
72At this time the Shoremen asked for permission to construct a block house,
in Black River for defence against the Spanish and against their own
slaves, but Otway refused to use the Mosquito Shore contingent funds to
construct fortifications, as being contrary to the 17th article of the
treaty. Shoremen to Pitt, 31 May 1766, DRH, appendix p. 4.
Shoremen to Pitt, 31 May 1766, DRH, appendix p. 4; Squire, The States,
p. 747. The signers of the petition were men who played long-standing
roles in the history of the Shore: William Pitt, Bartholomew Gilibert,
Daniel Hewlett, George Hewm, John Bourke, William Stotesbury, Thomas
Merriot Perkins, Philip Bode, John Lawrie (James Lawrie's brother) and
Bryan YcDaniell.
73
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that part of Spanish America to prepare the Shore for large-scale
immigration. Hodgson was in London to marry one of the three daughters
of the merchant Pitt, and to petition for a large allowance due to him
for his services on the Shore in 1764. 74
Hewm bruised Lord Shelburne's feelings when he arrived in London
by first taking General Tempest to meet the elder Pitt. When Hodgson
heard of this slight (and of the Shoremen's memorial) he went to Hewm
to inquire why the Shoremen had not requested him to present their
petition to the government. Hewm said that they did not know that he
was in England, and happily turned the responsibility of the project
75
over to him. Hodgson then presented the settlers' petition to Shelburne
(iniuding his own diagram for an independent company which he offered
to command),76 after explaining that General Tempest had been
recommended in a particular manner to Lord Chatham, by all
the principal Inhabitants of the Mosquito Shore, as a brave,
honest, and worthy Man, of the greatest Power of any Native
in the Country, and whose Protection of the Settlement there
was very essential.
Pitt had refused to see Tempest, Hodgson said, "for Reasons not for me
to investigate." Too obvious a slight mi ht have disastrous consequences,
he added, especially since the unsophisticated chief might blame the
743pe r to Hcara of Trade, 22 July 17,-6, CO 123/1, f. 90. Speer's petition
received no reply from the government. The third petitioner for the
superintendency after the death of the elder Hodgson, James Lawrie, was
stationed in Jamaica at this time.
75Hewm to Hodgson, 9 August 1766, DR, appendix p. 6. Hodgson explained
that he accepted the responsibility for the commission because he had
property on the Shore, and because Tempest had fed him when it was his
"Fate to be the Stranger". Hodgson to Conway, 9 Nove ber 1765, SP 37/4.
76Memorial from Robert Hodgson, 12 October 1766, CO 123/1, f. 109.
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English for an illne s that he was then suffering. 77
Early in 1767 Joseph Otway became seriously ill and sailed for
his family home in New York, but while still at sea, on 11 May, he died.
Otway had conducted himself admirably during his four years in Black
River, notwithstanding Spanish pressure and the difficulties of retaining
the friendship of the various parties of Zambos Mosquitos while still
restraining their incursions, and of controlling the motley British,
Spanish, Negro and mulatto populace. 78 During his superintendency there
was a slight decrease in population on the Shore as many adventurers
migrated to Belize because the Treaty of 1763 legalised logwood cutting
there. Because of the close ties between the Bay settlements, however,
the overall result was economic growth, and Belize continued to rely on
the Shore. In fact many Baymen maintained their plantations on the
Mosquito Shore while cutting wood at Belize.79
77Hodgson to Shelburne, 29 August 1766, CO 123/1, f. 107.
78
E1letson to Davis, 16 July 1767, H.P. Jacob, ed., "Roger Hope Elletson",
JHR, ii (1952), p. 86.
Speer to Conway, 2 September 1765, CO 123/1, f. 93; Otway to Board of
Trade, 12 July 1765, CO 137/33, f. 232; Declaration by Pedro Antonio
Alejandro de Valasco, 25 April 1771, printed in Antonio B. Cuervo,
Coleccidn de documentos ineditos sobre la geograffa y la historia de
Colombia (Bogota, 1891), p. 360; Anon., The Present State of the est 
Indies (London, 1778), p. 50. The number of white settlers on the
Mosquito Shore at this time was 201, mestizos 120 and slaves 970. Otway
noted that there was little difference between whites and mestizos, both
groups being English, Christian and property owners. Exports during his
superintendency varied little from before the war. The following are
average export figures at this time:
mahogany	 650,000 feet
sarsaparilla
	 110,000 pounds
turtle shell
	 8,000 pounds
mules	 150
plus small amounts of cotton, indi 6o and cacao. Otway to Lor s of Trade,
25 April 1764, CO 137/33, f. 167.
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Life on the Shore during Otway's superintendency was much the
same as it had been during the two preceding superintendencies. The
contingent fund was used for the same bizarre purioses; the purchase
of a Negro slave named Prince for King Georese and a barrel of pork
"to victual two Gangs of Mosquito Indians"; t e payment of £5 to Henry
Tonoston for a month's carpentry work on Otway's home. Otmay entertained
the Mosquito chiefs and warriors who annually came to Black River in
October for the customary distribution of gifts. At the same time,
the community was the scene of a trade fair, the town acquiring the
appearance of an Indian congress, bazaar and Octoberfest. The bank
swarmed with Indians, Negroes and mestizos; white traders from Jamaica,
Curaiao, New York, Philadelphia, London and Guatemala; and the Shoremen
and Baymen. Gifts distributed among the Mosquitos during the fair
of 1766 included three dozen blue and red spotted silk handkerchiefs,
six dozen highly polished silver ear bobs, two dozen silver rings set
with stones, three dozen ivory combs, four dozen jews-harps, forty
pounds of small gla s beads, seven gold and five silver laced hats,
twelve fine ruffled shirts for the chiefs, and 226 gallons of rum. 8o
On 16 July 1767, with Hodgson, Speer and Lawrie all anxious and
Account of the Mosquito Shore contingent expenses by Joseph Otway,
25 February 1767, CO 137/63, f. 20; Invoice of merchandise shipped by
David Milner for the annual presents to the osquito Indians, 16 April
1767, CO 137/63, f. 18. Indian presents were usually distributed on
the Mosquito Shore in October and November after the hurricanes but
before the northers and heavy seas of winter, when the Indians brought
turtle shell to Black River to trade with the Shoremen and the Jamaican
traders.
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available for the superintendency, Richard Jones was again appointed
superintendent. But only two weeks later, Lord Shelburne named
Robert Hodgson the younger to the post, superseding Jones' nomination. 81
Elletson to Otway, 28 March 1767, "Roger Hope Elletson", JHR, ii (1949),
p. 99; Elletson to Treasury, 16 July 1767, "Roger Hope lletson", JHR,
ii (1952), p. 86; Shelburne to Hodgson, 31 July 1767, CO 123/1, f.33.
Before Jones left Jamaica for the Shore, word of Hod son's appointment
arrived in Kingston. Jones remained on the island and the Mosquito
Shore was without a superintendent for more than a year.
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Cha ter VII
THE S F INTENDENCY of ROBERT iODGSON the YOUNGER:
1767 - 1771
After the de th of superintendent Joseph Otway, the Mos uito
Shore floundered without government or def nce, and the Shoremen were
frightened that Spain would take advantage of the situation to force
her claims in the Bay of onduras. Then suddenly and unexpectedly
the settlers faced catastrophe from within. Rumours of a plot ag inst
Mosquito King George I by General Tempest almost led to a massacre of
the white settlers on the Shore. Geor believed th t T pe t had
gone to London in 1766 "to get made king in his cad", and was now
scheming to make his royal aspirations a reality by as sinating him
and selling his wives and children into slavery. The king pr pared a
counter-plot to eize or execute a fe Shoremen who ere reportedly
involved in the conspiracy and sought the aid of Gov rnor Briton of
ebuppy, the principal los uitoIndi n chief, and of Admi al Dilson
of Pe rl Key Lagoon, head of the south rn party of Mos uito . But
the scheme disintegrated when Dilson refused to support him and Bri on
and George could not gree on a plan of ctio . The Shoreme , nowever,
were una re that George's plot h d coil psed, nd plea ed with ov rnor
1Elletson for aid.
1 Deposition by Henry Corrin, 28 y 176 , C 137/63, f. 56.
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Since Otway's successor, Robert Hodgson, h d still not arrived from
England, Elletson c mmissioned Richard Jones as interim superinte dent
to inve tigate the situation. When Jones arrived on the Shore he told
Ying George th t if he w re found guilty of this " icked and ungrateful
plot", he would be depos d and a new king elected. George burst into
tears and swore that he never intended to hurt any white person; he only
meant to thw rt Tempest. Softening before the king's te r , Jones
reasoned that someone must have invented the t le to put everyone at
odds, and th t George had acted from fear ra her than from malice. The
whole affair seemed highly improbable, although "to this poor illiterate,
unreflecting King it seemed very real.' 2
Jones sailed from Jamaica just about the time that Hodgson arrived
th re fro England, nearly a year after being named superintendent.
Initially, Hodgson's commission granted him powers exceeding those
exercised by any previous superintendent. He had been appointed
"Superintendent, Agent and Commander in Chief" of the Mosquito Shore
to discharge his duties "by doing and performing all and all Manner of
Things thereunto belonging". His orders were to come fro the principal
secretaries f state and from the gov rnors of Jamaica, the latter "for
the Time being" only, confirming Shelburne's int ntion to raise the
political status of the Shore. 3 B t when Lord hillsborough replaced
2Ellet on to Hillsborough, 24 June 1768, CO 137/63, f. 54. Jones to Ellet on,
25 July 176 , CO 137/64, f. 3; lletson to Parry, 28 Pay 17 8, ' og r Hope
Elletson", JHR, iii (1953), p.69.
3Hod5son's commission re d: "George the Third, by the Gr ce of God, King of
reat B it in, Fr nce and Ireland, Def rid r of the F ith, Duke of Brun wic
Luneburgh, Arch Treasurer of the H ly Roman Empire, an Prince Elector &c.
To Our Trusty and elbeloved Robert Hodgson EsqT, Greeting, We, being
desirous to cultivate a strict Union and Friendship between Our Indian and
(c ntinued on next p ge)
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Shelburne as secretary of state for the southern department, he modified
the commission to give Hodgson "no other Powers and Authorities than
had been given to his Predecessors in that office". 4
3- (7711751171I from previous page)
and Our other Subjects resident in Our Settlement on the Musqueto Shore, by
promoting the Prosperity, and improving the Commerical Advantage thereof,
do by these Presents constitute and appoint You to be Superintendant, Agent
and Commander in Chief in Our said Settlement, You are therefore carefully
and diligently to discharge the Duty of Superintendent, Agent and Commander
in Chief, by doing and performing all and all Manner of Things thereunto
belonging. And You are to observe and follow such Orders and Directions
from Time to Time as You shall receive from Us, One of Our Principal Secre-
taries of State, or the Governors of Our Island of Jamaica for the Time
being; And for so doing this shall be Your Warrant Given at Our Court at
St. James's.... Shelburne to Hodgson, 31 July 1767, co 123/1, f. 33.
Hodgson's commission from Lord HillsborouLh was less formal and emphasised
the practical aspect of his duties. "The King having judged it expedient
for His Service, and the national Interests, to continue the Establishment
of a Superintendant of the Settlements on the Mosquito Shore; His Majesty
has been graciously pleased, upon the Death of captain Otway to direct that
You should be entrusted with that Service. You will therefore fit yourself
with all convenient Speed, & forthwith repair to the said Shore, and apply
Yourself with all Zeal & Diligence to establish good Order among the Inhabi-
tants; To promote the Prosperity of the Settlement; To improve the commercia:
Advantages which may be derived from It; And to cultivate a strict Union and
Friendship with the Indians in those Parts; But in exerting Your Endeavours
for these good Purposes, His Majesty's Intentions are, that You should make
it the constant Object of Your Care, not only to observe the Engagements of
the late Definitive Treaty, but to prevent any Attempt which might tend to
disturb the public Peace, whether it should arise, on the One hand, - from
any irregular Conduct of His Majesty's Subjects, or, on the Other, from the
Enmity said to be entertained by the Mosquito Indians, to the Spaniards. I
am further to acquaint You with His Majesty's Pleasure, that You should
forthwith transmit to me, thro' the Hands of the Governor of Jamaica, an
accurate Account of the Settlement entrusted to Your Care, specifying It's
Extent, the Number of its Inhabitants, the nature and Amount of It's present
Trade; and what farther commercial Advantages it is Capable of affording.
You are also in like Manner to transmit to me, from Time to r"ime, every
particular of useful Information which may relate to the internal State of
the Settlement; And as it is of great Importance that His Majesty should be
exactly & punctually informed of every Transaction which may occur with any
Persons acting under the Authority of any Foreign Prince or tate, You will
be particularly careful to transmit to me, thro' the Hands of the Gov rnor
of Jam ica, an Account of such Transaction, as also the most particular &
exact Accounts which can be procured, from Time to Time, of the State of the
Settlements of any foreign Power in the Neighbourhood of the Mosquito Shore.
His Majesty having been graciously pleased to direct, that You should
h ve tne same Allowance as has been made to former Superi tendants; I h ve
accordingly signified His Maty's Cowan s to the G ov.r of Jamaica for that
purpos ." Hillsborough to Hodson, 20 February 1768, co 137/63, f. 1.
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There were numerous reasons for the long delay in Hodgson's departure
from Engl nd: gov rnment debate over the future of British rule on the
Mosquito Shore, Hodg on's desire to obtain the money d e to him for
pre ious services, and his wish to contact commercial corre pond nts.
y this delay Hodgson missed an op ortunity to carry out Shelburne's
strong commission, and the Shoremen became more accustomed to their
in ependence.
Although his instructions were clear, Hodgson was to wage an
unending battle over their interpretation with the Shoremen and the
governors of Jamaica. The principal settlers, who were already aware
of Hoagson's unsympathetic and arrogant manner, disapproved of his
nomination even before he arrived on the Shore, and feared that his
rule would be autocratic, in contrast to Joseph Otway's laissez-faire
government. Furthermore, they no long r desired an autonomous government,
and they were now alarmed that the suierintendent would be unaccountable
to the governor of Jamaica. Consequently, the Shorem n threatened to
abandon their plantations, or if nec ssary even "Proceed to Violences
w ic maj Involve the Colony."5
Hodgson's difficulties beg n th day he arrived i Jamaica. Although
he knew that he could not be effective at his post ithout the count nance
of both the gov rnor of Jamaica ('who held the purse string ") and the
commander of the Jamaica naval station, he aroused Governor Ellets n's
ire and suspicions about his h nesty, and belittled Ad iral Parry's
5Jones to Ell tson, 3 Augu t 1768, CO 137/64, f. 9.
6160
co petence by complai inb
 th t there had been only a "very slender
assertion of aut ority" on the warship that had brought him to Ja aica.
He pres nted bills to Elletson for items that he had purcha ed in London
for use on the Shore (explaining that this had been the accepted practice
during the previous superintendencies), but the governor refused to
honour them because they were improperly presented. 6
 After telling
Elletson that this decision could cripple hi in the "present alarming
juncture" on the Shore, Hodgson berated him for naming Jones as interim
superintendent.
I beg Your Honor would be pl ased to furnish me with a
Dispatch to him for him to surcease all Authority on my
Arrival on the Mosquito Shore as it may at once prevent
any illtimed and unnecessary Discussion.
Jones was sent to the Shore only to "prevent and put a Stop to a Conspiracy
formed amongst the Indians to destroy the white People there", Elletson
replied; his investigations would surely be over before Hodgson arrived. ?
Without having reconciled his differences with Parry and Elletson,
Hodgson left for the Shore in July 1768, determined to establish a
gov rnment independent of Jamaica and under his strict supervision.
He publicly read his instructions from Hillsborough and announced that
there would be no immediate change in the existing government on the
Shore, a move which helped him to gain the superficial confid nce of
Hodbson to Hillsborough, 10 July 1768, CO 137/66, f. 241; Hodgson to Parry,
14 July 1768, CO 137/64, f. 171; Hodgson to Elletson, 10 July 1768, CO 137/
66, f. 245; Elletson to Hodgson, 11 July 1768, CO 137/66, f. 247. Hodgson
pres ed further claims for reimbursement the following year with Governor
Sir illiam Trelawny, but for some unknown rea on Trelawny even refus d to
reimburse him for purchases made on the governor's own orders. H dg on to
Trelawny, 31 May 1769, CO 137/64, f. 151; Hod son to Hillsborough, 23 June
1769, co 137/64, f. 167.
7Hok,son to Elletson, 10 Ju y 1768, co 137/66, f. 245; Elletson to Hodgson,
11 July 1768, CO 137/66, f. 247.
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the Shore en. But before this trust could develop, he published a highly
controversial proclamation.
It has been thought ex edient that a council should be
elected for the forming of laws, and the better inducing
peace, policy, and good order a o g the di ferent inhabitants
of the osquito chore, the said council, to consist of twelve
per ons, one half thereof A
 at the least, to be chosen by the
free voice of the people.0
The leading Shoremen complained vehemently of this tyrannical effort to
dominate the council, forcing Hodgson to announce that elections were
to be held to select a council "of twelve men elected a t e whole people."9
But the Shoremen now refused to accept even this concession. Late in
February 1769, after the election had twice been delayed, Hodgson wrote:
"in general the inhabitants either through Fear, Ignorance, or Presumption,
are little inclined to any degree of Controul"; he despaired that such
men could benefit the Mosquito Shore or England. 10
while Hodgson bemoaned the obdurate nature of the Shoremen, the
leader of his opposition, James Lawrie, was endeavouring to establish an
identity as Hod6son's successor by undermining his reputation with the
new governor of Jamaica, Sir William Trelawny, and by offering "to render
...any service in my power at this place." 11
8
Proclamations by Robert Hodgson, 25 July and c. August 1768, DRH, appendix
p. 7; Hodgson's reply to the "State of Facts", n.d., CO 137/69,f. 2 8.
9The "whole people" were composed of about 200 white men; o her races,
including the Mos uito Indians, were excluded from voting.
10
Hod0son to illsborough, 24 February 1769, CO 137/64, f. 88; Proclamation
by obert Hodgson, 9 and 18 F bruary 1769, DRH, appendix pp. 9, 10.
11 Sir William relawny wa the cousin of E ward Trel wny, for er governor
of Jamaica, and the benefactor of Ho gson's fat er.
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We have a Person who calls himself our Commanding Officer,
tho' I have seen nothing yet that gives him that right;
he also informs some that we are independent of Jamaica
which if so, gives us much concern, and in that casT must
look upon ourselves, as abandoned by all the world. '2
Governor Trelawny consciously, almost openly, aggravat d the settlers'
discontent by demonstrating his sympathy for them. "Any grievances that
you have suffered from or any misrepresentations which have been made by
Hodgson relative to the independency of the Mosquito shore from this
Government", he said, should be reported. The Shoremen were ordered to
obey Hodgson as their superintendent while the affair was being
investigated, but Trelawny's letter left no doubt that they need not
fear the superintendent or his mysterious commission. Robert White,
agent for the Mosquito Shore, said that it was Governor Trelawny who
had convinced the Shoremen not to support Hodgson. 13
Unaware that he would be sailing into a maelstrom, Hodgson decided
to go to Jamaica "to court the Governor" and to discuss the problems
of the Shore. He received a cool reception and was informed of Lawrie's
insinuation that his instructions had never been made public. 14 Henry
Corrin said that: "with regard to us here and those that expect to Govern
us I hope his Excellency will take us into his consideration and not
suffer us to be tyranized over." The same fear that had caused Corrin to
oppose Otway's appointment in 1762, that the Indian slave trade would
suffer under a strong administration, motivated him now. 15 And Trelawny
12Lawrie to Trelawny, 25 February 1769, CO 137/64, f. 181.
13Trelawny to Lawrie, 12 May 1769, CO 137/64, f. 122; "Facts or Proofs"
against Robert Hod6son, White to Lords of the Board of irade, 11 N vember
1773, p. 23, in CO 123/2, vol. ii.
14
Hodgson to Hillsborgugh, 23 JuAe 1769 CO 132/64 t
 f 167; Hodgson toTrelawny, 25 May 17b9, CO 137/b4, f. 1;3; Affidavit .
 in support ofRooert Hodoon, 7-9 June 17b9, CO 137/ 4, f. 212,
15Corrin to Jon s, 13 April 1769, CO 137/64, f. 143. See above, p.125.
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accused Hod son of ridiculing the governor's authority by transmitting
his dispatches to h'tehall, "through the Hands of the Governor of Ja aica"
as required, but sealed. 16
Some accusations against Hodgson had more subst nce, especially the
charge that he used the superintendency to promote his trade and to
acquire vast tracts of land. Hodgson admitted that he had large land
holdings on the Shore, but explained that the grants had been obtained
from his friends the Mosquito chiefs for his services. The w rmth of
this camaraderie, Hodgson's enemies suggested, was rather the sultry
glow of rum. The sug gestion that he wished to extend his empire to
the off-shore islands m de Hodgson laugh. "As for my getting a Patent
for Sn. An reas and old Erovidence I regard it as meant to imply that
among my other Unhappinesses I was a Fool." 17 He already owned most
of Greater Corn Island, one of the many small islan s off the coast,
if
and/this island was typical of the others, indeed he would have been
a fool to have wished more of the same. His agent on the island wrote:
My anxiety to be gone from this place is heightened...
(more and more every day) and nothing adds to it more than
the infamy of the Neighbour which is now rown to such a
Fitch as to exceed all d scription. You had scarce left us
before the Island was quite in an uproar, new parties were
formed, and a General Engagement took place between all 0
colours...the Negro Ned was Ran thro' the Belly by Thomaslu
with a Sword tyed to a Stick, one or t o of his Ribbs broke
by JI.10 Fowler. ...soon after this...each Party ask d afresh
for Rev nge. The second upro r lasted much longer than the
fir t, nd I think it possible carried on with more Acrimony,
16H0 gson to Trelawny, 10 June 1769, CO 137/64, f. 128; Trelawny to
Hillsborough, 25 June 1769, CO 137/64, f. 112; Hillsborough to Hodgson,
20 February 1768, CO 137/63, f. 1.
17Hodgs n testimony, 27 ay 1769, CO 137/64, f. 137
18
Probably Georg Thom s.
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the Parties were now somewhat afraid of each other and
nothing out scrimishes took place. Tho' in this the Negro
old Cato had like to have been shot, Smith having discharg d
his Gun at him three sev ral times bec use he would not Box
him like a Man as he term'd it. I had scarce got Ned upon
his Legs again before Oronoco...bit off his right Ear. As
this came immediately home to myself I punished him very
smartly and Cutt off half of his own Ear - I fear it possible
the frays will be worse than ever as Christws draws near
and there is worse Ruin come to the Island."
Hodgson was also denounced for trading with the Spanish, but he denied
that he traded with anyone except to exchange goods occasionally for
things he needed. Years later, however, he inadvertently admitted the
charge by publishing a letter from Abraham Tonoston, his agent at Bluefields.
"Sir, according to your desire, I am in a f ir way of settling a trade
at Blewfields River." Hodgson also employed numerous factors in his
trade with the Spanish, and gave them his full support. "I will take all
one of
the care I can that your interest shall not suffer", he wrote to/his agents,
"and as to the Jury...they must either alter their opinion, or there shall
be no jury." Hodgson was not the first superintendent to trade on the
Shore or with the Spanish; all of his predecessors had done so, and with
no stigma attached to these ventures. 21
A ridiculous incident on Corn Island between Hodgson and an old
woman squatter on his property formed the basis for still another
complaint. The woman's common-law husband, George Thomas, charged the
"avaricious" Hodgson with using cruel methods to evict her from her
19Rur to odgson, 18 ovember 1775, RCS, HA/MSL,
20 !Facts or Proof ", p. 58. Hodoon's father first akplied for the
superintendency partly on the basis of the tra e that he proposed to
establish on the Shore. See above p. 53 . Tonoston to Hodgson, 16
September 1769, DRF, appendix p. 16.
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shack. 21 Hodgson did not deny the charge, but said that the accusation
w s built on hearsay evidenc , and therefore inadmissible in law; Thomas'
account wa merely "Scenery for the Pathetic Tal that follows...." As
for the woman: "I found her in it he shack] she remained in it while
I staid on the Island I left her in it she remained in it till I came
again she still staid in it while I staid and I again left her in it...."
As usual Hodgson had witnesses to support him, including Patt Poulson,
a hard-drinking Philadelphia grocer brought to the Sh re by "misfortune",
who later challenged him to a duel in another dispute. 22
Although Hodgson want d to discuss the charges against him with
Governor Trelawny, the governor avoided an early conference, explaining
that certain unnamed Shoremen with more accusations against him were
expected in Jamaica. The situation had become "very disagreable and
rather alarming" to Hodgson, who had come to Jamaica without the means
to defend h'mself against "irresponsible charges". Trelawny was treating
him as if the unknown charges were true, and Hodgs n fe red th t he
might perhaps even be contempl ting his dismissal from the superint ndency.
Therefore, he decided that the trying duty on the Shore was referable t
an unpleasant encounter with his accusers, and when the arrival of the
"s cret party"was delayed, he told Trelawny that it would be improper
to postpone his return to Black River. 23
21Thomas had another complaint: Hodgson planned to bring 'about 50 very unru]
Negroes" to Corn Island who would terrorise the few poor settlers there.
Hodgson re lied h rshly th t he did not "keep Negro s that are not to be
ruled". Declar tion by George Thomas, 13 Nay 1769, CO 137/64, f. 133;
Hodgson to Trelawny, 27 ay 1769, CO 137/64, f. 137
22_Affidav'ts by F tt Poulson and others, 15 ept mber 1769, CO 137/66, f. 78
Ho gs n to Tr lawny, 27 May 1769, CO 137/64 ; f. 137.
23Hodgson to Hillsborough, 23 June 1769, CO 137/64, f. 167; Trelawny to
Hodgson, 29 / Y 1769, CO 137/64, f. 149; Hodgson to Trela fly, 25 and 31
Yay 1760, CO 137/64, ff. 183, 151.
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Hod on's disr pectful attitude angered Trelawny, who demanded
a reply to the charg s already m e against him, as well as an explanation
why he had published election notices on the Shore. But hodgson ignored
these demands and repeated that he s w no r ason for remaining away from
his post. One of Governor Trelawny's relatives, Harry Trelawny, responded
for the governor.
your return to the Mosquito shore in the Quality of its
Superintendant will depend upon the opinion of his Excellency,
and of his Majestys Council of this Island, that you have
exculpated yourself from the charges brought against you.
If Hodgson left Jamaica before the charges were explained, he was to be
suspended from the superintendency. 24 Demanding to know the accusations
against him, Hodgson said that: "The Rule of my Conduct in these Affairs
is drawn from the Letter of the Earl of Hillsborough to me bearing date
Whitehall February the 20th 1768...." He refused to appear before the
Jamaica council, as it would offend the honour of His Majesty's appointment,
the secretary of state who authorised the instructions, and his own
reputation as a gentleman. Probably because his accusers had failed to
come to Jamaica, Hodgson returned to the Shore with his commission intact. 25
Trelawny's frustration burst into a stream of invective charges against
the superintendent in a long and tortuous tirade to Lord Hillsborough. 26
24
Trelawny to Hodgson, 3 and 5 June 1769, CO 137/64, ff
to Trelawny, 4 June 1769, CO 137/64, f. 155.
25
Hodgson to Trelawny, 10 June 1769, CO 137/64, f. 128;
borough, 23 June 1769, CO 137/64, f. 167.
26
Trelawny to Hillsborough, 25 June 1769, CO 137/64, f.
to Trelawny, 4 November 1769, CO 137/64, f. 249.
• 153, 157; Hodgson
Hodgson to Hills-
112; Hillsborough
16 7
While Hodgson was in Jamaica a dangerous situation w s evolving
on the Shore. As part of a Spanish plan to re uce the Mosquitos and
to expel the king's "inveterate Enemies" (the English) from the Coast,
Governor Joaquin de Nava of Co ta Rica commissioned Mosquito Admiral
Alparis Dilson as Spain's commanding general on the osquito Coast. Nava
reported that the Indians were anxious to recognise Spanish sovereignty,
but that the English had awed them with tales of Spanish cruelty. At
the invitation of Governor Nava, Dilson sent a dele ation to Cartago
headed by his brother Jaspar Hall, who pledged the Mosquitos' allegiance
to Spain (according to Nava) and promised to allow the young Mosquitos
to be taught the Spanish language and the precepts of the Doctrina
Cristiana in exchange for rich land at Matina on which to grow cacao,
the right to transport their produce into the int nor, and a guarantee
of protection from the British -- but with the freedom to trada with
them. 27 Governor Nava was suspicious of the Mosquitos' si cerity, since
they had often accepted gifts and privileges in exchange for worthless
promises of peace and alliance, but he saw no other way to stop their
depredations or to reduce them to Spanish rule. At that, Nava would
only treat with the reputedly more reliable pure Indian Mosquitos of
the south: Zambo Mosquitos were still barred from Matina and all other
communities in Costa Rica. 28
The rumours of an Hispano-Mosquito alliance terrified the Shor men,
27
Nava to Dilson, 23 May 1769, CO 137/65, f. 1 ; CDHCR, ix	 15; Nava
to Salazar, 14 July 1769, BA ^, iv (1940), p. 319.
28
N va to Sal zar, 14 July 1769, AG, iv (1940), p. 319; Dil on to
Hodgs n, 16 Sept mber 1769, CO 137/65, f. 260.
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who irresponsibly and incorrectly blamed it on Hodgson. Naval commander
For eat said that "The cause (as I am informed) is owing to Mr. Hudson
gis7, Superintendant upon the Shore, who has assumed an oppressive &
arbitrary power amongst them...by which he has made himself obnoxious
to the whole Shore." Forest did not explain how this tied Hodgson to
the conspiracy. 29
Even if Dilson did unite with the Spanish, the Shore f c d no
immediate threat, since the other Mosquito chiefs would not support him,
and no Spanish governor could undertake such a project without approval.
Nava sent a copy of the proposed treaty to President Salazar, who
thought that the document was "significant", although he turned to Madrid
for instructions when two old men with considerable experience in treating
with the problem of the Mosquito Coast, Alonso FernIndez d Heredia and
Luis Dlez Navarro, expresse s rious doubts that the Mosquitos could
be trusted. "It is not possible to subject the Mosquitos to our Christian
and honorable customs gxcept7 by force of arms", Heredia said. He had
once offered them even better terms, but his efforts had failed because
of the Anglo-Mosquito alliance and the bellicosity of the Indians.
Heredia also opposed the use of aguardiente to attract the In ians ("These
people are much'nclined to this drink and denying it disg ts them.")
because it would lead to "a tho and scandals". 30 Navarro, who sugge ted
29Shoremen to Tr lawny, 7 - October 1769, CO 137/65, f. 12; Forrest to
Stephens, 8 October 1769, CO 137/64, f. 263; Patt rson to Ho gson,
11 September 1769, DRH, appendix p. 14; Tonoston to H dgson, 16 September
1769, DRH, appendix p. 16.
nieport by Pedro de Salazar, 29 December 1769, AGS Est 8133,folder 7;
Heredia to Salazar, 24 ov mber 1769, BA G, iv (1936), p. 385.
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that perh ps t e whole thing was an English plot, opposed granting
land to the Mosquitos or giving them access to the interior. They would
harvest everyone else's cacao, and probably use their knowledge of the
country to conquer the whole province. 31
dhen Governor Trelawny learned that the Mosquitos had "entered into
a Treaty with the Subjects of some foreign Potentate", he aga'n ordered
Richard Jones to the Shore to investig te these rumours and to contact
Hodgson who was to "afford him all the Aid and Assistance in is7...
power towards conciliating the Affections of the Yosquito Indians...."
Trelawny also named Hodgson's implacable enemy, James Lawrie, to serve
with Jones on a special commission of the peace, thus further weakening
Hodgson's authority among the Shoremen. 32
Meanwhile, Hodgson had learned of the Dilson-Nava pact and had
decided to investigate it. he left Black River for the windw rd Shore
on the same day that Jones arrived at Cape Gracias a Dios. Jones
remained for weeks at the Cape "because of the violence of the north winds
and by other Impediments, treating with the Moskito Indians and Settling
and Adjusting sundry differences betwixt them and the White Inhabitants"--
and incidentally taking advantage of his stay to investigate Hodgson's
conduct. Hodgson had a simpler explanation for Jones' long stay at the
Cape, which Jones later admitted; he had been incapacitated by a severe
attack of gout. 33
31From Luiz Diez Navarro, 4 Dec mber 1760, BAGG, iv (1936), p. 386.
3 2Minut s of the council of Jamaic , 8 lovember 1769, CO 137/65, f. 41;
Trelawny to Jones, 2 Nov mber 1769, CO 137/65, f. 14; Trelawny to
Hodg on, 20 November 1769, CO 137/66, f. 127.
33Hodgson to Hillsborough, 14 November 1769 and 2 March 1770, CO 137/65,
ff. 111, 239; Jones to Trelawny, 4 April 1770, CO 137 65, f. 183; Hodgson'.
diary, 17 December 17 9 - 2 March 1770, inclose in Hod son to Hills-
borough, 2 March 1770, C 137/ 5, f. 239.
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On 22 Dec b r o gson visited Governor Briton, who promised that
he would act ag in t Dilson if t ere should be need for "violent measures".
Two d ys later H dgson met Dilson an accu ed him of bein a "rogue,
rascal, and v'llain". The admiral, whose "Behaviour wore the air of
Embarrassment and appreh nsion, took some pains to e culpate himself",
and accus d George ana Briton of "having injured him by false Reports
and Sugoestions". He explained that h had taken vivant ge of Nava's
invitation to open a tr e with the interior, arguin c, that if the English
could trade with the Spanish during times of peace, the Mosquito /, en should
have the same freedom. Hodgson tacitly approved Dilson's commercial
plans, but he warned him never to speak disrespectfully about the
English, unaware that had he "not been an Englishman Dilson would have
thrown a Lance thro' him' for his intemperate remarks. 34
odgson later conferred with Admiral Israel, one of Dilson's closest
allies, and tried to en ure his loyalty by renewing his commission with
as much pomp as w s possible on a tropic beach. Soon afterwards Hodgson
met the lugarteni nte at Yatina, a humb e subordinat who Hodgson
described as a "destitute mul to", telling him th t he was bringing
letters r ther than Dilson's head only because the t o nations were at
peace. He was stationed on the Shore to pres rve that peace, Hodgson
s id, and he thr atened to unleash the M s uitos if the Spanish tamp red
with them. The lugarteniente apologis d for trying to sed ce he
3' Hodgson to Dilson, 9 October 1769, DHR, app n ix p. 21; J nes t Trelawny,
4 April 1770, CO 137/65, f. 183; ho gso 's diary, 1 Dec ber 1769 -
2 M rch 1770, inclo ed in Hodgson to Hillsborough, 2 M rch 1770, C 137/65,
f. 239.
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Mosquitos, and promised to eep the peace if t e English would only
re train the Indians from "plundering and ill-using the Spaniards".35
he odgson left Matina he believed th t he had crushed the Dilson
conspiracy, but he su pected that Jasper Hall and two of his friends
mibht still be "deluded" by Spanish gifts, prompting the chilling re ark:
"I fear it will be neces ary to put them out of the way." But it was
two others who were to suffer the execution of is threat. "Israel
the Mosquito Admiral died", Hodgson rote in his diary on 25 March; a
few days later he noted th t he was "much concerned at being di appointed
by (Dilson's] Death." Dilson had been "a spirited lead"ng Man but his
Duplicity of Conduct rendered his Allegiance rather dubious to the last."
Governor Nava, depressed by his failure with the Mosquitos, wrote: "I do
not lack suspicions that the English cut short is life. It appears
that the time has not arrived gor their reduction], nor has the All
Powerful r served for me that duty."36
Hodson to Nava, 23 January 1770, CO 137/65, f. 246; arren to Hodbson,
1 February 1770, CO 137/65, f. 256; Hodgson to Gill, 20 February 1770,
C 137/65, f. 270; Arlegui to Na y , 3 February 1770, BAGG, i (1940), p. 15.
The lugart niente had earlier writ en a rather pitiful letter to Dilson
begging for a respite from the attacks by the Indians Its tone w s so
abject that it fooled the commander of the Jamaica naval station into
believing that it was "a Blind under which they hope to carry their point
with Admiral Dilson and his Brothers." Forrest to Trelawny, 9 November
1769, CO 137/65, f. 181.
Hodgson's diary, 17 December 1769- 2 March 1770, inclosed in H dgson to
Hillsborough, 2 M rch 1770, CO 137/65, f. 239. Hodgs n read the burial
service for Admiral Israel, "a good and brave Mosquito Man", and probably
the first M squito chief buried as a Christian, and corn issioned you g
Tylas to succ d Dilson. Hodgson to Hillsborough, 7 Oct b r 1770, CO
137/60, f. 100; Nava to Salaz r, 15 Sept ber 1771, B GO, i (1940), p. 18.
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While Hodgson was travelling on the windward Shore, Jones was still
at the Cape conferring with various Shoremen and Mosquito chiefs, including
King George. If the Mosquitos did not prove their fidelity, he told
George, it must be assumed that they intended to support Dilson in his
treason. The king interrupted to demand that Dilson be hanged and
offered to perform the execution himself. However with George's loyalty
assured, Jones politely refused the offer and sailed south to see Dilson.
Jones met the admiral just before his death, and "ply'd him with a little
Strong punch", before asking why he had corresponded with the Spaniards
knowing that the priests would take his favourite wives and daughters
and his people enslaved. Dilson recited the story of the conspiracy.
Some years agoe the Spaniards of Carpenters River (or Matina)
most Treacherously Murdered One of his Brothers, several
other Moskito Men and several White People, whom they had invited
there to Trade with them, that in Revenge of this Masacray,
he some time afterwards went and took a small, Spanish Fort
in that River, and destroyed and brought away sev ral Spaniards
Etc. however not thinking this sufficient Satisfaction for
the former Injury, he sometimes afterwards plundered that River
Again and Carried away a Quantity of Cocoa, etc., but did no
Other Injury, on which the Spaniards Entered into an Agreement
to pay him 20 Seroons of Cocoa every Year provided he would
for the future refrain him self and also prevent any other of
the Moskito Indians from Plundering them in that River, this
Proposal he Accepted of, and the Spaniards paid the Tribute
pretty Regular for s veral Years and then by Degrees fell off,
till their Payments became so Irregular and Uncertain that he
sent them word, that if they did not make good their Paym nts
Agreeable to their Contract he would One time or Other pay
them another Visit and Compell them to do it. This so far
alarmed them, that it came to the ears of the Governor of
Carthago and soon after a Message and presents was sent to
Dillson Promising him good Plantations and great honors and
Riches if he would forsake the English and come over to the
Spanish Interests....
The attention paid to Dilson worked on his vanity and he sent his brother
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to parley with N va. In Cartago
the pri sts and Gov rn r De Nava gdv'sed the India& to
cut off all the hablish hereticks, whom Go Almighty dispis d
so much, that he would no sooner have one of their Souls,
than he would those of the Mules and Hor es, therefore th y might
see there was no harm in Murthering them....
Dilson replied to Nava's letter with Jones' elp. He thanked the governor
for his pledge of peace, and promised that the Mosquitos would "always
observe and keep the times of Peace ana Warr with the English and
Spaniards" (though he accused them of being always the first aggressors).
He also reproached Nava for planning to build forts on the Shore to
keep the Mosquitos from their turtle fishing grounds. "How your
Excellency will effect your purpose here", he added, "without permission
first obtaine from the Governor of 2Jamaica7 time alone must show." 37
The prying activities of Richard Jones on the Shore incited an
enduring feud with Hodgson, who was enraged when he heard that Jones
had told the Shoremen"that C ptain Hodgson had no sort of authority,
that he was only to be considered as a private Gentleman'." That a
man of such "Folly and Malignity" could be commissioned to go to the
Shore in the first place disgusted Hodgson. His "bodily Infirmiti s
alone rendered him unfit for such an Ern ertaking."38
Lord Hillsborough supported Ho gso . Jones had no busine s on the
Shore in an official capacity hile a crown officer was stationed there.
But Governor Trelawny defen ed Jones' commi sion, since th grievances
there were the result of Hodbson's misconduct and since Hodgson was
37Jones to Trelawny, 4 April 17 0, CO 137/65, f. 183; Dil on to Nava,
c. February 1770, CO 137/65, f. 192.
38Hodgson's diary, 17 December 1769 - 2 arch 1 70, inclosed in Hodbson
to Hillsborough, 2 }'arch 1770, CO 177 5, f. 239.
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not yet at his post when the Dilson crisis first arose, he argued,
contradicting hims if, it had been necessary to send someone to the
Shore without delay. Furthermore, Hodgson
in peremptory terms refuses to attend officially me and
his Majestys Council of this I land, ass rting his Authority
to be totally independant of them and his corresRondence to
be confined to your Lordships department alone.3
The Mosquito Shore was slow to return to its peculiar brand of
normalcy. Two Indian intrigues in two years had left the Shoremen
nervous -- and their feud with Hodgson unsettled. ko The magistrates
and most of the settlers had been further alienated from the superintendent
just before the Dilson conspiracy by a dispute betw en Hodgson and Francis
Weaver, a tailor by trade and bound to Hodgson as a servant. Late in
August 1769, magistrates Daniel Hewlett and William Fitt received
identical notes from Hodgson that seemed to indicate a serious problem.
Sir, a Matt r of consequence to the Legislative Authority
in this Settlement having late harpened, makes it necessary
for me in the Kings name to desire you will be at the Kings
house i; fortified three-storey building that also erved as
Hodgson's home] at 9 O'Clock this forenoon, in order to judge
of and determine the most expedient Measures to be taken
thereupon.
In response to Hodgson's call, Hewle t met him nd the two m n were on
their way to Fitt's home when they encountered the town constable.
3 9Hillsborough to Trelawny, 23 February 1770, CO 137/65, f.83; Trelawny
to Hillsborough, 28 ay 1770, CO 137/65, f. 173.
Forrest to Stephens, 12 June 1770, Adm 1/2481. In Septe ber 1770, un ware
of Dilson's de th, Charles III confirmed his commission as governor f the
Mosquito Coast and approved most of the other articles of Nava's "treaty",
although he r fused to allow the /osquitos to use the San Juan River or
to establish cac o plantations at Latina. Re 1 or en, 17 Septe ber 1770,
B GG, ii (19 0), p. 145.
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"Weaver refused coming with him on 5ouE7 Warrant", the constable
told Hodgson, "as it was not Signed by a Justice f the Pe ce, else he
would obey it...."
Hodgson's reply, " e are two Magistrates", astonished He lett, who
asked Ho gson if he were also a magistrate.
"Chief Magistrate", responded Hodgson, who had sent the constable
back to fetch Weaver.
At Pitt's house, after a table and chairs were hurriedly set up,
Hodgson took the centre seat and asked Pitt, his father-in-law, and
Hewlett, who was also Pitt's son-in-1 w, to sit beside him.
When a bystander chanced to sit down at the same table, Hodgson
cried out "Sir, we must not allow this, we are now a bench of Justices...."
After the reprimanded citizen had moved to the back of the room,
Hodgson produced a warrant for Weaver's arrest and an affidavit from the
constable stating that he had refused to obey it.
"If Weaver was his Servant", Pitt commented dryly, "he might have
come without a Warrant."
"That was confounding two questions in one", Hodgson replied,"the
contempt he shewed to his Warrant was what he was then on."
Weaver was brought before the table and testified that he had not
worked out his time for Hodgson because the superintendent had threatened
to beat him.
Hodgson called out "Shall such a Puppy contemn my Authority and
warrant, Look at him doth he look like one that will dispute my Authority?
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By God I would make a broath of him first, but by his looks it would
be Foiso ." Furthermore, if the const ble refused to carry out his
orders he might beat him as well. "N y", he went on, "in such a Case as
this...A Nagistrate's Authority was very gr at and...he could have
answered Killing him and the Taylor to."
Forgetting Weaver for a moment, Hodgson claimed to be chief justice,
with the po er to supersede Hewlett or any other officer on the Shore.
He ad itted that his authority did not come from Jamaica (Hewlett and
Pitt served under a grand commission from the governor of Jamaica, and
there was a general belief among the Shoremen that the superintendent's
commission must also come from the governor), but he said that it was
from the king and thus "three times" greater than that of any previous
superintendent. "He has nevepet produced any commission to the
Inhabitants", Hewlett later swore before the governor.
Fitt and Hewlett refused to support Hodgson against Weaver. "It
was now tile general Opinion of the People", Pitt said angrily, "that he
could not be a Magistrate till he was qualified", and therefore he had
no authority to sit with them. "If he insisted to be a Magistrate he
might set by himself...."
A large number f curious spectators had gathered during the debate.
Much "was their Surprize and Contempt for the author of it", according
to Hewlett, " hen they found nothing greater had happened than a
quarrel betw en Yr. Hodgson and ,bis Taylor." "Mr. Hodgs n's Ludicrous
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d'scourse...made him the laughing Stock of the place...." 41
H dgson laboured to reconcile the Shoremen to his rule, arguing
that h's influence with Lord illsborough would bring th in s curity,
prosperity and independence. In October 1769, fearful of a slave
uprising and of the inconsistent behaviour of the Mosquitos, the Shoremen,
including Pitt, He lett, Hewm, Bode and Lawrie, reached an understanding
ith Hod son, Affirming that " e ar certain that no Gentleman whatev r
knows better than Yourself what a very valuable Country this is, & the
great importance thereof in everal respects to Great Britain", they
asked Hodgson totelp them obtain "An established Mode of Constitutional
Government, supported with two Independent Companies...."42 As requested
Hodgson supported the settlers' petition, but he also asked that his own
commission be enlarged and that the Mosquito Shore be separated from
Jamaican authority to strengthen the civil government there. He even
offered to raise an independent company and transport it to the Shore
at his own expense. But with no one willing to take the responsibility
for any innovation, Whitehall decided not to change the existin c, form
of gov rnment.
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In spite of the numerous difficulties, the English settlements on
41Hodgson to Hewlett and Pitt, 20 August 1769, in Hewlett to Jones,
1 October 1769, CO 137/65, f. 2104. hodgs n to Hillsborough, 9 August
1769, CO 137/64, f. 276.
42Speech of Robert Hodgson to the Shoremen, 7 August 1769, DRH, appendix
p. 12; Lawrie to Ho gson, 8 August 1769, RH, appendix p. -7; Petition
from the Shoremen, 17 Cctober 1769, CO 13775, f. 73; Shore en to
Hodgson, 27 Cctober 1769, CO 137/69, f. 256.
43Hodgson to Hillsborough, 19 ctober 1769, CO 137/65, f. 70; R gulations
proposed by obert Hodgson for the government of the Mosquito h re,
19 Oct ber 1769, CO 13 /35, f. 2 3.
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the Mosquito Sh re and at Belize flourished. To avoid high English duties
on tortoise shell and s rs parilla, and because of thearailability and
quality of inexp n ive Dutch goods and th r ceptive Dutch market for
logwood and mahogany, a profitable tra e was carried on with the Dutch
of Curaiao. But the most im ortant re son for this pro perity was the
new legal status of the logwood settlements on YucatAn.
	 lack River became
a way-station for merchant ve sels going to and from the Bay, and many
Snoremen traded with the Baymen or had gangs cutting wood at Belize.
Furthermore, the Shore supplied Belize with all of its fresh meat and
most of its fresh vegetables. Finally, there was a growing feeling among
the Shoremen that the Treaty of 1763 gave them the same legal status as
that enjoyed by the Baymen. If support could be obtained from the governmeni
the British colony in the Bay of Honduras promise further, perhaps
spectacular, growth. 44
Hodgson to Hillsborough, 3 September 1768, CO 137/65, f. 68; Vargas to
Salazar, c. 15 January 1769, Guat 459. Exports from the Mosquito Shore
in 1769 were worth £61,048 sterling. The most important official exports
were:
Mahogany	 789,000 feet	 £19,737
Sarsaparilla
	 195,300 pounds	 17,902
Tortoise shell	 9,600 pounds	 3,840
Cacao	 122,500 pounds	 12,250
Mules and horses 	 250
	 2,000
Spanish coin, gold and silver bullion
	 3,500
Small amounts of beef hides, deer skins, cotton, coffee and indigo were
also exported from the Shore. There w also a considerable unrecorded
trade in Negro slaves with the Spaniards and Indian al ves with Jamaic
Belize and North America, as well as the trade with the Dutch. But th re
are neither exact figures nor estimates on t is trade. Jones to
Trelawny, 4 April 1770, CO 137/65, f. 183.
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Chapter VIII
THE HODG60D-SETTLER CONT OV411SY:
The First and Second Revolts, 1771 - 1775
Frustrating the Dilson conspiracy did not ease tension in middle
America. The Mosquito Indians continued their incessant incursions,
and Spanish missionaries expanded their op rations towards the Mosquito
Shore, where the Hodg on - settler dispute was becoming ever more
strident, and various parties of Zambos Mosquitos had begun jealous
squabbles among themselves. And hovering over all was the threat of
another war as Spain and England argued over the possession of the
Falkland Islan s. "War with our Neighoours the Spaniards is daily
expected", the Shoremen cried early in 1771. There were rumours that
inv sion preparations were being m de; in Nicaragua, Governor Cavello
had r cently called for a "oloody war" to destroy the Zambos Mosquitos,
and in Costa ica, Governor Nava had told Robert Hodgson that: "I intend
to estroy som of the English gin the Mosquito Shorgw ogtto e
considered Pirates." 1
Shoremen to Trelawny, 29 January 1771, CO 137/66, f. 221; Nava to
Hodgson, 12 Febru ry 1770, CO 137/66, f. 119. C vello to pre ident of
Gu temala, 20 January 1770, B GG, iv (1940), p. 330; or compreh nsive
studies of the Falkland Isl nd dispute see Octavio il unilla, " lvinas.
El conflict° Anglo-Espaliol de 1770', A u r'o de tudio Amer'c n  , iv
(1947), pp. 267-422, a d J lius Goeb 1,  ne trugg e for t e lk nd
I 1 nd	 Yale, 1927).
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opanish c lonists also feared a rupture. In the north, 600
* Englishmen and 300 Mosquitos were expected in inva e Yucat'n, and Cavell°
reported similar enemy plans for Nic ragua. A junta de g erra in Panam4
in June decided that it was impossible to reinforce tne garrison on the
San Juan because "tho e coasts are...inundated with Mosquito Indians."
In Nay 1771, as both sides waited apprehensively for the outbreak of
hostilities, the Mos uitos looted and burned a Spani h vessel at the
mouth of the San Juan which was carrying supplies to Fort Inmaculada. 2
Colvill Cairns, an Irishman who had established a plantation n ar Governor
Briton's home at Tebuppy, had instigated the attack, and then spread the
rumours that the Spanish had been the aggressors. He encouraged the
Ind'ans to "retaliate" by assaulting Matina, but they were dissuaded
from doing so by other Shoremen and the immediat crisis was averted.3
Then with the news that the Anglo-Spanish controversj over the Falkland
Islands had been resolved, the apprehension of a conflict once again
subsided. 4
2Three prisoners taken by the Mosquitos in the seizure were ransomed by
Thomas L'Lstrange, who, according to the Spanish, ha become English
Earluilor at Bluefields at the death of Henry Corrin. Charles III
rebuked Governor Olaziregui of Panam4 for corresponding with L'Estrange,
calling it a partial recognition of the English settlements on the Mosquito
Co at. Quitero to Charles III, 6 June 1771, Guat 665; Olaziregui to Arriag.
18 June and 12 July 1771, Guat 665; Mosquito control of the mouth of the
San Juan River at this time was so co plete that the Spanish were obliged
to send garrison replac ments for Fort Inmaculada across the peninsula
from Portovelo, up the Pacific Coast and then back across Nicaragua.
3Cairns also encouraged the Mosquito to seize a Spanish supply vessel at
the mouth of the San Juan in 1774 and then loaded his own schooner ith
the plunder. He owned thirty piraguas which he loaned to the Indians for
their turtling and raiding expeditions, and was perhaps the worst offender i
the peculiar form of ebt peonage practised by English traders on the Shore.
4Junta de guerra, 11 June 1771, Guat 665; Fernandez to Cavez, 6 October 177(
Guat 855; Oliver to Arriagar, 11 May 1771, lax 3099; Cavello to Arriaga, 20
May 1771, Guat 461; Calderon, elice, p. 215.
181
In spite of the relaxation of internat'onal t n ions, Mosquito
incursions continued, e pecially into Costa ica, Talamanca and Panama,
where the populous Indian villages offered an endless supply of slaves. 5
After the Mosquitos had extirpated the coastal tribes near Bocas del
Toro in the 1740s, they were forced to extend their operations as far
south as Portovelo, and to carry their raids deep into the populous
Talamanca region. Mosquito depredations continued elsewhere, however,
In the summer of 1771 on the leeward Shore, Zambo General Tempest s ized
three Spanish mulattos and the sarsaparilla that they had been hired to
gather for John Christopherz. Tempest then sold the sarsaparilla and
kept the Spaniards as slaves. Christopherz refused to ransom them,
arguing that it would merely encourage the Indians to similar future
mischief and frighten Spanish traders from coming to the Shore. 6
The English and opanish officials used various techniques to restrain
the Mosquitos. Governor Trelawny or ered that a plan be prepared for
their cultural and political advancement. Superintendent Hodgson
sugested that King George I strengthen his rule by holding court
several times a year to listen to the complaints of his subjects and by
using public games to give them "more ample Notions of Social Virtues".
George ignored the suggestions, however, and there was no change in
the Mosquito behaviour. 7
 Two years later Hodson met with Indian Governor
Timothy Briton at Tebuppy to advise him to accept an offer from the
5Eodoon to Hillsborough, 15 December 1772, C 137/69, f. 71.
6Christopherz to Hodgson, 4 August 1771, DRH, p. 41; N va to president of
Guatemala, 15 September 1771, A3G, i ( 174(7, ), p. 18.
7Trelawny to Hodoson, 8 January 1772, CO 137/67, f. 36; Diary of Robert
Hodbson,16 February 1772, CO 137/67, f. 195.
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Spanish at Matina to pay the Mosquitos forty seroons of cacao a year
in exchange for a "perpetual Reconciliation". While it would be hard
for the Spanish "to pay for living in their own Country", Hodgson said
it was preferable to the Indian incursions and to the "little Pilferings"
which stifled commerce. Briton promised to accept the pro osal, and
Hodgson sailed for Matina to inform the Spaniards of the decision, first
stopping at the San Juan River to pick up the stripped and partly burned
hulk of the Spanish supply boat recently seized by the Mosquitos. He
towed it to Matina, and beached it a few feet from the lugarteniente's
shack. The Spaniards there pleaded with Hodgson to take it elsewhere,
since it was the king's boat. If guardacostas came from Cartagena to
retrieve it, they said, the illicit trade at Yatina would surely be
exposed; the discovery would mean their ruin, and perhaps their death.
Although Hodgson refused to move the boat, the Matinos were able to
dispose of it before the arrival of inquisitive officials.8
Mosquito incursions were more feared in Guatemala than was illicit
commerce9 and even the Conse'o de las Indies occasionally agreed that
8Terry to Hodgson, 13 March 1774, CO 137/69, f. 209; Diary of Robert
Hodgson, 1 April 1774, CO 137/69, f. 209; Hodgson to Dartmouth, 24 July
1775, CO 137/70, f. 161.
9King Charles III erroneously believed that the geographical location of
Guatemala was sufficient protection against the Mosquitos and the English,
but after a punishing series of raid , President Martin de Mayorga said
that he was "far from the belief" that this "advantage" had hindered the
English and their "infidel" friends; in fact, he noted, their insolence
was increasing daily. Declaration by Bartolo Reyes, n.d., 1772, BAGG, i
(1940), p. 20; Mayorga to Arriaga, 30 October 1773, printed in Ga7C-5
Pallez, Memoria , ii, 168.
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preventing these was a more pres ing need than stopping the tr de. In
1770, Jos4 Antonio de Vargas, who owned a plantation in the mountains
of M tagalpa, was accused of trading with the Mos uito . However the
fi c 1 of Guatemala def nded Varg s becau e he acted as a s f c.,uard against
Mosquito raids and h d attracted the famous oolwa Captain Ya insen
(Garrison) to the Spanish cause. For these services Vargas wa c uitted
of the charges ag inst him (although they were proven), and ev n awarded
the title of capit n de las conquistas by Charles III. Hi ac user was
ordered to pay all expenses in the case, plus 200 pesos to Varg s for
having maligned his honour. 10
Spanish missionaries on the frontier tried to counter th se raids
by giving titulos de iaE to the los uitos to permit them to ent r reduced
villa„es such as San Francisco, Boruca and Atirro (thus allowing the
introduction of illicit merchandise from Jamaica and Curayao). They
would come in whether peaombly or by force, the priests arg ed, so they
might as well take ad ant ge of this contact to proselyte them, yet
there are no signs that this ta tic was ev r successful. 11
Spanish ml sion ry ent rpris Vuring this period were part of a
broa er ca paign to stop Mosquito incursion and illicit tr e,
prepar tory to ejecting the rit h from the coa ts of Gu temala and
10
Te ti o y by the fi c 1, 24 October 1770, Guat 856; Declaration by
Gabriel de Espinosa, 16 May 1771, Guat 600; Opinion of the Co , ejo,
27 June 1771, Guat 408; Charle III to uarci , 16 J nuary 17? , Gu t 68.
11
ep rt by the C nsejo	 is I ia , 10 lay 17 0, Guat 4 8; D cl r tion
by Marcelo S zar, n.d., CD A, x, 41; obadilla to the  yun ' to 
of Gu t m la, 1 July 1775, CC, p. 202; B jarano to the syun a e to,
15 S pte er 1775, RC, p. 205.
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to re ucing theoqito Indian . H vrtheiinari rcived
little support a even much vilific tion fr m Spani h cob o 'sts and
offici is wh fe red the Angl -losq ito re ctio . Evn^ rrCvello
refus to s nct'on an att mpt to reduce the Indians of T log lpa b cause
of the incid nts "pernicious to the Royal Service 	 p cc' th t ight
ensue.	 ever heless, the missionaries penetrated down the anks iver
towards C pe Gracias a Dios, frightening the Engli h set ler on the
coast. The Yosquitos and Shoremen struggled unceasingly ag inst the
missionary influ nce, especially among th "Commerce" Indi s, who ere
v lu ble as intermedi ries and porters in the c ntraband tra e, and s
tribut ry In'i ns and spies. 12 Indian chiefs who succumbed to the Spani h
attractions were punished, churches burned and village priest murdered.
Reduced Indi ns were impelled to flee from their guardians into the
mountains by osquitos who entered th ir viii ges at night. The reaction
of British offici ls to missionary activities was indir ct and less
brutal. Ho gson asked the Church of Engl nd to send a mis-'onary to
the Shore and received funds from the gov rnor of Jam ica to support a
chaplain in lack River. Admir 1 orge od ey bro ght King G orge I
and sev r 1 other chiefs to Jamaica in 1774 to off et the tampering of
an Irish prie t". The r suit of this gener 1 oppo ition to the panish
mi sionaries w s a failur in their work in Tologalpa and i Mat g lpa,
Hodgson to Hillsborough, 7 October 1770, CO 13 /66, f. 100; Est b n to
the f' c 1 of u t mala, 19 April 1773, AGG, ii (1942), p. 114; Cavello tc
Ch les III, 7 Sept mber 1774, Gu t 600; Opinion of the Co ejo de is
I d'as, 4 March 1776, Gu t 4o9.
13Chamorro to the guardi in of the Colegio de Cristo in Guate ala, 20
November 1774, Guat 450; Hodgson to Trela ny, 8 April 1772, CO 13 /68,
f. 17; Rodn y to Stephens, 1 Octob r 17741 Adm 1/239.
Hodgson to Trelawny, 15 ovember 1772, CO 137/68, f. 13; odgson to
hillsborough, 7 October 1770, CO 137 66, f. 74; Shoremen t Jones, 12
March 1770, CO 137/65, f. 208; All of Pitt's children were illegit ate,
which carried little stigma on the Mosquito Shore or anyw ere on the
frontier. According to the Rev. hr. Thomas arren, a mis ion ry ent to
the Shore by the Society for the Prop gation of the Gospel, "Cohabitation
...is very pr vailing in those parts, and L17 find great 'fficulty t
recomm n marriage." warren to S.P.G., n.d. 1770, printe in An A tract 
of th Proceedings of the ciety f r the Propag ton of t e Go p 1 
Annu 1	 p rt, 177  (Lo don, 1771), p. 31.	 'lliam iitt's la t will and
te tament, 12 May 1770, FCC,	 11 s, f. 436.
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as well as in the more distant reductions of Tala anca and Peten,
prompting one Ft nciscan friar to rem r th t: "There was no hope of
reduction, either among the apostate or among the infidel." 13
The domestic squabbles on the Shore were just a bitt r tho gh
less sanguinary. Hodgson's deter ination to rule again collided with
the obstinacy of the settlers, many of horn had become his lasting
enemies. Yet he did not face an angry ultitude alone. He was upported
by the c techist of th Society for t e Propagation of the Gospel in
Black River, Christian Frederick Post (a man of "extraordin ry c aracter"),
and by Philip Bode (who, like Hewlett and Hodgson, was married to one
of Pitt's illegitimate daughters), and by Pitt's popular son, John. 14
But Hodg on's enemies were more numerous and far more vociferous than
his friends, and they took advantage of Richard Jones' recent visit15
pettyto voice numerous/complaints: that he had impressed men for duty in
the king's name--and then used them in his own service; th t he had
given a militia officer's commission to Abraham Tonoston, not only
Hodgson's business associate, but a mestizo as well; that he had claimed
15See above, p. 169.
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ownership ov r vast tr cts of unused land n the Shore; a d fi ally,
that he had sanctioned the slavery of friendly "Commerce" Indians 16
Disputes over Indian land grants most deeply split od son and
the Sh re e , and led to what H bson described as the "rrst and
s cond revolts". In April 1770, he creed that all gr nts must be
recorded and that new grants must h ve his certification. A month la er
he induced Mosquito Ki g George I to issue him a new gr nt and to
reconfirm his old ones. Since Fodgson already held ore land than
anyone else on the shore, the angry reaction of the horemen was not
surprising. 17 In "open Defiance" of odgson, but on the strength of
the special commission of the peace from G vernor Trelawny, James Lawrie
s t as a justice at court in Black River. The superintendent saw his
authority crumbling before the "Licentious Irregularity" of his enemies.
"The Civil Power, the only Power here", he told Hillsborough, "has got
out of all Rule and Controul, and the H ndura Spirit and Impatience
of ebuke is daily increasing." Even the magistrates, he said, were
"mostly people of abandoned Character." 18
16Shoremen memorial, January 1770, CO 137/65, f. 202; Potts to Jone
c. ebruary 1770, CO 137/65, f. 198, John Potts, a settler at Bluefields,
accused Hodgson of transferring Cookeraw Indians, who had been subject
to Henry C rrin until his death, to Abraham Tonost n. Although Hodgson
was guilty f this accus tion, a fe years later he brought a tribe of
Rama Indians b ck to the coast after they had been mistrea ed and driven
into the interior by wind r horemen. Mos uito Sh re conti gent
expenses, 23 October 1772	 T 1/5u4, f. 213.
1 71n ian land grant decr e, 5 April 1770, CO 137 69, f. 258; Land grant
fro G orge I to	 gson, 17 a 177 , FO 53/44, f. 255.
18Lawrie to Ho son, 25 ept mber 177 , DRH, p. 3 ; Hodson to Trela fly,
22 ebru y 1771, CO 137/66, f. 227.
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Hoping to re stabli h his rule and to puni h his opposition,
Hodg on wrote a conciliatory lett r to G v rnor Trelawny as ing him
to withdr	 11 m gistrates' commi ions on t e Vlore. Trelawny
rescin ed the old commission, as requested, but then he a pointed
Hodgson's wor t enemies, J mes Lawrie, Daniel e lett and George Hewm,
as the new magi trates. Even the key positions in the militia went
to his adversaries. Hodgson w s amazed by the new commi sion, which
he s id was "calculated to set every thing in a flsme, absolutely."
The only bright spot for him was the selection of his father-in-law,
William Pitt, as custos and keeper f the records. And even that
adv ntage w s about to be lost. On 14 April odgson wrote th t Pitt,
whose life "does honour to uncultivated Nature", had taken to his bed;
the old man was dying.19
had
Hodgson/acted too quickly when he pressed Trelawny to revoke the
magistrate's commis ion, for wh n H'llsborough responded to his complaints
by instructing Trelawny to reprimand the magistrates serving under the
old commission and to give Ho gson the power to sup rs de th if they
persisted in their revolt, Tr lawny ha air ady i sued the n co i ion,
and he ign red ill borough' or rs. 20
In the summ r of 1771, Trel ny sent the quietus (rele e) for the
old commi ion and th dedi us ( uthor'ty) for the new to Pitt, b t
19Hodgson to Tr 1 wny, 2 Feb uary an 14 April 1771, CO 137 , ff. 227,
23 ; Tr 1 y to Ho g on, 8 April 1771, CO 137/66, f. 229; H b on to
rdl wny, 29 J n ry 1771, CO 137/69, f. 234; Trel ny to itt, 6 April
1771, CO 137/69, f. 271.
20Hill borough to Trelawny, 4 1 , y 1771, CO 137/66, f. 136.
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Pitt die before the new commission could be brought into operati n.
Taking v t ae of th confus d s'tu ti n, the Sh r m forc d hoda on
to give up the qu'etus ( ich he h d taken at Fitt's de th),	 id a
as e bly at ob rt Stote bury' 	 a n, nd elected t 'r wn
'Cons rv tors of the Pe ce'. Acc rding to 	 g on, tnese me h d fi ally
e t bli hed th i "de p ate Union".
h n I look round me for matter ereon to ex rcise Hi
Majesty's In tructions, I find none left, and I am thereby
forced to begin to think it is almo t ti e for me to quit
this Scen of Confusion and leav the Country to its
C ta trophe.21
Trelawny now admitted that some of the magistrates in Black River
had fallen into "irreaularities", but he eff ctively exonerated them
by extending most of their commissions (George Hewm wa dismis ed from
office, and th n only temporarily), explaining that "violent measures
would put the Settlement in a flame." The governor then rebuked Hodg on
for being partially responsible for the disturbances on the Shore, and said
th t he hoped that the "petty Disorders' would yield to "the many
important objects of Indian Policy on the Mosquito hore." Thus, he
a,reed with the settlers who claimed that Hodgs n sh uld have no
authority other than that of "Superint n ent of Indian ffairs". 22
Hodgson denied that the juri diction of the superi t ndent w s
limited to Indian ff irs, and altho gh he see d momentarily resigned
21Journal of the "First Revolt" on the Mosquito Shore, 25 June 1771,
CO 137/69, f. 269; od -on to Lynn, 24 and 28 pte ber 1771, CO 137/67,
ff. 51, 47; Ro n y to t phens, 4 Decemb r 17 1, SP 94/1 9.
22Trela ny to Hods n, 8 January 1772, CO 137/67, f. 36; Gel rina to
Hewlett, 8 January 1772, CO 137/69, f. 69.
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to the new arrangement on the Snore, he still long d for effective power,
and planned to continue his struggle against the Shoremen. "The People
dropped the legislative Authority they had assumed to themselves, & the
Settlement is somewhat at rest", he said, "but I doubt it's continuing
so", for a "certain licentious spirit gxisteg that was ready to burst
forth at any time."23 Hodgson's bitter feud with Trelawny was renewed
at this time when he accused the governor of crippling him in his job.
"If your Excellency wishes me to do much, You must begin with affording
me full Countenance and Support." In response, Trelawny accused Hodgson
of being primarily responsible for the problems on the Shore.
Litigation Evasion or Delay await every measure respecting
the Mosquito Shore which does not originate from youself;...even
the Decorum of expression you speak of preserving...is so
irksome that you seize the first opportunity of indirectly
conveying illiberal reflections on my Conduct.24.
"I must take leave to mention to Your Excellency", Hodgson retorted,
"that it is my well considered opinion ghat the disorders on the Shore7
are owing to your Excellency's discountenancing the Authority the
King intended inc to exercise here...." "The Settlement in Your Excellency's
hands is become a Seat of Anarchy and distress." 25 These comments might
have earned Hodgson a court-martial, but he had the last word; before
he could act, Governor Sir William Trelawny died. 26
23Hodgson to Hillsborough, 15 December 1772, CO 137/69, f. 71; Hodgson
to Hillsborough, 9 April 1772, CO 137/67, f. 91.
24Trelawny to Hod son, 15 November 1772, CO 137/68, f. 21; Hodgson to
Trelawny, April 1772, CO 137/68, f. 17.
25Hodgson to Trela fly, 15 December 1772, CO 137/69, f. 73.
26Dalling to Hillsborough, 19 December 1772, CO 137/68, f. 25. Hodgson's
father had been threatened by Governor Knowles with a court-martial for
similar remarks many years before. ee above p. 79.
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After Trelawny's death neither the Shoremen nor Hod 6son were
anxious to resume a dispute that offered so little profit. Recognising
the need for an ef ective government, they resolved their differences,
and the Shoremen petitioned Trelawny's temporary replacement,
John Dalling, for an elective council. "We leave much of these matters,
as also the State of Our Militia, to be represented...by the Superintendant,'
the settlers said. Dalling responded by approvin their request but he
also approved Hodgson's priv te solicitation by appointing him chief
magistrate and keeper of the records, posts which previous superintendents
had held and which Hodgson claimed by right, but which neither Trelawny
nor the Shoremen had been willing to grant him. The organisation of
the militia and the power to dissolve the council were also entrusted to
Hodgson, while the Shoremen were commanded to offer "a due, and proper,
Subordination" to him. 27
Hodgson was now convinced that he could "deal with the Multitude",
but his victory was so complete that it "defeated every hope and
expectation of the colony", and the "coalition" began to break up even
before the council were selected. The election was delayed when
Hodgson was injured, and then the Shoremen decided to hold it without
him, forming a "Council of the People" that Hodgson called a 'Presumptious"
Shoremen to Dalling, 29 January 1773, CO 137/69, f. 3; Dalling to
Shoremen, 19 April 1773, CO 137/69, f. 5; Shoremen to Hod son, 26
January 1773, DRH, p. 46; Dalling to Hodgson, 19 April 1773, DRH,
p. 55; "Facts or Proofs" against Robert Hodgson, White to the Lords
of Trade and Plantations, 11 Nove ber 1773, p. 16, in CO 123/2,
vol. ii.
27
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and illegal a sumption of power. 28
N matter what decisions Dalling might have made, the Hod son -
settler coalition was doomed from the beginning because of a fanciful
investment scheme. Early in 1771 an unknown settler discovered an
abandoned Spanish gold mine in the mountainous frontier r gion near
Black River. Soon afterwards, a group of Shoremen, including Lawrie,
Hewlett and Gilibert, received a huge grant of land near Blac River
from George I, extending thirty miles inland from the sea. To assure
control of the area, which became known as the Alberapoyer Estate, a
similar grant was obtained from Captain Philip, chief of the lower Paya
Indians who inhabited the region. In April 1772, a company was formed
and divided into twenty-two equal shares, with Allan Auld and James
Lawrie being named steward and factor, respectively, in London and on
the Mosquito Shore. 29 The Alberapoyer agents then requested government
protection, and received a promise of "effectual support" from
Hillsborough. But Hodgson opposed the scheme, which he called "iniquitous"
because it would injure the wandering Shoremen who worked the region
for its sarsaparilla and wood products; Lawrie explained Hodgson's
28Pub1ic notices post d at Black River by Robert Hodgson, 22 May and 5 June
1773, CO 137/69, ff. 14, 20; Hodgson to Dalling, 9 July 1773, 00137/69,
f. 9; McLeish, "British Activities", p. 253. In later years Hodgs n's
enemies claimed that he had promised not to accept any commission from
Dalling. However, there are no documents available to support the
contention, which Hodgson vigorously denied. White to Pownall, 26 June
1775, CO 137/70, f. 53; "Facts or Proofs", p. 70.
29Land grants from King George I, 21 May 1771 and 4 November 1772, FO 53/44,
If. 263, 266. Land grant from Captain Philip, 29 June 1771, FO 53/44,
f. 259; Rules and dir ctions for the Estate of Alberapoyer, 2 April 1772,
TS 11/989/3665. George received fiv shillings worth of goods in exchange
for the grant.
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antagonism diff rently; he had not been invited into the scheme.
Because of the threat that Hodgson posed to their plans, the Alberapoyer
investors decided to force his removal from office. He "will never
have done disturbing this Settlement", they wrote. "Its hard we cannot
be relieved from a Man, who is so disagreable & has the Interest of
this poor Store, so little at heart...." Lord Dartmouth, who had
replaced Hillsborough, ordered the new governor of Jamaica, Sir Basil
Keith, to inquire into the complaints against the superintendent, as well
as "to give due encouragement to such undertakings glberapoyer7 as you
think may be of Advanta tse to the Commerce and Interest of the Kingdom." 30
The election on the Mosquito Shore in June 1773 indicated the
strength of Hodgson's opposition: only one of his friends, John Fitt,
was elected to the council, while three of his strongest enemies, Burke,
Hewm and Lawrie, received more votes than any other candidate. 31 The
new councilmen composed an oath which they asked Hodgson to administer.
Its preamble had a certain independent flavour.
Whereas it 's directly Contra y to the Principles of the
British Constitution for British Subjects in any Settlement
to be there bound by Laws made by an Assembly in any other
Settlement or Collony, when the said Subjects so bound...
have no legal Representatives of their own Electing in the
Assembly of Such other Settlement....32
Hodgson refused to read this "patched-up oath" to the "Revolutionary
30Shoremen to Dartmouth, 30 June 1773, TS 11/989/3665; Hodgson to Shoremen,
27 March 1773, c 137/69, f. 85; Shoremen to Ho son, 1 February 1773,
CO 137/69, f. 83; Lawrie to Jones, 2 February 1773, CO 137/70, f. 114,
Dart uth to Keith, 27 October 1773, CO 137/68, f. 101.
31 Black iver election r turns, 12 June 1773, CO 137/69, f. 22.
32Council to Hodgson, 3 July 1773, CO 137/69, f. 28.
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Council", telling them th t "the moment I swear You...into Business
I swear myself out, wnich You kn w that I must not do." The new
council members declined to accept an alternate oath that Hodgson had
prepared, but they r fused to swear themselves into office, as suggested
by a committee of Shoremen, afraid of being accused of open rebellion
against the crown. 33 But late in September, after the harvest season,
they boldly acceded to the request of the settlers; the "second revolt"
had begun. Hodgson wrote excitedly:
I have barely time to acquaint Your Honor that the leading
Inhabitants of this Country have broke out into such open
acts of opposition to Government that I am under a n1ç . ssity
of representing them to you as in a State of Revolt."
He pleaded with Dalling for troops (sixty red coats should "bring the
Settlement into order") and for a condemnation of the Shoremen's actions.
They had not proceeded from a "spirit of proud, ignorant Licentiousness",
Hodgson said, but rather from the influence of "rebellious Principles".
Their leaders had off...red "the Allurement of natural Liberty to the
vicious and ignorant"; they had established a government and were
"alluring foreign Strength" to their "new erected State". 35
The Shoremen assumed all civil and juridical power on the Shore,
33Declaration by Robert Hodgson, 21 June 1773, CO 137/70, f. 123; Hod son
to Council, 17 July 1773, CO 137/69, f. 106.
34Hodgson to Dalling, 26 September 1773, CO 137/69, f. 30.
35Ho gson to Dalling, 8 October 1773, CO 137/69, f. 108; Hodgson to
Dartmouth, 9 November 1773, CO 137/69, f. 65. Hodgson never enlarged
on these open accusations of revolt and tre son. Ho ever, one is
tempted to subg st that he was referringto North America, for the
Shoremen's closest commercial ties were with New York and Philadelphia.
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although Hod on tried to counter them by establishing an opposing court
with himself, William dalker and Christian Frederick Post
magistrates. But declaring that Post was a foreigner and Hodgson's
commission a "phony piece of paper", the council elected magistrates
on 2 October independent of both Hodgson and the governor of Jamaica.
The Shore had, inde d, experienced a bloodless revolt, for if the council
election in June had been lawful (which Hodgson denied), their election
of magistrat s certainly was not.37
In November the Jamaica council discussed the situation on the
Mosquito Shore. They saw no chance for Dalling's plan of government
to succeed, although they felt that Hodgson "should even possess a
greater degree of authority under proper restrictions, than he has
hitherto enjoyed", and they advised the governor to interpose his own
authority there. "Nothing can be more derogatory to the Commission His
Majesty has been pleased to Honor LHodgson with than thg...unworthy
struggle for Independent power" by the settlers. Dalling responded by
36Post was born in Polish Prussia in 1710 and spent many dangerous years
as a missionary among the Indians of North America. In 1745 he was
arrested on a false charge of inciting the Iroquois Indians to raids in
New York. During the Seven Years War, Post detached the Delaware Indians
from their alliance with the French after Braddock's defe t, thus forcing
the French to abandon Fort Duquesne and retreat from the region. In 1761,
he was reputed to have built the first white man's house within the boun-
daries of the present state of Ohio. He was sent to the Mosquito Shore
by the Moravians in 1764 and spent the next twenty years th re. He died
in Germantown, Pennsylvania, in 1785. Post's fascinating journ la are
pri ted in Reuben Gold Thw ites, Early estern Travels 174 - 1 46 (Cleve-
land, 1904), pp. 177-291 and in Anon., A nqu'ry into the Causes of the 
Alienation of the Delaw re and hawanese In ian from the ritish
Intere t.... (London, 1759), pp. 130-171.
37Declaration by Joshua Stoddart, 20 November 1773, CO 137/69, f. 32; Anon.
report from Black River, n.d., CO 137/70, f. 110; Public notice at Black
River, 29 Sept mber 1773, Co 137/70, f. 108; laite to Pownall, 9 July 1774
CO 137 69, f. 180. The Shoremen later admitted that their behaviour had
been quetionable , but ass rted th t they had acted for "Self
(continued on n xt page)
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by dissolving the Mos uito Shore council on 23 Novemoer 1773, and by
forbidding the S oremen to hold new elections until instructions were
received from London. But the Shoremen ignored Dalling's orders, knowing
that he wa about to be replaced by someone whom they hoped would be
more amenable to their desires. In fact, the new governor, Sir Basil
Keith, had already received orders from Dartmouth to investigate
Hodgson's conduct and "to establish such Regulations and Reform as
Shall appear...necessary and exledient." 38
When Keith arrived in Kingston he was informed that the Shoremen
had been forced to form a government for the "Peace Policy good order
& Government as well gs for7 the Pre ervation of the Colony." Convinced
that Hod son was largely responsible for the problems there, he only
mildly rebuked the Shoremen. Yet in spite of his sympathetic tone, the
settlers disclaimed Keith's authority just as they had Hodgson's. Only
the king or parliament, they maintained, could settle a permanent form
of government for them.39
Meanwhile, Hodgson's enemies, the "revolutionary Rabel" with their
"desparate Cause to defend", had construed the silence from Whitehall
(7;717117W-From previous page)
Preservation". Robert dhite admitted that it was a "revolt", but not one
against the crown or the governor of Jamaica, but rather "against the
illegal, arbitrary, assumed powers and authority of Mr. Hodbson".
"Facts or Proofs", p. 47.
38Jamaica council report, 23 November 1773, CO 137/69, f. 34; Dalling to
Shoremen, 23 November 1773, CO 137/69, f. 316; Dartmouthto Keith, 27
October 1773, CO 137/68, f. 101.
39Shoremen to Keith, 4 March 1774, CO 137/69, f. 163; Keith to Shoremen,
5 April 1774, CO 137/69, f. 165; Keith to Dartmouth, 2 Septe ber and
4 October 1774, CO 137/69, ff. 318, 344.
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and Dartmouth's o en support of the Alberapoyer scheme as encouragement.
The council had attempted to serve a warrant o him, Hodgson said, and
they had even begun to construct a jail 'into which they very likely
will put all those who ono° e their sort of Democracy". According to
Keith, who looked upon the events on the Shore in wonder, the settlers
there were "well satisfied with their own temporary scheme of Polity." 4o
Whitehall's policy towards the Mosquito Shore during this turbulent
period in Hodgson's superintendency was vague. tile England's possession
of Belize was "limited and circumscribed by the Treaty of Paris", Lord
Hillsborough wrote in 1770, the Shore was one of the Possessions of
ideorge 111'27 crown", and the king was anxious "to counteract and defeat
any Views that may be formed to the Prejudice of them". If the question
had been left to the gov rnors of Jamaica--especially Lyttelton, Keith
and William Trelawny--the Shore would have been abandoned. When refusing
to grant military protection to the Shoremen in 1771, Trelawny wrote:
You will easily conceive that every Governor would necesbarily
think himself happy, if the connection between him and the
Superintendant could, without detriment to His Majestys Service,
and welfare of his Subjects, be dissolved."
The Shoremen deplored the'r limited relationship with England, while
Hodbson described the Mosquito Shore as "not absolutely part of the
4°Hodgson to Dartmouth, 31 July 1773, cc 137/69, f. 314; Keith to Dart outh,
19 November 1774, CO 137/70, f. 3.
41
Trelawny to Hillsborough, 28 May 1770, CO 137/65, f. 173; Hillsborough to
Forrest, 23 ebruary 1770, CO 137/65, f. 88; Hillsborough to Trelawny, 23
Fe ruary 1770, C 1 63, f. 3; Hillsbor ugh to Admiralty, 23 February
1770, CO 137/65, f. 80, Tr 1 ny t Hillsb rough, 3 June 1771, CO 137/66,
f. 213.
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Realm but rather in t e Kings Hand only."42
Before Whitehall could deci e how to r s lye the curious situ tion
on the 2. osquito Shore, Engla d's diplomatic policy was di torted by the
evolving events in her American colonies. Any move that might incite
foreign diplomatic or military controversy was deemed inexpedient.
Therefore, the English cabinet opposed all 'new Arrangements" or any "Act
of Power" by the superintendent on the Shore which might lead to "DiscussionE
of Right"; a strong response to the Shoremen's opposition to the crown's
authority, as represented by the superintendent or by the governor and
council of Jamaica, had to give way to the exigencies of England's policy.
Hodgson's "Influence" with the settlers was to be derived from the "Goodwill
and Affection of the People and not in the exertion of Authority & Act
of Power". 43 In December 1774, however, the critical situation in North
America impressed the government with the need to resolve rather than to
ignore the problems of the Mosquito Shore, "an object of great Importance
tho' involved in much difficulty". Yet Whitehall did nothing, and when
revolution erupted in the North American colonies, the situation on the
Mosquito Shore remained unchanged, and only an occ sional vessel sent
down from Jamaica to observe the activities there interrupted the
capricious behaviour of the Shoremen and Superintendent Hodgson. 44
42Hodgson  to Dialling, 26 September 1773, CO 137/69, f. 30.
"Dartmouth to Keith, 4 June and 6 July 1774, CO 137/69, ff. 157, 178.
44Dartmouth to Keith, 10 December 1774, CO 137/69, f. 353; Rodney to
Douglas, 25 June 1774, Adm 1/24 , f. 20.
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Chapter IX
THE MOSQUITO SHORE DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION:
James Lawrie, 1775 - 1779
From his appointment as superintendent of the Mosquito Shore
in 1768 until the outbreak of the American Revolution, Robert Hodgson
was engaged in tempestuous squabbles with the Shoremen and with the
governors of Jamaica. Then in August 1775, three weeks before
George III issued the proclamation for the suppression of rebellion
and sedition in the colonies, Lord Dartmouth recalled Hodgson,
explaining his decision to Sir Basil Keith, governor of Jamaica.
It is impossible in taking a full view of Mr. Hodgson's
Conduct not to see that a great deal is to be attributed
to his misbehaviour in many instances; at the same time
I do not think that his Errors are imputable to a want
of Integrity but to a consumate Vanity and a mistaken
Idea of Importance that does not belong to his situation.
But Dartmouth realised that Hodgson was not entirely responsible for
the disorders on the Shore.
I think it is chiefly owing to the restless & ungovernable
Spirit & Temper of its Inhabitants, which have manifested
themselves in acts of usurpation very little short of open
Rebellion against the King's Government....
Governor Keith was ordered to appoint a person "to superintend the
Settlement upon the Mosquito Shore during Mr. Hodgson's absence...."/
The choice of words was unfortunate, for it led to a dispute between
1Dartmouth to Keith, 2 August 1775, CO 137/70, f. 67. Italics my own.
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Hodgson and John Ferguson, appointed as his temporary replacement.
When Ferguson crossed the ocean bar at Black River, he argued that
his duties were to begin immediately, but Hodgson refused to relinquish
his authority. Encouraged by James Lawrie and other principal
settlers, however, Ferguson began to implement the instructions he
had received from Keith, and Hodgson prudently desisted from quarrelling
further, satisfying himself by composing a note of protest to Lord
George Germain, secretary of state for the American colonies. 2
Ferguson's first responsibility was to strengthen the civil
administration on the Shore. Lord Dartmouth, Germain's predecessor,
suggested that the plan of government prepared by Lt. Gov. John Dalling
for the Mosquito Shore in 1773 be adapted to the present situation,
and he reprimanded the Shoremen for their impertinent refusal to
acknowledge Jamaican jurisdiction. "It is the King's Intention that
the Affairs of the Shore should continue to be, as they ever have
been, under the Controul & Direction of His Governors of Jamaica, with
the Advice of the Council." Germain later approved this measure as
the best civil arrangement possible.
2Dartmouth to Hodgson, 2 August 1775, CO 137/70, f. 72; Lords of Trade
to George III, 3 June 1776, CO 324/21, f. 419; Keith to Hodgson, 29
December 1775, DRH, p. 73; Hodgson to Germain, 10 March 1776, CO 137/71,
f. 136; Ferguson to Keith, 18 April 1776, CO 137/71, f. 176; Minutes of
the council of the Mosquito Shore, 23 September 1776, CO 123/2, vol. ii,
f. 141; Council to White, 23 April and 24 July 1776, CO 123/2, vol. ii,
ff. 116, 117.
3Dartmouth to Keith, 2 August 1775, CO 137/70, f. 67; Keith to Ferguson
29 December 1775, CO 12344; Germain to Keith, 3 April 1776, CO 137/71,
f. 64.
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A few days after he arrived in Black River, Ferguson read his
instructions to the Shoremen, who expressed their satisfaction over
the same articles that they had refused to accept three years earlier.
On 1 March 1776, they elected a council of twelve members, five of
whom, including Lawrie, were then in London representing the settlers'
case against Hodgson. 4
Hodgson's relationship with the settlers further degenerated
before he left for England. Because of "the Intemperance of a Multitude",
he said, "the more Truth I write the more I enrage." 5 One man whom
he had mistakenly accused of perjury demanded an apology or a duel;
he apologised. 6
 Another, Bartholomew Gilibert, read the following
comments about him by Hodgson:
It will be time enough for me to speak of Mr. Bartholomew
Gilibert's merit when I think he has any; at present I look
upon him to be a worse man than the moderation I mean to
adhere to will allow me to exRress. I can scarcely
understand him in English...."
Gilibert replied by calling Hodgson "a coward, a liar, a villain, and
a disgrace to the commission he formerly bore."8
Like his arrival on the Shore, Hodgson's departure seemed perpetually
4
Ferguson to Keith, 18 April 1776, CO 137/71, f. 176; Mosquito Shore council
to Keith, 20 April 1776, CO 137/71, f. 187; Mosquito Shore council to White,
23 April 1776, CO 123/2, vol. ii, p. 116; Keith to Germain, 14 June 1776,
CO 137/71, p.171.
5Hodgson to Germain, 10 March 1776, CO 137/71, f. 136.
6
Reid to Hodgson, 2 March 1776, CO 123/2, vol. ii, f. 136; Hodgson to Reid,
3 March 1776, CO 123/2, vol. ii, f. 136.
7Gilibert to Hodgson, 6 May 1776, CO 123/2, vol. ii, f. 138; Hodgson to
Gilibert, 5 May 1776, CO 123/2, vol. ii, f. 138. In contrast, Robert White
said that Gilibert was "universally esteemed by all the settlement", for hie
"good-humour, sincere friendship, high honour, strict probity, manly spirit,
and every worthy accomplishment." "Facts or Proof", p. 90.
8Fnblished notice by Bartholomew Gilibert, 19 May 1776, CO 123/2, vol. ii,
f.100.
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delayed; the vessel that had brought Ferguson sailed too soon to allow
him to prepare for the voyage; a promised passage failed to materialise
because of a missed rendezvous; and his own sloop was beached for weeks
on a nearby island. Hodgson was aware of the suspicions, which evidence
supports, that he delayed his departure for commercial reasons. He
countered ineffectually: "However strange my Delay may seem, I have
done all Man could do to obey His Majesty's Commands...." 1° Not until
June 1777, nearly two years after his recall, did he arrive in England.
Competition to succeed Hodgson was nearly as severe as the
endeavours to remove him had been. The post offered prestige and
opportunities to augment the lucrative but fixed salary by commercial
ventures. Among the contenders was Jeremiah Terry, a tall, amiable
merchant adventurer from Virginia, blind in one eye but with a kind
face. 11 Terry arrived on the Shore just before Hodgson's recall--in
time to win the distrust of both sides by remaining neutral in the
controversy. James Lawrie said that he was
a common Adventurer...ghg Affected a Misterious reserved
Conduct, sometimes hinting that he was employed by a set
of Private Gentlemen12 in England to Examine the Shore,
with Respect to the Propriety of establishing a large
settlement, and at Other times that he was an Agent from
Administration....13
9
"Facts or Proofs", p. 111.
10Hodgson to Germain, 10 March, 2 May and 25 July 1776, CO 137/71, ff.
136, 205, 219; Affidavit by Robert Hodgson, n.d., CO 123/3, vol. ii.
11Chavarria to Perils, 24 August 1778, Guat 464.
12
"The"private Gentlemen" were Alexander Blair and Dr. Charles Irving.
See below, p.211 . Lawrie to Robertson, 10 November 1774, LS, MS 3942,
f. 173.
13Lawrie to Dalling, 23 October 1776, CO 137/74, is 126.
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As a representative, perhaps even a partner, in an ambitious colonisation
project for the Shore, Terry's commercial interests were threatened by
the unstable relationship between Hodgson and the settlers, and by the
Mosquitos' odious habit of seizing Spanish Indians and selling them
as slaves. 14
Indian slavery had been outlawed by a Jamaican law in 1741, but
the decree was ignored on the Mosquito Shore, where even the superintendents
engaged in the traffic. 15
 Hodgson's participation in it was instrumental
in Dartmouth's decision to recall him.
What seems most blameable in Mt. Hodgson's Conduct, is the
contemptuous manner in which I find he treats the Mosquito
Men and his encouraging by his own example, the Inhuman &
in every light unjustifiable practice of making Slaves of
the Neighbouring Indians & sending them off the Coast for
sale, a Practice which, in his Situation, it was hi 9 duty to
have discountenanced, by every Means in his Power.lp
Hoping to end this evil, Terry persuaded Mosquito King George I to name
three of his subjects, including the heir to the throne, as members of
a commission headed by Duke Isaac, brother of the king, to accompany
14When the governor of Veragua called for the reduction of the Talamanca
Indians of Costa Rica and Panama in September 1775, his purpose was to
rid the coast of the Zambos Mosquitos and English "who cause grave
damage not only to that province, & the kingdom of Guatemala, but also
to...Tierra Firme and...the whole coast of Veragua...carrying away
unnumbered Indian prisoners." Bejarano to the ayuntamiento of
Guatemala, 15 September 1775, CRC, p. 205.
15Petition from Jeremiah Terry to the House of Commons, n.d., 	 T 1/527;
Jacobs, "Roger Hope Elletson", JHR, ii (1953), p. 48; Diary of Juan
Antonio de Gastelu, 21 February—=-11 July 1776, Gnat 665. Paradoxically,
Terry's closest friend, Colvill Cairns, was the most notorious dealer
in Indian slaves on the Shore.
16Dartmouth to Keith, 2 August 1775, CO 137/70, f. 67.
203
him to England. 17
 The plan enraged Hodgson, whose displeasure fell
most heavily upon Isaac, "one of the most wicked and vicious of his
whole nation", and who he had "once marked...out for capital Punishment...."
But Terry ignored these imputations. In November 1774, he sailed with
the Indians to London, where their reception was polite, but hardly
enthusiastic. Hodgson's denunciations had arrived before them, and
one of the Indians had contracted small pox on the voyage. Nevertheless
they were successful; Dartmouth issued orders
forbidding all persons, under pain of His Majestys highest
Displeasure, from making Slaves of the native Indiana &
sending them off the Coast for Sale, as a Practice
irreconcilable with every Principle of Justice, good
Policy and Humanity.19
Terry petitioned for the superintendency soon after Hodgson's
dismissal. Realising that others wanted the position, he requested
support from his friends on the Shore. "A petition from the King La
the Mosquito India& to his Majesty here...may be of service to me",
he wrote, adding "I have beat the Bush it is hard another should catch
the Bird...." Then: "I am no Scotchman gs were Lawrie and many
Shoremeg consequently of the wrong side of the hedge except Rectitude
Other members of the commission were Mosquito Admiral Dick Richards and
Captain John of the tributary Woolwa tribe. George I reportedly sent
a barrel of Mosquito Shore soil to his "brother" king, George III, with
a pledge of 5,000 Mosquito warriors, if necessary, to put down any revolt
that might erupt in the North American colonies. Declaration by Jose
Guilbot, 29 July 1776, Guat 665.
18
Hodgson to Dartmouth, 16 November 1774, CO 137/70, f. 1; Hodgson executed
similar threats against Mosquito chiefs Dilson and israel in 1770. See
above, p. 171.
19
Dartmouth to Keith, 2 August 1775, CO 137/70, f. 67; Pownall to Irving,
13 October 1775, CO 137/70, f. 153.
17
2o4
of principal carries me over." 20 Terry counted on a declaration in
his behalf from his friend and associate, Dr. Charles Irving, 21 but
unknown to him, Irving also sought the post, and had the support of
the heir to the Mosquito crown, Prince George, who wrote:
Wee likewise Consider ourselves much Obliged by the directing
Mr Irving to take care and Conduct us to our Native
home. He has always treatted us with great kindness
and in whose House We have Resided for some Months,
And with Submission We apprehend he is well qualified
to Succeed the present Intendant Lliodgson7 who is so
Obnoxious to every Mosquitto Man that we dread the
Consequence Should he be Continued in Office.22
A perennial candidate for the superintendency was Captain Joseph
Smith Speer, who volunteered to serve on the Mosquito Shore to exploit
its rich resources. Speer possessed personal and imperial ambition,
but he was perhaps too honourable for a post demanding machiavellian
cunning for dealing with the Shoremen, the Mosquitos, their Spanish
neighbours and the governor and council of Jamaica. 23
A memorial "respecting the Sentiments of the people on the Shore
in favour of Capt. Lawrie" for the superintendency was presented to
Germain in March 1776. 24 According to the petitioners, James Lawrie's
earned
twenty-five years as a respected colonist and friend of the Indians had /
the position for him.
Of all the candidates the most obvious successor was John Ferguson,
20Terry to Cairns, 1 November 1775, CO 137/74, f. 130.
21 Irving was the celebrated discoverer of a desalinisation process.
22George to Dartmouth, 10 November 1775, CO 137/70, f. 155. Although Terry
broughtt1B Indians to London, Irving was their host during much of their
stay.
23Petition from Joseph Smith Speer, 11 February 1776, CO 5/248, f. 119.
24Hewm to Germain, 31 March 1776, CO 137/71, f.71. The document was heavily
padded with signatures of Belize merchants, demonstrating the ties binding
the two settlements, as well as a certain lack of scruples among Iawrie's
friends.
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popular among the Shoremen, and Sir Basil Keith's protege. Keith
described Ferguson's "Discretion, Integrity, and Activity, gg fitting
such an Employment." "I venture boldly to ask your Protection for Him",
he wrote to Germain, "In case Mr. Hodgson is not to return again as
His Majestys Superintendant on the Mosquito Shore." 25 In London,
however, Lawrie and his friends convinced Germain of the urgent need
to replace Hodgson, and Lawrie was named the fifth English superintendent
of the Shore. His selection was made without consulting Governor Keith;
all previous superintendents except the younger Hodgson had been appointed
by the governors of Jamaica.26
Lawrie's arrival in Black River on 29 August 1776 "had an amazing
effect on the spirits of every individual...gn thg settlement, after
being dispirited by the oppressive and abominable practices of Mr. H--,
tending to the total destruction of the colony."27
As auspicious as Lawrie's presence seemed to be, the settlers'
problems remained. The news from North America was discouraging, and
the fear that had so often afflicted them in the past, that a Spanish
2 'Keith to Germain, 26 June 1776, CO 137/71, f. 169; Keith to Shoremen,
15 June 1776, HA/MSL, f. 24.
26Germain to Lawrie, 17 May 1776, CO 137/71, f. 75.
27Lawrie to Germain, 7 October 1776, CO 137/72, f. 55; Mosquito Shore
council to White, 10 October 1776, CO 123/2, vol. ii, f. 118. The
community of Black River at this time was composed of forty-two houses,
each with its provision garden, on a long main road parallel to the sea,
and twenty-three houses on another street running towards the mountains,
where most of the mulatto and Negro inhabitants lived. According to a
Spanish visitor, the houses were built on stilts because of the marshy
land, and were colourfully painted and neatly kept. Diary of Jose Estes
Sierra, 21 August - 23 December 1776, Gust 450.
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invasion was imminent, and that the Mosquito Indians might ally themselves
were
with the enemy, again distressed them. The Shoremen/also threatened
with a slave revolt, and plagued by the enticement of their Negroes by
the Spanish. Nor had the Indian slave problem been resolved, in spite
of Dartmouth's ruling. Superintendent Lawrie, who was held responsible
by Sir Basil Keith for the enslavement of the Indians, despaired of
eliminating the trade, for it would be necessary to control the Jamaican
merchants who financed it and the "lower class of people" who encouraged
Mosquito depredations. 28 Nevertheless the Mosquito Shore council
passed an act in August 1776 abolishing the Indian slave trade, although
Indians enslaved before 22 October 1776 were not affected by the ruling.29
Three months passed before the decree was published on the Shore in a
curious proclamation from the Indian governor, Colvill Briton. Briton
prohibited the "future" enslavement of Indians and forbad English traders
to give them further credit, a practice which had led many Mosquitos
into debt bondage. But he opened the way to abuse by ruling that: "All
my Men who are indebted to the British Subjects are to go out to the
* Southward and Strike their Debts gy turtle fishine, whenever their
employers may order them without giving them or me any trouble...."
And he further demonstrated his contempt for the decree by offering
"a Young able Indian Slave" for information leading to the apprehension
28Lawrie to Keith, 15 and 27 January 1777, CO 137/72, ff. 94, 97; Keith
to Lawrie, 28 February 1777, CO 137/72, f. 110.
29"An Act for recovering and extending the Trade with the Indian Tribes",
22 August 1776, CO 137/154.
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of anyone illegally selling tortoise ahell. 30
Late in 1777 Lawrie recommended that all Indian slaves on the
Mosquito Shore be purchased with government funds and returned to
their own tribes. He estimated that £3,000 sterling distributed among
the slave owners (of whom he was one) should cover the expense. 31
John Dalling, Keith's replacement as governor, rejected Lawrie's proposal,
remarking that the Mosquitos have "an inveterate habit of getting those
Indians into their possession by force or fraud, and employing them in
all servile offices." The purchase of these slaves could become an
endless form of ransom. 32
Yet a more immediate threat than the Indian slave problem, both
to the economy and to the security of the Shoremen, was their rebellious
Negro slaves, most of whom were expert in handling fire arms, and who
greatly outnumbered the whites. 33
 In November 1775, a large number of
slaves, frustrated in a legal claim to freedom, fled into the vast
"' Proclamation by Colvill Briton, 29 November 1776, CO 123/31; Proclamation
by Sir Basil Keith, 29 December 1775, CO 123/31.
31
Lawrie to Germain, 29 August 1777, CO 137/73, f. 19; Registry of Indian
slaves, 24 February to 20 August 1777, CO 123/31. Every influential
Shoreman had at least one Indian slave. James Lawrie and his brother John
owned eleven. Robert Hodgson had a well-distributed "harem" of Indian
women slaves; Loraina, age 20, was at Cape Gracias a Dios; Dines, 25, and
Nelly, 13, were in Black River; and Jemimo, 30, was in Corn Island.
32Dalling to Germain, 14 November 1777, CO 137/73, f. 11- The Indian slave
issue was ignored in the turbulent years after 1777 and it was not resolve(
until the general emancipation at Belize in 1833.
33Hodgson disagreed with the established theory that Europeans could not do
physical labour in the tropics, and gave warning that the settlers should
not rely too heavily on their slaves, for they would some day be without
their services. The Dutch, by their labours in the salt beds of Araya
off the coast of CumanA had long since proved the fallacy of the theory.
Hodgson to Germain, 10 March 1776, CO 137/71, f. 136.
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savannah and pine-forested frontier conntry. 34 The new claimant to
their services, John McHarg, accused Spanish officials of enticing
the slaves away, and demanded their restitution. But in reply, President
Vargas of Guatemala accused the Shoremen of habitually giving refuge to
Spanish outlaws and ruled that fugitive slaves desirous of embracing
the church were to be granted their freedom. 35 Ferguson threatened
to send armed vessels to Omoa to demand the return of the runaways,
but without assistance from the governor of Jamaica, whose hands were
tied by the refusal of the council to send arms or troops to the Shore,36
he was unable to fulfill his warning. 37 Every effort to capture the
38
slaves "and reduce them to Obedience" failed, but the expected revolt
did not take place.
34The slaves were originally the property of Henry Corrin at Bluefields.
35McHarg to Balarde, 5 February 1776, BAGG, i (1940), p. 72; McHarg to
Barase, 5 February 1776, ibid.; Saavedra to Mayorga, 13 April 1776, ibid.;
Vargas to Cavello, 13 November 1775, ibid., p. 41; SAnchez to Ferguson,
6 February 1776, Guat 450; Opinion of the fiscal, 15 February 1776, Gust
450; To support his refusal to return the fugitive slaves, Vargas cited the
reales cedulas of 1 July 1704, 19 December 1739 and 19 September 1774.
Chatfield to Palmerston, 20 May 1849, FO 252/41. Frederick Chatfield, who
became British charg‘ d'affaires in Central America in 1849, quoted
extensively from the manuscript of the history of Guatemala by Archbishop
Francisco Garcia de Peliiez in dispatches to Palmerston.
36Lawrie to Keith, 11 October and 9 December 1776, CO 137/72, ff. 49, 92;
Petition from the Mosquito Shore council, 10 October 1776, CO 137/72, f.57;
Lawrie to Germain, 7 October 1776, CO 137/72, f. 55; Keith to Lawrie, 23
December 1776, CO 137/72, f. 51; Brown, "Anglo-Spanish Relations", p. 356.
Vera Lee Brown enumerates the contW gritical problem in Jamaica which
persuaded the council to refuse aid to the Shoremen.
37Mayorga to Arriaga, 22 February 1776, Gust 450.
38Lawrie to Keith, 15 January 1777, CO 137/72 , f. 94. The Zambos Mosquitos
of General Tempest made an unsuccessful search for the runaways. Their
employment was reminiscent of the use of the Indiana in Jamaica during the
maroon uprisin s late in the seventeenth century and again in 1720 and
1737.
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Seizures by pardacostas and the fear of invasion created
apprehension on the Shore ranging from restlessness to despair. The
Anglo-Spanish wars were so frequent and the periods of peace so short
that the scattered settlers were forced to maintain an expensive armed
vigilance. Since the Spanish never recognised the legality of these
settlements, and the English government was loath to offer the security
of colonial status, the Shoremen were not even secure in peacetime.
England's preoccupation with the revolt in America furnished Spain
with an ideal opportunity to acquire territories previously lost, or
provinces which she claimed but which she had never effectively governed,
such as the Mosquito Coast. 39 Spain's involvement in the American
revolution is not well-known, for she acted unilaterally and without
consideration for the Americans; the support she gave to them before
1779 was economic rather than military: a few pesos through Franklin's
mission in Paris and refuge and a market for rebel privateers operating
Prior to 1782 there had never been a Spanish settlement between the
mouth of the San Juan River and Cape Honduras, although numerous reales
cedulas in the sixteenth century called for the conquest and colonisation
of the Mosquito Coast--variously known as Veragua, Cartago, Castilla del
Oro and the provinces of Taguzgalpa and Tologalpa. The attempts to occupy
the Coast in the seventeenth century were limited to several unsuccessful
missionary efforts. But not until the eighteenth century did Spain
attempt to eject the British settlers and reduce or exterminate the
Mosquito Indiana. See, for example, the collection of inedited documents
on early Nicaraguara historia in Documentoa pare la Historia de 
Nicaragua ColecciSn Somoza (17 vols., Managua, 1954); Description of
the provinces of Honduras and Higueras, Academia de la Historia,
ColecciOn Muiroz A/66, f. 130; Ponce de Leon to crown, 26 May 1584, CRM,
p. 30; Guerra de Ayala to crown, 30 December 1608, Guat 39; Report by
Andrels de Arbieto Ocileta, 9 April 1654, Colecci6n de documentos 
referentes a la historia Oolonial de la Independencia (Managua, 1921),
p. 136.
39
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in European waters.LM) There is an appearance of naivete, even of
paradox, in Spain's support of the Americans, yet she did not favour
independence for England's American colonies, and merely used the
rebel cause to implement her own policy. 41 The Conde de Floridablanca
commented that:
The Most immediate utility that Spain can make of the
war between the English and her colonies is to see if
they can be flung out of Florida, and then from el seno
Mexicano, and tp destroy her establishments on Campeche,
Mosquitos, etc. '2
Later, Floridablanca raised Spanish aspirations by adding Gibraltar and
Minorca to his list, while retaining the Mosquito Coast as before. 43
towards Spain under
English policy/during the mini-mtries—of- Weymouth, secretary of
state for the southern department, and Germain, was guided by a blind
desire for Spanish neutrality; the time was ideal for Spain to present
her demands to the English court. But she failed to do so, for Spanish
ministers were inclined rather to react to than to initiate events.
Nor did the English skilfully implement their policy, because they
were unaware of the sweeping concessions necessary to do so. English
4o
A well-documented study of Spain's role in the America Revolution is
Juan Francisco Yela y Utrilla, Espaaa ante la independencia de los 
EE.UU (2 vols., Lerida, 1925).
41Grimaldi to Charles III, 14 November 1775, AGS, Est 8155, folder 9a.
The Marques de Grimaldi was afraid of the consequences if England
should solve her quarrel with her colonies too quickly. Spain, he said,
should help the American colonies to maintain the struggle, but not
help them to bring it to a successful conclusion.
42Memoria1 from the Conde de Floridablanca, March 1777, AHN, Est 4199.
45
Floridablanca to Aranda, 4 April 1778, printed in Yela y Utrilla,
21.cit., ii, 249.
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ministers even supported projects detrimental to Spanish interests,
and only in regard to England's own valid complaints did they appear
willing to bend in deference to the Spanish; Germain deliberately
misinterpreted evidence of Spanish depradations in the Indies so as
not to endanger Anglo-Spanish relations.
One of the best examples of support given to projects prejudicial
to Spanish interests was a colonisation scheme by Dr. Charles Irving
which made the Spanish permanently aware of the "value" of the Mosquito
Coast and of the dangers of its being in foreign hands, and also aware
that the region was as unknown as the most obscure territory in America;
Floridablanca was unable to extract even the barest shred of reliable
information about the Coast from the mass of letters, dispatches and
memorials in the archives. There was not even positive proof that the
English had settlements on the Coast. But the apparent danger was too
serious to ignore. Gradually, Floridablanca prophesied, contraband
merchandise would flow to the Pacific and into every corner of the
empire; English settlements would spread like a blight across the lush
forests and savannahs of the isthmus, and eventually the English would
unite with the Indians to embrace all of America. 44 A few diaphanous
Englishmen and their Zambo Mosquito friends seemed to threaten the
continued existence of Spain's colonial empire.
Dr. Irving proposed to take possession of the Mosquito Shore in
the name of George III. However the boldness of his plan made Lord
4 'Report by the Conde de Floridablanca, 26 November 1775, ARN, Est 4227,
vol. i.
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Dartmouth uneasy, and he refused to sanction it openly, although he
privately offered some financial support, and promised a governorship
to Irving if it were a success. Dartmouth stipulated that all
acquisitions of land be obtained by grant from the king of the Mosquito
Indians. But whether by private enterprise or government sponsorship,
the effect on the Spanish court was the same. 45
Charles Irving, a "man of great talents, with much fire and drive",
was not representative of the common merchant adventurers who scoured
the Caribbean for a share of the fabled Spanish wealth. But he was
garrulous and careless in his choice of confidants. He bragged to the
Compte de Guinea, French ambassador to the Court of St. James, that he
envisaged a colony of thirty or forty-thousand inhabitants industriously
harvesting the riches of the Mosquito Shore and introducing the treasures
of England's factories to Spanish America. Irving admitted that the
political object of his venture was the establishment of a crown colony,
a foothold that might one day bring "radical changes" to America. "One
could feel the consequence of that power on the Spanish continent",
Guinea said, especially when compared with the effect on Spain's commerce
in the Indies by a few trading companies in Jamaica. 	 reported
the subject of this conversation to Vergennes, the French minister of
foreign affairs, who carried an exaggerated version of the tale to the
45Pownall to Irving, 13 October 1775, CO 137/70,
46Guinea to Vergennes, 13 October 1775, cited by
p. 57; Masserano to Grimaldi, 13 October 1775,
f. 153.
Esquivel, "Las Incursiones",
AGS, Est 8133, folder 12a.
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Conde de Aranda, Spanish ambassador in Paris; the 30,000 colonists had
now become 60,000. Suggesting that the promise of a governorship to
Irving proved the malevolent designs of the English court, Aranda noted
that "Each time I look over the map, Irving's object appears to be of
greater consequence." A British foothold on the Mosquito Coast, he said,
could cut all communications between M4xico, Havana, Yucatgn and Honduras
with Cartagena, Caracas and Portovelo, and lead to unforseen future
catastrophes. "The Mosquito enterprize unquestionably would be a mortal
blow"; Spain must do everything in her power to crush it. 47
Aranda saw a solution to the problem. The expedition could hardly
be under the auspices of the English king, be reasoned, for "that would
be too unjust, a veritable declaration of war", therefore Irving and
the colonists could be considered pirates, and the Spanish need not
fear interference or retaliation for measures taken against them. 48
Grimaldi agreed that Spain must act quickly, although he was convinced
that England would counter with a declaration of war. "The recent
example of the Falkland Islands", he said, "an object incomparably less
important than that of Mosquito, proves this belief."49 With the king's
approval the governors of Panama, Portovelo and Veragua in the viceroyalty
47Vergennes to Aranda, 17 October 1775, AGS, Est 8133; Masserano to Grimaldi,
31 January 1777, AHN, Est 4284, vol. i; Aranda to Grimaldi, 23 October 177!
Guat 665; Aranda to Grimaldi, 6 November 1775, AGS, Est 8133, folder lib;
Esquivel, 22.cit., p. 59.
48Armada to Grimaldi, 20 and 23 October 1775, Gnat 665; Grimaldi to
Masserano, 18 December 1775, AHN, Eat 4280, vol. ii.
4 Grimaldi to Charles III, 14 November 1775, AGS, Est 8133, folder 9a;
Masserano to Grimaldi, 24 November and 1 December 1775, AGS, Est 8133,
folder 12.
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of Santa 1.4, and Nicaragua, Comayagua and Costa Rica in the audiencia
of Guatemala, were ordered to dispatch pardacostas to intercept Irving's
vessel, the Mornind Star, to detain the Mosquito princes, and to imprison
Irving and his crew. Failing that, they were to locate and destroy
the new colony. 50
In response to these orders, Manuel Flores, the viceroy of Santa Fg,
ordered two guardacostas, the Pacffica and the Recurso, to search for
Irving's vessel, but he said that he had neither the force nor the
funds to attack the enemy settlements. 51 Other provincial officials
experienced the same difficulties. Governor Quiroga of Nicaragua,
complained that the provincial defences were too weak to repulse an
enemy attack, and that consequently the Nicaraguans lived in perpetual
fear. The president of the audiencia of Guatemala, Martfn de Mayorga,
said that the enemy could not be conquered, nor their illicit trade
suppressed. 52 While officials in America hesitated to take action
against the enemy, Spanish ministers, who declared that the question
of war or peace was "useless in this discussion", adopted a variation
50Real orden, 22 November 1775, CRM, p. 176.
51Agreement between the viceroys of Peril and Santa Fe, 12 February
1776, printed in Somarriba-Salazar, Les Limites, p. 213; Flores
compared the Mosquitos with the Moors of North Africa, though "I find
this difference, that the Moors have war with other nations of Africa,
and sometimes with those of Europe; but the Mosquito Indians...only
make war against Spanish settlements." Flores to Arriaga, 13 February
1776, Guat 665.
54lores to alvez, 30 July 1776, Guat 665; Mayorga to alvez, 7 June
1776, Guat 878; Saavedra to Mayorga, 17 June 1776, Guat 463; From
Domingo Cavello, 30 January 1776, Gust 463.
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of a plan by Luis Diez Navarro to expel the English from the Mosquito
Coast. 53 The plan was not carried out, but rumours of it discouraged
English colonists from moving to the Shore, and even prompted some
established settlers to leave.
Meanwhile, Prince Masserano was directed to complain to the British
court that the Irving scheme was a violation of the Treaty of 1763.
Masserano felt that such a move would be an acknowledgement of Spain's
inability to control her own territories, but he reluctantly approached
Dartmouth, who candidly admitted that he had spoken to Irving. This
news removed any doubt in Madrid that the English government had
sanctioned Irving's venture, and it resulted in the real orden of
28 February 1776 which called for the expulsion of the English settlers
and the reduction or extermination of the Mosquito Indians. 54
The Morning, Star sailed from London on 13 November 1775, with Dr.
Irving, his partner Alexander Blair, and their three Indian passengers
unaware of the turmoil that their journey was causing. Early in April,
Irving disembarked at Great River on the windward Shore to prepare for
the future arrival of colonists. The Indians were then landed at Cape
Gracias a Dios, and on 26 April 1776 the vessel anchored off the bar
at Black River. Four days later, after Blair and most of the crew had
53Report by the Conde de Floridablanca, 26 November 1775, AHN, Est 4227,
vol. i.
54Grimaldi to Masserano, 25 December 1775, AHN, Eat 4280, vol. ii;
Masserano to Grimaldi, 26 January 1776, AGS, Eat 6993; Real orden to
the president of Guatemala and the governors of Panami and Portovelo,
28 February 1776, CRM, p. 180.
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gone ashore, the Pac/fica and the Recurso, flying Dutch colours, drew
alongside the Morning Star. The Dutch flags were lowered, Spanish
banners raised, and the Morning Star was boarded, and soon afterwards,
as the frantic witnesses on the Shore ran about helplessly, she sailed
away in company with the guardacostas. Hodgson, who was still searching
for transportation back to England, penned an angry note to the anonymous
Spanish commander complaining of
so great an Outrage on the Harmony that seemed to subsist
between our Kings.... Such an act of Violation & Depradation
...gemonstrateg that the Motives on which you have hazarded
this Transaction have occasioned you to regard Public Faith
& National Peace of little Import.55
The Spaniards accomplished two important objectives by the daring raid:
suppression of the projected colony and a powerful discouragement to
similar schemes.%
The Shoremen expected an invasion after the seizure of the Morning
Star (the most serious encounter between the English and the Spanish
near Black River in twelve years), and feared the seizure of supply
vessels expected momentarily from North America. (A hurricane had
ravaged the Shore in November and provisions were badly needed.) Letters
and memorials requesting military aid and supplies poured out of Black
55Hodgson to the commander of the guardacostas, 1 May 1776, CO 137/71,
f. 211; Affidavit by Thomas Archdeacon, 3 May 1776, CO 137/71, f. 182;
Testimony by John Patterson, 21 June 1776, Guat 665; Diary of Juan
Antonio de Gastelu, 21 February to 11 July 1776, Guat 665; Flores to
Gastelu, 20 February 1776, Guat 665.
56Masserano to Grimaldi, 31 January 1777, AHN, Est 4284, vol. i; Blair
to Germain, 17 July 1776, CO 137/71, f. 221; Testimony by Jose Guilbot,
29 July 1776, Guat 665.
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River after the guardacostas visit, and nothing could have stopped
the settlers from flight if the Spanish had returned.57
Governor Keith called the seizure an open act of piracy, "supposedly"
committed by the Spaniards. But the "improbability that the Spaniards
would at once by so flagrant an Act of Hostility Violate the last
Treaties of Peace", and testimony that the guardacostas never came
within 200 leagues of the Shore, led Keith to suspect American rebel
privateers. Germain, who had replaced Dartmouth three days before the
Morning Star sailed from England, recoiled in disbelief at the suggestion
that Spanish vessels were involved. Prince Masserano was elated at the
Spanish success, and encouraged the rumours that the Americans were to
blame, since it relieved him of the unpleasant duty of making explanations.5
Alexander Blair returned to London in September and pleaded with
Whitehall to request the Spanish to make reparations for the seizure
of the Morning Star. "In this critical juncture in England's history",
Germain told Blair, how could England protest to Spain, especially when
he and Governor Keith doubted that the Spanish were guilty? By December,
Blair had conclusive proof from a crew member of the Morning Star, who
had escaped from Cartagena, that the Spanish had seized the ship, but
Germain still refused to do anything that might disturb Spanish neutrality.
57Hodgson to Germain, 2 May 1776, CO 137/71, f. 205; Shoremen to Gayton,
4 may 1776,. Adm 1 240, f. 219; Shoremen to Keith, 4 May 1776, CO 137/71,
f. 189; Ferguson to Keith, 4 May 1776, CO 137/71, f. 180; Shoremen to
Gaddea, 4 May 1776, HA/MSL, f. 15; Bouke to Garrison, 8 June 1776,
HA/MSL, f. 20.
58Keith to Germain, 14 June 1776, CO 137/71, f. 171; Gayton to Shoremen,
15 June 1776, HA/MSL, f. 22.
59Germain to Keith, 5 September 1776, CO 137/71, f. 217; Masserano to
Grimaldi, 12 July 1776, AHN,Est 4281, vol. ii; Masserano to Grimaldi,
19 July 1776, Guat 665.
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Lord Weymouth, however, was more receptive to Blair's representation
and sent various documents on the case to Lord Grantham in Foririd.
There was no response from the Spanish, so Blair then took the case to
the House of Commons which refused to act in his behalf. In despair of
being granted justice by either nation, he wrote an open letter to London
newspapers: "The English flag was insulted", he exclaimed, "English
sailors made captive in a most cruel & ignominious way, & a colony, which
could become as flowering as any other entirely ruined." 60
Spanish officials in the Indies deflected complaints on the Morning
Star. The governor of Cartagena admitted the seizure, but denied that
he had the authority or the power to restore the vessel to her owners.
He promised to forward complaints and petitions from Governor Keith and
the owners of the vessel to "Superior Tribunals", a favourite artifice
used by colonial officers to shift responsibility and to avoid making
decisions. 61
The winter of 1776-1777 was difficult for the inhabitants of the
Published letter from Alexander Blair, in MAsserano to Floridablanca,
14 March 1777, AGS, Est 6996; The Annual Register, or a View of the 
History, Politics, and Literature, For the Year 1777 (London, 1778),
p. 255; Affidavit by Frederick Sund, 20 September 1776, CO 137/71,
f. 391; Affidavit by Charles Irving, 21 September 1776, CO 137/72, f. 22;
Weymouth to Grantham, 31 January 1777, SP 94/203. Irving and Blair
continued to press their claims for years, but they were never reimbursed
for their loss, even thouibh their ship did not carry contraband goods,
logwood or other Spanish produce. Blair to Germain, 17 July and 17
December 1776, CO 137/71, ff. 221, 389; Masserano to Floridablanca, 14
March 1777, AGS, Est 6996; Blair to Weymouth, 1 March 1779, SP 94/207,
f. 239; Blair to Weymouth, 30 December 1777, SP 94/204; Grantham to
Weymouth, I May 1777, FO 95/7, Weymouth, to Grantham, 20 January 1779,
SP 94/254.
61
Keith to Pimienta, 15 October 1776, CO 137/72, f. 26; Pimiento to
Keith, 2 November 1776, CO 137/72, f. 29.
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Mosquito Shore, who awaited an invasion or a slave revolt while
experiencing privations because of the increasing difficulty of
obtaining provisions from North America. And unknown to them, a
leading settler on the windward Shore was carrying on a treasonable
correspondence with the Spanish that threatened to turn the Indians
against them. In the summer of 1775 Governor Pedro Carbonell of Panamel
had the "rare surprize" of receiving three letters from Sandy Bay on
the windward Shore. The notes were signed by the old Mosquito king
George I, the Indian governor, Timothy Briton, and that irascible
Irish merchant-trader-Indian slave dealer, Colvill Cairns. They revealed
a barely veiled scheme by Cairns to establish a personal empire
extending from the Mosquito Shore into Panadt, with the unofficial
approval of the Spaniards. A fourth document (which the Spanish never
saw but with the same date), was a land grant from George and Briton,
alloting to Cairns:
all the Lands belonging and appertaining to the island
called Bocca Tora Zpocas del Torg, formerly inhabited,
but since conquered by the above mentioned King and
Governor, laying near the Lattitude of nine and ten degrees
North, and_also all the Islands and Kays...including the
Cherokee Zphiriqui7 Lagoon and the Islands and Keys also
thereunto belonging, with ten leagues up the Main Land...
and three Leagues to the other side of the Cherokee Lagoon62
In spite of his extensive new land holdings, Cairns' position was insecure
as long as his Indian employees remained alienated from the Spaniards.
Consequently he solicited a treaty of peace and commerce with the
6210.
	
nd grant from George I and Timothy Briton to Cairns, 10 August 1775,
10 53/44, f. 284; Testimony by Juan de la Cruz, 15 July 1776, Guat 665.
Spaniards in the name of the Mosquito chiefs. In exchange for an
agreement by the Mosquitos not to molest the Spaniards working the
gold mines of Veragua, Cairns asked that the Mosquitos be granted
the freedom to fish along the coast of Panama south of Bocas del Toro. 63
Cairns' overture created nearly as much excitement as did the Irving
expedition. With the opportunity to reduce the Mosquito Indians thrown
gratuitously into his lap, and with the real orden of 28 February as
his authority, the viceroy of Santa F4 authorised Carbonell to contact
Cairns and the Mosquito chiefs.° A small fleet commanded by Francisco
Navas and comprised of the Pacfica and the Pastora (the Morning Star in
her now role as a guardacostas) were sent to Cairns' plantation at Bocas
del Toro to "ratify the Preliminary Articles 5f friendshig with the
King & Governor of the Mosquito Shore." Navas had secret orders to chart
the coast in case it should become necessary to use force against the
English there. 65
Navas arrived at Bocas del Toro nineteen months after Cairns'
original correspondence with Carbonell to discover that the old king
and governor were dead and that Cairns was at his residence in Tebuppy .66
63George I to Carbonell, 10 August 1775, Beltran y Rozpide, La Mosquitia,
no page reference; Declaration by Thorivio de Carmen Espinosa, 6 June
1776, Guat 665; Lawrie to Germain, 3 May 1777, CO 137/72, f. 164;
Cairns to Lawrie, 10 May 1777, CO 137/73, f. 197.
64Carbonell to Cairns, 8 February 1777, co 137/72, f. 182; Carbonell to
Briton, 8 February 1777, co 137/72, f. 180; Carbonell to Gilvez, 31 July
1776, Guat 665.
65Lortia to Flores, 26 June 1776, Guat 665; Irving to Blair, 10 January
1777, SP 94/203.
66The two chiefs died during a small-pox epidemic.
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But a messenger reported that the young successors to George I and
Briton, King George II and Governor Colvill Briton, were anxious for
a rapprochement with the Spaniards. With renewed optimism the Spaniards
sailed for Tebuppy where they were greeted courteously, but with signs
that the young chiefs were not as pliable to Cairns' wishes as their
fathers had been. They obstinately refused to break their ancient
alliance with the English, and would only agree to an entente cordiale,
while still demanding the right to fish along the coast of Panami.
Navas knew that further discussion was useless and after hurriedly
bestowing a few gifts on the Indians, the Spaniards withdrew.
The failure of the negotiations can be attributed to King George II,
whose year in England had made him a lasting friend of the English, and
to Colvill Briton, whose independent nature Cairns was chary of testing
too quickly. 67
Rumours reaching Black River distorted Navas' visit into a full-
scale invasion by land and sea. The Zambos Mosquitos of General Tempest,
usually anxious for a fight with the Spaniards, retreated 100 miles into
the back country, while many Shoremen fled to Jamaica. 68
 When Lawrie
learned of the true nature of the mission his relief did not weaken his
determination to punish Cairns, who had inadvertently divulged his
67
Diary of Javier de Vargas, 23 January - 10 May 1777, MN 324; DGHC,
p. 43; Cairns to Carbonell, 15 April 1776, Gust 665; Iturrate to
Carbonell, 15 July 1776, Gust 665; Carbonell to Navas, 8 February
1777, Gust 665.
68
Lawrie to Germain, 3 May 1777, CO 137/72, f. 164; Shoreman to Keith,
26 January 1777, HA/MSL, f. 33; Report by Thomas Davey, 18 July 1777,
Adm 51/250.
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duplicity by acknowledging certain incriminating letters from Carbonell.
Lawrie said:
your Lordship will perceive that Cairns (who does not
understand Spanish) did not know the Contents of the
Spanish letters, otherwise I dare say he never would
have given me an opportunity of seeing them especially
as the Governor of Panama declares in his letter to
Cairns 'that the proposals made by him, Cairns, are the
best that ever came to his knowledge. ,b9
The rumours of Spanish depredations along the windward Shore proved
to be true. On their return voyage to Cartagena, the Spanish
commissioners, angry at the snub by the Indians, retaliated by attacking
English settlements, seizing two sloops and burning a third. Greater
damage was prevented by Zambos Mosquitos who shadowed the Spaniards and
ambushed them while they were harvesting the Shoremen's provision patch
at Bluefields and drove them from the coast. 70
Colvill Cairns reacted angrily to the "piracies of the perfidious
Spaniards" by proposing that 500 Mosquito Men be armed and set on
Spanish settlements. He was also indignant at the "ungenerous conjectures"
of his fellow settlers. While admitting that he had communicated with
the enemy, he swore that he had been urged to do so by the old king and
governor, and that his intentions had been honourable. Cairns escaped
punishment (except for a small fine) because Lawrie was too preoccupied
with the greater problem of chasinis the Spanish from the coast. Lawrie
Lawrie left Black River with seventy white men and twelve piraguas full
69Lawrie to Germain, 3 May 1777, CO 137/72, f. 164.
70
Lawrie to Germain, 24 May 1777, SF 94/204; Affidavit by John McHarg,
29 September 1777, CO 137/73, f. 23.
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of Zambos to aid the Indians and Shoremen. But when the party reached
the windward Shore, the Spaniards had already left and the chase was
abandoned. 71
Soon after the Spanish visit to Tebuppy, rumours again swept the
Shore that the Spanish planned to invade. 72
 Bartholomew Gilibert
reported in July 1777 that
The Country aback is all in motion, I dread the Fate of
the Shore and likewise of the Musquito Men. we shall
certainly be attack'd next August. the Spaniards are making
the greatest preparations both by Sea and Land.73
John McDaniell, who carried on a clandestine trade in the interior,
said that 1,500 Spaniards, supported by two large men-of-war, were going
to attack the leeward Shore in August. 74 But no attack came.
Superintendent Lawrie announced that the enemy had postponed the
invasion until spring, an assertion that drew a sarcastic comment from
Governor Dalling. "It is with pleasure I observe the Clouds, which
appeared...to be gathering in August, are not in your opinion likely
to burst till the Spring. "75 The Shoremen's repetitious cries of
71Cairns to Lawrie, 10 may 1777, CO 137/73, f. 197; Sierra to Mayorga,
31 August 1777, Gust 665. The Spanish experienced some bad moments
when they heard of Lawrie's expedition. Governor Ferngndez of Costa
Rica sent a troop of militia to Matina to defend against an invasion
of Costa Rica. Ferngndez to Mayorga, 15 October 17774 Guat 464.
72Cairns to Lawrie, 3 April 1777,C0 137/72, f. 170; George II to Keith,
12 April 1777, CO 137/73, f. 205; Lawrie to Germain, 3 May 1777, SP 94/204.
73Gilibert to Lawrie, 1 July 1777, CO 137/72, f. 227.
74
Affidavit by John McDaniell, 12 July 1777, CO 137/72, f. 233; Lawrie to
Dalling, 4 August 1777, CO 137/72, f. 221.
75Dalling to Lawrie, 8 November 1777, CO 137/73, f. 15.
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"invasion" had wearied Governor Keith and his successor John Dalling,
and now elicited irritation rather than concern. When a naval
intelligence report failed to mention any Spanish armament in the Bay
of Honduras, Dalling told Lawrie that he no longer gave any credit to
the settlers' fears, and then told Germain that those "very extraordinary
Letter0 from Mr. Lawrie", were full of childish and groundless
expressions of fear and without analysis or opinion.
	 fact, the
Spanish had been preparing to invade the Shore, but their preparations
had failed to keep pace with their plans, and the dangers of the winter
northers had moved them to postpone the attack.
In response to the incessant clamouring by the Shoremen for
government recognition and greater protection, Dalling reiterated the
traditional English policy towards the Shore.
However warm in the interests of the Mosquito Shore, I can
neither do, nor authorise any thing to be done that may
tend to accelerate the discussion of a question which
Government has uniformly, within my memory, wished to
decline. The territorial claim of the English to the Shore
has been considered of too delicate a decision to be
delegated either to a Governor of Jamaica or Superintendant
of the Shore.
Lawrie should be aware, Dalling added, that the time and manner of raising
Dalling to Germain, 14 November 1777, CO 137/73, f. 11; Lawrie to
Germain, 29 September 1777, Co 137/73, f. 19; Germain to Dalling,
7 January 1778, CO 137/73, f. 9. Dalling proposed the preposterous
theory that Spanish depredations resulted from the seizure of the sloop
Nicaragua by the Mosquitos many years before. To placate the Spaniards,
Dalling ordered that full reparations be made to its owners, a move
enthusiastically approved by Germain. The incident had no bearing on
events developing either in Spain or in the Indies, but Dalling and
Germain both seized upon it as an easy way to relieve the tension between
the two nations. Dalling to Germain, 24 October 1777, Co 137/72, f. 219.
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the point of colonial status was for the government to decide, since
he had been repeatedly instructed to excite no jealousies over the
matter. Dalling recalled that efforts by the younger Hodgson to acquire
an independent company for the Mosquito Shore had caused the prohibition
of all correspondence by His Majesty's representatives on the Shore
with Spanish officials.77
Lawrie's official functions, Dalling said, were restricted by the
articles of the Treaty of 1763; the superintendent's request for military
aid was a violation of the 17th article of the treaty, indicating that
he did not understand the nature of his commission. The question of
colonial status was shuttled aside at this time by Germain. How can
anyone, he wrote, "imagine that by these Injunctions Ziawrie's instructions7
it was intended to convey an Idea that it was the Purpose or Wish of the
Crown to establish a Colony or erect a Legislature on the Mosquito Shore"?
Every British citizen, he added, comes under the protection of British
law, and whenever a specific need arises on the Shore, the Jamaica
council can supply a temporary ordinance as needed. "It is His Majesty's
Intention that the affairs of the Mosquito Shore should continue to be
as they ever have been, under the Controul of His Governor and Council
of Jamaica."78
77Dalling to Lawrie, 8 November 1777, Co 137/73, f. 15; Dalling's
predecessor, Sir Basil Keith, was the first governor to order that the
superintendent should not correspond with the Spanish governors without
prior approval from Jamaica. Dalling expanded the policy by ordering
that all correspondence with the Spanish be made from Jamaica.
78Germain to Keith, 4 June 1777, co 123/3.
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In spite of their more pressing problems, the Shoremen were
experiencing the common vicissitudes of civil administration. The
court of common pleas was at a standstill because the chief judge had
resigned; some officials had left the Shore and others were dead--
including Hodgson's old foe George Hewm. 79 But the feud between
Hodgson and Lawrie continued and coursed so strongly through their
correspondence with Dalling that it was
a matter of severe search and labour to come at their
meaning. Their private views and interest mix themselves
so much with matters of publick concern as to render a just
separation and inference extremely difficult. 8o
79Shoremen to Keith, 3 June 1777, HA/MSL, f. 40. In 1840 an English
adventurer stumbled onto a flat stone partially hidden by the
tropic undergrowth that had conquered the town of Black River.
On the stone were the words
Time was I stood as thou dost stand,
And viewed the dead as thou dost me;
'Ere long thoul't lay as low as I,
And others stand and gaze at thee.
Underneath the poem was engraved the name of George Hewm, who died
on 20 April 1777. Thomas Young, Narrative of a Residence on the 
Mosquito Shore, with an Account of Truxillo, and the Adjacent Islands
of Roatan and Bonacca (London, 1842), p. 55. The Shoremen were often
eccentric. Philip Bode left of a shilling for church services at
his burial. "I know the Law will give it them therefore I allow it",
he wrote in his last will and testament, "but I abominate it nothing
but a parcel of Damn's Stuff." Last will and testament of Philip
Bode, 25 April 1778, FCC, Cornwallis, f. 328.
8oDalling to Germain, 14 November 1777, CO 137/73, f. 11; Dalling to
Germain, 24 October 1777, co 137/72, f. 219. The main subject of
the feud at this time was over the responsibility for the seizure of
the Spanish sloop Nicaragua in 1770, which Lawrie blamed on Hodgson.
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The dispatches and letters that made life difficult for Dalling
were no easier for Germain, whose task of evaluating them was complicated
by the distortions of time and distance and by his unswerving desire
for Spanish neutrality. The rumours of an impending Spanish attack on
the Mosquito Shore would have been alarming, he admitted, if there were
any proof to corroborate them. But considerable evidence of Spanish
perfidy did reach Germain in the summer and autumn of 1777. Lord
Weymouth claimed that the Spanish court was aiding the American rebels
through the merchant house of Gardoqui in Bilbao, 81 while American
tobacco was being allowed into Spain duty-free. 82 The English consul
at Cadiz reported that a battalion of troops had recently sailed for
the Bay of Honduras. "The Officers of this Batalion", he wrote, "have
extraordinary encouragement, given them to go on this service. 
83
This disquieting intelligence induced Germain to ask Dalling for "an
exact and authentic account of the real State and Condition of the
Settlement gm the Mosquito Shorg." But little else was done by
the English ministers in the winter of 1777, and England's diplomacy
remained timid. Few words of England's well-founded complaints reached
the Spanish ministers through Grantham, and while Germain authorised
excessive reparations to the owners of the Nicaragua, Floridablanca
81Weymouth to Grantham, 25 July 1777, SP 94/204; F1oridablanca to Muzquiz,
30 July 1778, Yela y Utrilla, 2E.cit., i, 382.
82Weymouth to Grantham, 1 August 1777, SP 94/204.
83Hardy to Weymouth, 16 September 1777, SP 94/204.
84Germain to Keith, 4 June 1777, CO 123/3; Germain to Dalling, 3 December
1777, CO 137/72, f. 203.
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skilfully parried Grantham's Weak representations on the Morning Star,
a case founded far more in equity.
Meanwhile, on the Shore, the settlers relaxed at the approach of
the winter northers, although their fears soon returned. In January,
Lawrie reported that a Spanish attack was expected, and by March many
Mosquitos had fled into the back country and some Shoremen had abandoned
their plantations. 85 But as usual, the Spanish invasion failed to
materialise, although one isolated incident strengthened the settlers'
conviction that they were threatened with annihilation. Bartholomew
Gilibert and two other merchants were murdered by "fugitive English
Negroes in Concert with the Spaniards...." 86 Governor Dalling was finally
convinced of the need to support the "infant colony" on the Main, but
he still believed that the Shoremen were exaggerating the danger and
perhaps even creating it.
in so small a Community the Mosquito Shorg, there are no
individuals, however despicable, that cannot raise themselves
into persons of mischeivous consequences; and that they are
...as busy in creating occasions of Alarm and danger as they
are importunate to have them removed and be protected under
them.87
And therplate in the spring of 1778 Germain changed his attitude towards
the Shore when he realised that war with France was inevitable.
In this Situation of Affairs and while it is uncertain
what part Spain may take in case of War with France, the
Settlements on the Mosquito Shore and the Bay of Honduras
85Lawrie to Dalling, 14 January 1778, CO 137/73, f. 183; Shoremen to
Germain, 26 January 1779, CO 123/2, vol. ii.
86White to Germain, 26 January 1779, CO 137/74 , f. 69; Shoremen to Germain,
26 January 1779, CO 123/2, vol. ii.
87Dal1ing to Germain, 2 July 1778, CO 137/73, f. 181.
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become objects of great Attention and I do not think
the Inhabitants can be blamed for putting themselves
in a State of defence at a time when there is so much
reason to expect they will be attacked by a hostile force....
He may even have envisaged colonial status for the Shore.
Whether I consider the Mosquito Shore as an Inlet of
Commerce or a Post of Annoyance I see its Consequence
in so important a point of view that I cannot ohelp being
exceedingly anxious for its preservation....°°
Early in 1778 Vergennes rejected a Spanish proposal for an offensive
alliance against England, and turned her attention from a direct attack
on British settlements on the Mosquito Shore to more subtle designs. 89
Thus France's hesitation to sign an offensive alliance with her Bourbon
sister became an unintentional instrument of maladroit British diplomacy
which kept Spain neutral, if unfriendly, through 1778.
Spanish officials failed to forge an alliance with the Mosquitos
through Colvill Cairns, but they still hoped to do so. In February
1778, Governor FernItndez of Costa Rica invited Mosquito Admiral Trelawny
(Alparis) Dilson (a young man of twenty-eight who "carried himself well"),
the new chief of the southern party of Mosquitos, to Cartago to arrange
a treaty of peace and friendship. Fernsindez, who took Dilson into his
home and "had him at his table and took him on his paseos and amusements",
named him "captain of the North Coast", and promised to grant his people
land in Costa Rica and the right to live under their own laws. The
Mosquito youth were to be taught to read and introduced to Catholicism.
The governor also promised that the Mosquito officers would be allowed
88Germain to Dalling, 15 May 1778, CO 137/73, f. 138.
89
F1oridablanca to Aranda, 13 January 1778, Yela y Utrilla, 21.cit.,
184; Vergennes to Floridablanca, 29 January 1778, ibid., p. 214.
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to keep their honours, and to pay the Indians twenty-five pesos worth
of cacao for each Spanish slave they owned. Dilson left Cartago wearing
a silk uniform with a silver-handled sword and baton, and with the
Spanish celebrating a victory in the long struggle against a coarse
but clever, even sophisticated enemy. However theirs was an ephemeral
victory. When Dilson returned home his gifts were taken from him and
there was even a suggestion from Jamaica that he be strangled. 90
No scheme to reduce the Mosquito Indians and to expel the English
from the Mosquito Shore was as involved and expensive or conducted with
as much enthusiasm as a conspiracy involving the American Jeremiah Terry.
Terry's failure to gain the superintendency, compounded by Lord Dartmouth's
refusal to reward him for his services to the crown, and by the increasing
seriousness of the revolt in America, had induced him to formulate a
plot to expel the British from the Mosquito Shore. When news of Benjamin
Franklin's mission to Paris reached London in December 1776, Terry put
his plan into operation. On the raw, snowy morning of 2 January 1777,
90	 nFernandez to Dilson, 12 February 1778, Guat 423; Minutes of peace
negotiations between Admiral Dilson and Governor FernsIndez, 15 February
1778, Guat 464; FernSndez to Mayorga, 18 and 28 February 1778, Guat 464;
Bobadilla to Irrivarren, 10 April 1778, CO 137/73, f. 229; Deposition
by John Hooker, 14 May 1778, CO 137/73, f. 193. Admiral Dilson missed
the fate of the previous Dilson who was probably killed by Robert
Hodgson for a very similar transgression. Declaration by Miguel
Nicolas Castrillo, 29 November 1778, AGS, Est 8133, folder 17b.
See above, p.171. The Nicaraguan diplomat-historian, Josg Dolores
amez, interpreted the treaty as a humiliation for the cowardly Costa
Rican, a people "quivering in terror" before the Mosquitos, while
overlooking the equally timorous reactions of contemporary Nicaraguans
to the enemy. G4mez, Costa de Mosquitos, p. 116.
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he left London, and five days later he was conferring with Franklin.
We have no minutes of their conversation, but it is clear that Terry
proposed to eject the English from the coasts of Guatemala, and that
when he returned to London he was acting with the approval--if not under
the orders--of his illustrious compatriot. Terry's personal desire for
revenge against England had become part of the greater struggle raging
in North America. 91
Immediately after his return to London, Terry conferred with Prince
Masserano. In exchange for an annual pension of £500 or for a single
payment of £10,000, he offered to expel the English from the Shore and
to reduce the Mosquito Indians to a permanent allegiance to the Spanish
crown. Masserano's initial reaction was reserved, but he forwarded the
proposal to his court, where it was received with cautious excitement.
Terry was requested to come to Madrid; "His Majesty was very much
interested in hearing the details of the plan." This positive response
infected Masserano with enthusiasm. He assured Terry that his reward
would match his merits and more than indemnify him for the disappointing
treatment from the English. But he reminded Terry that he was to "aid
the Spanish crown to regain her own usurped territory", and "not to
foment revolt on the Mosquito Shore", a distinction intended to protect
Masserano from the compromising testimony of a disgusted American if
91
Terry to Franklin, 7 and 8 January 1777, American Philosophical Society
Library, Franklin Papers, vol. 5,1 numbers 4,5; From Jeremiah Terry,
26 March 1776,	 T 1/527; Lawrie to Dalling, 23 October 1778, CO 5/7,
f. 544; The Gentleman's Magazine and Historical Chronicle, 1777, xlvii,
642.
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Terry's mission to Madrid should fail. 92
Terry sailed for Spain on 1 April 1777 with advice from Masserano
to avoid contact with Englishmen in Spain in case their inquisitiveness
should endanger the enterprise. In Madrid, he met with Bernardo del
Campo93
 and the Conde de Floridablanca, who approved his suggestions
almost without modification. Terry proposed to outfit a vessel of
approximately 200 tons at Bilbao with fishing equipment suitable for
the Mosquito Indians, and with a cargo worth £5,000 for trade. He
planned to ruin the Jamaica traders by underselling them, and then to
destroy the English establishments on the Shore by inducing the Mosquito
chiefs to "resume" the government of their country--preparatory, no
doubt, to the establishment of Spanish hegemony over the region.
Terry hired two captains, one formerly the master of an American
rebel privateer, and the other a Spaniard; he acquired three sets of
ship's colours: American, British and Spanish; and he hired a mixed crew
of eight Americans and twenty-five Vizcainos. Optimistic of success, he
also suggested that another vessel follow his own AtlEintico in six to
to eight months. 94
The ineptitude of eighteenth century espionage was never more
92Masserano to Grimaldi, 31 January 1777, AHN, Est 4284, vol. i; Floridablanc
to Masserano, 24 February 1777, AHN, Est 4284, vol. ii; Masserano to
Floridablanca, 21 March and 4 April 1777, AHN, Eat 4227, vol. ii;
Masserano to Floridablanca, 31 March 1777, AHN, Est 4284, vol. ii.
93Campo became minister to England in the 1780s and negotiated the
Mosquito Convention of 1786. See chapter XI.
9' Terry to Campo, 12 June 1777, AHN, Est 4227, vol. ii; Salmon to
Admiralty, 28 October 1777, Adm 1/3972. Terry also planned to free the
Indians and Africans who lived in bondage on the Shore.
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apparent than during Terry's Spanish sojourn. Lord Grantham was aware
of his presence in Madrid, and even of the general purpose, but his
interpretation was faulty.
There is at Madrid a Mr Terrz suspected of having a
Commission from the LWmerican/ Congress. he says that
if he does not succeed in a month's time, he is to go
away. I make no doubt whatever that his attempt (if he
makes any) will be quite fruitless.95
In London, Germain continued to ridicule every suggestion that the
Spanish court was contemplating hostile action against the Mosquito
Shore.96
The preparations for the expedition took seven months. Terry and
his contact in Bilbao, Diego de Gardoqui of the merchant house of
Gardoqui, had to overcome numerous obstacles thrown up by jealous Spanish
merchants, suspicious Englishmen, quarrelsome sailors and bureaucratic
port officials. The port commissioner tenaciously refused to allow
the AtlAntico to sail until Gardoqui obtained a royal order directing
him to issue a passport for the vessel. 97
Just prior to Terry's departure, Campo reviewed the security measures
for the expedition. The American was well versed in the tricks of the
contrabandista, he noted with candour, so Terry should find it easy to
contact the Spaniards on the Main without arousing unnecessary suspicions.
Nevertheless, Campo promised to order Spanish colonial governors to aid
Terry, and gave him five passwords, Atlititico, Campo, Masserano, Bilbao
95Grantham to Weymouth, 18 June 1777, SP 94/204.
96Germain to Keith, 4 June 1777, CO 137/72, f. 126.
97Campo to Terry, 25 December 1777, AHN, Est 4227, vol. ii.
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and Gardoqui, to identify him to suspicious Spanish officials. "Everything
now rests on you", Campo said, "we have done everything in our power to
ensure the success of your voyage." 98
When the Atleintico glided down the Nervi‘n River from Bilbao into the
Cantabrian Sea early in February 1778, Terry felt that the success of
his mission had been assured, for every obstruction to his plan had been
eliminated and he believed that a peace treaty had recently been arranged
between the Mosquitos and the Spanish by his old friend, Colvill Cairns.
He did not suspect that the intelligence of a treaty had been premature,
or that the Shoremen were on their guard and that Cairns was frightened. 99
The voyage was marred by only one incident. The Atlkitico was seized
near Cartagena by two guardacostas of the Caracas Company, the same company
whose agents had seized the Morning Star. Terry and his ship and crew
were detained for more than two months, and only the timely intervention
of Viceroy Flores saved the vessel and cargo from the prize court and
Terry from a Spanish dungeon. 100 Flores' action was "like a reprieve
for a condemned man" to Terry, whose joy at regaining his vessel was
only dimmed by "the number of Judas congratulations that crossed...Many
98Campo to Terry, 19 November 1777, AHN, Est 4227, vol. ii; Terry to Campo,
30 April 1778, AHN, Est 4227, vol. ii.
99Terry to Campo, 4 April 1778, AHN, Est 4227, vol. ii; Affidavit by
Jonathan Worth, 26 October 1778, CO 123/2, vol. i; Abalos to Flores,
4 April 1778, Guat 665. Floridablanca had prophesied the seizure by
suggesting that Terry should not act impetuously in carrying out his
plans, "for he might be taken by our own gyardacostas, such as has befallen
others sailing for the Shore." Floridablanca to Masserano, 24 February
1777, AHN, Est 4284, vol. ii.
1 00Flores to Abalos, 20 May 1778, Guat 665; Flores to alvez, 30 May 1778,
Gust 665.
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who while their tongues were employed in wishing me joy, discovered
1,101by the Muscles of their faces their sour dissapointment....
In July, more than a year after he had discussed his project with
Campo in Madrid, and a year and a half since his meeting with Franklin
in Paris, Terry anchored the AtlEIntico at the mouth of the San Juan
River, and informed the crew that he intended to establish a colony
and trading post there. 102 He immediately put his scheme into operation.
At his invitation, George II, General Smee, Duke Isaac and most of the
principal Mosquito chiefs and a large body of warriors arrived at
Terry's campo towards the end of August. 103 The Indians spent a
considerable time "carousing with Mr. Terry" (a prerequisite to serious
discussion) before he asked for their advice and assistance in establishing
a fishing and lumber-cutting establishment on the San Juan. He admitted
that he had an agreement with the Spanish, but only to avoid the American
privateers and to bring quality merchandise to the Indians at prices far
lower than the Jamaicans could offer. The chiefs agreed to allow Terry
104to remain, and they volunteered to help him--at the customary wages.
They also agreed to meet with Spanish commissioners at Chagres during
101
Terry to Campo, 8 June 1778, AHN, Eat 4227, vol. ii.
102Affidavit by Jonathan Worth, 26 October 1778, C0123/2, vol. i.
103
Terry to Campo, 1 August 1779, AHH, Eat 4227, vol. ii. Two of the
principal chiefs were not present, General Tempest was too far away
to make the trip easily and Governor Briton refused to attend without
permission and advice from Lawrie.
1 C*EXamination of a Mosquito Man named Penus, 10 October 1778,C0 137/74,
f. 138; Affidavit by Jonathan Worth, 26 October 1778, CO 123/2, vol. i;
Terry to Campo, 1 August 1779, AHN, Est 4227, vol.ii.
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the next turtling season, stating their intention in a letter to
the Spanish, composed with Terry's assistance.
We...have given Mr. Jerh. Terry (as we believe him to be
a friend of our nation) our consent to settle upon the land
at and near the mouth of said River St. John's Nicaragua,
during his good behaviour, and we have at his request agreed
to make a firm and lasting peace, between the Mosquito Men
and Spanish Nation, as soon as the regular forms properly
authorized by the King of Spain, can pass between Deputies
appointed by him and us; and it is our request that the
Governor of Costa Rica and Nicaragua may immediately be
made acquainted with our Resolution, and thro' them the
Viceroy of Sta. Fe, who we trust will communicate them to
the King of Spain, so that his Deputies may meet ours upon
the 15th day of August next...at a place called Sucia Bite
on the Shore a little to the Westward of Chagra gt the
south-east limit of the coastal territory dominated by the
Mosquitog; and in the mean time it is our desire, that all
hostilities and injustice should cease between Mosquito Men
and Spaniards from this day, until the King of Spain's
pleasure upon this subject shall be made known to usp...
and if favorable your people may safely visit our Shore and
carry on such Trade as you think proper to permit.10
Although the Mosquitos were interested in a treaty of alliance rather
than of submission,the Spanish, especially at Matins, were overjoyed
with these "preliminaries". According to Governor Perie of Costa Rica,
the Mosquito chiefs and upwards of 200 warriors mixed with the vecinos
of the cacao producing region in a joyful celebration. Afterwards they
retired to Terry's establishment, where officials "of both nations"
signed a pact of friendship. While Terry distributed gifts from an
almost endless fount, the Indians "could express themselves no otherwise
than by acclamations of 'viva el Et/ de Espana.'" Terry's influence
over the Mosquitos was so great, Perie said, that they even carried
105
"George Rex, Isaac Duke and Regent, Governor Briton, Admiral Frederick,
John Smee General and Admiral Dilson", to the viceroy of Santa Fe,
5 September 1778, CO 123/2, vol. i.
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Spanish colours on their piraguas. The Mosquito chiefs also agreed
to hold a general congress in December or January to inform their
people of the peace with the Spanish. "With great chearfulness" the
Mosquitos began clearing land and constructing dwellings for Terry.
Within six weeks they had finished eight houses, cleared sixty acres
106
of land and floated 200 cedar logs to the port from up-river.
Terry now began the next step in his plan by inviting Cairns to
San Juan to meet "an Old Friend that will be glad to see you." But
Cairns was no longer a ripe prospect for Terry's proselyting efforts,
for while he had trifled with the Spaniards for commercial reasons,
there could be no advantage to him in a Mosquito-Spanish treaty arranged
by someone who worked the same fishing grounds and employed the Indians
who had previously worked for him. Furthermore, Cairns also knew of
Terry's aversion to the Indian slave trade, a profitable arm of his
own business. 107 Unaware of the enmity that his old drinking crony
now harboured towards him, Terry repeated his invitation in August
with greater urgency. "I shall not trouble you with a word of Politicks
till I see you, for God sake, or rather for the sake of Friendship
come to me.... "108 Terry made yet a third plea to Cairns, hinting
that the matters he wished to discuss were of great consequence. "A
man's thoughts and schemes upon paper are not to be trusted among the
106	 /Perie to (probably) Carbonell, 18 March 1779, CO 137/76, f. 33;
Chavarria to Peril, 22 August and 8 September 1778, Guat 464; Peril to
dilvez, 24 September 1778, Guat 665.
107Affidavit by Thomas Brookman, 19 March 1779, CO 137/74, f. 226; Terry
to Cairns, 2 July 1778, CO 137/74, f. 132.
1 08Terry to Cairns, 26 August 1778, CO 137/74 , f. 134.
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worthies of this Shore," he wrote, "your own persecution cannot yet
be forgot."109 Meanwhile, while Cairns was offering excuses for delaying
his visit, he plotted to ambush Terry's camp with the aid of a few
trusted settlers and Governor Briton. The scheme was abortive however,
as Terry refused to lower his defences--even for an old friend. 110 But
Terry's "Trusty Guard of Moskito Men", commanded by Admiral Dilson, gave
him an exaggerated sense of security. Swayed by the mellowing effects
of alcohol, he injudiciously boasted of his commission to an equally
voluble settler at Pearl Key Lagoon, and Cairns soon had the details
of Terry's commission, giving him a legitimate motive to eliminate his
rival. 111 In the middle of October, "grieved" to learn that an old
friend had turned traitor to king and country, Cairns turned to
Superintendent Lawrie and Governor Dalling with a number of affidavits
demonstrating that Terry had promised Briton and other chiefs fabulous
gifts for their help in throwing the English off the Shore, and that
the majority of the Indians favoured Terry. "Some of the Chiefs declare",
Cairns said, "if any Englishman on this Coast hurts or disturbs him that
all the rest will be put to the Sword." 112
109Terry to Cairns, 19 September 1778, CO 137/74, f. 136.
110Affidavit by Thomas Brookman, 19 March 1779, CO 137/74, f. 226.
111Affidavit by John Wilson, 25 October 1778, CO 137/74, f. 186.
112Examination of a Mosquito-man named Penus, 10 October 1778, CO 137/74,
f. 138; Affidavit by John O'Hanlon, 10 October 1778, CO 137/74, f. 140;
Affidavit by John Young, 10 October 1778, CO 123/2, vol. i; Affidavits
by Abraham Gill and Samuel Price, 23 October 1778, CO 123/2, vol. i;
Cairns to Dalling, 15 October 1778, CO 137/74, f. 128.
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The nature of this new threat to their security startled the
Shoremen, for if the Indians turned against them, their slaves would
also revolt; panic drove many settlers to fortify themselves in their
homes. 113 In spite of a sudden irresolution on Cairns' part, who
suggested that they await aid from Jamaica, Lawrie resolved to act
immediately. 114 On 16 October he sailed for the San Juan, planning
to recruit Briton and any other Mosquito Men or settler who could be
persuaded to join him. But gaining the cooperation of the Indians was
not easy. The young Mosquito king refused to cooperate, and found
himself decommissioned and plain George until Governor Dalling renewed
his title months later. 115 Nor was Briton enthusiastic about attacking
an armed vessel owned by a man friendly with most of the Zambos and
Mosquitos--in spite of the promise of considerable plunder. However,
the threat to divest Briton of his treasured commission had the desired
effect, and he agreed to participate in the raid, although he demanded
that the Indians act alone. But Lawrie insisted that he accompany
Briton, apprehensive that the Indian would find an excuse to abandon
113The storm of rumours had taken a heavy toll, for Terry's Indian allies
had left San Juan with intentions no more offensive than settling their
domestic affairs and celebrating the usually raucous Christmas season.
114
In response to pleas from the Shore for aid, Dalling said that the
evidence against Terry was "too conjectural and vague" to warrant any
decisive measures. However his instructions reached the Shore too
late to alter the succeeding events. Dalling to Lawrie, 18 January
1779, CO 123/2, vol. i.
George had the strength and spirit that made him the best of the long line
of Mosquito kings. His abilities as a ruler were never again exhibited
by his successors, except perhaps for a short period during the reign of
his great-grandson, Robert Henry Clarence, who was chief of the Mosquito
Indians when the Mosquito Reserve was incorporated into the Republic of
Nicaragua in 1894.
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the venture, or to massacre Terry and his people if he did go through
with the attack.116
After brief stops at Walpa Sixa, Pearl Key Lagoon and Bluefields
to enlarge his little army, Lawrie held a final war junta at Monkey
Point, just north of the San Juan. The party was now composed of fourteen
white men, a few Negro slaves, and a small guard of Mosquito Indians and
Zambos under Governor Briton, General Smee and Admiral Frederick. During
the night of 29 October they approached Terry's camp, and at dawn two
Mosquito piraguas commanded by Briton closed in on the Atlgntico; three
others under Smee went to the small dock where a schooner was loading
mahogany. The Mosquitos asked for aguardiente, then suddenly they began
to wave an English flag, and to shout "long live the King of England".
They aeized the Atlgntico and the houses on shore without resistance from
Terry's men,most of whom were lying miserably ill in huts on shore. 117
Terry had been anticipating a visit from Lawrie and hoped that
the tumult was no more than a typical display of Mosquito exuberance.
He boarded the Atlgntico, where he was met by Briton and threatened with
death, but after one of the Shoremen with the Mosquitos cried out "Don't
kill him, it is not time yet!" Terry was placed in irons on deck. A horde
11 6Affidavit by Thomas Brookman, 19 March 1779, CO 137/74 , f. 226;
Examination of Robert Campbell, 20 March 1779, CO 123/2, vol. i;
Lawrie to Dalling, 8 November 1778, CO 137/74, f. 215.
117
Examinat1on of Robert Campbell, 20 March 1779, CO 123/2, vol. i;
Declaration by Luis de Ribera, 29 November 1778, AGS, Est 8133, folder
17b; Declaration by Miguel Nicol gs Castrillo, 29 November 1778, AGS,
Est 8133, folder 17b.
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of Indians and whites, including Cairns and Lawrie, clambered aboard
the AtliIntico. Terry nodded to his old friend Cairns and exchanged a
few polite words with the superintendent. Meanwhile the Indians,with
the assistance of many of the whites, began to sack the vessel, then
while the victors were celebrating their triumph, most of the cargo
was trundled onto a sloop belonging to Cairns. Terry and his men were
kept in chains for Oweek while their captors debated their fate.
Eventually, compelled by decreasing supplies, Lawrie sent the Spanish
members of Terry's crew to Matina and shipped Terry to Jamaica for
trial. 118
On 7 November Jeremiah Terry began the saddest part of the journey
that had taken him from this same coast to London, Paris, Madrid, Bilbao,
Portovelo and San Juan. Robert Campbell, master of the Savannah-la-Mar
and Terry's host and jailer on the voyage to Jamaica, described him as
an exemplary captive, one who had resisted the temptation to escape
when the opportunity presented itself, and who had even volunteered his
services when members of the crew fell sick. Unknown to Campbell, however,
Terry was determined to gain vengeance on the English and had pledged
himself to return to the Mosquito Shore. In a chance encounter with
the Atlttntico (which Lawrie had manned with Terry's American crewmen)
at Corn Island, he offered £600 to his old crew if they would seize
11 8Examination of Jeremiah Terry, 15 March 1779, CO 123/3, vol. i; Lawrie
to Dalling, 8 November 1778, CO 137/74, f. 215; Perie to (probably)
Carbonell, 18 March 1779, CO 137/76, f. 33; Declaration by (probably)
Luis de Ribera, 29 November 1778, AGS, Est 8133, folder 17b.
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the ship and carry her to Portovelo, Cartagena or Havana. But afraid
of the consequences of failure, they declined to accept the offer. 119
A wealth of damning evidence accompanied Terry to Jamaica, and
Governor Dalling's first inclination was to consider him guilty of
the charges. "That Terry has intended great mischief, by debauching
our Allies," he wrote, "and extirpating those of our settlers there...
seems to appear clearly." 120 But when Terry faced the Jamaica council
on 15 March 1779, his subtle testimony was corroborated by the depositions
of two of the men who had participated in the raid against him.
Furthermore, the charges of his accusers were weakened by embellishments
and exaggerations. Lawrie's explanations exposed a fear that the attack
on the Atl4ntico was unauthorised, perhaps even piratical. Terry "had
repeatedly declared his Ship and Cargo...go be7 Spanish property," he
explained nervously, "which effectually put it out of my power to prevent
the Mosquito Men from taking the whole into their possession." In a
letter composed for Colvill Briton by Colvill Cairns, the Indian governor
claimed Terry's vessel as a prize "wether the Ship is Spanish or American
Property". "The Moskito Nation", he added, Is "...always at ar with the
former, & the latter I am informed are at iar with the Great King of
England." 121
Terry admitted to the council that he was a Spanish subject--but
119Ekamination of Robert Campbell, 20 March 1779, CO 123/2, vol. i;
Examination of Bartellet Curtis, 23 May 1779, CO 137/75, f. 186.
120 Dalling to Lawrie, 22 February 1779, CO 137/74, f. 184; Dalling to
Germain, 27 February 1779, CO 137/74, f.162.
121Briton to Dalling, 7 November 1778, CO 137/74, f. 184; Dalling to
Germain, 27 February 1779, CO 137/74, f. 162; Lawrie to Dalling,
8 November 1779, CO 137/74, f. 215.
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temporarily and only for the advantages of trade. Except for a fervent
denial of having a commission to expel the English trade from the
Mosquito Shore, he let the facts testify in his behalf. 122 Dalling
now began to see that the documentary evidence against Terry was "only
copies, and those seemingly imperfect ones". 123 The merchants and
him
sugar growers who comprised the council could not condemn/for his
fishing and wood-cutting enterprises, nor for his becoming a Spanish
subject. Peaceful commercial contact with the Spanish on the Main was
an ideal most merchants aspired to; after all, a good percentage of
the island's income came from trade with the Spaniards. Although the
council made no mention of reparations, it ruled Terry innocent of the
most serious charges and authorised him to leave Jamaica.
Throughout his forced stay on the island, Terry schemed to return
to the Shore. When George II was in Kingston to have his commission
renewed he secretly conferred with Terry and promised to oust the
Shoremen in exchange for arms and protection against English retaliation. 12
But Terry's return was delayed until August 1782.
News of Terry's misfortune on the San Juan was a crushing disappointment
to the Spanish court, and depressed Spanish officials in the Indies. The
Mosquitos would now be "better armed and more insolent than ever", President
Mayorga of Guatemala said sullenly. The disillusioned Governor Peril
122Affidavits by Brookman and Campbell, and examination of Terry, previously
cited.
12 
3Dalling to Germain, 1 April 1779, CO 137/74, f. 179.
124
Terry to Campo, 3 November 1779, AHN, Est 4227, vol. ii.
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told the commander at Matina not to trust the Mosquitos or have any
more communication with them, although he suspected that the consequences
of Terry's failure "would be mercantile rather than bloody". Matfas de
Gelvez, brother of the illustrious Jose de Gelvez, who was soon to
replace Mayorga, received word of Terry's failure ftwith indifference,
expecting the same considering the lack of faith on the part of the
English." But Gelvez said that he was preparing the militia and would
go out in person to "exterminate in short order...those feeble enemies
who have caused Us So much trouble." 125
England's ministers were slow to grasp the significance of the
Terry conspiracy. In Madrid, nine months after Terry's departure from
Bilbao, Lord Grantham was not even aware that a serious situation
existed. When Floridablanca said that there were points of contention
that must be adjusted between the two nations, Grantham commented that:
"he seemed to lay most stress upon the Settlements in the Bay of
Honduras". 126 Long after Terry had established his community on the
San Juan, Germain remarked that Spanish "proceedings are of so hostile
a nature towards His Majesty's Subjects...gm the Mosquito Shorg as to
justify the taking every precaution for their Security. "127 But as
late as April 1779, his judgment clouded by his determination to insure
125Chavarria to Perie, c. 10 November 1778, AGS, Est 8133, folder 17b;
Perie to Chavarria, 15 November 1778, Gust 665; Peril to Gelvez, 15
November 1778, Gust 665; Mayorga to Charles III, 6 January 1779, AGS,
Est 8133, folder 17; M. Gilvez to J. alvez, 6 January 1779, Gust 665.
126Grantham to Weymouth,23 November 1778, SP 94/206.
127Germain to Dalling, 7 October and 2 December 1778, CO 137/73, ff. 213,
243.
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Spanish neutrality, he expressed his conviction that Terry had no authority
from the Spanish court.
it would be unbecoming of His Majesty's Dignity to take
any Steps upon the Subject which might give just cause of
Jealousy to His Catholic Majesty, or might in any degree
call in question that Harmony which subsists between the
Courts of Great Britain and Madrid. 12o
In April 1779, less than a fortnight after Germain's expression of
confidence in the Spanish court, Spain and France concluded an offensive
alliance against England. Article seven of the alliance described
Spanish ambitions in the approaching war.
The Catholic King on his part understands that he will acquire
by means of the war and the future Treaty of Peace the following
advantages: 1. The restitution of Gibraltar; 2. The possession
of the river and fort of Mobile; 3. The restitution of Pensacola
and the whole Florida coast corresponding to the Bahama Channel
...; 4. The expulsion of the English from the Bay of Honduras
ghe Mosquito Shorg, and the observance by the English of
the prohibitions against making any establishments on Spanish
territory as outlined in the Treaty of Paris of 1763 ghe non-
fulfilment of this article by the English--according to the
Spanish--in refusing to withdraw from their establishments on
the Mosquito Coast was a sore point which had rankled the
Spanish since the signing of the treatg; 5. The revocation
of the privilege conceded to the English to cut logwood on the
coast of Campeche gielizg; 6. The restitution of the island
of Minorca.149
More than a month after the signing, Lord Grantham was still unaware
of the existence of the alliance. When Floridablanca told him on 17 May
that rumours of an impending rupture between the two courts were
groundless, 130
 Spain had, in fact, already despaired of settling their
differences for "when negotiations were under way to keep the peace, word
128Germain to Dalling, 2 April 1779, CO 137/74, f. 154.
129
TCD, p. 552.
13°Grantham to ieymouth, 17 May 1779, SP 94/208, f. 133.
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was received of the English depredations at the mouth of the San Juan
River and in the Bay of Honduras." 131 The day after Floridablanca's
conversation with Grantham, a real orden commanded Spanish governors
132
in America to prepare for war; Charles III had decided to commence
hostilities in June. The ambush and sacking of Terry's camp and vessel
--acts which Floridablanca described as outrages to the Spanish flag
and crown--were the most important components of a series of articles
in a manifesto explaining the Spanish decision to declare war.
"The most recent and most grievous" complaints against the English
since the Treaty of 1763 were enumerated in the manifesto; the first
eight items relate to the Mosquito Shore.
1. The English had not destroyed all fortifications made in the
Bay of Honduras, as prescribed by the Treaty. (The only English
fortifications "in that part of the world" were at Black River on the
Mosquito Shore.)
2. The English had more firmly established themselves in the Bay
of Honduras.
3. The English had incited the Mosquito Indians to revolt.
131Manifesto of the Motives upon which his most Christian Majesty has
Founded his conduct with Regard to England... (Madrid, 1779), in
Sp 94/254, f. 220; Robert White replied anonymously to the Spanish
charges in A Full Answer to the King of Spain's last Manifesto,
Respecting the Bay of onduras, and the Mosquito Shore (London, 1779).
132Real orden to the president of Guatemala, 18 May 1779, Guat 869;
Floridablanca to Liston, 5 November 1784, Gust 666; A Full Answer,
P. 59.
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4. English settlers had established themselves on the Mosquito
Coast for no other reasons than to usurp Spanish territory and to engage
in clandestine trade. The centre of these operations was at "El Fiche"
(Pitt). Proof of this usurpation, according to the author, was Lawrie's
appointment as "Captain General" of the "new establishments".
5. The English tried to retain the Mosquitos as allies in spite
of offers by the Indians to recognise Spanish sovereignty.
6. The Irving scheme was another example of English usurpation of
Spanish territory.
7. Rather than give satisfaction to the Spanish, the English had
actually complained to the Spanish court on the same subjects, and
were even "menacing Spain with war".
8. Late in 1778 the Spanish settlement at the mouth of the San
Juan was attacked and destroyed. "When this happened peace negotiations
were taking place; the Catholic king was working for England's benefit
to obtain peace." There followed a long list of further complaints:
seduction of the Indians of Panamit and Louisiana; the attack on a Spanish
warship in the harbour of New Orleans and eighty-six other insults to
Spanish navigation and trade in the previous three years; and eleven
recent violations of Spanish territory, the last one being the attack
on Terry's settlement. 133
Spanish orders to officials in the West Indies were explicit:
/33Manifesto of the Motives, loc.cit., Ca1der4n, Belice, p. 241.
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For the purpose of preventing the evil designs of the
court of London, the king has decided to start the most
vigorous hostilities against England. Consequently, steps
are being taken to unite the Spanish and French squadrons,
and to declare war on Great Britain in June.... The king
has commanded that you take whatever opportune steps are
available to dislodge the English from tnose coasts, and
subject or destroy the Zambos Mosquitos who are allied
with them. The Governors of Havana and Yucatan and thp
viceroy of Santa Fe are to help in these operations.1,4
Early in June, as Spain was concluding her final preparations for
war, the significance of the Terry conspiracy became apparent to Germain.
"Terry's plan", he wrote, "was deeply laid, & had more powerful support
than the projects of a mere Adventurer could have obtained." But in
spite of this proof of Spanish hostility, Germain still hoped for a
reconciliation. "In the present situation of Affairs...gm should not7
carry our suspicions so far as to make them the apparent motives of our
conduct." Consequently he ordered Terry to be detained in Jamaica as
a rebel rather than as a Spanish agent. 135
easily 36
On 16 June 1779, the "indolent and/frightened° Lord Weymouth
received from the Marques de Almodovar, Spain's minister to the English
court, a message decrying the "unbelievable excess of insults against
the Spanish flag and the violation of the King's territories" that
"amountgd7 to a Declaration of War." "In spite of the pacific nature
of the King", the message continued, "Spain was now forced to use every
means at her command to render justice to her people and to the dignity
134Real orden to the president of Guatemala, 18 May 1779, Gnat 869.
135Germain to Dalling, 2 June 1779, CO 137/74, f. 236; The argument had
long since become academic: Terry had left Jamaica two months earlier.
136Fiers Mackesy, The War for America, 1775 - 1783 (London, 1964), p. 18.
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of her King." After denouncing the English for their subversive
activities among the Indians of Louisiana and for daring to name a
savage San Bias Indian captain-general of Veragua, Almodovar alluded
to England's support to the scattered settlements on the Mosquito Shore
and to the abortive Terry enterprise.
Finally, the territory in the Bay of Honduras has recently
been violated by acts of hostilities and other excesses
against Spaniards, who have also been imprisoned. Apart
from the fact that the Court of London has neglected to
accomplish the stipulations of article 16 4aE7 of the Treaty
of Paris, Spanish homes have been invaded. 37
The next day Almodovar presented a lengthy expose of Spain's complaints
against England similar to the manifesto mentioned above. 138
Germain's reaction to the Spanish declaration was immediate. He
authorised that attacks be made against New Orleans and Darin, but in
a message to Governor Dalling he placed fond hopes on future operations
to be conducted in middle America, using the friendly Mosquito Indians
and modern day "Free-Booters".
137Almodovar to Weymouth, 16 June 1779, SP 94/208, f. 223; Weymouth
to Grantham, 16 June 1779, SP 94/208, f. 231; Floridablanca to
(probably) Liston, 5 November 1784, FO 185/1. Shelburne and
Richmond described the crisis wrought by the Spanish declaration
"as the most awful the country had ever experienced, and comparable
with the Armada." Mackesy, ok.cit., p. 263; Jimenes to Pitt,
27 October 1763, CO 137/61, f. 213; Grimaldi to Masserano, 20 January
1767, AHN, Eat 4269, vol. i; Brown, a.cit., p. 354.
38Almodovar to Robinson, 17 June 1779, SP 94/20 , f. 248. Under.-
Seeretery- Robinson or Germain, writing in the margin of Almodovar's
paper, blamed most of the acts on the American rebels. Violations
in the Bay of honduras were disposed of with the succinct epithet:
"never heard of".
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The Accounts you have transmitted...of the Fidelity and
Attachment of the Musquito Indians to His Majesty, leave
no room to doubt of their Assistance in any Enterprize
against the Spanish Territories adjoining to their Country;
The first step therefore that appears necessary to be taken
is to supply them with Arms & Ammunition, & encourage them
to make Inroads into the Spanish Settlements in the
Neighbourhood. The Hopes of Plunder may perhaps incite
many Free-Booters from the Islands and Continent of America
to join the Indians in these Incursions...139
An American rebellion had become a general war.
139Germain to Dalling, 17 June 1779, CO 137/74, f. 239.
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Chapter X
ANGLO-SPANISH CONFLICT,
1779 - 1783
Throughout the eighteenth century Spain tenaciously defended an
archaic economic policy that clashed with England's trading interests
in the West Indies. This confrontation, instrumental in provoking
Anglo-Spanish conflicts in 1739 and 1762, again led to war in 1779.
England used her foothold on the Mosquito Shore and her friendship with
the Mosquito Indians during the war in a serious attempt to open a
commercial highway to the Pacific Ocean, while the Spanish tried to
expel the English settlers from the Coast and reduce or exterminate
the Indians. The Shore became a savage but silent jungle battleground,
the sounds of conflict muffled by the raucous campaigns far to the north. '1
Spanish colonial officials knew about the war a month before their
English counterparts, an advantage strengthened by plans to unite the
French and Spanish fleets and by confidence that the struggle in North
America would forestall any immediate English offensive. And the Spanish
had another advantage in the struggle: in spite of the traditional
1M. alvez to J. alvez, 6 July 1779, CO 137/76, f. 31; Extract of a
letter from M. alvez to J. alvez, 6 September 1779, in Chatfield to
Palmerston, 20 May 1849, FO 252/41.
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Anglo-Mosquito alliance, certain despotic acts practised on the Indians
by the Shoremen, especially Superintendent James Lawrie's peremptory
dethronement of King George II during the Terry epi ode in 1778,2
disaffected the Mosquitos tow rds the English. 3 The Spanish were unaware
that soon after their declaration of war in June 1779, Lord George
Germain had ordered "that Attacks should be made upon the Spanish
Possessions in America on the side of the Mosquito Shore, and the
Mississippi."4 But the Shoremen and Jamaicans were too concerned with
their own defences to undertake immediate military operations. Their
caution was well founded. On 15 August 1779 Fr sident Matlas de GS1vez
of the audiencia of Guatemala ordered the governor of the province of
Yucatn, Roberto de Rivas Betancourt, to eject the English from the
Yosquito Coast. Rumours of English plans to invade Guatemala gave
greater urgency to G‘lvez' orders. But xivas needed no prompting; he
had been drilling his ragged militia and assembling armed vessels since
2 August, the day he r ceived the celebrat d real orden of 18 ay 1779,
announcing the intention of the Spanish court to open hostilities.5
2See above, p.239.
3The Spanish hoped to widen this breach by distributing gifts and gold and
silver medals to Mosquito chiefs. However this tactic was unsuccessful,
for they found it impo sible to reach them during the war and had to be
content with a arding the medals to the paciqu s of the more primitive
tribes on the frontier.
4Germain to the lords of the Admiralty, 25 June 1779, SP 42/55, f. 9.
5Navarro to alvez, 11 August 1779, Adm 1/241, f. 356; Dalling to Germain,
6 Au ust 1779, CO 137/75, f. 148; alvez to Rivas, 15 August 1779, cited
by Calderon,	 lice, p. 243; Rivas to Galvez, 18 August 1779, i id.,
p. 244.
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On 9 S ptember, Rivas' forc attacked the logwood co st rather
than the Mos uite S ore as or ered, d stroying the communit of St.
George's Key near Belize. 6 The Baymen should have r ceived a warning
from Black River in time to prepare their defences--or at least to
evacuate the settlement, since intelligence of Spanish plans had reached
the Mosquito h re even before 2 August. But Lawrie was in the back
country, and the inhabitants of Black River withheld the infor tion,
fearing that the Baymen might interfere with an expedition from the Shore
searching for Spanish register ships.?
The first British campaign in the war was in reaction to the
destruction of St. George's Key. Lt. Col. John Dalrymple, who had been
sent to the Bay by Governor John Dalling to elicit the aid of the Shoremen,
Baymen and Mosquitos for future expeditions, arrived in Black River at
the same time as the news of the "treacherous" attack on the Key.
Dalrymple immediately requested the Shoremen and the Zambos Mosquitos
of General Tempest's party to join him in a punitive expedition. But
the same men who failed the Baymen now tried to deter the Zambos. In
Dalrymple's n arly unarm d v ssel, the Indians would be at the mercy of
the Spaniards, they argued, and Black River was about to be invaded;
every man was needed at home. Nevertheless, a small number of Shoremen
6The disaster at St. George's Key hurt many Shoremen who owned property
there, including Hodgson, Lawrie and Colvill Cairns. Hodgson's losses
amounted to L494,Jamaica currency, Lawrie's were L585/4/4 and Cairns'
L184/17/6. List of the losses sustained by property owners in St. eorge's
Key, 13 September 1782, CO 123/2, vol. ii.
7Lawrie to Dalling, 2 September 1779, CO 137/76, f. 46; Dialing to
Dalrymple, 20 Octob r 1779, CO 137/76, f. 82; Dalrymple to Dalling, 3
October 1779, CO 137/81 , f. 225; M. alvez to J. alvez, 1 Sept mber 1779,
CRM, p. 187.
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(120 of them were still out searching for the re later ships) and Zambos
agreed to join hi . On the sa e day that they sailed for Belize they
met three English frigates of w r commanded by Captain John Luttrell
and learned that the regi ter ships were sheltered under the cannon of
Fort San Fernando de Omoa. Luttrell had failed to force the surrender
of the fort by a lengthy bombardment. Excited by the prospect of plunder,
Dalrymple suggested th t they combine their forces to renew the attack;
Luttrell enthusiabtically agreed. They sailed for Omoa, stopping at
Truxillo to enlist a few Baymen and the Shoremen who had failed to find
the register ships. Near Omoa, Dalrymple's men disembarked and approached
the fort by a forced march through thicket and swamp. Eh route the
Zambos silenced enemy lookouts, cleared the trail of undergrowth, and
even took on the gruelling task of hauling the heavy cannon. On 20
October, after a siege in which the town of Omoa was burned to the
ground, Dalrymple led a successful escalade over the thick castle walls.
The largest Spanish fort in the kingdom of Guatemala and three register
ships and cargoes worth three million pesos were in Engli n hands.8
The Zambos Mosquitos had been so much in evidence during the siege and
on the escalade that Spanish defenders thought the attack had been
the work of the Indians with a few English advisers and naval support.8
tome sources s y that the booty was worth much le s than three million
pesos. See Robert S. S ith, "Indigo Prod ction and Trade in Colonial
Guat mala", HARP, xxxix (1959), p. 199: and Salvatierra, Contribuci'n,1,472.
A.he dispute betw en tho e who participat d in the expedition and their
superiors in Jamaica and in London over the div ion of t e plun er was an
interesting aftermath. The navy claimed the e tire sum bec us the booty
s captured "at s a', although the ve sels were anchored in the harbour
nd the c pture w s only m de possible by Dalrymple and his irregul r force.
Th re was another si elight to the victory. After the surr rider
Dalrymple tried to help the hosquitos regain two of their comrades,
(continued on next pa e)
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The capture of Omoa was an a kward appendage to an expansive
military operation on the Spanish Main suggested by Robert Hodgson
(the form r superintendent of the osquito Shore who hoped for a new
command in the Indies), and eagerly supported by Lord George Germain.
Hodgson proposed to divide the Spanish empire and to open a trading route
to the South Sea by invading the kingdom of Guatemala through Nicaragua.
After the capture of Omoa, Germain ordered Gov rnor Dalling to use
"The most vigorous efforts...to gain possession of the lake and country
of Nicaragua Land to givi7 the greatest encourag ment...to the native
Indians and Creole Spaniards to join the King's troops." To encourage
the Mosquitos, 2,000 fowling pieces and a great supply of light ordnance
and presents were sent for their use in hunting and warfare. Dalling,
who was excited by the prospects of leading an expedition on the Main,
and who had been given a free hand in the operations by Germain, had
begun the preparations even before receiving specific instructions to
do so. He felt that the expedition would revenge England for Spain's
"perfidious and unprovoked" declaration of war. He also agreed with
Germain that it would be "such a Div rsion as will oblige our new
Enemy the Spaniard to look at home instea of disturbing us here",
(continued from previous page)
Trumble and Brumsley, who h d been prisoners for many years in Panama
and Cartagena. Dalrymple demanded their relea e, giving the commander
of the fort, Si on Desnaux, a painful alternative. Since Des aux had
ignored a call to capitulate during the siege, the arrison were prisoners
of the Mosquitos. They would remain their slaves until their two comrades
w re freed. Howev r, the g rrison were relea d aft r Desn ux promised tl
look into the case; and nothin more is heard of Trumble and Brumsley.
Lawrie to Dalling, 4 October 1779, CO 137/76, f. 48; Dalrymple to Des aux
26 October 1779, CO 137/75+ f. 235; Dalrymple to Amherst, 21 Octob r 1779
0 34/119, f. 174; Luttrell to Parker, 25 Octooer 1779, Adm 1/242, f. 426
Testimony by Fernando Mancebo, 1 January ),780, Guat 464 Testimony by
Alonso Gil Rond4n, 5 January 1750, uat L++, Testimony by	 Detnaux,11 February 1760, Guat 464; M.GAlvez to J.Galvez, 15 larch 17 0, Guat 464
London Magazine, December 1779, p. 5 9.
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demonstrating the fe r in Jamaica of a Franco-Spanish invasion. 10
Dalling ordered Lawrie and Dalrymple to recruit as many Mosquitos
and Shoremen as pos ible for the scheme designed to s ize Fort
Inmaculada on the San Juan, gain command of Lake Nicaragua and the
inland cities of Granada and Le6n, and occupy a port on the South Sea,
probably Realejo. The army was to assemble at Cape Gracias a Dios.
Considerable reliance was placed on Lawrie and the Shoremen, and
especially on the Mosquito Indians, whose assistance as scouts, bo tmen
and provisioners would be of the "greatest Consequence". But the governor
cautioned against depriving the Mosquitos "of their private plunder,
which gould7 occasion a general defection, and prove fatal to the
Enterprize." Lawrie expressed his optimism for the success of the
expedition, and promised to raise 1,000 Mosquito Men within three weeks. 11
Problems arose almost immediately. The scramble for the loot seized
at Omoa interfered with Dalling's recruitment of officers. On learning
that the navy intended to appropriate the spoils, Dalrymple informed
Dalling that "many reasons concur to carry me to Britain." This
"un-officer-like" conduct infuri ted and frustrated General Dalling,
10Germain to Dalling, 17 Jun 1779, CO 137/74 , f. 239; Dalling to Ger am,
13 November 1779, CO 137/76, f. 53; Dalling to Parker, 17 Dece b r 1779,
CO 137/ 7, f. 224; Hodgson to uermain, 3 J nuary 1781, CO 137/ 0, f. 323;
Hodgson to Dalling, 17 ecember 17 0,	 Sta Fe 1261; Germain to
Dalling, 1 M rch 1780, GP/SDB.
1 1Dalling to Dalrymple, 20 N vember 1779, CO 137/76 , f. 82; Dalling to
Polson, 4 February 17 0, CO 137/76, f. 247; Germain to Dalling, 4 D c mber
1779, CO 137/75, f. 202; Lawrie to Dallin , 18 Nov moer 1779, CO 137/76,
f. 224; Lawrie to Dalling, 17 December 1779, CO 137/81, f. 202; Germain
to Dalling, 4 January 1780, GP/QDB.
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especially since he had placed his hopes for success on Dalrymple's
proven leadership. Nothing, he insists , should thw rt the "very
serious s rvice" they w re about to undertake. Hoping to stop him
before he left for England, Dalling sent orders for Dalrymple to
receive the troops at Cape Gracias a Dios. 12
Opposition to the invasion came from various sources. Command r
Parker of the Jamaica station t ought the scheme detrimental to the
defence of the island and that it had little chance of success, although
he reluctantly agreed to furnish his support. The sugar-growers and
merchants of Jamaica were antagonistic to any move that might weaken
the island's defences. Because of the "fear of the jealousy of the
People", Dalling had to raise the invasion force by stealth. . Soldiers
w re sent to the Main as "Convalescents", a ruse not likely to deceive
many people considering the large number of men involved an the
notorious unhealthiness of the Shore. 13
keanwhile in England, news of victories over the Spanish and
Americans greatly encouraged public and governmental enthusiasm for
the conflict.	 ord of the capture of Omoa reached London on 17 D cc ber
just four days before news of a similar victory at Savannah. 14 These
12Dalrymple to Dalling, 5 October 1779, CO 137/76, f. 72; Dallin. to
Germain, 15 Nov mber 1779, CO 137/76 , f. 56; Dalling to Dalrymple,
14 November 1779, CO 137/76, f. 86.
1 3Dalling to Germain, 13 November 1779, CO 137/76 , f. 53; Parker to Dalling,
15 December 1779, CO 137/77, f. 221.
The news of the v'ctory at Omoa was greeted with excitement in England.
Horace Walpole, in r ferring to what he called the "ridiculous" British
action in Georgia, wrote: "They had bet r to have stuck to their triumphs
on the Mosquito Shore; which were heroic and perfect in every light, and
the narratives of which se m to me the clearest relations of any battle or
siege I ver saw." walpole was probably r f rring to Dalrymple's account 4
the aAtck printed in The L ndon Magazine or Gentle ans Monthly Intelligen.
c r, 1779, xlv 11, 509.	 alpsole to Ossory, 23 Dece per 1779, printed in
Mthaith .Lewis,ed.,Horace a4o e's orrespon e cc ith the Cou tess of
Upper ssory (2 vols., London, 1965), ii, 148.
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triumphs induced the ritish cabinet to a kprove the expedition on the
San Juan and to authorise strong reinforc ments for it. On Christmas
eve they presented Governor Dalling with 3,000 additional troops. 15
In Jamaica, however, the euphoria of initial success was dissipated
by bad news from the Main. Omoa had been recaptured, w ich prompted
Lawrie to lament that the San Juan expedition would thus be delayed.
Furthermore, the dry season was well advanced; if they did not r ach
Lake Nicaragua before the rainy season began in April or May, operations
would become extremely difficult or even impossible. Rather than po tpone
the enterprise, Governor Dalling, a military man unhappily immersed in
the petty squabbles of civil administration, decided to act immediately.
Yet further delay was caused by the renew d threat of a Franco—Spanish
invasion, and the first unit of 540 men did not leave Jamaica until
3 February 1780. Since Dalrymple's whereabouts were still unknown, the
military command of the expedition w htto Captain John Poison, a youg,
in-xperienced officer frightened by his new responsibilities. Poison
had flexible orders. If La rie were unable to collect a large supporting
force he wa to consider lesser objectives, such as harassing Spanish
frontier towns and posts. 16
Poison's army was pla oued by b d luck and inept leadership from the
15Hodgso9•o
4 January
Mackesy,
1779, CKG,
16Lawrie to
Lawrie, 6
and 14 F b
Germain, 27 Dec mber 1779, CO 137/73, f. 262; Ger amn to Dalling,
1780, GP/SDB; Cabinet minutes, 24 Dece ber 1779, cited by
ar for America, p. 314; Stormont to George III, 24 Dece ber
iv, 533.
D llin , 27 D cc ber 1779, CO 137/81, f. 230; Dallin to
January 1780, CO 137/ 1, f. 217; Dal11n, t	 rm ' , 28 Jan ar.
uary 17 0, CO 137/76, ff. 144, 220.
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beginn'n .	 tie ual thr	 r f ur y	 ns't to the Cape took two
w eks becau e of stormy w ther. At their arrival th y found n ither
Indians nor cr ft. Three more we ks p ssed before Lawrie' storm-
battered force b g n to ar ' ye fr m BI ck Riv r and from o her En lish
and Mosquito settle ents on the Shore. Many pira bu s had been estroyed
and their crews lost in the pounding surf. The principal Mos uito
chiefs, King George II, General Tempest and Governor Briton, and their
men, were brought together only with great difficulty. Briton refused
to leave Tebuppy until persuaded by Poison and young Lieut nant Horatio
helson, commander of the naval forces on the expedition. On the scheduled
day of derarture for the San Juan a number of Indians ran off, ostensibly
to search for provisions, and when the expedition finally did sail on
16 March the fleet immediately ran onto a reef. Most of the vessels
were soon freed, but strong windo cind a heavy sea delayed their arrival
at the mouth of the San Juan until 27 March. 17
when Poison's army began to move up t e river, 1 d by Nelson and
Lieutenant Edward Marcus Despard, a capable young Irish engineer, 18
17Dalling to Germain, 2 June 1780, CO 137/77, f. 149; Benjamin /,oseley,
A Treatise on Tropical Disc sea, om Milit ry Operati xis and on the Cli te 
of the West Indies (London, 1792), p. 76; Carola Oman, els n (London,
1947), p. 29; Mackesy,
	 p. 335.
Nelson de cribed his efforts on the advance up the river. " ajor Poison,
who commanded, will tell you of my exertions; how I quitted my ship,
carried troops in boats an hundred miles up a river, which none but the
Spaniards since the time of the buccaneers had ever ascended; it will then
be told how I boarded, if I may be allowed the expression, an out-post of
the enemy, situated on an isl nd in the river; that I made batt ries, and
afterwards fought them, and was a principal cause of our succes ." James
Stanier Clarke and John McArthur,  he Life of Ad iral Lor els , K. . 
Fro is Lords	 nuscrip s (2 vols., Londo , 1809), i, 22.
18
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they encount red further difficultie . The piraguas were too large
and unwieldy; s v ral of th m capsized and a number of men drowned in
the brackish current of the river. An immod r t use of rum in the
tropic heat by the unconditioned troops took a further toll. Advance
units re ched Fort Inmaculada on 11 April, when Nelson and Despard
proposed to lead an immediate as ault. But Poison cautiously decided
to besiege the fort. Cannon were set on a hill ov rlooking the enemy
and the two sides s ttled down to an artillery duel. 19
President Matlas de dlvez, who had arrived in Granada to organise
the defence of Nicaragua, despaired of relieving the fort. The English
controlled the river, the only route by which aid could be sent, and
desertions had reduced the number of available militiamen in the kingdom
to 600 men--mostly untrained and unarmed. GLvez planned to raise 1000
men for an expedition, but recruitment was difficult and the naval force
he expected from Havana and Car agena was to arrive two years late.
Meanwhile, the kingdom remained vulnerable to the English invaders on
the San Juan. 20
At the fort the rains had begun and continued until the Spanish
capitulat d on 29 April. The victory coincided with the first sickness
among the Briti h troops and the Mosquitos; the victors were no better
off than the vanqui hed. There were no useful supplies in the fort which
was not only "an improper hospital, but a certain grave to almost all
19Folson to K mble, 1 Fay 1780, KF, ii, 215.
20M. Galvez to J. G t vez, 24 April 1780, Guat 464; elvez to Rivas,
23 May 1780, Vex 3021; alvez t Navarro, 28 May 1780, Cuba 127
iv s to elvez, 7 July 1780, Mex 3 21.
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who entere it."21 Also, many Engli h ffic rs an men mistreated t e
Indians, in spite of Governor Dallin ' warn'no. Pole n even refused
to 1 t th have the Spanish mulatto prisoners promised by Dalling.
The Moe uitos were fond of N 1son22--and of Dalrymple, who h d belatedly
joined the expedition--but Nelson was evacuated to Jamaica when he
contracted dye ntery, and Dalrymple gave himself up to the few pie sures
that might be purchased on the San Juan. 23 The Moe uitos began to
21Thomas Dancer, A rief History of the late xpe itio  ....(Kingston, 1781),
P. 18.
On the adv nce up tream, one of Nelson's men w s killed by a snake bite.
"Captain Nelson also, during this march, h d ne rly experienced the same
dreadful f te.	 emn one d y excessively fatigued, he h d ord red his
hammock, on one of their halts, to be slung under some trees. During his
sleep, th t extraordinary animal called the Monitory Lizard, from its
faculty of warning persons of the approach of any venomous animal, passed
across his face; which being observed by so e of the attendant giosquito/
Indians, they, shouted, and awoke hi • He immediately started up, and
throwing off the quilt, found one of the most venomous of the innumerable
serpents in that country, curled up t his feet. From this providential
escape, the Indians, who at ended, entertained an idea that elson was a
superior being, under an e pecial protection; and this idea, which his
wonderful abilities and un caned exertions tended to confirm, was of
essential service in gaining their confidence, and prolonging their
co-operation." Clark, 22.cit., i, 36.
2 3.Ar Alexander Leith wrote: mDalrymple's greatness of soul has been at
length obliged to relinquish the path of glory for the purer air of the
Corn Islands; ...I hope ZTe7 has left no body like him behind. - he was
troubled somewhat with an ague, but proce ded up the river with Genl.
Kemble in order to attack a strong b ttery the Spaniards have erected at
the entrance of the Lake - however his martial spirit was obliged to bow
to another cold fit, and he in a few days returned, not loaded with
honors & crowned with laur is, but extremely encumbered with a great quan-
tity of fat turkies, and some broods of fine young chickens - it see s
this Gentleman, durin0 the extrem s verities he has undergone in the
course of this bloodl 9 campaign never stirred without his hen roosts,
Cl ret, urkie - he de_ms his health of gr t import rice to his Country,
and cert inly leaves no means untrie to est blish it effectually - I was
extremely ill when he returned, but he took up his quarters in the Fort,
and ente tamed me every evening wit three or four Spanish whores rolling
on his bed, with whom he pr cticed all the conduct of a Covent Garden
(continued on next p se)
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desert in great numbers. t the same time, in London, uermain co mented
prophetically: "without the assist nce of the Mosquito Indians it will
be impossible to retain the country, even if Captain Poison obtains
possession of it.' Their loss was disa trous, for they were the only
experienced bateaux-men and hunters available. Poison began to withdraw
his forces downstream leaving behind a small garrison. Meanwhile, a
greater catastrophe was developing at the mouth of the river, where newly
arrived reinforc ments had begun to perish in the harbour's "pestilential
vapours". The Mosquitos gone, it was impossible to transport the men
upstream before the epidemic sprea of "fluxes and intermittant fever";
dysentery, malaria and yellow fever had begun their work on the troops. 24
cntirnuedfrom previous page)
brothel - I could not help observing to him that I thought his state
of health not so very danerous as he seemed to apprehend; and that
people would look strangely on him as a sick man, when he could drink
his Claret, and eat his turky, as well as any Officer in the Camp.
I therefore advised him to remain some time with me for is own
credit - this conversation was not much relished by him, and as there
appeared some foundation for my observations, it became neces ary for
him to clear away all imputations immediately - He accordingly sent
for Captn. Dixon; and, in a most piteous manner, the tears trickling
down his face in strict accord with his tremulous voice, told him he
found his constitution entirely gone, and he was convinced he should
die in a few hour ; beg'd that his dear corp , th Loy 1 Iris , i, t
fir v r him; and, as a tok n of the affection he bore, even in the
agonies of de th, to o br ve a b y of men, he beque thed to the
sick of the corps all his wi e and turkies - Dixon, who h s but
little command of his risible faculties, burst out lau6hing, and
swore 'by G-d he should not die.' ho ev r Dalrymple, having establish d
his pie of sickne s, and affection for his Corps, returned to the
Spanish Whores, and the next worning (not being able to wal ) was
carried to the bo t by four negroes.' Leith to Keatin 6 , 22 July 1780,
CO 137/81, f. 249.
24Galvez to Navarro, 18 July 1780, Cuba 1278; Germain to Dalling, 5 April
1780, Report on t e M nuscripts of 1r . Stopford-Sackville Historical
Manuscripts Commission (2 vols., London 1904, 1910), ii, 2 5; Corr 1 to
Ferna, 10 August 1780, C e". , x, 9 ; Poison to Kemble, 1 / y 1780,
KI, ii, 215.
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In spite of the multiplying disa ters, the English ar y on the
San Juan had opportunities to control Lake Nicaragua. During the
siebe on the fort, Lt. McLean of the Jamaica volunteers and twelve
Mosquito t‘en c ptured two ene y pir guas on the lake, and later the
outlet was contr lied by another small force. But Poison ignored
theoe opening ; his interest did not extend beyond the fort. 25
When General Kemble, who replaced Poison as commander of the
expedition, arrived at the mout of the San Juan with further reinforcements
in may 1780, his lack of enthusi sm for the expedition matched Poison's.
"My d'stress for the want of Men to havigat the Craft 21s7 very great,
and if mg at a loss how to surmount it." Nevertheless, after many
difficulties Kemble reached the castle, then made a half-hearted attempt
to accomplish the purpose of the expedition by leading 300 men upriver.
But after some desultory reconnoitering "the whole were ordered to
embark and retreated much to the disappointment of all and to the
astonishment of the troops in general." Shortly afterwards Kemble
returned to the mouth of the river, le vin g a token garrison at the
fort. 26
On 10 August, aware of the failure on the Main, and f ced with
revived fears of a Franco-Spanish invasion which had made it impossible
for him to send further reinforcements, Dallin g ordered Kemble to
destroy the fort. Although control of the South Sea rout was still
25
R port by David Lamb, 27 July 1781, CO 123/16.
26 e
 
ble's Journal (New York, 1884), p. 7, From the Collections of the
New York Historical Society, p. 7; Kemble to Dallin , 5 July 17 0,
CO 137/78, f. 250; eport b D vi Lamb, 27 July 1781, CO 123/16.
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a primary object of government, it would have to wait for a other
season.
27
A month later Dalling admitted that the campaign must be abandoned,
not only bec use of the gr at mortality--in Jamaica as well as on the
Main--but also because of the lack f support from the navy and the
loss of a relief fleet fro England. He order d that the surviving
troops be transferred to Bluefields, lack River and Jamaica. On 30
October, Germain gave his own coup d grace to the expedition when he
s id that New Orleans rather than the Spanish Main should become the
primary object of attention. Howev r, he hoped that Bluefields would
b come the base for future attacks against the enemy. 28
It is sometimes held that the San Juan expedition was an attempt
by England to partially indemnify herself for the loss of her Am rican
colonies.	 o ever, Lord George Germain did not harbour thoughts of
Americ n independ nce in 1779, and sur ly George III would never ave
accepted Spain's American colonies as r compense for the loss of England's
own re elliou thirteen. 29 The primary object of the invasion of
Guatemala was to di co rag are ive Spanish act and to e courage
2 7Dalling to Kemble, 10 August 1780, C0/137/78, f. 246; Dalling to
ermain, 12 August 17 0, CO 137/784 f. 205; Dalling to K mble, 20
Au ust 17 0, CO 137/7 f. 24 ; Ge eral officers' in etin , 17 August
1780, C 137/78, f. 234.
28Dalling to Germain, 19 September 1780, CO 137/78, f. 281; Germain to
D lling, 30 October 1780, CO 137P3, f. 265; Germain to Dalling,
1 Nov mber 178 , C 137/78, f. 268.
29T her w r conte porary sugge tions that t e Mosquito tiore would in ke
n ide 1 substitute for the 1 s of the Amer'c n c ionic . S e the
anon. 1 tter to he i g ton  oyal Jazette, 12 October 1784, p. 250.
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trade by opening communications across the peninsula. After Spain
declared war, Germain's dispatches became optimistic, even exuberant;
England need no longer humble herself to retain Spanish neutrality.
Germain was anxious to carry the conflict to the enemy, but he made it
clear that England did not intend to establish colonies in middle America,
favouring the restoration of the Spanish provinces to their native and
Creole inhabitants.30
The San Juan fiasco, with its great waste of men and materials, was
a gross caricature of a military campaign. The army of more than 1,400
men was reduced to less than 400, with no more than five men lost is
combat. For every man who fell in battle 200 perished in the ravaging
epidemics. Whole units fell sick in a single night. 31
 The navy
Germain to Dalliag, 17 June 1779, CO 137/74 , f. 239; General officer's
meeting in Kingston, 4 January 1780, CO 137/78, f. 234; C.F. Mullett,
"British Schemes Against Spanish America, 1806", BAHR, xxvii (1947), p.269;
Williams, Isthmian Diplomacy, p. 20; Alcee Fortier and John Rose Ficklen,
Central America and Mexico (Philadelphia, 1907), p. 115; John Dalrymple,
Memoirs of Great Britain and Irfland (2 vols., Edinburgh, 1781, 1788), i,
appendix 1, p. 2.
The expedition was composed of the following units:
Regular troops	 635
Jamaica volunteers	 258
Jamaica Legion ("a riotous troublesome set of people") 	 213
Royal batteaux men	 125
Light horse or dragoons ("Curacao Men, Sailors, Italians,
Portuguese")	 98
Artificers	 22
Total:	 1,379
This total does not include Mosquito Indians, Shoreman,
Baymen or navy.
Hercules Rosa, agent general for the expedition was "confounded in such
Schemes by the Medley of Characters, which were likely to compose the
army on the Expedition: for Instance, Officers of Sea and Land, Artificers,
Gentlemen Volunteers, Indian Kings, Princes, Generals and Colonels of their
class and colours.... it was a task beyond his abilities...." Dalling to
Germain, 1 January 1781, CO 137/79, f. 172. Hodgson estimated that the los
of men on the expedition was 4,000, more than twice the number of men
actually participating. Bentham to Wilson, 29 September 1781, printed in
John Bowring, The Works6f Jeremy Bentham (11 vols., London, 1838-1843),
x, 109.
30
31
266
suffered in a similar fashion. Lt. Newnham Collingwood, later Admiral
Lord Collingwood, succeeded Nelson as commander of the Hinchinbroke on
the expedition, reported that 180 of the 200 members of his crew died
in four months While stationed at the mouth of the river. 'Aline was not
a singular case," Collingwood wrote, "for every ship that was long there
suffered in the same degree. The transports' men all died;...but transport-
ships were not wanted, for the troops whom they had brought, were no
32
Trouble also came from the Shoremen, who told the Mosquitos that
the real purpose of the expedition was to enslave them, thus helping to
establish an early climate of discontent among the Indians. 33 Poison
said that "the Villainy of the Shore Settlers, who in general are the
outcasts of all the British West Indies", hurt the expedition because
they feared that it would hinder their illicit trade with the Spanish. 33
In spite of the many factors explaining the disaster, it is difficult
to believe that it occurred. The odds favouring success had been
overwhelming. There were few regular Spanish troops in the kingdom of
Guatemala, and the militia, though technically numerous, was composed
of barefooted, poorly trained and usually unarmed Indians, mestizos and
mulattos. In battle they could never have defeated the veteran British
forces with their Mosquito auxiliaries. Ultimately, the failure can be
traced to Poison and Kemble; the lack of initiative and enthusiasm in
32G.L. Newnham Colliagwood, A Selection from the Public and Private 
Correspondence of Vice-Admiral Lord Collingwood: interspersed with memoirs
of his life (London, 1826), p. 5.
33Pelson to Dalling, 30 April 1780, CO 137/81, f. 203.
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both men for the campaign was apparent throughout. Poison erred
either by not immediately storming the fort or by not laying siege with
a smaller force and pushing on to the lake. Kemble refused to attack
Fort San Carlos at the mouth of the lake, in spite of the ease with
which the point had twice fallen to small patrols.
The English were fortunate that the Spanish reaction to the invasion
was so tardy, for even before Poison's army left Jamaica, steps had
been taken to counter the expedition. In August 1779, Jose de delvez
notified his brother, Matias de Gilvez, president of the audiencia and
captain general of Guatemala, that the English had formed a large company
for the purpose of exploiting interoceanic communications across the
peninsula.' The day after Poison's army left Jamaica Charles III
ordered that aid be sent to Guatemala from Puerto Rico, Havana, Cartagena,
Merida and Peru. Three Peruvian guardacostas were ordered to patrol the
Pacific coast of Nicaragua to repulse the enemy if they should reach
that point. Gehvez ordered the construction of two small armed vessels (late
captured by the Zambos Mosquitos) on Lake Nicaragua and had breastworks
erected at the outlet of the lake, which were manned by frightened
militiamen who soon disappeared into the bush. Only the timidity of
General Kemble forced the English retreat. 35
34There is no indication of this is British sources.
35Charles III to Gillvez, 4 February 1780, Guat 451; J. alvez to M. Geilvez,
11 August 1779, Gust 464; Rivas to Navarro, 15 April 1780, Cuba 1279;
Rivas to Gelvez, 15 April 1780, Mex 3021; Galvez to Navarro, 20 April
1780, Cuba 1278; From the oidores of the audiencia of Guatemala, 19
August 1780, Cuba 1278.
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At dhitehall, a search was begun for a scapegoat. Germain accused
Lawrie of improper conduct in the preparations for the expedition, yet
there is no proof that he was guilty of anything but old age, a charge
Germain borrowed from Hodgson. Governor Dalling received even greater
abuse. Years later, William Knox told the younger Pitt that the
expedition failed "through the avarice and presumption of the..1Governor
of Jamaica in making the attack that he might share in the plunder, when
he was only ordered to make the preparations." But this accusation was
unfair; Dalling had been ordered to put the plan into operation and he
did everything in his power to assure its successtexcept perhaps to name
a proper person to command it.36
The poor treatment of the Mosquitos on the expedition can be blamed
on Poison, since Dalling had ordered him to treat them with care.
Hodgson wrote that they "were struck, they were starved, they were
treated with military strickness—and all ran away. „37
 Officers on the
expedition blamed the climate and disease for the failure. The weather
never cooperated. From the time they left Jamaica until their arrival
at Fort Inmaculada the army was hindered by the blustery winds of the
by
dry season and from that time oo/the insidious tropical rain.'8
The Spanish did not move to retake the castle on the San Juan until
36Germain to Dalling, 6 September 1780, CO 137/78, f. 130; Germain to
Dalling, 1 November 1780, CO 137/78, f. 268; Mackesy, op.cit., p. 337.
37Hodgson to Knox, 28 April 1781, CO 137/80, f. 21.
38Leith to Dallin6, 26 June 1780, CO 137/78, f. 198; Dolling to Germain,
2 July 1780, CO 137/78, f.167; McDonald's report, 24 August 1789,
CO 137/78, f. 228; Mullett, 22.cit., p. 273.
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they were sure that the English garrison had been greatly reduced by
disease. Matfas de Gliavez intended to command the counter-attack, but
he was suddenly crippled with such a bad case of gout that he was forced
to return to Guatemala, much of the way on the shoulders of Indian
carriers. One of his most trusted officers, Tomas de Jun g , laid siege
to the fort early in January 1781, after an unsuccessful attempt to storm
its gates. At night after the first day of bombardment the English
garrison, commanded by Captain Despard, crept out of the castle and
disappeared downstream. Charges of explosives, which were set before
the retreat, failed to detonate when an English deserter cut the burning
fusesP
The recapture of the fort was an epilogue to the English disaster.
Yet Governor Saavedra of Havana, who noted the value of the San Juan
interoceanic route, called the victory the most important one for Spain
in the war. 40
 While Fort Inmaculada was recaptured with ease, Galvez
complained that the enemy remained master of the North Coast, a situation
he would have remedied, he said, if the requested naval support had
arrived. And now, without the strength to stop them, alvez reported
that the Mosquitos and English were going to test their "arrogant and
insane schemes" on the Wanks (Segovia) and Bluefields rivers. 41
39Nava to Galvez, 18 September 1780 and 7 January 1781, Guat 465; M. Galvez
to J. asilvez, 26 September 1780, Gust 464; Gilvez toNavarro, 29 September
1780, Cuba 1278; Account of the seizure of the Castillo de la Inmaculada
Concepcidn, anon., n.d., BPR, Ayala LXVI-2884; Garcia Per:Ls, Memories,
iii, 113.
' Saavedra to alvez, 4 April 1781, Ind Gen 1578; Herrera to dolvez, 12
November 1780, Gust 869.
41M. Galvez to J. Gtavez, 5 November 1780, Guat 464; davez to Navia,
10 March 1781, Cuba 1324.
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San Juan was not the only British defeat on the Main in 1780.
While the English were preparing for the invasion, Glavez was gathering
the Guatemalan militia for an attack on the leeward Mosquito Coast.
A man imbued with the spirit of the conquistadores, he was confident of
success, especially with the reassuring intelligence that no more than
forty English soldiers defended Black River. Originally the army was
to include eighty veterans and 2,500 militiamen, but it was greatly
reduced as whole units fled into the hills to escape the obnoxious and
frightening service against an almost mythical enemy. Other problems
hindered the Spanish plans, including a lack of naval support and a
near rebellion in the capitol. But Ghlvez ordered the expedition to
proceed, although he turned its command over to the governor of
Comayagua when intelligence was received of the English expedition on
the San Juan.
42
On the day that Poison arrived at Fort Inmaculada, the Spanish
militia clashed with 400 English settlers and Negroes near Black River.
After a short exchange of gunfire, the Shoremen retreated into town
under cover of darkness. That night Philip Bode, commander in Lawrie's
absence, decided that the block houses in Black River were indefensable.
He dismissed his men, suggesting that they "provide for themselves"--sauve
TA Ent! The Shoremen fled in all directions--into the woods, towards
Cape Gracias a Dios, and to Roatein-unaware that the Spanish militia
42Galvez to Navarro, 12 January 1780, Cuba 1278i M. Gibvz to J. Geflvez,
22 February and 15 March 1780, Guat 464; M. Galvez to0. Gklvez, 6 January
1780, cited by Garcia Peliez, 22.cit., p. 108; From Matlas de Gsavez,
12 January 1780, ibid.
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had also fled in disorder. 43
Governor Dulling was shocked by the Shoremen's cowardice and
"abandoned principles". "By their pusillanimous behaviour they hardly
merit our compassion", he wrote. General Kemble noted "that their very
Negores gis7 were ashamed of them."44
The Spanish force displayed the same cowardice as the Shoremen.
According to John Skene Thomson and James Pitt Lawrie, who were captured
by the Spaniards, "They durst not proceed to the Town of Black River,
being afraid of the Mosquito Indians, of whom they entertain the most
dreadful ideas." In fact, the mestizos and mulattos who made up the
Spanish force were "kept in Order and Obedience by a Franciscan Friar,
& the Cudgels of half a dozen of Spanish Soldiers." Thomson felt that
"50 Regulars might have driven them like a herd of Cattle." "Such is
their Alacrity", he said, "that their progress home in one day tho'
against a rapid Stream was greater than they made in three days when
coming down to attack the settlement of Black River." 45
Early reportssaid that the Spanish invaders had reduced the community
"Affidavit by Alexander Smith, 9 September 1780, CO 137/78, f. 154; Hoare
to Dalling, 14 April 1780, CO 137/77, f. 199; Gklvez to Navarro,	 20 April
1780 and 18 July 1780, Cuba 1278; M. aivez to J. GAlvez, 24 and 25 May
1780, Gust 869.
44Dalling to Germain, 31 May 1780, CO 137/77, f. 188; Kemble to Dalling,
14 June 1780, CO 137/78, r. 188.
45Thomson made some interesting comments about the Spanish towns in the
interior. Comayagua, for example, was "a Bishops See, furnished with
Two or three hundred priests, & about half that number of Bells which
they are continually ringing." Thomson to Despard, 26 September 1781,
CO 137/81, f. 139; James Pitt Lawrie was Superintendent Lawrie's son.
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to cinders. Consequently, when an English vessel passed the settlement
on 18 April, the crew were surprised to see the town inhabited and its
multicoloured houses undamaged. Black River had not long remained
deserted. In their panicky flight the settlers had left many slaves
behind, a large number of whom had quietly taken control of the town.
And now the refugee Shoremen refused to return, fearing that the Negroes,
who were demanding tribute from visitors, and even trading with passing
46
vessels, were allied with the Spanish.	 The Shoremen who had fled to
had
Roatin were better organised than those who/rushed into the bush, and
persuaded Major Richard Hoare, the leading settler at Belize, to help
them regain their lost property before the slaves they had brought away
followed the example of their brothers. Hoare recruited eighty-four
volunteers and took them to the Shore on the Black Joke, Near Black River the
negotiated with the rebel Negroes, who were lectured by Hoare "on the
Impropriety of their conduct". His speech was well received. After
some bargaining the Negroes promised to relinquish the town and to
return to their masters; the rebel captains and their wives were freed
and awarded $100. each for "guarding" Black River in the absence of
the Shoremen.
47
After the events at Black River, the English continued to use the
Shore as a base of operations. Governor Dalling ordered the construction
of fortifications at Bluefieldd bluff, and ordered Lawrie to induce
"Report by aaptain Todd, 4 August 1780, CO 137/78, f. 242; Report by
Joseph Everett, 3 June 1780, CO 137/78, f. 5; Hoare to Dalling, 8 July
1780, CO 137/78, f. 315.
47Agreement between Richard Hoare and the Shoremen, 16 June 1780, CO 137/78,
f. 307; Report by Richard Hoare, 3 and 8 July 1780, CO 137/78, ff. 304, 30;
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the Mosquitos "to bother" the Spanish ipthe interior. To inspire the
Indians and to repay them for the coloured prisoners denied them at
the fort, he sent £500 worth of gifts. 48 He also commissioned Robert
Hodgson, who had returned to Jamaica hoping to command the San Juan
expedition, to raise a Mosquito and Negro corps. Hodgson accepted the
commission, then declined to go to the Shore because his old enemy,
James Lawrie, was still there. "What must be done with Mr. Lawrie &
the remains of his wretched CouncilVI" Hodgson asked. He lamented
that he might as well return to England, complaining bitterly to Germain
about not being placed in a position of responsibility from the first.
"The only thing I am sure of is that I have been sent to Jamaica where,
pity for my country: I am still standing with my arms across." Hodgson
remained in Kingston until December 1780, when he informed Dolling that
he was leaving immediately for London. The governor's answer was curt.
General Dolling present his compliments to Mr. Hodgson,
he intended to have made use of his abilities early on
the Main but as Mr. Hodgson made appear a disinclination
for that servicr the General did not chuse to push the
matter farther.'9
Hodgson's impudence did not deter theilew plans for the Shore. On
2 July Dolling named Captain Glendowe commander at Bluefields with
instructions to "bend not a little to ghgcapriceof the Mosquitos,
and to pay particular attention to Admiral Dilson on the windward Shore
48Dalling to Germain, 22 June 1780, CO 137/78, f. 62; Dolling to Kemble,
23 June and 10 August 1780, CO 137/78, ff. 68, 246.
Dolling to Hodgson, 2 July 1780, co 137/78, f. 202; Hodgson to Dolling,
9 August 1780, CO 137/78, f. 332; Hodgson to Germain, 13 August 1780,
CO 137/78,f.328; Hodgson to Germain, 23 September 1780, CO 137/79, f. 5;
Hodgson to Dolling, 15 December 1780, Sta Fe 1261; Report by Robert
Hodgson, 3 January 1781, CO 137/80, f. 323; Dolling to Hodgson, 16
December 1780, CO 137/80, f. 340.
49
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to
and/General Tempest on the leeward because of their commanding positions
on the frontiers of the Mosquito kingdom. However, King George II was
still the principal chief; Glendowe was to wait on him first. Dalling
also commissioned Dr. Irving50 and the Reverend Mr. Stanford as field
officers to assist in the reconciliation of the Mosquitos. Irving and
Stanford sailed for the Main on 6 September carrying 0,000 worth of
gifts and orders to raise a regiment of Indians. Shortly before he
left Jamaica, Hodgson noted with surprise that this important duty "was
to be riaqued in the hands of a flighty Doctor of Physic and a Clergyman
who he had been well informed had been rung about with a bell for
perjury."51
Sir Alexander Leith, David Lamb52 and the notorious Colvill Cairns
were also commissioned to conciliate the Indians, as well as to hire
piraguas for future operations. A number of Woolwa and Mosquito chiefs
met with Leith to provide boats and men. In return, Leith promised
the Mosquitos all the plunder that they could seize. 53
50Irving was part-owner of the Morning Star. See above p.
51 Dalling to Glendowe, 2 July 1780, CO 137/78, f. 173; Dalling to Germain,
1 July 1780, GP/SDB; Report by Robert Hodgson, 3 January 1781, CO 137/80,
f. 323.
52Lamb was a Shoreman who participated in the San Juan expedition as an
engineer.
51tf
ellegnbet een
e aerwLeith and Woolwa and Mosquito chiefs, 18 August 1780, CO
137/78, f. 298. Dalling to Germain, 19 September 1780, CO 137/78, f. 323;
Galvez to Solorzano, 6 September 1780, BAGG, i (1940), p. 111; Kemble to
Dalling, 28 August 1890, CO 137/78, f. 290; Kemble to Lamb, 30 August
1780, KP, ii, 291.
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In September 1780, a new spirit of optimism began to replace the
depression following the San Juan catastrophe. Governor Dialing wrote:
"In the midst of our gloom, fairer prospects seem to arise", and ordered
the 85th regiment of foot to the Shore. They were accompanied by three
Mosquito chiefs, who had been feted royally in Jamaica in hopes that
they would renew attacks against the Spanish.
On 1 October a general Indian congress was held at Cairns' home
in Tebuppy. Most of the major Mosquito chiefs were present, including
King George, Governor Briton, Duke Isaacs, General Smee, Major Jasper
Hall and the Admirals Richards and Dilson. They agreed to fight the
Spanish, but demanded the right to do so in their own way by striking
from ambush and in night attacks. Bluefielda was still thought to be
an ideal base of operations, but the attraction soon began to diminish.
Dalling and Kemble questioned the value of the river, and Irving, who
had explored it to its headwaters, said that no major invasion force
could penetrate into the interior on it. 55 Nevertheless, through Dr.
Irving's efforts, preparations continued for a general campaign. Irving
hoped to "render the Country easily accesalq.Perdition to the Spanish
Empire." On 3 December he reported that the remnants of the Army of
the San Juan were recovering, Negroes and piraguas were available, the
54Dolling to Germain, 19 September 1780, CO 137/78, f. 278; Ross to
McNaughton, 30 September 1780, CO 137/81, f. 340.
55India* congress, 1 October 1780, CO 137/79, f. 164; Kemble to Dalling,
11 October, 15 and 20 November 1780, CO 137/79, ff. 64, 129, 133; Kemble
to Cairns and Thomson, 13 and 15 October 17 0, KP, ii, 315, 316.
Kemble's tour of duty on the Mosquito Shore was a nightmare. Highly
suspicious, he complained of an entirely unexpected problem in a letter
to Cairns: "The Goats are dead, and I fear some foul play...." Kemble
to Cairns, 24 November 1780, KP, ii, 351.
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navigation of the principal rivers was understood, and the right
season was approaching. Operations were planned to begin before
Christmas; but the dry season passed with no action being taken
because there seemed to be no practical alternative to the San Juan
route and English officials distrusted both the Mosquitos and the
Shoremen.56
With prospects for action diminished, Irving sailed to Jamaica
late in February 1781, but he was immediately ordered back to the Shore
to carry on a sporadic war against Spanish settlements. Then suddenly
the governor had a change of heart. He now agreed with Admiral Parker,
who contended that Roattin and the leeward Shore were more worthy of
support than were major military operations into the interior.
Consequently, Dialing sent Captain Despard to establish a base at Cape
Gracias a Dios, but Despard soon announced that the Shoremen there were
little deserving of protection, and after leaving some ammunition and
provisions for Lawrie in Black River, he moved his small company to
Roatan. British interest in the Mosquito Shore was waning. 57
In spite of earlier displays of dastardly behaviour, the Shoremen
soon had an opportunity to redeem themselves. In May 1781, deserters
from the Honduras provincial militia arrived in Black River with news
56Irving to Dialling, 21 November 1780, CO 137/79, f. 158; Irving to
Dalling, 3 December 1780, CO 137/80, f. 43; Germain to Dalling, 7
December 1780, CO 137/78, f. 342.
57Dalling to Germain, 6 March 1781, CO 137/80, f. 92; Germain to Dalling,
7 March 1781, CO 137/80, f. 1; Parker to Dalliag, 1 April 1781, CO 137/80,
f. 170; Dalling to Parker, 9 April 1781, CO 137/80, f. 172; Dalling to
Despard, 20 March and 23 April 1781, CO 137/80, ff. 168, 157.
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that small pox and a lack of military discipline had left San Pedro
Sula nearly defenceless. Since the town was the repository for an
undetermined amount of treasure as well as for the arms destined for
use at Omoa, the Shoremen decided to attack it. Superintendent Lawrie
found he could "muster near 200 blacks and all fine young fellows",
while old General Tempest, Duke Isaac, Admiral Richards and King
George all announced their willingness to join the expedition. Less
than two weeks later, after the "dishonorable flight" of the dragoons
defending San Pedro, three companies of Shoremen, Negroes and Mosquitos,
commanded by John pitt, David Usher and John Young seized and sacked
the town, burning it to the ground in the fire that followed the
explosions which destroyed the armoury. King George III sent his
personal congratulations to Lawrie and his men, while Germain gloated
over the victory, one of the few achieved by the British at this time.58
The destruction of the large supply of arms and munitions in San
Pedro forced president Calvez to postpone attacking the Mosquito Coast.
Even more disheartening to GAlvez was the "villainy and disrepute" of
the 200 king's Negroes at Omoa, who could not be trusted to fight the
English, and the flight of the dragoons, who showed "little obedience,
no bravery••• and were useless"; they were "vicious and virtually without
Report by James Thomson, 3 September 1781 9
 CO 137/81 9 f. 133; Dalling
to Germain, 30 September 1781, CO 137/81 9 f. 123; Germain to Campbell,
10 November and 5 December 1781, CO 137/81 9
 ff. 37 9 187; dlvez to
Cargigal, 23 June 1781, Cuba 1324; M. Gglvez to J. Gftvez, 24 June
1781 9 Guat 878; Hoare to Dalrymple, 12 March 1781, Shel 79; Lawrie
to Dalrymple, 22 March 1781, Shel 79.
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military discipline", and contributed nothing but a great expense to
the kingdom. As a result, he asked permission to reform the military
in Guatemala, a request granted by Charles III in January 1782.59
However before Galvez received this permission, the Mosquitos renewed
their incursions. Matina was sacked and burned, and horrible cruelties
were inflicted on the inhabitants by 300 Zamboa Mosquitos and Englishmen
(disguised as Indians). Galvez also reported that another enemy force
repeated these barbarities at Malta, carrying a number of the inhabitants
into slavery. 60 He decided to retaliate as soon as he could conscript
and train an army and be assured of strong naval support. On 16 January
1782, the various units of his unwieldy, barefoot army--280 men each
from Tegucigalpa and San Salvador, 500 from San Miguel, 190 from Olancho
el Viejo and 180 from Santa Ana--marched towards a rendezvous at Jutigalpa
on the frontiers of the Mosquito territory. Another 100 veterans and
660 militiamen gathered at Truxillo to board warships from Havana,
Bacalar and Campeche, as well as from the consulado of Cadiz.
On 5 March the land army, commanded by Lt. Col. Vicente de Arrizavalaga,
who led the unsuccessful attack on Black River in 1780, began the
difficult march to the coast. A week later, on the day that the Spanish
fleet sailed from Truxillo to attack RoatEin and the Mosquito Coast,
cold heavy rains began to fall. On 25 March, a small number of Zambos
59M. Galvez to J. alvez, 24 June 1781, Guat 878; J. Glavez to M. GEilvez,
30 January 1782, Gust 878.
60	 /
M. Galvez to J. alvez, 4 January 1782, Gust 466.
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Mosquitos and Shoremen ambushed the column, killing and injuring
thirty-two men. Arrizavalaga claimed victories in further sharp
encounters, but very few of the unseen attackers were even wounded.
Because the Spaniards did not know the country, had lost most of their
provisions, and had received no word from GAlvez since leaving
Jutigalpa, they established a camp six leagues from Black River.
A few days later, with the provisions almost exhausted and the steady
rains continuing at Arrizavalaga's camp, the English stronghold at
Cape Camaron, Fort Dalling, 61 fell to G4lvez' army. On 2 April,
Arrizavalaga sadly wrote: "It is raining incessantly and our agonies
are multiplied by the clamour of the troops who have nothing to eat.
The hope that our miseries will be remedied is remote." On the same
day Matias de GEavez was being honoured as the first Spanish conqueror
of Black River. 62 When the Spanish had approached the community, most
of the Shoremen and troops fled to Cape Gracias a Dios without a fight.
While the conquerors celebrated their victory, the remainder of
Arrizavalaga's 1,500 troops ate the last available banana and palm
fronds. On 9 April, without even bothering to send scouts towards
Black River, Arrizavalaga ordered the retreat. "Without any food, the
troops nude from head to foot, and mired to their belts in the mud",
61Fort Dalling was located near the river emptying into the sea at Cape
Camaron known as Cape River--"Quepriva" to the Spanish, who called
Black River "La Criva" or "Fiche", after the Shoreman William Fitt.
62Columbus took possession of the American continent in 1502 at the same
place, which ,becameknown during the early colonial period as the Rio
de la Fosesion.
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they straggled back into the interior, leaving as many as 300 men
dead on the trail. 63
The Shoremen who had retreated to Cape Gracias a Dios thought
themselves to be at the mercy of the Spaniards. The enemy held Black
River (renamed ConcepciOn de Honduras), and another column was
approaching from the San Juan. The chance of receiving aid from
Jamaica was slight; the island was again expecting an invasion.
64
But the Shoremen were fortunate. The enemy approaching from the south
was badly mauled by a storm and unable to pass Bluefields; the army
at Concepcibn, weakened by Arrizavalaga's retreat, and without
sufficient arms and provisions, could not advance. Meanwhile, ambushes
by Mosquitos and English Negroes and desertions had placed the Spanish
in an almost untenable position. Only the timely arrival of supplies
saved Concepcion from being abandoned. 65
63M. Gilvez to J. Calvez, 16 December 1781, Gnat 869; Gilvez to Cagigal,
19 March 1782, Cuba 1324; M. Gilvez to J. G&(lvez, 20 March 1782, Ind
Gen 1578; Declaration by Gabriel Hervias, 18 April 1782, Guat 466;
Diary by Vicente de Arrizavalaga, 1 March - 13 April 1782, BAGG,
ii (1946), p. 65; Garcia Pelltez, 22.cit., p. 125.
64Campbell to Mathew, 8 March 1782, Letter-Books and Order-Books of
George, Lord Rodney Admiral of the White Squadron 1780 - 1782 (2 vols.,
New York, 1932), i, 269. From the Collections of the New York Historical
Society.
65M. Gsltivez to J. alvez, 2 and 29 April 1782, Gnat 466; Testimony by
Gabriel Hervias, 18 April 1782, Guat 466; alvez to Cagigal, 6 August
1782, Cuba 1324; Lawrie to White, 9 May 1782, CO 123/2, vol. ii; Campbell
to Shelburne, 15 June 1782, CO 137/82, f. 253; From a Jamaican merchant
to a /correspondent in London, 27 March 1782, Shel 79; Consulta from Matias
de Galvez, 4 August 1782, cited by Garcia Pelitez, 22.cit., p. 126; Glmez,
Costa de Mosquitos, p. 137. GAlvez' scorched-earth ideas were very
similar to earlier observations by Charles III that British colonisation
in the Bay of Honduras would be discouraged if all plant life there were
destroyed. See above, p.148.
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alvez' energy seems to have been dissipated by his success on
the Mosquito Coast. Rather than lead another expensive expedition,
he offered ten pesos for each Mosquito Indian captured, the ownership
of every captured Negro to the captor, and 1,000 pesos for the heads
of the leading Mosquito chiefs, King George and General Tempest. He
explained that he had only 400 fixed regulars in Guatemala, not nearly
enough men to cover the "points of most importance in the Kingdom":
Omoa, Truxillo, Black River and the river and port of San Juan. Glavez
still spoke of his devastating plans to destroy all fortifications,
buildings, plantations, fruit trees, stands of sugar cane and other
crops on the Coast. 66
Intelligence of Admiral Rodney's extraordinary victory over the
Comte de Grasse's French fleet, reached Jamaica late in July. The
island was now free from the threat of invasion, and General Archibald
Campbell, who had recently replaced the disgraced Dalling as governor
of Jamaica, was able to turn his attention to "The distressed and
precarious situation of those settlers collected at Cape Gracios a Dios,
2.17hich7 gives me infinite anxiety." Explaining that the loss of the
Shore would end the traditional alliance with the Indians and ruin
"a considerable branch of Traffick", Campbell asked Admiral Rodney and
Rear Admiral Rowley of the Jamaica station for boats to "sweep the Coast
of those gpanisg Intruders."67
66M. Gltivez to J. Gilvez, 2, 15 and 16 April 1782, Gust 466; dilvez
to Cagigal, 18 April 1782, Cuba 1324.
67John Macgregor, Commercial Tariffs,and Regulations of the Several States
of Europe and America...Spanish American Republics, xvii, in FO 115/99,
f. 216; Campbell to Rowley, 28 July 1782, Ada 1/242, f. 44; Campbell to
Rodney, 4 and 24 June 1782, Letter-Book.l.Rodney, i, 440, 461.
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The governor named Robert Hodgson to command the expeditionary
force. Hodgson had been in London since his dispute with Dalling,
persuading Knox and Germain to approve another campaign on the San
Juan. The route was too important to allow the previous disaster to
discourage them, he said--especially if the new expedition were led
by a person with an "enlightened mind". Although Hodgson was anxious
for this command, he still refused to participate in any operation in
which the "ignorant and incapable" James Lawrie might take part. In
September 1781, with the strong support of Lord Hillsborough (who had
named Hodgson to the superintendency in 1768 and who remarked that he
should have commanded the first expedition on the San Juan), for the
second time Germain approved a Hodgson scheme to invade Guatemala.
He was to command this new army on the Main, with a "rank of distinction"
--colonel with provincial rank--to aid him in recruiting for the
enterprise.68
Governor Campbell was ordered to send American loyalist volunteers 69
to the Shore to reinforce the troops already there and to enlist the
Mosquitos for action. Germain advised Campbell not to rely on Lawrie
for recruitment of the Indians. Nevertheless, Lawrie was informed of
the new scheme, and exactly as he had done two years earlier, he promised
68Hodgson to Knox, 28 April 1781, CO 137/80, f. 21; Hodgson to Germain,
28 June 1781, CO 137/80, f. 192; Patent to Robert Hodgson, 20 December
1781, Sta Fe 1261; Hillsborough to Knox, 17 September 1781, Sta Fe 1261;
Hodgson to Germain, 18 October 1781, Sta Fe 1261; J. GAlvez to M. GAlvez,
9 July 1781, Guat 869; Hodgson to Knox, 28 July 1781, in Bentham to
Wilson, 29 September 1781, Bowring, loc.cit.
69The Royalists had originally been recruited for use on the first San
Juan expedition.
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to recruit 1,000 Mosquitos and "Commerce" Indians in three weeka. 70
When Hodgson arrived in Jamaica he discovered that his efforts
were now to be directed at expelling the Spanish from the Shore. But
before preparations could begin, he incited another feud, this time
with Governor Campbell. Hodgson complained to Germain that he found
himself "accountable to those who...have not had the opportunity of
brusg
knowing what may be done,/ at a time when the rank You honored me with
here was on the point of bringing my former experience of the
fastnesses of the country into it's fullest use." 71 Hodgson's commission
to lead the expeditionary force to Black River was approved by Germain's
replacement, Thomas Townshend, but violently opposed by the Mosquito
Shore agent, Robert White, who decried "the Calamity which immediately
threatens the Settlers & Settlements of the Mosquito Shore, by the
return of Mr. Hodgson with higher powers of Oppression against them
than ever."72
70Germain to Campbell, 7 September 1781, CO 137/80, f. 289; Germain to
Campbell, 10 November 1781, CO 137/81, f. 37; Lawrie to Dalling, 18
November 1781, GP; Bowrijig, loc.cit. Shortly before his departure for
the Indies, Hodgson	 cguect—ef--Jeremy Bentham, who remarked that
he had a constitution of iron, and far from being "a little maddish"
as Shelburne commented, appeared to be "as sober and consistent as anything
about his lordship." His writing was bad, Bentham admitted (a fact born
out by Hodgson's letters and dispatches), but "his discourse is better...
his observations just." Bentham to Wilson, 3 October 1781, ibid., x, 110.
71Hodgson to Germain, 27 April 1782, Shel 78; Hodgson to Shelburne, 15 May
1782, Shel 79.
72Townshend to Campbell, 14 August 1782, CO 137/82, f. 265; White to
Townshend, 20 August 1782, CO 123/2, vol. ii.
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Nevertheless, in August Hodgson sailed with the relief force
to Cape Gracias a Dios. At their arrival, Captain Parry, who commanded
the naval convoy, was surprised to find more enmity among the Shoremen
than towards the Spanish. Prompted by Lawrie, many of the settlers
refused to serve under the imperious Hodgson. Parry told both sides
to get down to business or be left to their own devices. At Lawrie's
insistence, and with Hodgson's reluctant approval, Captain Despard was
given the command of the army composed of 600 Mosquito Men, 500 Negroes
and Shoremen, and eighty American loyalists, while Hodgson was acknowledged
as the titular commander-in-chief. On 26 August they sailed from the
Cape for Black River. Despard's force disembarked a few miles from
the community, while the fleet sailed on to anchor near the ocean bar
on the afternoon of 29 August. The presence of so many English sails
shocked the Spanish into a night of frantic defensive preparations. Then
at dawn, British banners were spied on the bluff overlooking the fort.
Lt. Col. Juliet, whom GAlvez named as commander on the Coast as a reward
for retaking Fort Inmaculada, immediately sent an envoy to the bluff
to discover the English intentions. Despard's explanation was simple:
he had come to recover the country in the name of the British crown.
Initially, the Spanish vowed a resistence to the death, but Despard
reminded them that retreat was impossible and once fighting broke out
he could not "restrain the fury of the Indians and Negroes". Julia
knew this was no idle threat, because the Spanish garrison at Cape
CamarOn had already been massacred. Furthermore, the provisions would
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last only a short time; they could not withstand a siege. Julia
capitulated with honourable terms, and at sunset on 31 August 1782
the Spanish garrison, 742 men and twenty-seven officers, marched out
of the fort to the drumming of tambours. ConcepciOn de Honduras, five
months old and the only Spanish community ever to be established on
the Mosquito Shore, was again in English hands.73
Because every veteran soldier in the kingdom had been captured
at ConcepciOn and could not return to active duty until a like number
of English prisoners were released, and because of the exhausted state
of the militia, GiEtivez feared a new English offensive. Yet he was
determined to gain revenge for his humiliation, and requested warships
and 100 trained mastiffs from the governor of Havana. With these fierce
animals he would destroy all signs of civilisation on the Coast. But
Gelvez was never able to carry out his threats, for he was named viceroy
of New Spain in October, and died shortly afterwards while trying to
direct from Mexico operations against the English and Mosquitos. Gailvez
had been a vigorous defender of Spanish rights in middle America, but
in the end his efforts were no more successful than any previous--and
73Domfuguest to Rosado, 23 September 1782, Cuba 1324; Articles of
capitulation, 31 August 1782, Cuba 1323; Despard to Hodgson, 5
September 1782, AGS, Guerra 6945; Hickey to Hodgson, 26 October 1782,
AGS, Guerra 6945; Bills presented by Robert Hodgson, 17 July 1782,
Sta Fe 1261; Julie to Gelvez, c. 31 August 1782, Guat 466; Parry to
Rowley, 23 August 1782, Ads 1/242, f. 46; Despard to Campbell, 2
September 1782, CO 123/14; Lawrie to Campbell, 31 August 1782, CO 123/14;
Campbell to Townshend, 10 October 1782, printed in the London Gazette,
30 November 1782, p. 753; Edward Marcus Despard, Memoirs of the Life of
Col. M. Despard (London, 1803), p. 13; Julil to Gailvez, 23 August 1782,
cited by Calderen, "Un Incidents Minter", p. 18.
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far more expensive. '
While the war continued, in fact early in the conflict, Spdh and
England began unofficial peace talks, with England basing her demands
on the articles of the Treaty of 1763. The Spanish did not reject
this suggestion, but insisted that the article relating to the Bay of
Honduras be carefully defined to avoid future quarrels. 75
 The talks
continued for two years, however, while each side struggled on the
battlefield to gain a position of strength. The English emissary,
Richard Cumberland, believed that he had the advantage in the negotiations,
and took the precaution "not to insert the article relative to the
Mosquito Shore". Although he felt no obligation to abandon the Shore
in exchange for peace, he was willing to give it up to assure the
retention of Gibraltar and Minorca. Cumberland's hopes for an advantageous
settlement were shattered by the arrival of the Comte d'Estaing in
Madrid and by the celebrated London riots of 1780, two events which
stiffened Spain's resolve to demand the best terms possible. But the
Spanish felt no confidence in obtaining an early and easy peace. In
February 1782, Floddablanca said that England would not give Spain
what she demanded, in fact he heard that an English minister had remarked
that"the King of England would recognize American independence when the
French were masters of the Tower of London"; and that "Madrid would be
the only equivalent exchange '!or Gibraltar. 76 But not until word
74
M. Galvez to J. Gllvez, 17 October 1782, cited by Calderdn,"Un Incidente
Militar", p. 23; M. Gilvez to J. Galvez, 21 September 1782, Garcia Pel&ez,
a.cit., p. 127.
75Floridablanca to Hussey, 2 March 1780, SP 94/209, f. 5.
76	 JHernandez". Sanchez, "La Paz de 1783", p. 185.
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reached London of Giftivez , victories in the Bay of Honduras did England
change her official attitude. In July 1782, the new English peace
commissioner, Alleyn Fitzherbert, was authorised to abandon the Treaty
of 1763 as the basis for negotiations and to consider Spanish demands
for territorial restitution and compensation. Early in the autumn,
before news of the successful English counteroffensive on the Shore
reached Madrid, the Spanish proposals were presented to Fitiherbert.
In addition to demands relating to Florida, Gibraltar and Newfoundland, 77
Fitzherbert was told:
Experience has shown that the English settlements on the
firm ground of the coasts of Honduras, Campeche and Mosquitos
lead invariably, sooner or later, to enterprises and
discussions capable of lighting the fire of war. These
establishments must not continue, nor be renewed 1 for they
are incompatible with the continuation of peace.Y8
By December, each government openly desired to end hostilities.
The only undecided question was that of the English settlements in the
Bay of Honduras. The Spanish no longer referred to the Mosquito Coast
by name, probably because its military reconquest raised the prospect
of a legal English claim to the region. But the Spaniards were granted
a fortuitous argument for their claims when Lord Grantham artlessly
commented to the Spanish imbassador in London about the Mosquito Shore:
"on alz retournera plus"; we will not return there again. The English
were not allowed to forget this statement.'9
77Cumberland to Shelburne, 20 May 1782, BM, Add 28,851, f. 3; Instructions
to Alleyn Fitzherbert, 27 July 1782, TO 27/3, f. 26.
78
To Alleyn Fitiherbert, 6 October 1782, AHN, Est 4203.
79Fitzherbert to Grantham, 18 December 1782, TO 27/3, f. 459; Grantham
to Spanish ambassador, 26 December 1782, 30/15/9, no. 945.
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The preliminary articles of peace were signed on 20 January 1783
with the Mosquito Shore question remaining unsolved. 80 Only one article
even hinted at the subject.
His Catholick Majesty shall not for the future suffer the
Subjects of His Britannick Majesty, or their Workmen, to be
disturbed or molested, under any Pretence whatsoever, in
their Occupation of Cutting, Loading and carrying away
Logwood, in a District of which the Boundaries shall be
fixed; and for this Purpose they may build without Hindrance,
and occupy without Interruption, the Houses and Magazines
necessary for them, for their Families, and for their Effects,
in a Place to be agreed upon either in the Definitive Treaty,
or within Six Months after the Exchange of the Ratifications.
And His said Catholick Majesty assures to them, by this
Article, the entire Enjoyment of what is above stipulated.
Provided that these Stipulations shall not be considered as 81
derogatory in any Respect from the Rights of His Sovereignty.
Throughout the war the Mosquito Shore seemed on the verge of being
granted colonial status. Germain had prompted adventurers to establish
on the Shore and had encouraged the Shoremen by promising them protection.
But he emulated previous ministers in taking no practical steps towards
colonial status,though perhaps he had this in mind when he wrote:
While the war continues...ghe Shoremen will7 be assured of
Succour and Protection, and they must endeavour to establish
themselves so effectually in that time, & from such Alliances
with the Natives & Creole Spaniards, thRt, when Peace comes,
they may be able to support themselves.°2
On 13 September 1780, Robert White proposed the establishment of
a "regular Royal Government" on the Shore to strengthen England's
80White to Germain, 22 June 1779, CO 137/75, f. 1; White to De Grey,
13 September 1780, CO 137/78, f. 145; White to Germain, 10 April and
28 July 1980, CO 137/80, ff. 19, 200; White to Townshend, 9 December
1782, CO 123/2, vol. ii.
81
Preliminary articles of peace between England and Spain, 20 January 1783,
30/15/9, no. 948.
82Germain to Dalling, 8 October 1779, co 137/75, f. 116.
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position in future peace negotiations. But White's imprudence and poor
timing were never more apparent. His memorials were blunt and demanding,
and tardy replies to his verbose petitions invariably incited embarrassing
sarcasm in his further correspondence. In August 1781, he complained
to Germain of the "Contempt shewen by Your Lordship to My Letters", and
asked for "an explanation of the Cause of this ungracious Treatment."
After further efforts to attract Germain's attention, he was humbled by
a short note from Knox addressed to "Henry White" about his "unauthorized
Representations respecting the Mosquito-Shore".
83
Nor did the Shoremen
strengthen their own cause. Their cowardly and disgracefill conduct
elicited the caustic ire of Germain shortly before White presented his
petition for colonial status.
The shameful Behaviour of the Baymen §e meant the Shoremen7
at Black River is a proof how little dependence ought to be
placed on such People, and how very unworthy the y are of
being the occasion of any extraordinary Expence. a4
More valuable support for the settlers came from Colonel Despard. In
spite of their shortcomings, he said, they were industrious men and worthy
of consideration.85
However, Whitehall found it difficult to support an independent
Mosquito colony because of its traditional dependence on Jamaica--
"without whose Preservation there can be little Expectation of retaining
83White to Germain, 28 August and 25 September 1781, CO 137/80, ff. 253,
312; White to Knox, 17 September and 10 October 1781, CO 137/80, ff. 300,
317.
84
Germain to Dalling, 6 September 1780, co 137/78, f. 130.
85
Despard to Dalliag, 3 September 1781, CO 137/81, f. 127.
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such retired Dependancies". 86 The fate of the Mosquito Shore was
to be left to talks leading to and following the definitive treaty
of peace.
86Shelburne to Campbell, 8 April 1782, CO 137/82, f. 141; Townshend
to Campbell, 26 November 1782, CO 137/82, f. 296.
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CHAPTER XI
MOSQUITO CONVENTION, 1783 - 1787
The preliminary articles of peace concluding the Anglo-Spanish
conflict of 1779 - 1783 made no mention of the Mosquito Shore,1
although the English presence on the Shore had been a major factor
in causing the war. But the Spanish were determined that there
should be no such oversight in the definitive treaty, which they felt
must delineate precisely the boundaries of British logwood settlements
in Yucatein, and leave neither "foundation nor pretext" for the British
to remain in their "furtive" establishments in the Bay of Honduras. 2
On the other hand, the British cabinet, disrupted by continuous dissensions
and preoccupied with the greater issues of France and America, had formed
no policy on the "Honduras question" to guide the Duke of Manchester,
the British commissioner in the ne ootiations which began in Paris on
21 May 1783. However the failure to name the Mosquito Shore in either
the Treaty of 1763 or in the recent preliminary treaty should have given
Manchester a strong advantage in discussions on this question. Nor
could England easily abandon the Bay of Honduras without provoking a
storm of controversy. 3 British merchants who traded there, the British
1 Preliminary articles of peace bet een England and Spain, 20 January 1783,
30/15/9, no. 948.
2Ca1dercin, Belice, p. 252; HernEfndez y SAInchez Barba, "La Paz de 1783",
pp. 180, 195.
3dhite to Fox, 30 April 1783, FO 72/1, f. 391; Campo to Aranda, 20 April and
8 June 1783, ARM, Est 2862, vol. ii; HernAndez y SAnchez parbs, op ! cit., 1)-
198; dlvez to Floridablanca, 3 June 1783, cited by Calderon, Belice, p.260.
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settlers on the Mosquito Shore (who were again pressing for colonial
status through their agent in London, Robert White), and the traditional
alliance with the Mosquito Indians, all had to be considered. 4 But because
of an oversight by Charles James Fox, who forgot to send instructions on
the Mosquito question, Manchester lost his advantage; he could only refer
to Lord Grantham's dispatch of 9 November 1782 to Fitzherbert for guidance.
Rather than think of parting with Gibraltar...You are
authorized to hold out a Relinquishment of our Settlements
on the Mosquito Shore, supposing fair Regulations to take
place, for leaving us Our ancient Right of cutting Logwood.... 5
Furthermore, Grantham had told the Conde de Aranda, the Spanish
commissioner at the negotiations: "Si c l eat du ate des Mosquitos lequel
a ete longtempa 67127 comme un Point jaloux, on n'y retournera plus." 6
Aranda, supported by the French minister, the Comte de Vergennes, used
this statement as an instrument to press for the total evacuation of the
English settlements on the Mosquito Shore. The result was a draft
article? which Fox called "as unpalatable as unexpected", and for which
he reproached Manchester for having allowed it to be inserted.
Your Grace's acquiescence in the Article proposed have made
it almost out of the question to hope that the Spanish Minister
will so far relax, as to acquiesce in the Idea of our Keeping
our Settlements on the Mosquito Shore....The only thing that
could be wished to have been otherwise in...this negotiation,
is that you had taken an earlier opportunity of apprising me
of this cursed clause in the 6th Spanish Article.
Memorial from the Shoremen to North, 8 April 1783, CO 123/2, vol. ii;
Mosquito Indian chiefs to Despart, 25 April 1783, CO 123/14; Chiefs to
Campbell, 25 April 1783, CO 123/14; Campo to Aranda, 8 June 1783,AHN,Est 424(
5Grantham to Fitzherbert, 9 November 1782, CO 123/3.
6Manchester to Fox, 6 July 1783, CO 123/3.
7EXcepting the word "Spanish" before the word "Continent", this article was
nearly identical to article six in the definitive treaty. See below,
p. 323,
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Nevertheless, Fox accepted some of the blame. "The unfortunate
circumstance too of my having left this Article quite blank in my
project prevented my words coming into consideration in the same manner
as those of the other Articles."8
Yet the draft article was far from a complete Spanish victory.
Manchester had refused to allow the words Mosquito Shore to be included
in it, leaving it so loosely worded that "the part of the world, which
settle& are to quit is totally undefined, and Jamaica itself
might, strictly speaking, come within."9 But Fox admitted privately that
the intention of the article was the evacuation of the Shore; as Robert
White said, "his Majestys Subjects reside no where on the Coast of
America in those parts, except upon the Mosquito Shore." 10
Convinced by White and certain merchants that the Shore was "much
the more considerable object" than the logwood settlements, Fox decided
to try to retain the country for England. And since it had not been
mentioned in the preliminary treaty, he argued, England was not bound
to give it up. 11 He instructed Manchester to omit the article if
possible, or to remove all references to the evacuation of settlements
in the West Indies. However rather than break off or unduly delay
8
Fox to Manchester, 20 July 1783, CO 123/3.
9Fox to Manchester, 2 July 1783, CO 123/3; Manchester to Fox, 6 July 1783,
CO 123/3.
10White to Fox, 24 June 1783, FO 72/1, f. 523.
11Dyer to Munro, 17 March 1783, NLS, 5528, f. 115; Campo to Aranda, 28 June
1783, AHN, Est 4246; Fox to Yanchester, 2 July 1783, CO 123/3; Fox to
Manchester, 20 July 1783,30/15/9, no. 1141; Dyer to Fox, 28 June 1783,
10 72/1, f. 539.
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negotiations, he was to sign the treaty including the controversial article.
The English commissioner first tried, unsuccessfully, to eliminate the
article, and then tried to alter its wording, which provoked Aranda to
cry repeatedly "Expliquez vous, il faut vous expliquer", 12 until Manchester
finally found it necessary to explain that England
had some Settlements on the Mosquito Shore which had no
Connection with Honduras but were on the Territory of Free
Indians which Our Government had never had an Idea of
abandoning, and of which no mention had ever been made in
the negotiations; We could not therefore consent to give
them up by general Words.13
But Aranda refused to alter his stand, although he agreed to insert the
word "Spanish" before the word "Continent" in the article. It was a
matter of "great indifference" to him, he said, whether or not the word
was included, since the whole continent and the adjacent islands were
under Spanish sovereignty. Aware that Aranda would break off the
negotiations rather than agree to the English requests, Manchester and
Fox accepted the lesser concession, hoping that it would make the article
even more vague than it already was. 14 While it remained obnoxious to
the English and even "dangerous to the duration of peace", Fox reasoned
12Fox to Manchester, 2 July 1783, CO 123/3; Manchester to Fox, 28 July 1783,
30/15/9, no. 1146; Manchester to Fox, 9 and 13 July 1783, CO 123/3; Fox
to George III, 12 July 1783, CKG, vi, 416. Vergennes told Manchester that
if he persisted with his objections: "Vous en aurez pour deux ans."
Manchester to Fox, 28 July 1783.
13Manchester to Fox, 13 July 1783, CO 123/3.
14Aranda to Manchester, 13 July 1783, 30/15/9, no. 1127; Manchester to Fox,
9 and 13 July 1783, CO 123/3.
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that England could interpret the term "Spanish Continent" in her own way. 15
ell aware that the issue would not end with the signing of the treaty,
he instructed Manchester to make no comments "which might in any degree
preclude or prejudge this future que8tion." 16 Aranda and Vergennes also
must have known that the article would bring further controversy, yet
Aranda failed to exact a more precise enunciation of Spanish demands,
because Vergennes, who was anxious to conclude the treaty, wished to
avoid "any Specifications or discussions on the Mosquito Business."
Consequently, when the treaty was signed on 3 September 1783, the problem
was left unsolved. 17
 The inclusion of article six18 in the Anglo-Spanish
Treaty of 1783 was a victory for Spanish diplomacy, although it remained
so vague as to be left entirely open to diverse interpretations.
A few days after the signing of the treaty, Lord North, secretary
of state for the home department, defined England's public interpretation
of article six.
by the words Spanish Continent, His Majesty's Servants
understand that part of the Coast of Honduras which is not
included in the described Limits, and such other parts of
the Continent of North America, as have been, and are
acknowledged by Us to belong to the Crown of Spain.19
15Fox to George III, 19 July 1783, CKG, vi, 419; Fox to Manchester, 20 July
1783, CO 123/3; Draft note, Manchester to Aranda, n.d., 30/15/9, no. 1123;
Cabinet minutes, 18 July 1783, Lord John Russell, ed., Memorials and
Correspondence of Charles James Fox (4 vols., London, 1553-57), ii, 132.
George III, on hearing of this deception, commented: "It is a very untoward
circumstance that a Definitive Treaty cannot be concluded without leaving
clear ground for fresh Disputes." George III to Fox, 19 July 1783, CKG,
420.
16
Fox to Manchester, 20 July 1783, CO 123/3.
17
Manchester to Fox, 31 July 1783, CO 123/3; Diary of the Conde de Aranda, 9
July 1783, AHN, Eat 4230; Vincent T. Harlow, The Founding of the Second 
British Empire 1763-1793 (2 vols., London, 1952, 1964), i, 324.
18See Appendix A.
North to Campbell, 3 October 1783, co 137/83, f. 134.19
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In accordance with the terms of the treaty be informed Governor Campbell
of Jamaica that "the Subjects of His Britannic Majesty, wherever dispersed
...on the aforesaid Spanish Continent shall collect themselves within...
the space of 18 Months after the exchange of the Ratifications of the
said Treaty" within the assigned territory on the logwood coast of
Yucatan (Belize). 20 Since there were few British settlers on the coasts
of Yucatan, M4xico and middle America in 1783 except those at Belize and
on the Mosquito Shore, North could only have been referring to the Shore.
But in a secret dispatch to Campbell he outlined England's actual
interpretation of the article.
His Majesty, in His Negotiations with the Court of Spain,
most certainly never meant to affect the rights of any third
Person, and consequently did not include the Mosquito Shore
(which has never belonged to the Crown of Spain) under the
name of the Spanish Continent.
Therefore, he said, English settlers on the Shore did not have to evacuate
their settlement8; 21 in fact they "ought to be supported", although in
as inoffensive a manner as possible.
It would be disadvantageous to enter into a fresh Quarrell
with Spain upon this point in the moment of a return of Peace,
when the Nation, from their aversion to War, may be inclined
to yield too much for the sake of preserving the Public
Tranquility. It is to be hoped, that Spain is in the same
Sentiments, and that when She sees our Settlers in a condition
to resist, She will not use Force at the hazard of producing
a fresh rupture between the two Courts.22
20North to Campbell, 30 September 1783, CO 137/83, f. 125.
21North to Campbell, 3 October 1783, "Most secret & confidential",
CO 137/83, f. 131.
22North to Campbell, 7 November 1783, CO 137/83, f. 136.
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Superintendent Lawrie was informed in November that "The native
Princes and Inhabitants of that Country will...rest satisfied, that
they are exactly on the same footing as before the commencement of the
War."23 This decision encouraged a large migration to the Shore of
Loyalists from South Carolina, Virginia and Georgia, and of others
"ruined by the cession of East and the conquest of West Florida." The
Mosquito Shore, according to an editorial in the Kingston Royal Gazette,
should replace England's lost colonies, especially in this "period of
crisis" when every effort must be made to extend commerce, England's
"only resource in the day when the combined rage of the House of Bourbon
attempts to shake you to the centre."24
When a new English government reaffirmed the previous policy of
support for the Mosquito Shore, 25 Governor Campbell agreed to assist the
Loyalists to establish themselves there, and sent detailed instructions
to Lawrie to improve civil administration, including the election of a
council. 26 However, Whitehall's pledge of support did not alleviate the
23Campbell to Lawrie, 26 November 1783, CO 137/84.
24Kingston Royal Gazette, 12 October 1784, p. 250; Campbell to North, 14 Jul:
1783, CO 137/83, f. 120; Campbell to Sydney, 3 July 1784, CO 137/84; Tonyn
to Campbell, 27 May 1784, CO 137/84; J. Campbell to A. Campbell, 3 July
1784, CO 123/3.
Lord Sydney, who came to office at the fall of North, not only affirmed thz
government "will shew a particular attention to their Situation and
concerns", but authorised convicts to be sent to Belize and to the Shore t4
cut wood for the Baymen and to assist the American Loyalists to establish
themselves. The authorisation was later withdrawn, but not until a large
number of convicts had already been sent to the Shore. Sydney to Campbell
19 March 1784, CO 137/84; Sydney to Clarke, 5 October 1784, CO 137/84.
25
26Campbell to Lawrie, 4 June 1784, CO 123/14. No Indian, indented s rvant,
mulatto, Negro or anyone of mixed blood was eligible for the council.
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insecurity of the Shoremen, who were apprehensive about Spanish intentions
and about the weakness of their aging superintendent. According to Campbell:
Major Lawrie is actually worn down to a state of Dotage, and
as his Estimates are generally formed by designing people
about him, who take advantage of his years and infirmities,
I find it necessary to restrict his draughts for the
extraordinary Services of the Shore, as they often exceed
the limits of propriety.27
The fears of the settlers were well-founded. In July 1783 a high-ranking
Spanish official said that the Mosquito Coast should be invaded immediately
after the signing of the definitive treaty of peace, before the English
had time to react. If this were not done, Spain would find herself
threatened with guerras a cada instante. 28 Matfas de Gdivez, the
viceroy of M/xico, had already begun to fit out an expedition in Guatemala
and Havana to destroy the Mosquito Indians, those "disobedient vassals
of the king". 29 On receiving intelligence of these plans, Fox asserted
that the expedition could be "justified upon no principal whatever."30
However Manchester and Aranda ignored the subject, not wishing to allow
new issues to disrupt the negotiations.
On 25 August, a week b fore the signing of the treaty, Jose de GAlvez
gave the president of the audiencia of Guatemala, Jos' Estacherla, the
"extremely important" duty of removing the British settlers from Black
River--by force if necessary--if they had not already moved as prescribed
by the treaty that was about to be signed. Once the English were gone,
27Campbell to Townshend, 25 January 1783, CO 137/83, f. 19.
28
A /rticulo del oficio, 17 July 1783, AHN, Est 4227, vol. i.
29
Aranda to Campo, 30 July 1783, AHN, Est 2862, vol. ii.
30Fox to Manchester, 20 July 1783, CO 123/3; Galvez to Floridablanca,
8 February 1783, AHN, Est 4203.
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Estacherfa was to command a two-pronged offensive against the Mosquito
Indians in conjunction with Matfas de Gilvez, Governor Merino Ceballos
of Campeche, and the viceroy-archbishop of Santa F4, Juan Antonio
Caballero y GOngora. One arm of the expedition was to move north from
PanamA, subduing the Calidonian Indians en route, while another column
was to move south from Guatemala; the two armies were to draw together
until "those Barbarians were reduced to a state of extinction or
prostration", so that they could never again rebel against the king or
give asylum to foreign enemies of the crown. 31 Early in January 1784,
Estacherfa said that he was ready to begin operations. Spanish troops
gathered at the headwaters of the major rivers leading to the Shore,
while naval forces were ready to sail from Havana, Campeche, MArida,
Bacalar, Omoa, Truxillo and Cartagena. 32 According to Galvez, the
Mosquitos, those "enemies of all humanity", faced slavery or "utter
extinction". The operation, which alvez called "the most important
duty assigned to me by our august sovereign", was scheduled to begin
on 1 March 1784.33
The settlements on the Shore were not without protection. Admiral
31alvez to Estacheria, 25 August 1783, Guat 665; alvez to Merino
Ceballos, 25 August 1783, Calderdn, Belice, p. 263.
32Estacherla to GAlvez, 6 January 1784, Guat 665; Christopherz to Campbell,
10 April 1784, CO 123/3; Lawrie to Campbell, 4 August 1784, FO 72/3, f.271
Despard to Campbell, 4 August 1784, FO 72/3, f. 283; Mosquito chiefs to
Campbell, 12 June 1784, CO 157/84.
33GA1vez to Merino y Ceballoa, 5 May 1784, Guat 666; Caballero y G6ngora
to GAlvez, 21 March 1784, CRM, p. 224; Despard to Campbell, 4 August
1784, FO 72/3, f. 283.
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Gambier of the Jamaica naval station, one of the few naval men who had
ever supported the Mosquito settlements, approved "at this Critical period",
Campbell's intention "to Keep these petty Kings and Princes, steady in
their Diatural affection ibr the English and hatred of the Spaniards...."'
In July he ordered a ship of the line to convoy a regiment of troops to
the Shore. Their arrival overjoyed the Mosquitos, who lit great fires
as the English sailed along the coast. It was now believed that "hostile
efforts may be of no more avail against our country, than the pecking of
a wren against the tallons of an eagle."35
But the Spanish attack did not occur. Viceroy Caballero y angora
failed to recruit an invasion force, preferring rather to work for the
peaceable conversion of the Mosquitos. Then with the publication of the
treaty of peace, Matfas de alvez ordered that operations be suspended
until 19 March 1785, eighteen months after the evacuation of British
settlements in the Bay of Honduras.
	 Gdlvez continued
offensive preparations against the Mosquito Indians. In May 1784, after
asking for permission to attack them, but before receiving the affirmative
answer (which was issued on 4 August by Charles III), he ordered the
governors of Bacalar and Campeche to send armed piraguas and 300 men each
to Truxillo, and he revived plans to use perros bravos against Ne6roes
54Gambier to Stephens, 28 February 1784, Adm 1/243.
35Gambier to Stephens, 5 July 1784, Ada 1/243; Norman to Pakenham, 23 August
1784, Ada 1/243; Gambier to Sydney, 14 November 1784, CO 123/3; Supplement
to the Kinston Morning Post, 19 and 26 March 1785.
360aba11ero y GOngora to Gilvez, 31 March 1784, Sta Fe 600; Gitivez to
Estacherfa, 9 June 1784, Guat 666; Estacherfa to alvez, 11 August 1784,
Guat 666; Lawrie to Norman, 20 September 1784, FO 72/4, f. 41.
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and Zambos living near Black River. 37
 Trusting neither President
Estacherfa nor the gov rnor of YucatAn, he named Francisco Antonio
Crespo (inspector interino in Mexico) to command the expedition. In
the weeks that followed, 1,000 militiamen and seven vessels from the
presidio at Bacalar gathered at Truxillo to await GAlvez' commands.
But Galvez died suddenly without leaving further instructions, and his
subordinates, including Crespo, were unenthusiastic about conducting
military operations on a distant frontier, and left the responsibility
to Gabriel de Hervias, commander at Truxillo. But Hervias decided that
he could do nothing without further reinforcements, arguing that it was
impossible to attack the enemy by land. 38 Furthermore, because of the
"infinity of swamps and lagoons" in a country unadaptable to Spanish
labour, and inhabited by cruel Indians, Hervias did not even think that
Spain should wish to attack. While his orders were explicit and included
"every thing but the word War", he refused to invade the Coast and asked
for a transfer to another post. 39
37Memorial from Matfas de GAlvez, 18 April 1784, CRM, p. 231; M. GAlvez to J.
GAlvez, 24 April 1784, Guat 665; GlItivez to M rino Ceballos, 19 May 1784,
Guat 666; Real orden to Caballero y Gdhgora, 4 August 1784, CRM, p. 228;
Floridablanca to Campo, 25 November 1784, AGS, Est 8134.
38
Hervias' troops were mostly impressed militiamen (many of whom had already
died of disease), and were "much disatisfied with the usage they rec ived
from...5i7." Herrera to fGalvez, 25 February 1785, Guat 665; Real audiena
gobernadora of Mexico to Galvez, 25 April 1785 1 Guat 666; EstacE;Tia to
Hervias, 30 April 1784, Guat 665; Hervias to Galvez, 8 Aueust 1784, Gust
666; Report by Gabriel de Hervias, 15 August 1784, Guat 666; Estacherfa to
GAlvez, 12 October 1784, AHN, Eat 4227, vol. ii. An English naval officer
who visited Truxillo said that he "only wanted assistance to destroy the
whole." Norman to Pakenham, 17 October 1784, FO 72/4, f. 47.
39Hervias to Galvea, 8 November 1784, Guat 666; Norman to Pakenham, 17
October 1784, FO 72/4, f. 47.
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If Hervias had invaded the Mosquito Shore, failure would surely
have attended his efforts, for by the middle of November 1784, the
English had collected 1,600 armed men to repulse the expected invasion,
which was now rumoured to be set for 19 February 1785, a month before
the expiration of the eighteen months granted by the treaty of peace.
England also had powerful warships in the Bay, while the only vessel
available to Hervias when he was ordered to travel to Black River to
discuss the terms of the treaty with the British had no sails. ko
As the Spanish became aware that the English intended to retain their
settlements on the Mosquito Shore, a suspicion arose that they also
intended to make themselves masters of the coast from Yucaten to Darien,
and then to construct an interoceanic canal to Realejo by way of the
San Juan River and Lake Nicaragua. Hervias cited the weakness of Spanish
positions on the San Juan River and at Truxillo, and said that the people
of Olanchito and Yoro were "English rebels at heart" and ready to "take
up arms for England". Estacher/a said that the English operating from
the Mosquito Coast, "where the consequences have been so fatal to the
state, business, peace and tranquility of the kingdom," were also planning
to promote an alliance between the Zambos Mosquitos and the irreduced
/ 41
Indians of Peten. 	 Plans were in fact then underway to unite the
Mosquitos with the San Bias Indians of Panamit, although neither the
Lawrie to Clarke, 22 December 1784, CO 137/85; Hervias to Galvez,
8 August 1784, Gust 666; Report by Gabriel de Hervias, 15 August 1784,
Guat 666.
41Hervias to alvez, 26 October and 22 December 1784, Guat 666; Fhertes to
Casamayor, 11 March 1784, Guat 665; Estacherfa to Gillvez, 12 November
1784, Guat 666; Estacherfa to Mace, 27 March 1784, Gust 665.
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Spanish fear nor the English plans were realised. Colonel Despard
remarked that in alliance the Mosquitos and San Bias Indians would be
able to resist all the power of Spain. 42
Although too weak to wage a successful war in the West Indies, Spain
was blindly determined to fight for the Mosquito Coast, hopefully with
the aid of the French, but alone if necessary. According to Bernardo
del Campo, who was named envoy to the Court of St. James in February
1783 after rising swiftly through Spain's "anonymous bureaucracy",
Whether by blood and fire or otherwise, we must see that
not a single Englishman remain on the Spanish Continent...
because even the doleful extreme of a war to obtain completely
this object would be in truth the lesser evil than tolerating
them there, allowing them to consolidate and forcing Spain)
to suffer the same war at a time and under the circumstances
to suit them.
In a conference late in October with Lord Carmarthen, secretary of state
for the foreign department in Fitt's ministry, Campo said that: "f aM7
sure that the king Eng master would rather risk ten wars than yield
this point." England had no alternative, he declared, but to issue
immediate orders for the evacuation of the Shore. 44
Intelligence that the Spanish were not only considering a war but
actually preparing for hostilities in the Bay of Honduras alarmed the
British cabinet and prompted the radical Duke of Richmond to comment:
"This must necessarily...bring on a Rupture with Spain...." If England's
42_
memorial from Edward Marcus Despard, 10 November 1784, CO 123/3.
43
Campo to Floridablanca, 5 November 1784, AHN, Est 4227, vol. i.
44
Minutes of a conversation between Campo and Carmarthen, 28 October 1784,
BM, Add 28,059, f. 48; Campo to Floridablanca, 5 November 1784, AHN,
Est 4227, vol. i.
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rights to the Shore could not be supported on legal and historical
grounds, he said, then she should withdraw her settlers from there
so as to avoid a war. 45
Early in Nove ber 1784, Pitt, with the approval of his cabinet,
decided to negotiate the evacuation of the Mosquito Shore. On 15 November
he instructed Robert Liston, the English envoy in Madrid, to broach the
subject with Floridablanca. "It might be also privately added", Pitt
said, "...that there is no doubt of our being ready to remove from the
Mosquito Shore if the Business is put in a proper Train;" but first
musg satisfy the Public, and justify our Conduct to Parliament"
by insuring the security of the Mosquito Indians and by obtaining an
additional cession of land for the wood-cutters.
	 Floridablanca
should react to the overture by arguing that the matter was no longer
open to discussion, that by the definitive treaty the English had already
surrendered the Shore, then Liston was to proclaim that "the Probability
of Hostilities taking Place...will fully prove the Necessity of some
further Arrangements...."47
The willingness to accommodate Spain resulted from a variety of
reasons. England was still recuperating from seven years of war; the
resumption of hostilities could be an economic disaster. Furthermore,
an accord with Spain would lead hopefully to important commercial
46Anon. minute, 13 November 1784, FO 72/3; Pitt to Liston, 15 November 1784,
FO 72/3; Carmarthen to Liston, 28 November 1784, FO 185/1.
47Carmarthen to Liston, 28 November 1784, FO 185/1.
45
Richmond to Sydney, 29 October 1784, CO 123/3.
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concessions and to the dissolution of the crumbling Franco-Spanish family
alliance. 48
Yet while England was anxious to resolve the Mosquito problem and
ready to make the neces ary concessions, she see ed unable to do so
gracefully. Carmarthen told Campo early in Dece ber that there were
many people who believed that the Mosquito Shore was not part of the
Spanish continent. This news "came as if it had fallen from the clouds",
Campo said later. He "had to call for assistance from God so as not to
become discomposed or say or do anything that he would later regret."
He told Carmarthen that the English interpretation of the phrase was
absurd. "Not only would it be a scandal to all of Europe," he said,
"but it would inevitably cause a bloody war, because the decorum of the
king and the honour of the Spanish people would be cruelly compromised." 49
A similar exchange on "that cursed Mosqueto affair" occurred between
Liston and Floridablanca in Madrid. Floridablanca began the conversations
by saying that: "The English Ministry lost an opportunity of uniting the
two Countries at the commencement of the last War. Another now presents
itself, I hope they will not neglect that also." In reply, Liston
claimed the Mosquito Shore for England on legal grounds, and then
explained the English interpretation of the phrase "Spanish Continent".
Floridablanca, a man with "Strong nervous affections", according to Liston,
48
Carmarthen to Liston, 28 November 1784,F0 185/1; Pitt to Liston, 29
November 1784, FO 72/3; Liston to Carmarthen, 5 December 1784, FO 72/3.
49
Campo to Floridablanca, 11 December 1784, AHN, Est 4227, vol. ii.
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"appeared to have difficulty to contain the marks of his dissatisfaction
within the Bounds of moderation." "I thought myself lucky", he remarked,
"in not having been kicked down Stairs." If England "resolved to protect
her Settlers upon the Mosquito Shore", Floridablanca threatened that ',War
must be a consequence." His kin6 would grant only a three-month extension
of time for the evacuation of the Shore; English settlers who refused to
move peacefully would be driven away by force. As to the Mosquito Indians,
Spain would "reduce them to submission or...transport them to the different
islands in the Gulf of Mexico."50
Yet the heated conversations were little more than decoration; on
7 January 1785 Floridablanca promised to ask the king to suspend orders
for the expulsion of the English settlers from the Mosquito Shore and he
agreed to continue conversations with Liston. 51
Reales Ordenes calling for the suspension of all hostile plans
against the Mosquito Coast were issued on 20 January 1785 to Spanish
govenors in the West Indies. Until these orders arrived months later,
however, the Spanish continued their offensive plans. A large number of
Liston to Fraser, 8 January 1785, FO 72/4; Resolution by Charles III,
5 January 1785, AHN, Est 4227, vol. i; Liston to Carmarthen, 7 January
1785, no. 1, NLS, 5531, f. 1; Liston to Fraser, 8 January 1785, FO 72/4;
Liston to Carmarthen, 8 January 1785, FO 72/4. Floridablanca commented
that the English interpretation of the words "Spanish Continent" was
"a subterfuge which he should not have been surprized to meet with from
an Italian Abbe, but which was unworthy of Englishmen...." Liston to
Carmarthen, 7 January 1785, no. 1, NLS, 5531, f. 1.
51
Liston to Carmarthen, 7 January 1785, no . 2 1 DILS , 5531, f. 7.
50
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piraguas were being constructed on the Wanks River and on Lake Nicaragua
for an attack scheduled to be made in October against the Mosquito Indians,
"whose Extirpation was determined on from their repeated Barbarities." 52
Exaggerated rumours reached Black River that the attack was planned for
April, rather than October, and that 14,000 Spanish troops were going
to descend on the Shore; similar intelligence came from the Baymen at
Belize. 53 When word was received that Pitt had decided to discourage
further immigration to the Shore, and when no assistance was given to
Shoremen who wanted to move from there, the general situation "cast a univera
damp on all their Spirits...."54 The English began frantic defensive
preparations and pleaded for aid; failing that they demanded boats so
that they might flee the country. "I shall be left alone", Lawrie said,
unless troops were placed on the Shore. He called a general congress of the
Mosquitos at Cape Gracias a Dios in January to soothe the Indians, who had
begun to form "the most Unfavourable Ideas of our Sincerity; And to suspect
52
Reales 4rdenes, 20 January 1785, CRM, p. 242; Estacherfa to Geflvez,
15 April 1785, Guat 666; Medina to Morales, I March 1785, AHN, Est 4227,
vol. i; Robinson to Lawrie, 25 January 1785, FO 72/5, f. 524.
53Letter from Black River, 10 February 1785, printed in The Whitehall
Evening Post, 7 May 1785.
54
Baymen to Campbell, 31 May 1784, CO 137/84; Cabinet minutes, 15 November
1784, CO 123/3; Paterson to Hervias, 5 February 1785, Guat 666; Despard
to (probably) White, I March 1785, CO 123/3; Dirom to Sydney, 5 March 1785,
CO 123/3; Supplement to the Kingston Morning Post, 5 March 1785. The
critical situation in the Bay of Honduras caused a different sort of cancer]
in Jamaica. When word was received from London that troops would soon be
arriving in Kingston intended for the defence of the Mosquito Shore, an
anonymous correspondent to a Kingston paper wrote that: "lie must, no doubt,
think ourselves highly indebted to our Mosquito brethren, as on their
account we are to be saddled with the maintenance of 2,000 men, which, with
regard to ourselves, we have not the least occasion for." Supplement to
the Royal Gazette, 4 June 1785, p. 455.
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that the British Settlers would assist the Spaniards, to extirpate them
from the Country." However the arrival of reinforcements and a large
supply of arms, plus three warships to patrol the coast, calmed the
settl re and Indians. The Zambo General, Thomas Lee, even offered to
attack Truxillo with 500 men to destroy whatever armaments the Spanish
were preparing there. On Sydney's orders, George Etherington (promoted
to brigadier general for this service) was sent to command the regular
troops during the "critical Situation of affairs in that Country", although
Etherington was given strict orders not to fight unless the Shore was
attacked. 55
Spanish intelligence reports said that English warships were at
Cape Gracias a Dios and that twenty-eight Mosquito piraguas were being
armed for the purpose "of beginning a war before the conclusion of the
period signaled by the treaty of peace." A Spanish spy learned in a
Kingston waterfront cafe that English troops had orders to insult and
provoke the Spanish into a war. The English had so overreacted defensively
that Estacheria, who had planned to invade the Coast, now believed that
the enemy was preparing a "lively war" and called for strong reinforcements
(especially if he were to carry out his orders), as well as for guardacostas
Lawrie to Campbell, 12 June 1784, FO 72/3, f. 260; White to Nepean,
19 May 1785, CO 123/3; Pakenham to lords of the Admiralty, 22 January
1785, FO 72/5, f. 309; White to Sydney, 16 April 1785, CO 123/3;
Clarke to Yonge, 24 January 1785, WO 1/54; Pakenham to Cornwallis,
28 January 1785, Adm 1/243; Jamaica Gazette, 26 January and 5 February
1785, p. 95; Log of HMS Bull o , 20 Marcn 1785, Adm 51/141; Clarke to
btherington, 30 January 1785,
 CO 137/85.
55
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from Cartagena and Havana to patrol the Shore. During this tense period,
one clash was reported between English and Spanish vessels, and there
were even rumours that war had erupted.%
But when Etherington arrived on the Shore, he requested the Spanish
to do nothing until word was received of the progress of negotiations in
Europe. Hervias readily agreed to await further instructions; he had
little choice, for his veteran troops were almost nonexistent, and the
militiamen were forever disappearing. In fact, he had only twelve men
fit for duty at the end of the stipulated eighteen months period after
the Treaty of Peace. Then in April, the real orden of 20 January arrived
in Guatemala, and war was averted. 57
This period of uncertainty had a severe effect on the Mosquito Shore
economy. Immigration was stunted and men were reluctant to gamble the
lives of their slaves or to invest money in clearing land. Some of the
leading settlers began to abandon the Shore. The Spanish faced similar
problems. Lookouts had to be supported on the frontiers of the Mosquito
territories and expeditions undertaken ito maintain the English within
their limits." According to treasury accounts received from Santa Fe,
Estacherfa to GIlvez, 15 April 1785, Guat 666; Audiencia of Guatemala
to GAlvez, 20 February 1785, Guat 666; Zejudo to Casamayor, 11 April
1785, Guat 666; Hervias to Estacherfa, 23 April 1785, Gust 666;
Declaration by Captain Swasey, printed in the Supplement to the Royal
Gazette, 5 February 1785, P. 115; Anon. editorials in the Supplement 
to the Royal Gazette, 19 February and 26 March 1785, p. 255; Sastre to
Gilvez, 20 March 1785, Guat 666; Hernendez y anchez Barba, 211..cit.,
p. 215.
57Hervias to Etherington, 4 March 1785, FO 72/5; Hervias to Estacherfa,
5 March 1785, Gnat 666; Sydney to Clarke, 8 March 1785, CO 137/85;
Estacherfa to Gelvez, 14 January, 15 March and 30 April 1785, Gnat 666.
56
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Guatemala and Yucaan for an unspecified period of time, these operations
and other defensive measures against the Mosquito Indians and English in
the Bay of Honduras had cost more than £700,000 sterling. 58
Before talks could begin seriously in Europe on a treaty respecting
the Mosquito territory, the question of preconditions had to be resolved.
Charles III would not negotiate until the English issued orders for the
evacuation of the Mosquito Coast, and he insisted that Gibraltar be
included in the discussions as his price for enlarged boundaries on the
logwood coasts. Carmarthen refused to accept these conditions, arguing
that the evacuation of the Mosquito Shore was to be the subject of the
negotiations, and that "it seems perfectly impossible that we should
ever admit a separate Object, & one of such Importance gis Gibraltar],
to be introduced into the Consideration of the present Question."59 Since
Spain's only practical objective in the negotiations was the acquisition
of the Mosquito Coast, Floridablanca agreed to begin talks on England's
terms. As a way of "bringing this unpleasant business to a more speedy
conclusion", George III suggested that London, rather than Madrid, be
selected as the site for the negotiations. 60
58Galvez to Floridablanca, 15 February 1785, Guat 666.
59Campo to Floridablanca, 29 January 1785, AHN, Est 4227, vol. i; Carmarthen
to Liston, 3 March 1785, no. 4, FO 185/2. According to Carmarthen,
England's object was "to bring the Spanish Minister to consent to a
Negotiation for an Exchange of Territory, in Lieu of the Settlements at
present held by British Subjects on the Mosquito Shore." Carmarthen to
Liston, 3 March 1785, no. 5, TO 185/2.
6oFloridablanca to Carmarthen, 16 February 1785, TO 72/4, f. 201; George III
to Carmarthen, 3 March 1785, LCG, 1, 136.
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The English entered the talks (which were delayed by heavy
parliamentary business in February and March 1785) knowing that if
they evacuated the Shore without some recompense "to justify the Measure
in the Public Opinion", it would create a "popular Clamour". They had
to consider their traditional alliance with the Mosquito Indians and
the "troublesome Task of removing the Settlers". Liston did not see
how the issue could be resolved. "The expulsion of the British
Inhabitants from the Mosquito Settlement", he said, "would raise such a
clamour as might be fatal to the Minister who should consent to it."
However, he added, the Mosquito Shore was the only "important subject
of contest" and would remain so until a solution was found to the problem. 61
Consequently, Spanish ministers did not enter the negotiations
optimistically. "If we see the Mosquito Coast without a single Englishman",
Campo wrote, "it will be truly God's benediction." Furthermore, he said
that England had extracted a Spanish promise not to initiate hostilities
in the Indies, while she delayed the evacuation of the Mosquito Coast
under the pretext that it was not part of the "Spanish Continent". Campo
even suspected that the English were promoting revolution in the Spanish
colonies. Floridablanca responded to the doubts of Spain's envoys in
Paris and London, exclaiming; " e must understand that we can never trust
that court in anything". The Mosquito Coast "was not of sufficient
61Campo to Fraser, 16 March 1785, AGS, Est 8134; Carmarthen to Liston,
3 March 1785, no. 4, FO 185/2; Liston to Carmarthen, 20 April 1785,
NLS, 5531, f. 100.
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importance to hazard involving the half of the World in a new war";
nevertheless he saw it as the cause of an imminent conflict; while in
"one of those fits of heat to which he is so frequently subject", he
told Liston that "it was impossible we should continue friends; that
the time must soon come when we should be violent and implacable enemies." 62
England also feared war over this issue. Unless British ministers
acted carefully in their discussions on the Mosquito Snore and the Bay
of Honduras, it was declared in an editorial in a London paper, "it is
very probable a war will be blown up again by incendiary rascals...."
While England struggled to pay the national debt, "the Spaniards may be
whetting the sword for another war.... "63
English representatives in Spain suspected that the French were
encouraging the Spanish to take an inflexible stand, and that the Duc
de Voguyon, the new French ambassador in Madrid ("a complete Courtier
and a man of intrigue"), had been sent to Spain for that very purpose. 64
Yet English ministers trusted their Spanish counterparts, although they
worried about the acts of individual Spanish officials in the Indies.
62Liston to Carmarthen, 7 January, 28 March, 20 April and 13 ay 1785,
NLS, 5531, ff. 7, 79, 100, 110; Aranda to Floridablanca, 4 February 1785,
AHN, Est 4227, vol. i; Campo to Floridablanca, 11 February 17 5, AHN, Est
4232; Campo to Floridablanca, 29 March and 26 April 1785, AHN, Est 4227,
vol. i; Floridablanca to Campo, 19 April 1785, AHN, Eat 4227, vol. i;
Liston to Carmarthen, 10 January 1785, private A, FO 185/2.
63The Whitehall Evening Post, 21 May 1785.
64Liston to Carmarthen, 13 lay 1785, NLS, 5531, f. 110; Munro to Carmarthen,
16 Fay 17 5, FO 72/5, f. 559.
6 5Liston to Carmarthen, 28 March 1785, NLS, 5531,f.79; Liston to Fraser,
30 March 17 5, FO 72/5; GAlvez, however, carefully followed the orders
of his uncle (Jose de GAlvez) to keep the pe ce. B. Gelvez to J. Gelvez,
4 April 1785, Gust 666.
Campo to Heredia, 17 June 1785, AGS, Eat 8157; Sydney to Clarke, 2 June
1785, CO 137/85; Carmarthen to Liston, 18 June 1785, FO 185/2. Curiously,
an article appearing the next day in a Kingston paper also ascribed the
wars of the eighteenth century to the Anglo-Spanish dispute over the Mos-
quito Shore. "The disputes between the Spaniards and the Settlers on the
Mosquito-Shore...with the smuggling trade carried on by the West-Indies
particularly the inhabitants of Jamaica, have been the cause of no
fewer than three wars with his Catholic Majesty, to the last of which we
owe our ruin, the loss of the dominion of the seas, and consequently of
America. It is more than probable that th present quarrel had originated
from the same causes." Supplement to the oyal Gazette, 18 June 1785,
p. 494.
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"I mention the d nger of Dn. d. de Galvez on of Matia0 de Galveg
doing mischief in the We t-Indies", Liston wrote. "He is a violent,
dangerous man" who might be "fed by his imperious and enterprizing
Disposition", to av nge his father's defeats on the Mosquito Shore by
attacking English settlements there without orders from Madrid. 65
When negotiations were resumed in London after the pause in February
and March, Campo was more optimistic of success. England would concede
Spanish demands, he said, because she did not want a war "for any reason
whatsoever". "With very little sacrifice Zr.e., territorial concessions
in Yucat;u27 our Court will succeed in settling this scabrous and
disagreeable matter which has already cost us several wars." 66 Progress
was immediate in spite of arguments against abandoning the Mosquito Shore
by two members of the British cabinet, the Duke of Richmond and Lord Gower.
The two nations agreed to include an article in the treaty to protect
the Mosquitos against mistreatment. (Campo later clarified this point
when he said that Spain "would never employ rigorous methods to reduce
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the Mosquitos except when they could not accomplish the same by softness
and moderationV67) But in the late summer and early autumn of 1785, even
as Spain made a second concession, permitting the Baymen to cut mahogany
as well as logwood in their assigned territory, a further delay (due to
urgent domestic business), precipitated a renewed crisis. Campo, who
had unsuccessfully tried to keep the negotiations going, wrote: "What
will they think at Madrid not hearing a word of Mosquitos? Damn Mosquitos!"
George III was also deeply concerned over the worsening situation. "If
both Courts do not with vigour enter into arranging the ill-left business
of the Mosquito Shore it must soon occasion much ill humour, which the
French may at their pleasure bring to something serious." 68 Spanish
ministers, interpreting the delay as being caused by ulterior motives,
especially when coupled with disquieting intelligence and rumours from
the Indies, ordered troops to be sent to the Bay of Honduras. And then,
with the explanation that England had failed to fulfil the sixth article
of the definitive treaty of peace, and that her "bad faith shows and
confirms itself more every day", Estacherfa, Caballero y GOngora and
Matfas de GAlvez were ordered to prepare "to harass and expel ghe
Campo to Carmarthen, 24 June 1785, AHN, Est 4227, vol. i; Floridablanca to
Liston, 1 May 1785, AGS, Est 8134. Meanwhile the English searched
(unsuccessfully) for proof that the Indians had tried to ally themselves
with the Spanish during or before the recent war. "Proof of the little
credit due to their professions to this country", Carmarthen said, "might
be of great service in the course of this business." Carmarthen to Liston,
11 February 1785, FO 185/2.
Campo to Pitt, 28 July 1785, AGS, Eat 8134; Campo to Floridablanca, 6 Augus
1785, AHN, Est 4227,vol.i; Campo to Carmarthen, 30 September 1785, AGS, Est
8134; Campo to Carmarthen, 1 September 1785, AHN, Est 4227, vol. i; Campo ti
Pitt, 13 September 1785, AHN, Est 4227, vol. i; Campo to Floridablanca,
7 October 1785, AHN, tst 4227, vol. i; George III to Sydney, 18 June 1785,
LCG, i. 166.
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Shoremeg...by force from the settlements on the Mosquito Coast." 69 dar
was again imminent, although William Carmichael, the American ambassador
in Madrid, did not believe so. "The two nations may bully," he said, "but
not fight in their pr sent circumstances for such an object."70 But
Carmichael was unaware of Spain's unflinching determination to acquire
the Mosquito Shore.
On the Shore, troop withdrawals from Black River were viewed "with
a degree of regret little short of Despair", and drew bitter complaints.
It also prompted the Shoremen to repeat defensive measures which had the
predictable effect of frightening neighbouring Spaniards. 71 Gabriel de
Hervias said that he would soon be forced to abandon Spanish military
posts near the Limn, Aguitn and Chapagna rivers of Honduras, as large
numbers of Loyalists were settling at Cape Gracias a Dios, and because
British settlements were being pushed ever closer to Truxillo. 72 As
usual, establishing an effective defence against the English and Mosquitos
seemed to be next to impossible. When Estacherfa ordered 100 militiamen
to be sent to Fort San Carlos on the San Juan River, seventy-three men
69Duff to Fraser, 1 August 1785, TO 72/6, f. 834; G4lvez to Floridablanca,
31 July 1785, AHN, Est 4227, vol. i; Real orden to Caballero y GOngora
and Matfas de Gglvez, 25 October 1785, Guai-3,6-6.
70Carmichael to Jefferson, 27 June 1785, PTJ, viii, 251.
71
Douglas to Lawrie, 21 June 1785, HA/MSL; Douglas to Innes, 20 June 1785,
HA/MSL; Hervias to Troncoso, 25 September 1785, Guat 666; Estacheria to
Galvez, 15 October 1785, Guat 470.
72
Letter from Jamaica, 7 May 1785, published in the Independent Gazeteer; or
the Chronicle of Freedom, Philadelphia, 11 June 1785; Caballero y G6ngora
to Gfilvez, 20 May 1785, Gust 666; Hervias to Estacheria, 28 June 1785, Gust
666; Ettacherfa to GAlvez, 15 August 1785, Gust 666; Estacherla to G4lvez,
15 September 1785, Gust 470; Hervias to Troncoso, 31 October 1785, Guat 666
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deserted the ni,ht after r ceiving their orders. Relations worsened
when some documents wh'ch d scribed En land's campaign on the San Juan
River in 1780 were captured by the Spanish and misinterpreted as being
plans for an impending invasion. And one Kingston p per reported that
"there is every reason to fear the groundwork is laying of a serious
quarrel between the two nations."73
However even as orders were being issued from Madrid to prepare for
war, the pendulum swung towards peace. British troops, who had again
returned to the Shore, were removed, easing tensions in the Indies; in
London, Campo said that the Shore was of insufficient consequence to
merit a war; furthermore, he said that the English should be trusted,
although they had caused the present long delay in negotiations; Spain
should not be too much in a hurry, for "it does not follow in this country
as it does in others that it can be said openly the King and his Council 
have decided the case and that is what will be done." He also suggested
that England be granted a few more leagues of "worthless territory in
Yucatan", a concession that English ministers had requested to prepare
public opinion for the abandonment of the Shore.
While Floridablanca was willing to grant this third concession to
the English, 74 the advantage in the negotiations remained with the Spanish,
73Estacherfa to GAlvez, 13 July 1785, Guat 666; Estacherfa to alvez, 14
October 1785, no. 32, Guat 879; Caballero y GOngora to GAlvez, 30 August
1785, Guat 666; "European intelligence", The Royal Gazette, 1 - 8 October
1785.
74
Hermenegildo to NarvAez, 12 December 1785, Guat 666; Estacherfa to GLvez,
15 December 1785, Guat 666; Carmarthen to Liston, 7 October 1785, FO 185/2;
Liston to Carmarthen, 27 October 17 5, FO 185/2p Campo to Floridablanca,
1 and 16 October and 23 November 1785, AHN, Est 4227, vol. i.
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for the compensation Spain offered in this new "concession" was a few
thousand square miles of unhealthy and unprofitable swampland and mountains
adjacent to Belize, itself "an open Receptacle for Out-Laws, Felons,
Foreigners, & all such Men as fly from Justice, or are fond of a
Licentious Life," and which did not offer an easy access into the
interior for British merchants. With "not above" twenty-five settlers,
there were not even enough people at Belize to form a government. 75
Robert White (who was to become the agent for the Baymen) said that "in
every point of View, Political as well as Commercial, the Mosquito Shore7
...is on present inspection, and in future Contemplation, infinitely
preferable to the Bay Settlement...."76
Also of advantage to Spain was the fact that England did not want a
war and still hoped to conclude a commercial treaty with Spain and to
separate the two Bourbon states (whose unity in a conflict many
Englishmen believed could turn England into a second-rate power). Yet
standing in the way of a harmonious relationship was the Mosquito Shore.
As Liston said: "The only indispensable Preliminary to any Degree of
Approximation between England and ...2Epaig seems an amicable Adjust ent
of our differences in America." 77
75Colonel Despard was the superintendent of the Belize settlements, but he
had been ordered to remain on the Mosquito Shore during the recent war and
had never taken up his new post, in spite of complaints. He did not move
to Belize until the evacuation of the Shore was terminated in June 1787.
White to Nepean, 26 November 1785, CO 123/3.
76White to Fraser, 16 December 1785, FO 72/6; White to North, 8 April 1783,
CO 123/2, vol.ii; White to Sydney, 25 November 1785, CO 123/3; Clarke to
Sydney, 7 February 1785, CO 137/85.
77Liston to Carmarthen, 30 December 1785, FO 72/6, f. 1454; Carmarthen to
Liston, 29 November 1785, FO 185/2; Campo to Floridablanca, 17 January
1786, AHN, Est 4227, vol. i.
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In January 1786, Floridablanca's distrust of the English led him
to weigh the advantages of acceding to the recent Franco-Dutch alliance.
He noted the increase in the number of English colonists on the Coast,
the command of the settlement at Cape Gracias a Dios by an English
colonel, the approach of settlers and wood-cutters to Truxillo, the
patrol of the coast by English warships, the attempt to disseminate
protestantism, and the continuing illicit trade. According to Liston:
The conclusion he drew was that we had formed a deliberate
plan for recommencing the war, by an invasion of the Spanish
Dominions in South America; that the negotiations begun by us
on the Subject of the Mosquito Coast had been only a pretext,
to gain time; and that we should renew hostilities as soon as
we thought ourselves in a condition to do it with advantage.
While "adhering to that sincerity which forms so striking a part of his
character", Floridablanca told Liston that Spain's eyes had been opened;
she could neither trust England nor try to stand alone against her, and
he admitted that the Spanish court had been invited to join the Franco-
Dutch Alliance. 78
Liston was deeply troubled. If any other minister but Floridablanca
had spoken of consenting to join the alliance, he said, it would merely
be "meant to alarm Great Britain, in hopes of obtaining on more favourable
terms the evacuation of the Mosquito Settlements."
	 that
76Liston to Fraser, 30 January 1786, FO 72/7; Liston to Carmarthen, 2 Februar3
1786, FO 72/7; Liston to Carmarthen, 5 and 10 February 1786, NLS, 5533,f 1.1]
15; From Liston n.d. (c. February 1786), FO 185/2; List of complaints agains
the British settlers on the Mosquito Coast, 6 Aptil 1786, AHN,Est 4227,vol.i
79The Spanish were aware of what might be gained by taking advantage of
England's fear of the Franco-Dutch alliance. Campo said that it created
an ideal opportunity for Spain to extract an advantageous treaty from
England. Campo to Floridablanca, 20 April 1786, AHN, Est 4227, vol. i.
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Floridablanca was serious, however, Liston went to him and "began to cry
like a baby", imploring him not to accede to the alliance. Floridablanca
replied that Spain would not do so if England would yield to Spain's
demand for the evacuation of the Mosquito Shore. 8o Liston wrote home
excitedly that "I have at least arrested for a moment a most disastrous
current of politicks that began to run against us." It was, he said,
indispensably neces ary to adopt some measures tending to an
immediate arrangement of the business of the Mosquito Shore,
if we wish to avoid a total change of principles and conduct
on the part oof Count Floridablanca, and perhaps an eventual
rupture... .°1
Faced with this situation, Pitt and the cabinet (which had not been
hasty to sign a convention with Spain when continued negotiations had
helped to maintain satisfactory relations) were suddenly given the
alternative of quickly resolving the Mosquito issue or of watching
England's European neighbours form an alliance obviously directed against
her. In March, Carmarthen said that the situation in Europe now made it
imperative that the Mosquito problem be settled quickly, although he
Floridablanca to Campo, 11 February 1786, cited by Hernandez y Sanchez Barb
op.cit., p. 223. Floridablanca was unaware of a serious incident that had
recently occurred in Honduras. In January 1786 Spanish officials arrest d
panish contrabandist  who traded with the English on the hore.
	 oon
afterwards the inhabitants of San Jorge de Olanchito freed the prisoners,
killing and wounding a number of soldiers who had been guarding them.
The situation was so critical, that Hervias said that Truxillo might have
to be abandoned, for his garrison was composed by "200 cowardly peasants
called militiamen." Estacheria to davez, 15 January 1786, Guat 666;
Hervias to roncoso, 7 February 17 6, Guat 666.
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Liston to Car arthen, 10 and 13 February 1786, NLS, 5533, ff. 15, 19;
Liston to Fraser, 11 February 1786, FO 72/7; Hern4ndez y dnchez Barba,
loc.cit.;	 Liston to Carmarthen, 9 March 1786, FO 72/7; Liston to
Carmarthen, 3 and 6 April 1786, FO 185/2.
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said that if Spain did sign the Franco-Dutch treaty, England would
continue to show good faith in the negotiations. "Even had.../this
statemeng been insincere," Liston said, "2117 must be considered as
a refined and masterly stroke of policy",for it brought further assurances
from Floridablanca that Spain would not accede to the alliance if the
Mosquito question were settled satisfactorily. 82 An agreement now
seemed near, 83 and Liston wrote:
If the next messenger brings a draught of a Convention likely
to put an end to the nauseous Dispute that has so long
occupied us, confidence and good humour will immediately
return: the accession, I trust, will never be more heard of. 84
But Liston was to have a few more bad moments.
I begin to be afraid that the Cabinet of Versailles have at
length got some Hint that the Delay of the Accession is owing
to our Interposition, & that they will make a new Effort to
disappoint the Mosquito Business & to set Spain & us by the
Ears. 05
Early in July he reported that there were signs that the Spanish Crown
might open hostilities against England, and against the Mosquito Indians.
"The bare mention of the Mosquito Shore or the Bay of Honduras", Liston
said, "puts...gloridablancg in a passion." 86 But Liston's fears were
82Carmarthen to Liston, 16 March 1786, nos. 8, 10, FO 185/2; Liston to
Carmarthen, 16 April 1786, no. 26, FO 185/2.
83Carmarthen to George III, 18 April 1786, BM, Add 28,059,f.116; Carmarthen I
Pitt, 17 April 1786, BM, Add 28,061,f.102; Campo to Carmarthen, 18 April
1786, FO 185/2; Carmarthen to Liston, 20 April 1786, FO 185/2.
84
Liston to Carmarthen, 19 April 1786, "Private and Confidential", FO 72/7.
85
Liston to (probably) Fraser, 8 May 1786, FO 72/8. Campo also wanted a con-
vention with England to be signed promptly because there was increasing
talk that independence of Spain's American colonies might be of value
"politically and for the good of mankind", and that there was intelligence
that activists working for this end were operating on the Mosquito Coast.
Campo to Floridablanca, 2 May 1786, AHN, Est 4227, vol. i.
86
Liston to Carmarthen, 10 July 1786, FO 185/2; Liston to Fraser, 12 July
1786, TO 72/8.
87Carmarthen to Liston, 14 July 1786, FO 185/2; Carmarthen to Hawkesbury,
14 July 1786, BM, Add 28,061, f. 218; Mosquito Convention, 14 July 1786,
CO 123/4. See appendix B for the text of the convention.
88Sydney to Clarke, 1 September 1786, CO 137/86; Campo to Floridablanca,
5 September 1786, Guat 666; Sonora to commander of Truxillo, 18 January
1787, NLS , 5534, f. 4.
Gardner to Hutt, 3 January 1787, Adm 1/243; Clarke to Sydney, 31 December
1786, CO 137/86. The number of settlers that were evacuated was 448;
the number of slaves 1,891. Of this number, 334 settlers were at Black
River, forty-five at Cape Gracias a Dios, thirty-three at Pearl Key
Lagoon, and fourteen at Bluefields. American Loyalists in this group
totalled sixty-six, with 143 slaves. List of settlers on the Mosquito
Shore, 16 October 1786, CO 137/486; Loyalists to Lawrie, 16 October 1786,
NIS, 5533, f. 152.
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groundless, for on 14 July 1786, the Mosquito Convention was signed in
London by Bernardo del Campo and Lord Carmarthen. 87 For the first time
in history the Mosquito Shore was the specified subject of an international
treaty: for the first time in history, England acknowled,ed Spanish
sovereignty over the Shore. The convention was ratified and exchanged
on 1 September. By its terms, the boundaries of the logwood settlements
near Belize were defined, and Spain's sovereignty was recognised throughout
the Bay of Honduras. The evacuation of the Mosquito Shore was to be
88terminated by 1 March 1787 (later extended to 30 June 1787).
Under the continual threat of a Mosquito or slave uprising, the
evacuation of the more than 2,300 Englishmen and their families and slaves
from the Shore was carried out between February and June 1787. 89 On 21
June, Superintendent Lawrie and the other English commissioners conducting
the evacuation left Black River. In the ruins of the little town
destroyed by the English before their departure, "The Spaniards fired
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a Royal Salute, and Hoisted His Catholic Majesty's Colours". With
Gabriel de Hervias their first governor of the Mosquito Coast since
the short rule of Toms de Juli4 in 1782, the Spanish turned to a sorrowful
future among the Mosquito Indians. 90
90
Log of HMS Camilia, John Hutt commander, 21 June 1787, Amd 51/150,
part vii.
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APPENDIX A.
Article six, Anglo .e Spanish r aty of Peace signed at Versailles
on 3 September 1783 by the Duke of Manchester and the Conde de Aranda:1
The Intention of the Two High Contracting Parties being to prevent,
as much as possible, all the Causes of Complaint and Misunderstanding
heretofore occasioned by the Cutting of Wood for Dying, or Logwood; and
several English Settlements having been formed and extended, under that
Pretence, upon the Spanish Continent; it is expressly agreed that His
Britannick Majesty's Subjects shall have the Right of cutting, loading
and carrying away Logwood, in the District lying between the Rivers Wallis
or Bellize, and Rio Hondo, taking the Course of the said two Rivers for
unalterable Bound ries, so as that the Navigation of them be common to
both Nations, to wit, by the River Wallis or Bellize, from the Sea,
ascending as far as opposite to a Lake or Inlet which runs into the Land,
and forms an Isthmus, or Neck, with another similar Inlet, which comes
from the Side of Rio-Nuevo or New River; so that the line of Separation
shall pass strait across the said Isthmus, and meet another Lake formed
by the Water of Rio-Nuevo, or New River, at its Current. The said Line
shall continue with the Course of Rio-Nuevo, descending as far as opposite
to a River, the Source of which is marked in the Map, between Rio-Nuevo
and Rio-Hondo, and which empties itself into Rio-Hondo; which River shall
also serve as a common Boundary as far as its Junction with Rio-Hondo;
and from thence descending by Rio-Hondo to the Sea, as the Whole is marked
on the Map which the Plenipotentiaries of the Two Crowns have thought
proper to make Use of, for ascertaining the Points agreed upon, to the
End that a good Correspondence may reign between the Two Nations, and
that the English Workmen, Cutters and Labourers may not trespass from an
Uncertainty of the Boundaries. The respective Commissaries shall fix
upon convenient Places, in the Territory above marked out, in order that
His Britannick Majesty's Subjects, employed in the Felling of Logwood,
may, without Interruption, build therein Houses and Magazines necessary
for themselves, their Families, and their Effects; and His Catholick
Majesty assures to them the Enjoyment of all that is expres ed in the
present Article; provided that these Stipulations shall not be considered
as derogating in any wise from is Rights of Sovereignty. Therefore all
the English, who may be dispersed in any other Parts, whether on the
Spanish Continent, or in any of the Islands whatsoever, dependent
on the aforesaid Spanish Continent, and for whatever Reason it might be,
1
The Definitive Treaty of Peace and Friendship, between His Britannick
hajesty, and the King of Spain, 3 September 1783. (London, 1783), p.11.
See also: Francis G. Davenport and Charles 0 Paullin, European Tre ties
bearing on the History of the United States and its Dependencies (4 vols.,
Washington, 1917, 1929, 1934, 1937), iv, 159.
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without Exception, shall retire within the District wnich has been
above described, in the Space of Eighteen Months, to be computed from
the Exchange of the Ratifications; and for this Purpose Orders shall
be issued on the Part of his Britannick Majesty and on that of His
Catholick Majesty, his Governors shall be ordered to grant to the
English dispersed every Convenience possible for their removing to the
Settlement agreed upon by the present Article, or for their retiring
wherever they shall think proper. It is likewise stipulated, that if
any Fortifications should actually have been heretofore erected within
the Limits marked out, His Britannick Majesty shall cause them all to
be demolished; and He will order His Subjects not to build any new ones.
The English Inhabitants, who shall settle there for the cutting of Logwood,
shall be permitted to enjoy a free Fishery for their Subsistence, on the
Coasts of the District above agreed on, or of the Islands situated
opposite thereto, without being in any wise disturbed on that Account;
provided they do not establish Themselves, in any manner, on the said
Islands.
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APPENDIX B.
Convention between His Britannick Majesty and the King of Spain.
Signed at London, 14 July 1786.1
Article I. His Britannick Majesty's Subjects, and the other Colonists
who have hitherto enjoyed the Protection of England, shall evacuate the
Country of the Mosquitos, as well as the Continent in general, and the
Islands adjacent, without Exception, situated beyond the Line herein after
described, as what ought to be the Frontier of the Extent of Territory
granted by His Catholick Majesty to the English, for the Uses specified
in the 3d Article of the present Convention, and in Addition to the
Country already granted to them in Virtue of the Stipulations agreed
upon by the Commissaries of the two Crowns in 1783.
Article II. The Catholick King, to prove, on his side, to the King of
Great Britain, the Sincerity of his Sentiments of Friendship towards
His said Majesty, and the British Nation, will grant to the English more
extensive Limits than those specified in the last Treaty of Peace; And the
said Limits of the Lands added by the present Convention shall for the
future be understood in the Manner following.
The English Line, beginning from the Sea, shall take the Center of
the River Sibun or Jabon, and continue up to the Source of the said Rivers;
from thence it shall cross in a strait Line the intermediate Land, till
it intersects the River Wallis; and by the Center of the same River, the
said Line shall descend to the Point where it will meet the Line already
settled and marked out by the Commissaries of the two Crowns in 1783:
Which Limits, following the Continuation of the said Line, shall be
observed as formerly stipulated by the Definitive Treaty.
Article III. Although no other Advantages have hitherto been in Question,
except that of cutting Wood for Dying, yet his Catholick Majesty, as a
greater Proof of his Disposition to oblige the King of Great Britain, will
grant to the English the Liberty of cutting all other Wood, without even
excepting Mahogany, as well as gathering all the Fruits, or Produce of
the Earth, purely natural and uncultivated, which may besides, being
carried away in their natural State,become an Object of Utility or of
Commerce, whether for Food or for Manufactures: But it is expressly agreed,
that this Stipulation is never to be used as a Pretext for establishing
in that Country any Plantation of Sugar, Coffee, Cacao, or other like
Articles, or any Fabrick or Manufacture, by Means of Mills or other Machines
whatsoever (this Restriction however does not regard the Use of Saw Mills,
for cutting or otherwise preparing the Wood) since all the Lands in
Question being indisputably acknowledged to belong of Right to the Crown
of Spain, no Settlements of that Kind, or the Population which would
follow, could be allowed.
/Convention between His Britannick Majesty and the King of Spain. Signed
at London, the 14th of July, 1786. (London, 1786).
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The English shall be permitted to transport and convey all such Wood,
and other Produce of the Place, in it's natural and uncultivated State,
down the Rivers to the Sea, but without ever going beyond the Limits which
are prescribed to them by the Stipulations- above granted, and without
thereby taking an Opportunity of ascending the said Rivers beyond their
Bounds, into the Countries belonging to Spain.
Article IV. The English shall be permitted to occupy the small Island
known by the Names of Casina, St. George's Key, or Cayo Casina, in
Consideration of the Circumstance of that Part of the Coasts opposite
to the said Island being looked upon as subject to dangerous Disorders;
but this Permission is only to be made Use of for Purposes of real Utility:
And as great Abuses, no less contrary to the Intentions of the British
Government, than to the essential Interests of Spain, might arise from
this Permission, it is here stipulated, as an indispensable Condition,
that no Fortification, or Work of Defence whatever, shall at any Time
be erected there, nor any Body of Troops posted, nor any Piece of Artillery
kept there; and in order to verify with good Faith the Accomplishment of
this Condition sine qua non (which might be infringed by Individuals,
without the Knowledge of the British Government) a Spanish Officer or
Commissary, accompanied by an English Commissary or Officer, duly
authorized, shall be admitted, twice a Year to examine into the real
Situation of Things.
Article V. The English Nation shall enjoy the Liberty of refitting their
Merchant Ships in the Southern Triangle included between the Point of Cayo
Casina, and the Cluster of small islands which are situated opposite that
Part of the Coast occupied by the Cutters, at the Distance of eight Leagues
from the River Wallis, seven from Cayo Casina, and three from the River
Sibun ; a Place which has always been found well adapted to that Purpose.
For which End, the Edifices and Storehouses absolutely necessary for that
Service shall be allowed to be built; but in this Concession it also includk
the express Condition of not erecting Fortifications there at any Time,
or stationing Troops, or constructing any military Works; and in like
Manner it shall not be permitted to station any Ships of War there, or
to construct an Arsenal, or other Building, the Object of which might
be the Formation of a Naval Establishment.
Article VI. It is also stipulated, that the English may freely and
peaceably catch Fish on the Coast of the Country assigned to them by the
last Treaty of Peace, as also of that which is added to them by the
present Convention; but without going beyond their Boundaries, and confining
themselves within the Distance specified in the preceding Article.
Article VII. All the Restrictions specified in the last Treaty of 1783,
for the entire Preservation of the Right of the Spanish Sovereignty over
the Country, in which is granted to the English only the Privilege of
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making Use of the good of the different Kinds, the Fruits and other
Produce, in their natural State, are here confirmed; and the same
Restrictions shall also be observed with respect to the new Grant.
In consequence, the Inhabitants of those Countries shall employ
themselves simply in the cutting and transporting of the said Wood,
and in the gathering and transporting of the Fruits, without meditating
any more extensive Settlements, or the Formation of any System of
Government, either military or civil, further than such Regulations as
their Britannick and Catholick Majesties may hereafter judge proper to
establish, for maintaining Peace and good Order amongst their respective
Subjects.
Article VIII. As it is generally allowed that the Woods and Forests are
preserved, and even multiply, by regular and methodical Cuttings, the
English shall observe this Maxim,as far as possible; but if, notwithstanding
all their Precautions, it should happen in Course of Time that they were
in Want of Dying-Wood, or Mahogany, with which the Spanish Possessions
might be provided, the Spanish Government shall make no Difficulty to
furnish a Supply to the English, at a fair and reasonable Price.
Article IX. Every possible Precaution shall be observed to prevent
Smuggling; and the English shall take Care to conform to the Regulations
which the Spanish Government shall think proper to establish amongst
their own Subjects, in all Communications which they may have with the
latter; on Condition nevertheless that the English shall be left in the
peaceable Enjoyment of the several Advantages inserted in their Favour
in the last Treaty, or stipulated by the present Convention.
Article X. The Spanish Governors shall be ordered to give to the said
English dispersed all possible Facilities for their Removal to the
Settlements agreed upon by the present Convention, according to the
Stipulations of the 6th Article of the Definitive Treaty of 1783, with
respect to the Country allotted for their Use by the said Article.
Article XI. Their Britannick and Catholick Majesties, in order to remove
every Kind of Doubt with regard to the true Construction of the present
Convention, think it necessary to declare, that the Conditions of the
said Convention ought to be observed according to their sincere Intention
to ensure and improve the Harmony and good Understanding, which so
happily subsist at present between their said Majesties.
In this View, His Britannick Majesty engages to give the most positive
Orders for the Evacuation of the Countries above-mentioned, by all His
Subjects of whatever Denomination. But if, contrary to such Declaration,
there should still remain any Persons so daring, as to presume, by retiring
into the interior Country, to endeavour to obstruct the entire Evacuation
already agreed upon, His Britannick Majesty, so far from affording them
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the least Succour, or even Protection, will disavow them in the most
solemn Manner, as He will equally do those who may hereafter attempt
to settle upon the Territory belonging to the Spanish dominion.
Artide XII. The Evacuation agreed upon shall be completely effected
within the Space of Six Months, after the Exchange of the Ratifications
of this Convention, or sooner, if it can be done.
Article XIII. It is agreed that the new Grants described in the preceeding
Articles, in Favour of the English Nation, are to take Place as soon as
the aforesaid Evacuation shall be entirely accomplished.
Article XIV. His Catholick Majesty, prompted solely by Motives of Humanity,
promises to the King of England, that he will not exercise any Act of
Severity against the Mosquitos, inhabiting in Part the Countries which
are to be evacuated, by Virtue of the present Convention, on Account of
the Connections which may have subsisted between the said Indians and
the English: And His Britannick Majesty, on His Part, will strictly
prohibit all His Subjects from furnishing Arms, or Warlike Stores, to
the Indians in general, situated upon the Frontiers of the Spanish
Possessions.
Article XV. The two Courts shall mutually transmit to each other
Duplicates of the Orders, which they are to dispatch to their respective
Governors and Commanders in America, for the Accomplishment of the present
Convention; and a Frigate, or proper Ship of War, shall be appointed, on
each Side, to observe in Conjunction that all Things are performed in the
best Order possible, and with that Cordiality and good Faith of which the
two Sovereigns have been pleased to set the Example.
Article XVI. The present Convention shall be ratified by their Britannick
and Catholick Majesties, and the Ratifications exchanged, within the Space
of Six Weeks, or sooner, if it can be done.
In Witness whereof, We the undersigned Ministers Plenipotentiary of
their Britannick and Catholick Majesties, in Virtue of our respective
Full Powers, have signed the present Convention, and have affixed thereto
the Seals of our Arms.
Done at London, this Fourteenth Day of July, One Thousand Seven
Hundred and Eighty Six.
Carmarthen and Le Marquis del Campo
At the Time of exchanging our Sovereigns Ratifications of the Convention
signed the 14th of July last, We the undersigned Ministers Plenipotentiary
have agreed, that the Visit of the English and Spanish Commissaries,
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mentioned in the 4th Article of the said Convention, with Respect to
the Island of Cayo Casina, is to extend in like Manner to all the
other Places, whether in the Islands, or on the Continent, where the
English Cutters shall be situated. In Witness whereof, We have signed
this Declaration, and affixed thereto the Seals of our Arms.
London, this 1st of Septekber, 1786.
Carmarthen and Campo
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